| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/14/2007 - 08/15/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 43549 | Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PIKETON State: OH
County: PIKE
License #: GDP-2
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707002
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 08/05/2007
Notification Time: 09:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2007
Event Time: 10:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JACK DAVIS (FSME)
| Event Text X-342 FACILITY CONTAINMENT SHUTDOWN
"On Saturday August 4th 2007 at 1025 hours, Autoclave # 1 in the X-342 Facility experienced a Containment Shutdown due to the actuation of both 'A' and 'B' EXTREME PRESSURE AUTOCLAVE alarms. The autoclave was in (applicable) TSR MODE II 'Heating' for 55 minutes when these actuations occurred. After reviewing the other autoclave operating parameters and the results of the as-found pressure loop values, it is evident that there was no release of UF6 inside this autoclave. Operations and Engineering Personnel are continuing their investigation into the circumstances surrounding this event in an attempt to identify the cause of the alarm actuations. With no evidence to suggest these alarms were caused by an invalid signal, the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) Office is reporting this event as a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System.
"The autoclave was placed in MODE VII 'Shutdown' and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of the incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA-RE1030 Appendix D. J. 2. Safety Equipment Actuations."
The licensee notified the Department of Energy and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY RON CRABTREE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1232 EDT ON 08/14/07 * * *
" Following a comprehensive review of the circumstances surrounding this incident by the PORTS Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (NRA) Group, a recommendation was made to the PSS Office that this event be retracted. This recommendation was based upon the determination that the 'Q' Safety function of the 'A' and 'B' EXTREME PRESSURE AUTOCLAVE alarms is to actuate when the internal autoclave shell pressure rises above the operating steam pressure (thereby indicating a UF6 release within the autoclave and placing the autoclave in containment. Since there was no UF6 release and the autoclave internal pressure was only due to steam, there was no valid signal to the 'Q' Autoclave Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown System. Per the reporting criteria stated in PORTS SAR section 6.9, Table 1, criteria J.2, this is not a reportable event due to the 'Q' system actuation being caused by an invalid signal. Based upon the information provided, the PORTS PSS Office is retracting this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Department of Energy.
Notified R2DO (Ogle) and FSME EO ( Flannery). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43559 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: THERMO NITON ANALYZERS LLC
Region: 1
City: BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 55-0328
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSH DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/10/2007
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MASSACHUSETTS - RECEIPT OF LEAKING SOURCES
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC reported that it had received 10 (ten) sealed sources from Isotopes Products Laboratories (IPL) that were contaminated or leaking sources. Five (5) of the sealed sources exceeded leak test reporting limits of 0.005 microcuries (185 Bq) removable activity and five (5) sources were contaminated, but with less than 0.005 microcuries (185 Bq) removable activity.
"The ten (10) sealed sources were each identified as IPL Model XFB-3, each containing 40 millicuries of Cd-109. Each sealed source was individually wipe tested by Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC and each wipe test was analyzed by a licensed consultant.
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC shipped back the affected sealed sources to IPL via Federal Express Priority Overnight shipment on 8/1/07. Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC stated that IPL is in licensed possession of the sources in Burbank, CA where they are being evaluated by their quality group.
"The area where the source leak tests were acquired was surveyed thoroughly by Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC and no contamination was found.
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC reports that the following five (5) sources exceeded the reporting limit of 0.005 microcuries by the amount indicated.
1. Serial Number NR9014 was 1.02 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
2. Serial Number NR9012 was 1.08 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
3. Serial Number NR9019 was 1.00 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
4. Serial Number NR9020 was 2.46 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
5. Serial Number NR9011 was 2.88 times the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
"Thermo NITON Analyzers LLC reports that the following five (5) sources were contaminated but did not exceed the reporting limit of 0.005 microcuries. The percent of the limit is reported below.
1. Serial Number NR9016 was 44% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
2. Serial Number NR9013 was 18% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
3. Serial Number NR9015 was 34% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
4. Serial Number NR9018 was 42% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries.
5. Serial Number NR9017 was 26% of the state limit of 0.005 microcuries". |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43561 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/13/2007
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY VENTILATION INOPERABLE
"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of offsite emergency response capability.
"At 2325 Central Daylight Time (CDT) on 8/12/2007, Callaway Plant received a trouble alarm for the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Investigation revealed the EOF had lost one phase of incoming rural electric power which is believed to have been caused by a severe thunderstorm in the area. At 0001 CDT on 8/13/2007, the EOF diesel generator was started and aligned to provide power to all building loads. An EOF functionality evaluation was performed for a loss on normal power with the EOF being supplied from the diesel generator and pre-existing degraded air conditioning cooling capacity. The evaluation concluded that the EOF was fully functional.
