| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/27/2007 - 02/28/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43183 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: IPS
Region: 4
City: OKLAHOMA CITY State: OK
County:
License #: 310-0901
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 02/23/2007
Notification Time: 20:43 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2005
Event Time: 06:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
BRUCE MALLET (R4)
LEN WERT (R4)
CHARLES MILLER (FSME)
MARTIN VIRGILIO (DEDO)
MELVYN LEACH (NSIR)
ROY ZIMMERMAN (NSIR)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISPLACED SOURCE CAUSES POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE
At approximately 0600 on 2/22/07 while loading a well logging source (Gulf Nuclear CSV H90 1 Curie Cs-137 directional source) into the pig on the truck, the crew unknowingly dropped the source in the motor pool parking lot. The source was picked up by a mechanic at approximately 0900 and he put it in the pocket of his jacket. He did not realize that it was radioactive, but thought it might be a part to something. The mechanic wore the jacket for about 4 hours. He visited several businesses including a sandwich shop. He hung the jacket in the break room where it remained for the remainder of the day and over night. On 02/23/07, the mechanic put the jacket back on. The well logging crew returned to the facility at approximately 0600 and discovered that the source was missing when they unpacked their equipment. The crew did not discover the missing source earlier because they did not need to use the source on a job site. The crew immediately started a search for the source. The mechanic produced the source when he heard that it was missing. In total the mechanic wore the jacket about 5.5 hours over the 24 hour period. This is an estimate based on an interview with the mechanic who was uncertain about the exactness of his recollection for the time he wore the jacket.
The mechanic and a couple of coworkers were taken to a local hospital emergency room and examined. No abnormalities were noted. They are scheduled to return to the emergency room on 2/24/07. Oklahoma continues to investigate. There has been no media interest.
The R4 PAO (V. Dricks) was also notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/24/07 AT 1025 EST BY MIKE BRODERICK TO MACKINNON * * *
Patient received two white blood cell counts, one on 02/23 and the other on 02/24, at Integris Baptist Hospital, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and both white blood cell counts were normal. The Doctor does not think the patient received a large dose. Patient is to report back in 1 week for follow-up testing.
A blood sample of the patient will be sent to RPA located in London, England for chromosome analysis.
R4DO ( Bill Jones) and NMSS EO (Joe Holonich) notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/24/07 AT 1228 EST BY MIKE BRODERICK TO W. GOTT * * *
The patient visited the hospital emergency room again on 2/24/07. The ER Physician stated there was no sign of radiation effects. Oklahoma is arranging for the exposed individual to see a radiologist and/or oncologist at the OU Health Sciences Center. Blood samples will be drawn and provided to RPA in the UK for chromosome analysis. The state investigation is continuing.
R4DO ( Bill Jones) and NMSS EO (Joe Holonich) notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/26/07 AT 1117 EST BY MIKE BRODERICK TO P. SNYDER * * *
The state provided a matrix of dose rate readings taken around the source by the licensee. The state is evaluating the information. The NRC continues to interface with the state on this event.
Notified R4 (C. Cain), R4DO (D. Powers) and NMSS EO (S. Wastler).
* * * UPDATE ON 02/26/07 AT 1255 EST BY MIKE BRODERICK TO J. KNOKE * * *
"When the mechanic removed the jacket containing the source, he initially hung it on a bollard (cement & metal post to keep vehicles away from a building) outside the logging company office. It was there all afternoon, the assistant mechanic stated that he was working in that area, so he has the possibility for exposure. The mechanic who was the main exposed person moved the jacket to the company break room at quitting time. There were staff working around the clock Thursday night, so there is a definite possibility staff were near the jacket while it was hanging there. Fortunately, the break room is small (more like a large closet) so most likely they would have gotten coffee and left. We will be interviewing staff this afternoon to try to nail this down."
"The exposed individual will see a very well-qualified physician, this afternoon. DEQ staff asked him to sign medical releases authorizing release to DEQ and to NRC. A blood sample will be taken and shipped to England for chromosome analysis.
