| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/07/2007 - 11/08/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43722 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 10/13/2007
Notification Time: 05:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2007
Event Time: 02:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE CONTROL RODS
"Susquehanna Unit 1 was being manually shutdown on 10/13/2007 for a planned maintenance outage to address control cell friction. Prior to the shutdown five control rods had been declared inoperable due to control cell friction. When reactor power was lowered to 10% at 0220, entry into Tech Spec 3.1.3 was required for 'One or more BPWS groups with four inoperable control rods'. The completion time for this specification is 4 hours. The inoperability of the control rods condition cannot be cleared in the specified time. This condition results in the unit being in a 'Shutdown Required By Technical Specifications'. The required action is to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours. The Shutdown required by Technical Specifications is reportable as a 4 hour Non-Emergency report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"Manual insertion of control rods will continue until all rods are fully inserted. Hot Shutdown is expected by 0800, 10/13/07.
"Shutdown activities will continue to place the unit in cold shutdown.
"A Press Release will be made concerning the planned maintenance outage."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1438 ON 11/7/2007 FROM TODD CREASY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On October 13, 2007, Susquehanna operators began the process of shutting down Unit 1 for a planned maintenance outage to address known control cell friction issues. Because four of five control rods declared inoperable during the operating cycle were located in the same Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) group, station personnel realized that conditions for entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3 'Control Rod Operability' Condition E would already be met when thermal power reached 10% rated thermal power during the shutdown. (NOTE: TS 3.1.3 Condition E is not applicable when thermal power is > 10%). With power less than or equal to 10%, TS 3.1.3 Condition E mandates restoration of control rods to operable status within 4 hours. If this 4 hour completion time is not met, TS 3.1.3 Condition F mandates that the plant enter Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) within the next 12 hours. At 0220 hours on October 13, power was lowered to 10% power and TS 3.1.3 Condition E was entered. Control Room personnel, anticipating that the 4 hour restoration window allowed by Condition E would expire before the LCO could be cleared, reported the shutdown as a shutdown required by Tech Specs per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The ENS report was made proactively before the 4 hour restoration window had expired. Subsequently, the Unit 1 mode switch was placed to Shutdown (Mode 3) at 0610 hours on October 13. Because the timing of this mode change was within the 4 hour restoration window provided by TS 3.1.3 Condition E and because TS 3.1.3 is no longer applicable once Mode 3 is attained, the Condition requiring shutdown (Condition F) was never entered as a result of the inoperable BPWS rods as was initially reported via EN #43722.
"However, TS 3.1.3 Condition F can also be directly entered if nine or more control rods become inoperable. As the controlled shutdown Progressed, four additional control rods had been conservatively declared inoperable because they failed to settle at latched position '00' in a reasonable period of time. (Note: LER reports 50-387/2005-002-00 and 50-387/2006-001-00 have previously discussed control rod friction experienced at Susquehanna.) Accordingly, TS 3.1.3 Condition F was entered at 0343 hours on October 13, 2007. This TS entry constitutes the initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications and is thus reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).
"Sufficient compensatory measures had been enacted such that TS 3.1.3 Condition F was no longer applicable by the time the controlled plant shutdown was completed. Therefore, the 60-day reporting that is necessary when a nuclear plant shutdown is completed per a plant's Tech Specs does not apply. (Reference: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A))
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Miller). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43767 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: SWEETHEART CUP (DBA SOLO CUP COMPANY)
Region: 1
City: NORTH ANDOVER State: MA
County:
License #: G-0285
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN MCALLISTER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/02/2007
Notification Time: 14:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
| Event Text LOSS OF CONTROL OF AM-241 SOURCES IN STATIC ELIMINATOR BARS
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On October 29, 2007, the Agency received notification from a metal recycling facility that unexpected radioactive material had been detected in an incoming load of scrap. Agency representatives responded to the site and determined, by using a radioisotope identifier, the presence of Americium-241. The load was returned to its originator under DOT SP 10656, MA-MA-07-01, where an investigation into the type, quantity and form of Am-241 could be performed under controlled conditions. Telephone interviews with the scrap recycler indicated the scrap had originally come from two facilities, one that had already been contacted by him, and had acknowledged possession and use of process gauges at their facility. The Agency contacted the responsible individual and requested an inventory of their sources be performed to determine whether any were lost or missing.
"On October 30, the general licensee reported none of their sources were unaccounted for. Consequently, an agency responder met with the scrap recycler later that day, and on separating the device from other materials, identified the source was a static eliminator bar. The licensee representative was contacted again, and he and another individual responded to the site, where on visual inspection they promptly took responsibility for disposing of the bar from their facility.
"The Agency's investigation to date indicates the initial bar found was one of 12 that had been transferred to the North Andover facility from another of the company's facilities located in Somerville, MA. An additional five bars were discovered the following day in a pile of aluminum scrap at the recycler's yard, where they have been temporarily secured. Six bars were found installed in process equipment at the North Andover facility. The static eliminator bars are not registered with the Agency, and current facility management claims no knowledge that these bars, originally distributed to Sweetheart Cup between 1993 and 1995 by NRD, Grand Island, NY, are required to be registered and controlled under equivalent general license regulations to other devices currently registered with the Agency.
"Sweetheart Cup was purchased by the Solo Cup Company approximately four years ago, and further investigation is necessary before determinations may be made on where, and how, the breakdown in communication regarding these devices occurred, and on the scope of the problem in Massachusetts, or in other jurisdiction where Solo Cup has had, or maintains, manufacturing facilities. The static eliminator bars are NRD Model No. A-2003 and contain up to 20.25 mCi Am-241 each. The licensee has committed to hiring a qualified consultant to assist them with fully characterizing the scope of this event, establishing a plan of correction, and implementing corrective actions if needed." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43768 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: P. FALLON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/03/2007
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2007
Event Time: 17:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text LOSS OF SPDS AND ERDS DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 1722 hours, on 11/3/2007, the SPDS and ERDS system was removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the SPDS computer system will he unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE AT 1715 ON 11/7/2007 FROM SUE REITH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Maintenance activities are continuing on the power supply for the SPDS and ERDS systems. Current estimate will restore the computer systems by 2000 on 11/08/07. An update will be provided once SPDS and ERDS are restored." R3DO (M. Phillips) notified.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43773 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 11/07/2007
Notification Time: 07:58 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2007
Event Time: 03:06 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
MJ ROSS-LEE (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 75 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM AS A RESULT OF LOSS OF NORMAL POWER 13.8 KV BUS
"With the plant in Mode 1 at [approximately] 75% power, the Auxiliary boiler and water treatment building 480 volt switchgear (NJS-SWG1J) faulted. The fault resulted in the loss of the NPS A bus (13.8 Kv normal supply), causing condensate and feed pumps to trip. Operators in the control room immediately responded and the plant was manually scrammed at 0306. Both the high pressure core spray (HPCS) and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems responded automatically and injected into the vessel (valid ECCS signal). Safety systems responded as expected, including level 2 isolations."
The licensee believes a transformer fault may have transferred up the line and caused the loss of normal power supply.
RCIC is controlling reactor water level with primary plant pressure approximately 325 psia. Decay heat is being controlled through modulating the SRV's. The licensee has all systems available to place the unit in safe shutdown and cooldown. The licensee has one inoperable EDG and is not in any technical specification action statement at this time.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 2214 ON 11/7/2007 FROM BRYAN KELLEY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The high pressure core spray system was returned to its standby lineup at 0318 (all times are CST). Standby service water was being placed in service at 0701 to raise service water header pressure when standby service water pump 'C' started automatically. NPS 13.8kv switchgear 'A' was restored to service at 1245. The reactor core isolation cooling system, which automatically started at the time of the event, was shutdown at 1645. The Division 3 diesel generator, which automatically started at the time of the event, was restored to its standby lineup at 1429. Shutdown cooling was placed in service with residual heat removal pump 'A', at 1626. The plant entered Mode 4 (cold shutdown) at 1942.
"The electrical fault that initiated the event has been isolated to a 13.8kv/480v transformer in the turbine building. An investigation is ongoing."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg) and NRR (Lubinski). | |