| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/15/2007 - 08/16/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43559 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: THERMO NITON ANALYZERS LLC
Region: 1
City: BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 55-0328
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSH DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/10/2007
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MASSACHUSETTS - RECEIPT OF LEAKING SOURCES
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC reported that it had received 10 (ten) sealed sources from Isotopes Products Laboratories (IPL) that were contaminated or leaking sources. Five (5) of the sealed sources exceeded leak test reporting limits of 0.005 microcuries (185 Bq) removable activity and five (5) sources were contaminated, but with less than 0.005 microcuries (185 Bq) removable activity.
"The ten (10) sealed sources were each identified as IPL Model XFB-3, each containing 40 millicuries of Cd-109. Each sealed source was individually wipe tested by Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC and each wipe test was analyzed by a licensed consultant.
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC shipped back the affected sealed sources to IPL via Federal Express Priority Overnight shipment on 8/1/07. Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC stated that IPL is in licensed possession of the sources in Burbank, CA where they are being evaluated by their quality group.
"The area where the source leak tests were acquired was surveyed thoroughly by Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC and no contamination was found.
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC reports that the following five (5) sources exceeded the reporting limit of 0.005 microcuries by the amount indicated.
1. Serial Number NR9014 was 1.02 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
2. Serial Number NR9012 was 1.08 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
3. Serial Number NR9019 was 1.00 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
4. Serial Number NR9020 was 2.46 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
5. Serial Number NR9011 was 2.88 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC reports that the following five (5) sources were contaminated but did not exceed the reporting limit of 0.005 microcuries. The percent of the limit is reported below.
1. Serial Number NR9016 was 44% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
2. Serial Number NR9013 was 18% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
3. Serial Number NR9015 was 34% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
4. Serial Number NR9018 was 42% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
5. Serial Number NR9017 was 26% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries". |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43564 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/13/2007
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: 15:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL HOT SHORT ISSUE WITH CONTAINMENT SPRAY SUMP SUCTION VALVES
" A condition is being reported as a conservative measure regarding a situation involving potential fire induced circuit failures on associated circuits. Plant Vogtle is considered to be in compliance with its current fire protection licensing basis, Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5.1 as endorsed by UFSAR Appendix 9B, however, this condition is being reported as the generic industry issues associated with multiple spurious circuit failures have not been resolved to date.
"A potential hot short issue exists involving Containment Spray Sump Suction valves 1(2)HV-9002A, 1(2)HV- 9003A, 1(2)HV-9002B, and 1(2)HV-9003B. If a fire were to occur in a location where the control circuit cables for those valves run in the same electrical raceway, a credible condition exists where either flowpath could spuriously open which would cause the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to drain down to the containment sumps.
"The fire zones where associated cables are located were placed under a compensatory hourly fire watch until compensatory measures were established. As an interim corrective action, operator manual actions have been specified and incorporated into plant procedures to deenergize and verify closed one valve in the series flowpath upon determination that a credible fire exists. These manual actions are in accordance with RIS 2006-10 for plants which are licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. Southern Nuclear will determine long term corrective actions for this condition.
"The effects of a fire sufficient to cause a spurious operation of multiple valves is not expected to be immediate and thus will allow sufficient time to perform the manual actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY G. SAXON TO J. KOZAL ON 8/15/07 AT 1522 * * *
"An eight hour report (EN#43564) per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported based on a fire-induced hot short issue (multiple-spurious) which could result in the spurious opening of Containment Spray Sump Suction valves 1(2)HV-9002A, 1(2)HV-9003A, 1(2)HV-9002B, and 1(2)HV-9003B. HV-9002 and HV-9003 are two valves in series between the containment emergency sump and the containment spray pumps. If a fire were to occur in a location where the control circuit cables for those valves run in the same electrical raceway, it is postulated a condition may exist where either flowpath could spuriously open which would cause the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to drain down to the containment sumps.
"The VEGP design basis defines a spurious control signal action/inaction as being caused by a single hot short, open circuit, or short-to-ground for a single component. Since all three conditions are postulated, the assumption that all adverse conditions will happen to the subject component(s) yields a conservative evaluation. Where a hi/low pressure interlace (fire-induced LOCA) is involved, an unlimited number of spurious control signal actions/inactions are postulated. Calculations have been reviewed to ensure these design criteria have been met.
"At this time, there is no definitive new guidance (Generic Letter, etc.) by the NRC on how licensees are to handle analysis of multiple spurious shorts. The status and history of misunderstanding and confusion relative to the regulatory and design requirements is well documented in NRC EGM 98-002 Rev. 2 and EGM 07- 004. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working to resolve questions raised by the industry about the adequacy of the existing staff guidance concerning fire-induced circuit failures and the consistency of staff interpretations of both the guidance and the underlying regulatory requirements.
"In summary, VEGP is in conformance with the current design basis. However, as defense-in-depth, actions have been taken that include implementation of hourly fire watches in the affected zones until procedural guidance for performance of manual actions were added to the Annunciator Response Procedures for the Fire Alarm Computer. The manual actions consist of opening the breakers for one of the emergency sump-to containment spray pumps suction isolation valves and then verifying the valves are closed.
"Based on the above discussion, SNC is retracting EN#43564."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ogle). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43568 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DONALD SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/15/2007
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2007
Event Time: 08:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NOTIFICATION TO STATE DUE TO CONTAMINATED MATERIAL DISCOVERED IN FREE RELEASE SCRAP MATERIAL
"At 0838 CDT on 08/15/2007, the State of Alabama Radiological Control Inspector [Deleted] was provided a voluntary notification that a small container of contaminated pipe compound was found in a local scrap metal recycling facility during an initial screening of a shipment of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP) scrap material.
"At 1630 on 08/14/2007, TVA received notification from Tennessee Valley Recyclers that a shipment of scrap metal from BFNP alarmed their truck monitor during the initial screening. The item was identified as a small metal can (4 oz.) containing pipe threading compound. The item was quarantined. Follow-up survey confirmed no additional contaminated material in the shipment.
"TVA retrieved the quarantined item. Follow-up radiation surveys of the container at BFNP confirmed that the material did not exceed any reporting requirement thresholds. All free release of material from the low level radwaste facility has been suspended pending the results of the investigation of the event.
"As a result of this voluntary notification to the State, this event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a notification to other government agencies has been made."
BFNP survey indicated 6000 cpm of Co-60. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 43569 | Rep Org: POTTSTOWN MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: POTTSTOWN MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: POTTSTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: 37-03906-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAULA LENANE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/15/2007
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAIL) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text MISPLACED I-125 SEED SHIPPED TO MEDICAL CENTER
Pottstown Memorial Medical Center asked Core Oncology Mills to ship seventy six (76) I-125 seeds (0.345 mCi each), and one of those 76 would be used for calibration. Core Oncology Mills shipped seventy seven (77) thinking that Pottstown Memorial Medical Center requested 76 seeds plus one for calibration. On 07/17/07, the shipment arrived from Core Oncology Mills which contained 76 seeds plus one seed in a separate package in a different location from the 76 seeds. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center looked for 76 seeds, which they counted, and believed this was all the seeds in the shipping package. When Pottstown Memorial Medical Center realized there were 77 seeds in the shipment, they looked for the missing seed, and reported it could not be found.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source | |