"DEQ staff will be doing interviews this afternoon with facility staff who were potentially exposed to the source. DEQ staff will use this information to determine who else may warrant medical follow-up. We will also get confirmatory readings on the radiation level of the source with an ion chamber (as opposed to the GM tubes used by the company measures sent earlier).
Notified R4 (C. Cain) Email only, R4DO (D. Powers) and NMSS EO (S. Wastler).
* * * UPDATE ON 02/26/07 AT 1908 EST BY MIKE BRODERICK TO W GOTT * * *
"The primary exposed individual ('A') has been seen by a physician from the OU Health Sciences Center who has strong radiation protection credentials. The physician's belief is that the patient will probably suffer radiation burns on his abdomen, and possibly on his fingertips. He doesn't expect any other short-term effects. No burns or other effects are visible now. There is no sign of GI tract syndrome. 'A' is going to have follow-up visits with the physician at one week and two weeks, and possibly additional visits.
"A blood sample has been taken from 'A' and tomorrow it will be shipped to England for chromosome analysis. There was some delay due to international shipping requirements for biohazardous material.
"DEQ and OU HSC staff worked together this afternoon to take measurements using ion chambers. The measurements showed lower readings than those calculated through inverse square law. We will prepare a detailed report tomorrow and send it. In short, the dose level with the ion chamber case in contact with the source was 3.3 rem/hour, falling off to 139 mrem/hour at one meter. A badge was exposed to the source at one inch for 3 minutes 35 seconds, and is being sent to Landauer for emergency processing, which will give us more information.
"DEQ staff interviewed additional personnel at the licensee this afternoon, focusing on determining who might have been exposed to excess dose other than 'A.' Tentatively, the most at-risk individual appears to be a coworker who rode with the coworker to lunch. While they were in the cab of a pickup truck, the coworker was sitting in the passenger seat on the opposite side of 'A's' body from the source, and across a sandwich shop booth from 'A' during lunch. After lunch, 'A' and the coworker worked together on a logging truck with the coat (and source) hanging a couple of yards away. They spent most of their time under the truck, which would have provided considerable shielding. Tentatively we think it is conceivable the coworker broke the limit for dose to the public, but doubt there was medically significant exposure. We will do a detailed analysis tomorrow to test this."
Notified R4DO (D. Powers) and FSME EO (J. Holonich)
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MIKE BRODERICK TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1723 EST ON 02/27/07 * * *
"The results for the dosimeter that was exposed to the Cesium source at one inch for 3 minutes 35 seconds were reported from Landauer this afternoon. Deep dose was 16,106 mrem and shallow dose was 15,374 mrem. This works our to about 4.4 mrem/minute or 264 R/hour skin dose.
"The package containing the blood sample from 'A' was shipped to England via overnight delivery this afternoon. Results are expected in the first half of next week."
The results of the examination of 'A' by an OUHSC radiologist have been received and will be combined with the ER records from the weekend and faxed to the NRC on 02/28/07. The results were not substantially different from the verbal report on 02/26/07 and described in the update on the afternoon of 02/26/07.
Notified R4DO (Powers) and FSME EO (Mohseni). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43187 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/26/2007
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/2007
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER CHILLER MALFUNCTION
"During the performance of rounds by a System Operator it was noticed that area temperatures in the TSC seemed higher than normal. The Control Room was notified and after investigating found that the TSC chiller was not running. An attempt was made to reset the freeze protection relay per the annunciator response procedure. The chiller would not start. Maintenance has been notified to investigate and repair the chiller. The importance of returning the chiller to service in a timely manner has been communicated to maintenance personnel and they will they will restore the chiller to operational status as soon as practical."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY THOMAS PETRAK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1524 EST ON 02/27/07 * * *
One of two TSC Chiller compressors had failed. The failed compressor has been disabled and the chiller package returned to service on 2/26/2007 @ 13:24. The capacity of one compressor is sufficient to handle the design heat load. Ventilation, filtration and pressurization of the TSC HVAC were not affected by the failed compressor. A replacement compressor and fan are expected on-site by 3/1/2007 and repairs should be complete by 3/2/2007.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43189 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ADAM FRAIN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/27/2007
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: 09:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2007 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
SAM COLLINS (R1)
MARY JANE ROSS-LEE (NRR)
JIM DYER (NRR)
TOM BLOUNT (IRD)
DAVID BARDER (FEMA)
CESSANDRA Mc KENTRY (DHS)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 60 | Power Operation | Event Text FIRE INSIDE THE UNIT 3 TURBINE AREA LOAD CENTER
At 0941 the licensee declared an unusual event at the site due to a fire in the protected area not extinguished in less than 15 minutes (EAL HU-6). The fire is located in the Unit 3 Turbine Area Load Center cubicle. The fire has affected Unit 3 bus duct cooling so the licensee is currently reducing power. The fire is currently out but the licensee is assessing conditions in the area. The licensee will do a thorough analysis of the affected load center to determine the extent of damage before officially exiting the unusual event.
All emergency diesel generators and emergency core cooling systems are fully-operable and available if needed.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/27/07 AT 1147 EST BY ADAM FRAIN TO MACKINNON * * *
Unusual Event exited at 1137 EST. R1DO (Rogge), NRR EO (M.J. Ross-Lee), IRD Manager (T. Blount), FEMA (Fuller) and DHS SWO (Haselton) notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43190 | Rep Org: CARRIER CORPORATION
Licensee: CARRIER CORPORATION
Region:
City: SYRACUSE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROMAN IWACHIW
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/27/2007
Notification Time: 09:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DALE POWERS (R4)
TABATABAI (email) (NRR)
| Event Text CHILLER COPPER SLEEVE CRACKS LEADING TO SLOW REFRIGERENT DISCHARGE
Manufacturer provided the following information via facsimile:
Carrier Corporation provided the following information of a potentially reportable condition regarding a Compressor and Bearing Discharge Temperature Sensor, Carrier Part #17FA999-1200-381 supplied by Carrier Corporation's Replacement Components Division to PSE&G Nuclear, LLC for use at Hope Creek Nuclear Station.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"The operative portion of the Sensor is encased in a copper sleeve 1 1/2 inch in length and 1/4 inch in diameter which is soldered to a brass fitting, which fitting couples the Sensor to the chiller to be monitored. PSE&G notified Carrier of four (4) separate instances where a crack occurred in the Sensor's copper sleeve. This crack did not affect the Sensor's ability to function and the Sensors did not cease to function. However, the crack in the Sensor's copper sleeve did result in a leak of refrigerant from the compressor of the chiller to which the Sensor was coupled. Three (3) of these four (4) instances were noted on chillers with safety-related applications, while the fourth was noted on a chiller dedicated to a non-safety application.
"PSE&G noticed the fast refrigerant leak during a routine, visual equipment inspection. As a result of this discovery, the Sensor was replaced, but a similar refrigerant leak was noticed approximately three (3) months thereafter. At approximately the same time, during pressure testing of another safety-related chiller, PSE&G noticed a similar refrigerant leak.
"Safety Hazard which could be created by such a defect: While the refrigerant leak appeared to have been a slow process occurring over some period of time, had that refrigerant leak continued uncorrected, the result would have been a loss of enough refrigerant such that the chiller would be automatically shut down by a separate safety feature.
Since mid- 2001 Carrier has sold the sensor to the following facilities:
NRC Region 1: Limerick Generating Station, PSE&G (Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem Generating Station)
NRC Region 2: Catawba Nuclear Station, McGuire Nuclear Station
NRC Region 3: Braidwood Station, Perry Nuclear Power Plant
NRC Region 4: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43191 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL REED
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/27/2007
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: 13:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON SPDS
"On February 28, 2007, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) will be removed from service to perform planned maintenance to the system. The maintenance will improve the overall reliability of the system. The removal of SPDS from service for Hope Creek also affects the transmission of data via the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Appropriate compensatory measures will be in place while SPDS is out of service. The SPDS is expected to be returned to service in approximately 2 days."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying local officials. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43194 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVE WILSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/27/2007
Notification Time: 19:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/2007
Event Time: 15:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION REGARDING RADIOACTIVE WASTE SHIPPING CASK CONFIGURATION
"This voluntary notification is being made to inform the NRC of a condition that may be of interest to the public.
"Upon arrival at the Barnwell South Carolina waste disposal facility, a shipping cask containing irradiated hardware that was shipped from Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) [Unit 2] was observed to have a number of bolts that were not fully torqued [Six of 12 bolts were not fully torqued]. The subject bolts secure the cask base plate to the cask body. There was no radiological safety concern associated with the bolting condition as survey results confirmed that no radioactivity leaked from the cask. This issue has been entered into the NMPNS corrective action program and an investigation is underway to determine the cause of the as-received bolting condition."
The licenses notified the NRC Resident Inspector and New York Public Service Commission. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43195 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRETT RAVAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/27/2007
Notification Time: 22:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: 19:47 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 35 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"Both Trains of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) were declared inoperable at 1620 when dampers 2-HV-AOD-228-1 and -2, Safeguards Area Exhaust Bypass Dampers, failed surveillance testing. A ramp down was initiated at 1947 as required by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
"Temporary repairs to the dampers were completed at approximately 2125 and the ramp down was terminated."
Temporary repair was made to the bypass damper seating surface.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43196 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: AL PROKASH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/28/2007
Notification Time: 02:04 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: 23:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR TRIP DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE
"On 2/27/2007 at 2333 CST a Reactor Trip occurred during performance of a surveillance procedure calibrating a Nuclear Power Range instrument. The Reactor trip resulted in an automatic Turbine Trip and actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. No safeguards equipment was out of service at the time of the trip. Following the trip, a steam inlet valve on a Moisture Separator associated with the main turbine failed to close which resulted in RCS temperature decreasing to 537 degF. This valve was manually isolated and RCS temperature returned to normal 547 degF. Normal heat sink to the Main Condenser was available during the event. Investigation is continuing into the exact cause of the Reactor trip.
"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the Reactor Protection System and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System."
All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed by Auxiliary Feedwater feeding the steam generators, steaming to the main condenser.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43197 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/28/2007
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: 22:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABILITY
"On February 27, 2007, at approximately 2200 hours, testing of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was in progress in accordance with 0PT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test following system maintenance. Soon after the HPCI turbine was started a high level alarm condition in the HPCI barometric condenser was experienced. Evidence suggests the most probable cause was due to failure of the 2-E41-F048, Condensate Pump Discharge Check Valve, to open. The adverse consequence of this check valve failing to open is inadequate cooling flow to the HPCI lube oil cooler. The HPCI turbine was removed from service per applicable plant procedures.
"At the time of discovery, the HPCI system was inoperable for scheduled maintenance. However, this equipment failure would have prevented the HPCI system from fulfilling its safety function. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) per Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1. 'ECCS - Operating' Condition D had been previously entered on 2/25/07 at 1500, which required maintaining the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system operable and restoration of HPCI operability in 14 days.
All other ECCS systems are operable including RCIC. The LCO allowed outage time is due to expire on 3/11/07 at approximately 1500 hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43198 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE BOWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/28/2007
Notification Time: 05:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2007
Event Time: 01:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 30 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNIT 2 REACTOR MANUALLY SCRAMMED DUE TO DECREASING CONDENSER VACUUM
" At 0120 hours on February 28, 2007 the Unit 2 Reactor was manually scrammed due to decreasing condenser vacuum. All control rods fully inserted during the scram. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -10", which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 2 remains in Mode 3, maintaining reactor pressure, with reactor water level in the normal level band. The cause of this event is still under investigation.
"Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 97% power.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The Main Condenser remains in service removing decay heat via the bypass valves. All ECCS equipment is available, if needed.
The licensee will inform the State and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |