| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/23/2007 - 02/26/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43171 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 02/19/2007
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2007
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EOF NOT AVAILABLE DURING RENOVATION
"Fermi 2 commenced an upgrade to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) on February 19, 2007 at 0800. The upgrade consists of furniture replacement and rearrangement of the seating layout. During this work, some floor panels will be removed for cable routing and accordingly the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event EOF activation is necessary, the Alternate EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the alternate EOF is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work, which is scheduled for Friday February 23, 2007."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE FROM KONRAD TO KNOKE AT 17:55 EDT ON 02/23/07 ***
"This is a follow-up to NRC Event No. 43171. The upgrades to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), which caused it to be unavailable for emergency use, have been completed and the EOF is now available for use."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43175 | Rep Org: NH DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Licensee: JOHN TURNER CONSULTING, INC
Region: 1
City: DOVER State: NH
County:
License #: 423R
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TWILA KENNA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/20/2007
Notification Time: 15:06 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2007
Event Time: 12:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
CANADA via fax ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"The New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Public Health Services' Radiological Health Section was notified at approximately 1:45 p.m. on Tuesday, February 20, 2007, by a representative from John Turner Consulting, Inc., of the theft of a portable soil moisture/density gauge from its vehicle on Tuesday afternoon, February 20, 2007, which was located at the licensee's facility in Dover, New Hampshire. The Licensee reported that a Troxler Model 3430 (Serial # 36724) portable gauge containing 9 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 44 millicuries of Americium-241: Beryllium was stolen from the licensee's vehicle parked at the licensee's facility located in [address deleted] Dover, New Hampshire. The locked gauge was padlocked in its original carrying case, which was attached to the bed of the vehicle with two chains with two separate locks. The State is following the incident. Local law enforcement has been notified by the licensee. Follow-up information will be provided to NRC."
NH Event Report ID No.: NH-07-001
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY STATE (DENNIS O'DOWD) VIA EMAIL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1653 EST ON 02/20/2007 * * *
The following information was provided by the State via email:
"As of approximately 4:35 p.m., Tuesday, February 20, 2007, the portable nuclear gauging device reported by NH Licensee John Turner Consulting, Inc. (License No. 423R) has been recovered and was retrieved by the licensee. The licensee's representative has confirmed that the gauge had been left with the Madbury (NH) Police Department, located near the Dover, New Hampshire city line, and was locked inside of its locked case when recovered.
"The New Hampshire Radiological Health Section will be dispatching an inspector or inspectors to the licensee's facility on Wednesday, February 21, 2007, to conduct further investigation into this incident."
Notified R1DO (T. Jackson), FSME EO (Moore), ILTAB via email and Canada via fax.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43182 | Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN McLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/23/2007
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2007
Event Time: 13:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SMALL NATURAL GAS LEAK AT GAS METER
"On Friday 2/23/07 at approximately 13:36 EST the Ontario, NY Volunteer Fire Department arrived on site at the Ginna Training Center in response to a report of natural gas leak The report was made to the local gas utility by an employee of the facility. This report was not made through the normal channel of control room communications. Per the local gas utility response procedure, they notify the 911 Emergency call center, if their response time is greater than 30 minutes. The local television media responded to the site based on the 911 radio transmission. The Fire Department left site at 13:57 hours. The gas utility found a minor leak on the gas meter outside the building."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and is expected to discuss this incident with the media. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43184 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ERIC MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/24/2007
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2007
Event Time: 19:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation | Event Text REDUCTION IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY
"On February 24, 2007, at 1820 hours, 13 of 51 alert sirens in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone were determined to be inoperable. This is considered a major loss of the Quad Cities offsite notification capability. The alert sirens were disabled due to a loss of power. Power was lost due to a major winter storm in the area. Repairs are in progress at the time of this notification. This report is being made due to the reduction in public notification capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
He licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43185 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID MANKIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/24/2007
Notification Time: 23:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2007
Event Time: 17:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text LOSS OF NORMAL ELECTRICAL LINEUP DUE TO GRID INSTABILITY FROM ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
"Immediate notifications are being made for the following events:
1) Valid RPS non-critical actuation: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)
2) Group 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)
3) Loss of decay heat removal (RHR Shutdown Cooling) isolated: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)
4) Auto start of 'A' Standby Diesel Generator and subsequent pick up of essential buses by both 'A' and 'B' Standby Diesel Generators: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Just prior to the event the plant was in Mode 5 with core alterations in progress and the 'B' Standby Diesel Generator being run manually for post maintenance testing. At 1756 hours on 2/24/2007, core alterations were halted due to indications that the grid was becoming unstable. Freezing rain had been in progress all day. At 1757 hours an electrical transient occurred as some of the offsite lines coming into the switchyard were lost. The 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus was lost. A full RPS trip occurred from loss of the 'B' RPS bus and too few inputs to the 'A' RPS trip logic. The loss of 'B' RPS power resulted in Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations. The Group 4 isolation caused a loss of decay heat removal capability (RHR Shutdown Cooling isolated). The 'A' Standby Diesel Generator auto started, but the 1A3 essential bus remained powered from offsite sources. The 'B' SBDG was already running. The 1A4 bus also remained powered from offsite sources. At 1820 hours, a degraded voltage trip signal was received resulting in both emergency diesel generators picking up their respective buses.
"At present, the essential buses 1A3 and 1A4 are being carried by the emergency diesel generators. Only one of the six lines supplying offsite power to the site is available. Both non-essential buses are being powered from the one offsite line. The emergency buses will remain on the emergency diesel generators until additional offsite lines can be restored. RHR Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1826 hours."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local officials. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43186 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KANE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/25/2007
Notification Time: 17:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEGRADED ELECTRICAL CABLES TO CCW SYSTEM
"On February 17, 2007, it was discovered that cables in a cable tray associated with the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system and Service Water system had sustained external damage by the heat effects from an un-insulated pipe that was in close proximity to the cable tray.
"On February 25, 2007, at 1100 hrs, as a result of continued evaluation of the cables in the cable tray and the discovery of a cable with unacceptable cable damage, it was determined that all cables located within the cable tray at the effected zone (that were not already isolated or replaced) were inoperable due to the loss of qualification life and the potential for cable-to-cable interaction from degradation of the cable insulation. This condition could potentially result in spurious equipment operation, causing components to be positioned in other than their desired safety position.
"Subsequently, on February 25, 2007, at 1300 hrs, it was recognized that a specific combination of two postulated cable faults could affect the CCW system resulting in a condition where there would be less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling capability, per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7.C. As a result, TS 3.0.3 was entered. At 1322 hrs, TS 3.0.3 was exited, following isolation of one of the two postulated cable faults, which restored the capability for 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling.
"The condition of potentially having less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems (CCW system) that are needed to remove residual heat."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |