| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/14/2007 - 09/17/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43186 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KANE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/25/2007
Notification Time: 17:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEGRADED ELECTRICAL CABLES TO CCW SYSTEM
"On February 17, 2007, it was discovered that cables in a cable tray associated with the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system and Service Water system had sustained external damage by the heat effects from an un-insulated pipe that was in close proximity to the cable tray.
"On February 25, 2007, at 1100 hrs, as a result of continued evaluation of the cables in the cable tray and the discovery of a cable with unacceptable cable damage, it was determined that all cables located within the cable tray at the effected zone (that were not already isolated or replaced) were inoperable due to the loss of qualification life and the potential for cable-to-cable interaction from degradation of the cable insulation. This condition could potentially result in spurious equipment operation, causing components to be positioned in other than their desired safety position.
"Subsequently, on February 25, 2007, at 1300 hrs, it was recognized that a specific combination of two postulated cable faults could affect the CCW system resulting in a condition where there would be less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling capability, per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7.C. As a result, TS 3.0.3 was entered. At 1322 hrs, TS 3.0.3 was exited, following isolation of one of the two postulated cable faults, which restored the capability for 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling.
"The condition of potentially having less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems (CCW system) that are needed to remove residual heat."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY BARB DOTSON TO JASON KOZAL ON 9/14/07 AT 1523 * * *
"EN #43186 reported on February 21, 2007, that cables associated with the component cooling water system had sustained external damage by the heat effects from an uninsulated pipe in close proximity to the cable tray. This was reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the component cooling water system, which is needed to remove residual heat.
"Subsequent evaluation of past operability concluded that these cables would not have failed as postulated, and are considered to have been operable. Therefore, the condition did not prevent fulfillment of a safety function and EN #43186 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (S. Burgess). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 43542 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/01/2007
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(5) - DEV FROM ISA
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text 24 HOUR REPORT OF A PROCESS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS
"During a review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) it was discovered that controls associated with the container transfer station in the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) area had not been included in the updated ISA Summary. Although process controls exist, they were not declared or documented in the ISA as IROFS (Items Relied on For Safety). This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10CFR70.50 Appendix A(b)(1). At no time did an unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective, and was not challenged.
"All affected equipment is shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for this process.
"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70.50 Appendix A within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee has notified Region 2 (Gibson) ,State, and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE AT 1433 EDT ON 09/14/07 FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee provided the following information as a supplemental report:
"A detailed review of authorized process equipment and controls was performed to ensure each has been evaluated in an ISA and the required IROFS have been identified. This review identified ten other processes with a valid criticality safety analysis that were not specifically documented as a part of an ISA evaluation and the required IROFS had not been identified. The ISA reviews for these have been completed and the required IROFS documented. A total of twelve new IROFS have been identified."
The licensee will inform the NRC Region 2 Office and the Headquarters Project Manager. Notified R2DO (Musser) and FSME (Wastler). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43579 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCBREARTY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 08/19/2007
Notification Time: 02:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2007
Event Time: 19:55 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR WORK PLATFORMS NOT PROPERLY RESTRAINED
"On August 18, 2007, at about 1955 PDT, both of SONGS Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were found in a condition that was not seismically analyzed. At about 2015 PDT on August 18, 2007, both of SONGS Unit 2 EDGs were found to be in the same unanalyzed condition. The condition involved EDG maintenance work platforms that had not been properly restrained, and, in the position found, could potentially render the EDGs inoperable during a seismic event.
"SCE is reporting this occurrence as a potential loss of safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).
"SCE took immediate actions to properly restrain the EDG work platforms, and an evaluation will be conducted to determine the cause of this event. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 99% power and Unit 3 was operating at about 100% power. SCE has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report."
* * * UPDATE AT 1853 EDT ON 09/14/07 FROM SUSAN GARDNER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On August 18, 2007, SCE reported that Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) work platforms on both Units 2 and 3 had not been properly restrained. This resulted in a condition unanalyzed for seismic events. Consequently, both trains of EDGs on both Units 2 and 3 were declared inoperable.
"SCE evaluated configuration of the platforms for vulnerabilities to a design bases event. SCE concluded that the DGs were operable as-found.
"Consequently, SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC (Event Log No. 43579)."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Jones). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43632 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TOLUNAY-WONG ENGINEERS, INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L-04848
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 09/11/2007
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 15:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
JACK DAVIS (FSME)
MATTHEW HAHN ILTAB ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE RETURNED TO OWNER
On 9/7/07, Component Sales Company of Houston, Texas purchased a moisture density gauge for $400.00 from [DELETED], who stated that he got the gauge at a garage sale. The Component Sales Co. representative investigated the serial number of the gauge and notified the owner of the gauge. The owner, Tolunay-Wong Engineers of Houston, Texas recovered the gauge a CPN model serial number MD80204152 with 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241/Be. The Tolunay-Wong Company representative stated that the gauge had been used the day before but did not know it was missing. The company is trying to determine if the source rod had been properly locked in place. The state believes that [DELETED] may be a minor. The State has not notified law enforcement, and is unsure whether law enforcement will be involved at all "since the gauge has been recovered." The state is investigating this matter.
Texas Incident Number - I-8442
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY TUCKER TO KOZAL ON 9/12/07 AT 1645 * * *
The State provided the following update via email:
"The RSO informed the Agency on September 12, 2007, that the technician who inspected the gauge after its return confirmed that the source rod was locked in the stored position."
R4DO (Shannon), FSME EO (Bubar) and ILTAB (via e-mail) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43641 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 09/14/2007
Notification Time: 02:18 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2007
Event Time: 23:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text POTENTIAL REACTOR PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"During an investigation in response to a low megger reading, a small amount of water was discovered in the environmental qualification boundary of the 22B RCS Thot thermowell (TE-3-422B2). Analysis of the water on 9/13/07 at 2304 showed Cesium 137 and 134, and Magnesium 54 indicating that the source of water intrusion into the thermowell was likely reactor coolant system (RCS) fluid. We are continuing the investigation for potential causes of water intrusion other than the Reactor Coolant System. This report is being made based on the previous indication of RCS leakage into 23A, RCS Tcold thermowell (TE-3-420) [see EN #43627 from 09/10/07] and similar discovery in our preliminary investigation.
"PTN Unit 3 Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.6.2.a permits no reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage in Modes 1-4. This report to the NRC is pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition."
Turkey Point Unit 3 is presently defueled.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43642 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/14/2007
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2007
Event Time: 10:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO EPA REQUIRED BY NPDES PERMIT
"At 0630 hours on September 14, 2007, while operating at 100% power, Pilgrim Station experienced a fish impingement on the intake structure traveling screens. Plant power was reduced to 50% and one of two seawater circulating pumps was secured. The impingement did not impact the operability of safety related cooling water systems. At 1050 hours, plant assessment determined that the impingement, involving a large school of Atlantic juvenile menhaden, is reportable to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under conditions of the Pilgrim National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Following a substantial reduction in the numbers of fish discharged via the traveling screen outfall trough, the seawater pump was restored to service and restoration of the plant to 100% power is in progress."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform both the State and EPA. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43645 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NED DENNIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 09/17/2007
Notification Time: 03:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2007
Event Time: 01:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI UNABLE TO PERFORM IT'S SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION
"During performance of the quarterly HPCI valve stroke test the HV-055-2F093, HPCI Vacuum Breaker Outboard PCIV, failed to close. The PCIV was declared inoperable. The valve was subsequently closed and de-energized to meet Technical Specification requirements. The valve did close from the handswitch on the subsequent attempt, investigation into the cause is in progress. The closure of this valve at 0149 on 9/17/07 prevents Unit 2 HPCI from performing it's safety related function. Unit 2 RCIC and all other Unit 2 ECCS systems remain operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |