| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/01/2007 - 08/02/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43436 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NED DENNIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 06/21/2007
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/21/2007
Event Time: 03:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO QUARTERLY VALVE STROKE TEST FAILURE
"During performance of the quarterly HPCI valve stroke test the HV-55-2F006, HPCI pump discharge isolation valve to Core Spray failed to open within the maximum allowed time. The HV-55-2F006 valve is a motor operated valve and the maximum allowed opening time is 17.25 seconds. The valve was given an open signal via the hand switch as required by the test but did not initially respond. Several minutes later the valve went full open. HPCI was declared inoperable at 0315 on 6/21/2007. Cause for valve stroke time failure is not known at this time."
As a result, the licensee is in a 14 day shutdown LCO.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM ARNOSKY TO HUFFMAN AT 0807 EDT ON 8/01/07 * * *
This is a retraction of the event notification made on 6/21/07 at 04:05 hours EDT. This event (#43436) was initially reported as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system safety function under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to failure of the HPCI pump discharge isolation valve to Core Spray to open within the maximum allowed time during surveillance testing. The valve was required to open within 17.25 seconds but opened several minutes after the open signal was initiated.
The open contactor was replaced and the valve was successfully tested. The affected valve was declared operable on 6/22/07 at 04:07 hours. The HPCI system was restored to operable on 6/23/07 at 04:07 hours following completion of maintenance and testing activities.
An evaluation determined that HPCI was capable of injecting sufficient flow to complete its safety function through the unaffected operable injection flow path to the feedwater header. The achievable flow rate would have exceeded the leakage from a one-inch liquid line break. Also, HPCI operation remained capable of being terminated by operator action during an ATWS event. Therefore, HPCI remained capable of fulfilling its safety function while the injection flow path to Core Spray was unavailable.
A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (White) notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43530 | Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: VITAL INSPECTION PROFESSIONALS
Region: 1
City: ALABASTER State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CASON COAN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 07/27/2007
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2007
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MALFUNCTION OF RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SAFETY EQUIPMENT
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
A licensee technician was performing an exposure with a INC Model IR-100 (Source: Ir-192 source strength: 41 Ci) on a test coupon in the company shooting room. When the technician attempted to retract the source the safety latch popped up to indicate that the source was in the shielded position. The technician approached the camera with a survey meter. The technician, thinking the source was retracted, turned the key to lock the camera. When the technician surveyed the front of the camera, the survey meter went off scale. The technician realized there was a malfunction exited the area and contacted the Assistant RSO (ARSO).
The ARSO and the technician determined that the source was still in front of the safety latch and not shielded. The licensee called the manufacturer for guidance. The licensee freed the source, and after several attempts was able to engage the safety latch and lock the source in the stowed position.
The camera has been taken out of service and is being shipped to the manufacturer for repair. Both the technician and the ARSO received between 2-3 mR during the event. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43532 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTSVILLE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-30951-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 07/27/2007
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2007
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF SOURCE TO RETRACT
The State provided the following information via email:
"ODH Bureau of Radiation Protection received a phone call from Varian Medical Systems at approximately 3:15 PM EDT regarding a situation which had occurred at a customer's location (St. Elizabeth Hospital in Youngstown, Ohio). The incident occurred at approximately 2:15 PM EDT. A Varian technician was performing maintenance on a Gamma Med Model 12i HDR unit, with the source extended into a shielded safe. During the maintenance action the technician disconnected a nylon tube that was part of the source wire travel path. This action caused the retract mechanism in the unit to energize, retracting the source wire from the safe, exposing approximately 8 inches of the source wire and the source end. The source is approximately 9.5 Curies of Iridium-192.
"Varian personnel believe that the disconnection of the nylon tube reduced the tension on the source wire, causing the park switch to no longer sense the presence of the wire, and energizing the retraction mechanism, which then pulled the source from the safe. The technician realized that something was not right when he heard the drive mechanism energize, and exited the treatment room immediately. Varian estimates the exposure to the technician as approximately 15 mrem, based on the activity of the source and time required to exit the room. The technician was not wearing his dosimetry at the time the incident occurred.
"Varian is sending an additional engineer to the customer location to assist with source recovery, with an estimated arrival time between 7:00 PM and 8:00 PM EDT. Varian has set-up a mock scenario at their office with the same model unit in the same configuration as what is present at the customer site. They have performed run throughs of source recovery, and have determined that the most effective method of retrieval will be to grasp the source wire with 18" forceps and then guide the source wire back into the shielded safe. They expect the evolution to take 5 - 8 seconds with an estimated whole body exposure of 25 mrem or less."
Ohio report # 2007-046 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43541 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY SPRINGS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/01/2007
Notification Time: 02:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2007
Event Time: 02:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2007 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
BILL TRAVERS (R2)
JIM DYER (NRR)
PATRICK HILAND (NRR)
I. LEE (DHS)
G. CANUPP (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN PROTECTED AREA GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES
"An Unusual Event was declared based on a fire lasting > 10 minutes within the Protected Area. Fire was on a Pole Mounted Transformer located on the 230 KV Supplemental Power System in the North East corner of the Protected Area. Helper Cooling Tower Fans were lost and sequenced back on. Unit 1 maintained 100% Rated Thermal Power. Unit 2 reduced power to 91.2% due to increasing Circulating Water Temperatures per procedure. Fire was extinguished at 0213 using dry chemical fire extinguishers."
Fire was initially spotted at 0152 EDT. It is believed that a snake may have caused the transformer to arc and that the arcing caused the wood transformer pole to catch on fire. Other than the brief loss of helper cooling to the circ water, there was no other impact on the facility. No offsite assistance from the fire department was called or needed. The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0250 EDT.
The licensee notified local and State Authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 43542 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/01/2007
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(5) - DEV FROM ISA
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text 24 HOUR REPORT OF A PROCESS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS
"During a review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) it was discovered that controls associated with the container transfer station in the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) area had not been included in the updated ISA Summary. Although process controls exist, they were not declared or documented in the ISA as IROFS (Items Relied on For Safety). This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10CFR70.50 Appendix A(b)(1). At no time did an unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective, and was not challenged.
"All affected equipment is shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for this process.
"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70.50 Appendix A within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee has notified Region 2 (Gibson) ,State, and local authorities. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43543 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY GARDNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 08/01/2007
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 77 OUT OF 108 PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SIRENS FAILED THEIR MONTHLY TEST
"On August 1, 2007, at 1200 Eastern Daylight time the prompt notification system (PNS) monthly test was performed and 77 of the 108 PNS sirens were not responsive to the test. This is considered to be a major loss of offsite response capability. Testing is being performed to ensure operability of the PNS sirens, trouble shooting has not identified the current problem with the system. 34 of the 77 sirens have been successfully tested and testing of the remaining sirens is being conducted."
State, Local and the NRC Resident Inspector have been notified of this by the licensee. | |