"At approximately 1000 CDT on 8/13/2007, maintenance personnel reported to the Control Room that the emergency ventilation system in the EOF was not functional based on the pressurization fans rotating in reverse. Three phase electrical loads at the EOF are incorrectly polarized apparently due to improper terminations at the diesel generator. If an emergency condition occurs during the time repairs are being made, the EOF will be utilized as long as radiological conditions allow. Procedure EIP-ZZ-C0010, EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OPERATIONS, section 4.4, directs EOF management to evaluate the need to relocate operations to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility, as required. Affected emergency responders have been notified of facility conditions and a courtesy notification has been made to the State Operations Branch Chief."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY KEITH DUNCAN TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1248 ON 08/14/07 * * *
"The EOF (Emergency Offsite Facility) rural electric power was restored to the building at 1730 (CDT) on 8/13/2007. At 0059 (CDT) 8/14/2007 the EOF diesel work was completed, restored and retested satisfactorily. Building temperatures were verified to be at 85 deg F and lowering, this is within the 55-95 deg F range for functionality. The EOF is considered restored to a fully Functional Status.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43565 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/14/2007
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2007
Event Time: 12:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY USE
"Fermi 2 removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating ventilation and air conditioning system from operation to facilitate preventive maintenance activities on August 14, 2007. During this work, the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary, the EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work, which is scheduled for Wednesday August 15, 2007."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JEFF GROFF TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2342 EDT ON 08/14/07 * * *
"Preventive Maintenance activities on the TSC HVAC system have been complete. The TSC is now available for use."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (J. Cameron) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43566 | Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC NOVACEK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/14/2007
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
| Event Text ROSEMEOUNT 1154 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER CALIBRATION PROBLEM
The supplier provided the following information via facsimile:
Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b) Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. [RNII] is writing to inform NRC that a total of ten (10) Model 1154 and 1154 Series H output range code 4 pressure transmitters whose model code includes special option suffix N0026 or N0079 may not calibrate at all of the published values [9 shipped to 2 utility sites in the United States].
"During evaluation of two returned Model 1154 output range code 4 pressure transmitters with special option suffix N0026, the cause of the customer-reported calibration problem was isolated to the amplifier circuit card assembly (CCA). Upon replacement of the amplifier CCAs the two affected transmitters calibrated and functioned normally.
"During root cause analysis it was observed that a single resistor (R316) on each affected amplifier CCA had an incorrect resistance value. The R316 resistor enables a standard upper range limit (URL) of a transmitter with output range code four to be increased from 150 inches water to 210 inches water in combination with a minimum span of 75 inches water. This R316 resistor allows the transmitter to achieve performance specifications, calibration ranges, and spans as indicated by the special option drawing.
"To meet site specific application requirements transmitters may be field recalibrated to different upper and lower range values and/or spans. Model 1154 and 1154 Series H transmitters with special option suffix N0026 or N0079 and amplifier CCAs whose R316 resistors were not replaced during the sub-assembly process, will have incorrect resistance values and may not calibrate to all upper and lower range values and/or spans published for the applicable special option. However, if an affected transmitter has been successfully calibrated, having the incorrect resistance value will not adversely affect transmitter performance during normal operation or accident conditions.
"The manufacturing records for the two returned Model 1154 transmitters (with amplifier CCAs with part number 01154-0001-0006) were carefully reviewed. The sub-assembly traveler lacked the required material traceability information, indicating that the R316 resistors were not replaced. In an abundance of caution RNII carefully reviewed all sub assembly travelers for part number 01154-000l-0006. No other discrepancies were found.
"The corrective action which has been taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for that action; and the length of time taken to complete that action:
"(a) RNII verified all transmitters in production and finished goods with applicable special options utilizing 01154-0001-0006 amplifier CCA's contained the correct board and resistor. No discrepancies were found. (Complete: 7/24/2007)
"(b) RNII evaluated all 01154 CCA's in production to ensure they contained the correct resistor. No discrepancies were found. (Complete: 7/20/07)
"(c) RNII examined all manufacturing paperwork for 01154-0001-0006 amplifier CCAs built and shipped prior to 7/24/2007. No additional discrepancies were found. (Complete: 7/25/2007)
"(d) An internal corrective action request was initiated. All corrective actions will be completed by 8/15/07.
"The end user is advised to determine the impact of this potential non-conformance on its plant operations and safety and take action as deemed necessary. RNII can supply replacement 01154-0001-0006 amplifier CCAs which can be installed per section five of the product manual or the transmitter can be returned to RNII for rework. If it is determined that return of affected transmitter(s) is required, RNII should be contacted to facilitate the return process."
Plants affected: Saint Lucie (6 received) , and Waterford 3 (3 received). |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 43567 | Rep Org: ENGINEERING CONSULTANT SERVICES
Licensee: ENGINEERING CONSULTANT SERVICES
Region: 1
City: ROANOKE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-25534-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SETH REYNOLDS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/14/2007
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2007
Event Time: 17:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
| Event Text TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED ON CONSTRUCTION SITE
At 1710 EDT on 08/14/07, a Troxler moisture density gauge, model 3430, serial number 36254, was in use at a construction worksite on VA Route 460. A large piece of construction equipment was backing up and while the gauge technician attempted to get the vehicle driver's attention, the vehicle ran over the Troxler gauge. The 8 millicurie Cs-137 source was extended and after the damage could only be retracted to within 4 inches of the gauge case. The technician kept the extended source in the ground and controlled access to the area. The gauge technician called the NRC Operations Center for assistance.
R1DO (Paul Krohn) and FSME EO (Holonich) were notified and briefed by the licensee technician on what assistance was required. During the conference call the RSO was notified and the company was dispatching personnel to the scene to assist.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CURTIS HOWELL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1953 EDT ON 08/14/07 * * *
The licensee was able to retract the source and close the shutter door. No significant personnel exposure was received. The area has been opened for unrestricted access.
Notified R1DO (Krohn) and FSME EO (Holonich). | |