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Oconee 1, 2 & 3 - Docket Nos. 050-00269; 050-00270; 050-00287

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-14-091
Oconee Nuclear Station
NOV
(White)
08/12/2014 On August 12, 2014 the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving the failure to establish measures to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, in 2004, the licensee implemented procedure NDE-995, "Ultrasonic Examination of Small Diameter Piping Butt Welds and Base Material for Thermal Fatigue Damage," to perform augmented in-service inspection program ultrasonic examinations, which did not provide measures to assure that high pressure injection nozzle component cracking would be identified and corrected. Consequently, in 2012, the licensee performed procedure NDE-995 on weld 1-RC-201-105, and did not identify any reportable indications; even though a ≥ 50% through wall circumferential crack was present in the weld. On November 11, 2013, the licensee identified the through-wall circumferential crack in weld 1-RC 201-105 after transitioning Unit 1 to Mode 3 to investigate non-isolable pressure boundary leakage.
EA-13-010
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV and
(ORDER)
07/01/2013 On July 1, 2013, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) and a Notice of Violation (NOV) for a Severity Level III violation to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke). These actions are based on Duke's failure to comply with a license condition associated with the amendment to complete their transition to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 for its Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. Duke received the NOV for not incorporating the protected service water (PSW) modification into its fire protection program site documents and confirming the risk reduction from the modification prior to January 1, 2013, as called for in its transition license condition. A CO was issued to provide a heightened regulatory accountability for the completion of the PSW system, and interim milestones associated with this modification.
EA-11-226
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(Yellow)
12/06/2011 On December 6, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding involving Duke Energy’s failure to perform a review for suitability of application of equipment essential to safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components.  Specifically, Oconee personnel failed to maintain the Standby Shutdown Facility pressurizer heater breakers and associated electrical components in accordance with the licensing and design basis of the plant, which resulted in the Standby Shutdown Facility being inoperable from 1983, until June 1, 2011.
EA-10-094
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(Yellow/White/SLIII)
08/12/2010 On August 12, 2010, the NRC issued a Yellow and a White finding with associated violations and a Notice of Violation (NOV) for a Severity Level III violation to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. (Duke) as a result of inspections at the Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3. The Yellow finding involved the failure to ensure the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Reactor Coolant Makeup (RCM) subsystem for all three units remained operable as required by Technical Specifications. The White finding involved the failure to identify and correct Unit 2 and Unit 3 SSF RCM letdown line degradation in a timely manner after degradation was identified on Unit 1, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action." A 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information," NOV for a Severity Level III violation was also assessed to Duke for submitting materially inaccurate information. Duke provided information which described an alternate flow path that could be used to control pressurizer level during an SSF event. However, it was discovered that this flow path was not available due to a closed manual valve inside containment.
EA-08-324
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
02/19/2009 On February 19, 2009, Duke Power Company, LLC was issued a White Significance Determination Finding which involved the performance of a maintenance procedure that was inadequate. Specifically, the maintenance procedure failed to identify and electrically isolate all main generator automatic voltage regulator trip outputs to the main generator lockout relay. This deficiency caused a main generator lockout which resulted in a loss of power event to the site which ultimately led to a loss of reactor coolant inventory while the reactor was shutdown.
EA-06-294
Oconee 3
NOV
(White)
02/13/2007 On February 13, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE significance determination process (SDP) finding involving the identification of foreign material in the Unit 3 A and B train reactor building emergency sump (RBES) suction lines during the end-of-cycle 22 refueling outage. Specifically, some time prior to and for the duration of Oconee Unit 3 operating cycle 22, adequate foreign material exclusion controls had not been implemented resulting in the discovery of foreign material in the A and B train RBES suction lines. The violation was cited against Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," and Section 9.e of the referenced Regulatory Guide 1.33 for the failure to comply with Nuclear System Directive 104, "Material Condition/Housekeeping, Cleanliness/Foreign Material Exclusion, and Seismic Concerns," for the failure to maintain the Unit 3 RBES free of foreign material.
EA-06-199
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
11/22/2006 On November 22, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE significance determination process finding involving the failure to effectively control maintenance activities and the failure to assess and manage the risk associated with removing an access cover in the south wall of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) to facilitate installation of temporary electrical power cables. The violation was cited against technical specifications because of an inadequate procedure and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) because of the licensee's failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk from maintenance activities.
EA-04-115
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
09/24/2004 On September 24, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving inconsistent fire response procedures that could result in the failure to maintain pressurizer level within the required indicating range. The violation cited the licensee's inadequate fire response procedures.
EA-04-018
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOVCP
(SL III)
$60,000
04/08/2004 On April 8, 2004, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to adhere to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, in that the licensee made changes to the Oconee facility as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and referenced analyses that involved unreviewed safety questions without obtaining prior NRC approval. In this case, the licensee revised an analysis for high energy line break accidents, which permitted the facility to initiate emergency feedwater up to 30 minutes and initiate high pressure injection up to eight hours after a high energy line break accident instead of 15 minutes and one hour as was discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
EA-03-145
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
12/30/2003 On December 30, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the inability of the pressurizer to perform its intended safety function under certain scenarios. The violation cited the licensee's failure to identify and correct this condition adverse to safety.
EA-02-243
Oconee 3
NOV
(White)
02/07/2003 On February 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the possible loss of high pressure injection (HPI) pump function during a postulated high energy line break/tornado event recovery. The violation cited the licensee's failure to properly implement the vendor's written instructions for attaching the electrical connectors on the pre-staged Unit 3 HPI pump emergency power supply cable from the auxiliary service water (ASW) switchgear.
EA-02-048
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
08/02/2002 On August 2, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a white SDP finding involving containment integrity upon a possible loss of reactor decay heat removal. The violation cited the licensee's failure to establish adequate procedures to assure that containment closure would be achieved prior to the time at which a core uncovery and fission product release could result from a loss of shutdown cooling.
EA-02-034
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
07/26/2002 On July 26, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a white SDP finding involving the vulnerability to flooding in the Oconee Unit 1 auxiliary building from a potential rupture of the high pressure service water (HPSW) system piping. The violation cited the licensee's failure to take prompt corrective action for the lack of mitigation capabilities for an auxiliary building flood, a condition adverse to quality.
EA-01-125
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
07/18/2001 On July 18, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding. The violation involved inadequate procedures for aligning the station auxiliary service water pump to mitigate a tornado and the licensee's failure to take prompt corrective action for this adverse condition even though the licensee had identified the condition approximately one year earlier.
EA-00-137
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
11/09/2000 On November 9, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding. The violation involved the failure to adequately establish design control measures involving the high pressure injection system using the spent fuel pool as a suction source following a tornado.
EA-98-268
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(SL II)
08/05/1998 Failure to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, to incorporate design basis requirements into drawings and procedures; and failure to maintain technical specification equipment in an operable condition.
EA-97-297 & EA-97-298
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOVCP
(SL III)

$330,000
08/27/1997 Cracks in HP injection line and failure of HPI pump.
EA-96-019
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
03/05/1996 Failure to provide adequate procedures to control fuel assembly movement in the spent fuel pool.

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Oregon State University - Docket No. 050-00243

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-98-320
Oregon State University Research Reactor
NOVCP
(SL III)
07/31/1998 Due to authorized wiring mod of reactor control panel, reactor scram functions were disabled.

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Oyster Creek - Docket No. 050-00219

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-23-076
Oyster Creek
NOVCP
(SL III)

$43,750
11/09/2023 On November 9, 2023, the NRC issued a notice of violation and proposed imposition of civil penalty in the amount of $43,750 to Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (licensee) for a Severity Level III violation.  The violation involved the failure by the licensee’s staff at Oyster Creek to design and prepare radioactive materials for shipment so that, under conditions normally incident to transportation, the radiation level did not exceed 200 mrem/hour at any point on the external surface of the package. Specifically, on May 3, 2023, the licensee’s staff at Oyster Creek shipped reactor segmentation tooling that had a maximum contact dose rate of 450 mrem/hour, contrary to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 71.5.
EA-16-241
Oyster Creek
NOV
(White)
04/13/2017 On April 13, 2017, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Exelon Nuclear (Exelon) for a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, “Procedures and Programs,” at Oyster Creek associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. Specifically, Exelon failed to properly implement a procedure for rebuilding and reassembly of an electromagnetic relief valve. The maintenance instruction directed reinstallation of a lever plate with previously removed lock washers. By failing to reinstall the lock washers, the licensee caused excessive friction between the solenoid frame and the cut-out switch lever plate, causing the cut-out switch lever to become bound in the energized position and rendering the valve unable to perform its safety-related function. Additionally, this incorrect reassembly resulted in the relief valve being inoperable for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time for the Automatic Depressurization System.
EA-16-057
Oyster Creek
NOV
(White)
07/06/2016 On July 6, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Exelon Nuclear for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," and Technical Specifications 3.7.C.2, for failing to appropriately prescribe an activity affecting quality, in documented instructions, associated with maintenance of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, since 2002, Exelon did not having appropriate work instructions to replace the EDG cooling flexible hose every 12 years as specified by Exelon’s procedure and vendor information. As a result, a flexible coupling hose remained in service for approximately 22 years and was subject to thermal degradation and aging that eventually lead to the failure of EDG No. 1 during a surveillance test on January 4. 2016. In addition, based on analysis of hose failure and review of past operability, the NRC determined that EDG No. 1 was inoperable for a period greater than its technical specification allowed outage time of seven days.
EA-14-186
Oyster Creek
NOV
(Yellow)
04/27/2015 On April 27, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Exelon Generating Company LLC (the licensee) for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," involving the failure to review the suitability of application of a different maintenance process, at its Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station that was essential to a safety-related function of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).  Specifically, from May 13, 2005, to September 9, 2014, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the acceptance criteria for a new EDG belt maintenance process, which resulted in the EDG's cooling fan shaft being susceptible to fatigue failure, which occurred on July 28, 2014.  Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of the EDG's inoperability between 2005 and 2014, the required actions of the Technical Specifications were not followed.
EA-14-178
Oyster Creek
NOV
(Yellow)
04/27/2015 On April 27, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding to the Exelon Generation Company, LLC (licensee) for a violation identified at its Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The violation involved the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which required the licensee to establish measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Specifically, from original installation of electromatic relief valves (EMRVs) in 1969, until the valves were redesigned and reinstalled during the 2014 refueling outage, the EMRV actuators were inadequate because when they were placed in an environment where the actuator was subject to vibration associated with plant operation, the mechanical tolerance between posts and guides created a condition where the springs could wedge between the guides and the posts, jamming the actuator plunger assembly. In addition, given the original design of the valve, the maintenance refurbishing processes were not adequate to maintain the required internal tolerances to prevent excessive fretting and wear of the internal components. As a consequence, two of the five total EMRVs were inoperable for greater than 24 hours in violation of Technical Specification 3.4.B.
EA-05-199
Oyster Creek
NOV
(White)
01/09/2005 On January 9, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and the Oyster Creek Generating Station Emergency Plan. This finding was associated with a White Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding involving the licensee's failure to properly utilize the Emergency Plan emergency action level (EAL) matrix during an actual event. Specifically, operators did not recognize that plant parameters met the EAL thresholds for declaring an Unusual Event and a subsequent Alert. Since an Alert was not declared, licensee personnel did not activate their emergency response organization to assist operators in mitigating the event. Additionally, State and local agencies, who rely on information provided by the facility licensee, might not have been able to take initial offsite response measures in as timely a manner had the event degraded further.
EA-04-213
Oyster Creek
NOV
(White)
03/1/2005 On March 1, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with a White SDP finding involving untimely actions to change an Emergency Action Level threshold value used to declare a General Emergency or a Site Area Emergency and revise supporting emergency procedures. The violations cited the licensee's failure to maintain an emergency classification and action level scheme and the failure to properly implement the configuration change process in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
EA-04-033
Oyster Creek
NOV
(White)
03/15/2004 On March 15, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a power cable insulation breakdown that resulted in a loss of the 4kV emergency bus and forced a plant shutdown. The violation cited the licensee's failure to identify and take prompt and appropriate corrective actions for a significant condition adverse to quality involving power cables.
EA-98-220
Oyster Creek
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
06/15/1998 Inoperability of automatic depressurization valves as well as design errors and apparent qualification concerns that contributed to the inoperability.
EA-97-617
Oyster Creek
NOV
(SL III)
02/08/1998 Equipment downgrading.
EA-97-421
Oyster Creek
NOV
(SL III)
11/17/1997 Multiple examples of design control and corrective action violations involving electrical distribution.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, November 15, 2023