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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/16/2007 - 05/17/2007
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43352 |
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: NONDESTRUCTIVE AND VISUAL INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5601-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 05/08/2007
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOUISIANA - WORKER OVEREXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"[A licensee representative] with Nondestructive and Visual inspection notified the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality on May 4, 2007 of an overexposure. The indicated exposure from the badge reading is 5123 mrem. Additional information will be forwarded once it is received."
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA070011
* * * UPDATE FROM LOUISIANA (VIA E-MAIL) TO HUFFMAN AT 11:39 EDT ON 5/16/07 * * *
Upon further investigation, it has been determined that there were two separate incidents where employees of Nondestructive & Visual Inspections, LLC may have exceeded the annual dose limit of 5 rem.
The first incident was the original basis for the above initial notification. "The worker involved] is an industrial radiographer, certified by the State of Louisiana. [The worker] . . .was employed by NVI, LLC from April 30, 2005 until March 29, 2007, at which time he was terminated for violating company policies. [The worker] did not turn in his March 2007 TLD badge.
"In February 2007, [the worker's] lifetime dose equivalent, while employed at NVI, LLC was 5117 millirems. His year to date dose equivalent for 2007 at this time was 132 millirems. His year to date dose equivalent for 2006 was 2535 millirems. This dose includes a calculated dose for the month of December 2006 for a badge that according to [the worker] was lost. On May 1, 2007, NVI, LLC received an exposure notification from Landauer for [the worker's] December 2006 TLD badge of 3156 millirems. This put his year to date dose equivalent for 2006 at 5691 millirems, which exceeds the annual dose limit for radiographers. The lost badge was apparently found and returned to Landauer by mistake. There is no way to determine what dose the badge had been exposed to during the four months that it was unaccounted for.
"[NVI, LLC] has tried on numerous occasions to reach [the worker] by phone to discuss this matter with him. [NVI, LLC] has been unsuccessful in attempts [to reach him] so far.
"The second incident involves another [worker]. [The worker] is an industrial radiographer trainee, certified by the State of Louisiana.. . . .[The worker] has been employed by NVI, LLC, since April 1, 2005.
"On May 4, 2007, [NVI, LLC ] received an exposure notification from Landauer. [The worker's] dose for the month of March 2007 was 5363 millirems. His year to date dose equivalent for 2007 is 5514 millirems. [NVI, LLC] notified [the worker] immediately and informed him that he could not perform radiography. [NVI, LLC] met with [the worker] the same day and discussed the overexposure. [The worker] stated that there was no way possible that he could have receive such a dose. He stated that at no time did he ever go offscale or have any type of incident or accident while performing his duties during the month of March 2007. . . .[The worker] is still employed by NVI, LLC and has been reassigned to perform other NDT methods that do not include radiography."
R4DO (Bywater) and FSME (Morell) have been notified. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43353 |
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON |
Notification Date: 05/09/2007
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2007
Event Time: 16:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO IDENTIFIED NON COMPLIANT FIRE PROTECTION MANUAL OPERATOR ACTIONS
"During performance of NFPA-805 Transition Project Task SUP-1, 'Manual Action Compliance,' it was determined there were 11 non-compliant manual operator actions that were being performed to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown in Fire Area A06 (1B32 area). These manual actions were being performed in an Appendix R Section III.G.1/G.2 fire area, however, they do not meet the criteria for allowable manual actions specified in RIS 2006-10, 'Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2 Operator Manual Actions.'
"The discovery of these non-compliant manual actions is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). Appropriate compensatory measures have been established for Fire Area A06 via initiation of hourly fire rounds. An extent of condition review has been initiated that will encompass the remainder of the safe shutdown areas in both Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) units. The results of the extent of condition will be documented in the site's corrective action program with compensatory measures being established as appropriate. The 60-day licensee event report, submitted to the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)ii), will provide the results of the manual action compliance review and follow-up corrective actions.
"The PBNP Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
* * * UPDATE 1735 EDT ON 05/15/07 FROM ERIC SCHULTZ TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This is an update to EN 43353 submitted at 19:33 EDT on 05/09/07:
"During performance of NFPA-805 Transition Project Task SUP-1, 'Manual Action Compliance,' it was determined that non-compliant manual operator actions are credited to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown for a fire. The following actions were identified during the extent of condition reviews conducted subsequent to EN 43353 report.
# Non-Compliant Actions
1 - Fire Area A03, 1P-2C CVCS Charging Pump Cubicle
1 - Fire Area A04, 1P-2B CVCS Charging Pump Cubicle
1 - Fire Area A05, 1P-2A CVCS Charging Pump Cubicle
6 - Fire Area A07, Chemical Drain, Laundry Tank and Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Filter Room
5 - Fire Area A08, HVAC Equipment Room & Pipeway No. 1 Valve Gallery Area
"These manual actions are credited for safe shutdown in an Appendix R Section III.G.1/G.2 fire area, however, they do not meet the criteria for allowable manual actions specified in RIS 2006-10, 'Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2 Operator Manual Actions.'
"The discovery of these non-compliant manual actions is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). Appropriate compensatory measures have been established for Fire Areas A03, A04, A05, A07 and A08 via initiation of hourly fire rounds. An extent of condition review is continuing that will encompass the remainder of the safe shutdown areas in both Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) units.
"The PBNP Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." Notified R3DO (Mark Ring).
* * UPDATE BY HALL TO KOZAL ON 5/16/07 AT 1737 * * *
"This is an update to EN 43353 submitted at 19:33 EDT on 05/09/07:
"During performance of NFPA-805 Transition Project Task SUP-I, 'Manual Action Compliance,' it was determined that the following non-compliant manual operator actions are credited to achieve and maintain not safe shutdown for a fire. These actions were identified during the extent of condition reviews for the above referenced report
[The following non-compliant actions were identified:]
"5 [actions for] Fire Area A01, Primary Auxiliary Building El. 44'& 66' (Except FX237)
5 [actions for] Fire Area A01-G, Unit 1 Façade
5 [actions for] Fire Area A01-H, Unit 2 Façade
3 [actions for] Fire Area A10, Radioactive Gas Treatment Area
3 [actions for] Fire Area A11, Pipeway No. 4 Valve Gallery
1 [actions for] Fire Area Al 2, 2P2C CVCS Charging Pump Room
1 [actions for] Fire Area A13, 2P2B CVCS Charging Pump Room
1 [actions for] Fire Area A14, 2P2A CVCS Charging Pump Room
12 [actions for] Fire Area A15, 2B32 Motor Control Center Area
21 [actions for] Fire Area A23N, North Side of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
19 (actions for] Fire Area A23S, South Side of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
8 [actions for] Fire Area A25, D06 Battery Room
9 [actions for] Fire Area A26, D05 Battery Room
7 [actions for] Fire Area A27, G01, Diesel Generator Room
7 [actions for] Fire Area A28, G02 Diesel Generator Room
1 [actions for] Fire Area A29, Air Compressor Room
1 [actions for] Fire Area A61, P206A & P207A Fuel Oil Pump Room
7 [actions for] Fire Area A71, Diesel Generator Building, Train B Areas"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Ring). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43366 |
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ARNOSKY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 05/16/2007
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2007
Event Time: 02:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS DURING TESTING
"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuations of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B), namely core spray (CS) and residual heat removal (RHR).
"Unit 2 commenced refueling outage activities on Saturday March 10, 2007. Relay replacements for the 4 kv safeguard bus LOCA auxiliary control time delay relays were planned for all four buses due to a relay failure on Unit 1 that was identified during the prior refueling outage testing.
"On Monday March 19, 2007, at 02:20 hours, during emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance testing a Unit 2 Division 3 LOCA signal was inadvertently initiated during the planned replacement of the D23 bus LOCA auxiliary control relay (162-117). The relay was being replaced at a pre-determined step in the test. The relay was in an energized state when removed. When the new relay was installed an unplanned actuation of LOCA load shedding and sequential loading occurred. The relay was subsequently replaced and tested successfully.
"D23 EDG had been secured just prior to the event. The following loads were tripped and automatically restored: 2C CS pump and D234 load center breaker. The C emergency service water (ESW) pump tripped and did not restart since the EDG was not running. The 2C RHR pump continued to run. The 2A CS loop received a partial actuation in that the Division 3 signal was initiated but the Division 1 signal was not initiated. The 2C CS pump was operating in full flow test mode; therefore, it tripped and re-started as designed and 2A CS pump did not start which was expected. The 2A CS loop automatic valve alignment is initiated by the Division 1 signal; therefore, no automatic 2A CS loop valve alignment occurred.
"On Wednesday March 21, 2007 at 14:08 hours during EDG surveillance testing a Unit 2 Division 2 LOCA signal was initiated during the test which started the D22 EDG and tripped the D224 load center breaker as expected. However, the load center breaker did not re-close which was not expected and other expected actions did not occur. At 14:41 hours, 33 minutes later, the remaining LOCA actions occurred when 2B RHR pump, 2B CS pump, and 2B reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) fan automatically started, and D224 load center breaker automatically closed due to a late actuation of the D22 bus LOCA auxiliary control relay (162-116). At 15:48 an additional unexpected relay actuation caused the 2B CS pump and D224 load center breaker to trip. The relay had been replaced earlier in the day and the ongoing testing was intended to satisfy the post maintenance test (PMT). However, the relay did not actuate at the point in the test designated as the PMT; the relay actuated unexpectedly 33 minutes later.
"The cause of the first event was a less than adequate technical review of a test revision that added a step to replace the bus LOCA auxiliary control relay. The affected tests have been revised to replace the relay at a point in the test when it is de-energized. The cause of the second event was an equipment failure due to an intermittent connection between the relay pin connector and the relay base. The affected relay and base have been replaced and tested successfully.
"All of the systems that received start signals functioned successfully. The only equipment malfunction was associated with the degraded relay. The RHR and CS starts were partial actuations. The D22 EDG train start was an expected actuation. The C ESW train was tripped but was not automatically started.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since 2B RHR pump, 2B CS pump, and 2C CS pump automatically actuated on an invalid signal.
"Component data:
Equipment name: D22 Bus LOCA Aux Control Time Delay Relay
Equipment number: 162-116
Manufacturer: A348 Amerace Corp
Model number: ETR14D3A002
Serial number: 83330224"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43367 |
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WELLS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON |
Notification Date: 05/16/2007
Notification Time: 20:08 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2007
Event Time: 16:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF 26 EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER
"Due to severe weather storms in the area surrounding Indian Point Energy Center, 26 of the 156 emergency sirens have been out of service as of 1655 hours on 5/16/07 due to either loss of local AC power (24 sirens) or communications problem (2 sirens). 15 of the 26 sirens are in Rockland County; the remaining 11 sirens are in Westchester County. Sirens in Orange and Putnam counties were unaffected. Rockland and Westchester Counties have been notified and route alerting is available as an alternate means of public notification. Additionally, a high speed telephone notification system is available for public notification by the counties. Contact of the local utilities has been initiated to request power restoration to the areas associated with the 24 effected sirens; the communication problems with the remaining 2 sirens are under investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, New York State Public Service Commission, and Rockland, Westchester, Putnam and Orange counties.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOHN WELLS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0318 EDT ON 05/17/07 * * *
"Update on status of report on siren status. As of this time only 12 sirens remain out of service and this is below the 16 siren reportability requirement. Breakdown of siren outages is as follows: Rockland County - 2 sirens with power issues only, and Westchester county - 10 sirens out of service of which 6 are due to power and 4 due to communications issues."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector, New York State Public Service Commission, and Rockland, Westchester, Putnam and Orange counties.
R1DO (Perry) notified. |
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