Event Notification Report for September 26, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/25/2007 - 09/26/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43654 43655 43656 43660 43662 43663

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43654
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: WINGERTER LABORATORIES, INC
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #: 0673-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/21/2007
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
ILTAB EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"Licensee called 9/21/07, 1:15 AM and reported that a Troxler gauge [model 3411, s/n 10416] is missing. It was last seen on 9/19/07 during the morning inventory in the locked storage locations along with other gauges. It was not present during the evening inventory 9/19/07. No other gauges are missing. Employees started being interviewed by the RSO on 9/20/07. The storage locks have not been tampered with. It was reported missing to the North Miami PD [report # 07-30026] and this office on 9/21/07. Florida is investigating."

Isotopes were Am-241/Be (40 mCi) and Cs-137 (8 mCi).
Florida Report # FL07-140.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43655
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: REGENT OF UC CAL. ENV. HEALTH & SAFETY, UC DAVIS
Region: 4
City: DAVIS State: CA
County:
License #: 1334-57
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K.A. HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/21/2007
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
ILTAB EMAIL ()
MEXICO FAX ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"Reported vandalism of Tritium Exit sign located in the North Parking Structure on campus. Sign was broken open and tritium tubes removed. Police were notified. Estimated activity 12 Ci. No contamination present on wipes of area. Licensee notified all departments of the theft via a safety advisory.

"As of 09/20/07 the tritium tubes have not been recovered. A 30 day reporting requirement [is being issued] because it was considered that an exposure would be highly unlikely from this incident. Since the tubes from the sign appeared to be intact when they were removed from the sign (no contamination on wipes) the radiation exposure to the individual is assumed to be zero. The licensee will be replacing all the tritium exit signs with non-radioactive exit signs by November 30, 2007."

CA Report # 082207

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43656
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: GLOBAL X-RAY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #: OK-15194-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/21/2007
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2007
Event Time: 15:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (FSME)

Event Text

POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE OF RADIOGRAPHER HELPER

The State of Oklahoma received a report from Global X-Ray Services of a high monthly exposure reading based on results from Landauer. The August badge for a radiography helper had an exposure of 5680 mR. Initial interviews with the employee determined that he had no instances where his dosimeter ever read off-scale or his rate meter ever indicated excessive exposure rates. His work record shows that he worked for 24 days in the month of August with I-192 radiographic devices. He worked with various radiographers during the month and there is no current information showing any excessive exposures for any of the radiographers. The employee is relatively new and has been averaging 200 - 300 mR per month exposure prior to the August reading.

Landauer is performing analysis to determine if the dose indicates a 'Static' exposure. Both Global X-Ray and the State are developing follow-up actions at this time.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43660
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CATHERINE HOFFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/24/2007
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2007
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
72.74 - CRIT LOSS/THEFT OF SNM
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
LANCE ENGLISH ILTAB ()
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF CONTROL OF SPENT FUEL SOURCE MATERIAL

"Primary sources belonging to Oconee Nuclear Station were shipped with fuel assemblies to McGuire Nuclear Station. The two fuel assemblies are being stored in McGuire's spent fuel pool. The primary sources are comprised of Americium and Beryllium. The discovery was made after Oconee notified McGuire and requested an inspection of the fuel assemblies."

The fuel assembly shipment from Oconee to McGuire occurred about 20 years ago. Details about the sources are not known at this time. The sources are not lost, but rather it is an accountability situation as to who has possession of the sources. McGuire confirmed it has the sources.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM D. McCORKLE TO J. KNOKE AT 1710 EDT ON 09/25/07 * * *

"EN#43660 reported on September 24, 2007 stated that primary sources belonging to Oconee Nuclear Station were unknowingly shipped with fuel assemblies to McGuire Nuclear Station. The two fuel assemblies are being stored in McGuire's spent fuel pool. The discovery was made after Oconee notified McGuire and requested an inspection of the fuel assemblies. This was reported under 10 CFR 72.74, Loss of Special Nuclear Material (SNM).

"After further evaluation by Site Engineering and Regulatory Compliance, it was determined that this issue was not reportable under 10 CFR 72.74 because the definition of SNM, as defined in 10 CFR 72.3, specifically excludes source materials. Therefore, no SNM was lost.

"In addition, this issue is not reportable under a similar criteria, 10 CFR 73.71, Discovery of loss (or recovery) of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, because the shipment of the fuel assemblies from Oconee to McGuire for storage was always accounted for and arrived safely. Nor do these Oconee Americium and Beryllium primary sources meet the definition of spent fuel as defined in 10 CFR 72.3."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified NRR EO (M.J. Ross-Lee), R2DO (Bonser), IRD (J. Cruz), ILTAB (email).

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 43662
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: R.J. COOK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/25/2007
Notification Time: 03:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2007
Event Time: 00:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (FSME)

Event Text

LEAKING SULFURIC ACID TANK

"At 2356 CDT, 9/24/2007, the National Response Center was notified (Report Number 849830) of a leaking sulfuric acid tank located at the C-616 facility. At 0005, 9/25/2007 CDT, the Kentucky Emergency Response Team (Report Number 2007-3170) was notified of this same issue. The tank has developed a leak on the bottom and contains approximately 420 gallons of sulfuric acid which is leaking into a concrete containment dike. This containment dike can be valved to a neutralization pit. The amount of the sulfuric acid which has leaked exceeds the reportable quantity.

"This event is reportable as 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.'

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-07-2542: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-12"

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43663
Rep Org: ABB INC (CBTS)
Licensee: ELECTROSWITCH CORP.
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERENCE MALLOY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/25/2007
Notification Time: 10:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
PART 21 GROUP ()

Event Text

POTENTIAL FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SPECIFICATION CONFIGURATION

Two Electroswitch P/N 70034K01 L-2 Auxiliary Switch Assemblies supplied to First Energy Perry Nuclear under purchase order #45151322 were taken from a spare parts inventory and were missing a spacer bushing (P/N 650311A39) that holds the rotary contact in position. First Energy Perry Nuclear reported this under OE25399. The absence of the bushing could allow the contact to move out of position, resulting in a loss of electrical contact. The presence or absence of the spacer cannot be determined from electrical or functional tests of the switch, because the electrical contact may not be displaced from its correct operating position.

The two nonconforming switch assemblies were not installed or placed in operation. Plant procedures require all switches to be opened and inspected prior to installation.

ABB has taken or is taking action to quarantine and physically inspect all available on-hand inventory, notify all customers, revise dedication procedures, and review historical procurement and customer records.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021