| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/14/2007 - 02/15/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43109 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 01/20/2007
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2007
Event Time: 03:38 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CREVS AND CRETS INOPERABLE DUE TO 1A AND 2B EDG OOS
The licensee discovered two separate issues that required the 1A EDG and 2B EDG to be declared inoperable. It was discovered that the 1A EDG exhaust fan damper had failed which required the 1A EDG to be declared inoperable and 22A Service Water Heat Exchanger Inlet strainer diversion valve was failed which required the 2B EDG to be declared inoperable.
With both of the EDG's inoperable the licensee declared the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and the Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) systems inoperable. This condition placed the licensee in a 2 hour LCO to place the plant in hot shutdown. At 0432 the 1A EDG was restored to operability and the applicable LCO was exited. The condition existed for 56 minutes. Subsequently the repairs were completed on the 22A Service Water Heat Exchanger Inlet strainer diversion valve and the 2B EDG was returned to service.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1248 EST ON 2/14/07 FROM JOE GIOFFRE TO S. SANDIN * * *
This notification is retracted based on the following:
"On January 20, 2007, at 16:38 EST, EN 43109 was made by Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of Safety Function'. At that time, a condition was believed to exist which, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a system function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Specifically, the onsite emergency power supplies to both trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) were declared inoperable due to separate issues on the 1A EDG and the 2B EDG.
"After further evaluation, it has been determined that both DG's were operable and, therefore, the CREVS/CRETS safety function was not lost. Significant margin existed to support operability for both DG's. Accordingly, this event is not reportable. EN43109 is, therefore, retracted by this notice."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (White). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43165 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL DEES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 02/14/2007
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2007
Event Time: 10:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - SUPERVISOR CONFIRMED POSTIVE FOR ALCOHOL
An employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. A work review is in progress. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43166 | Rep Org: CONVAL, INC
Licensee: CONVAL, INC
Region: 1
City: SOMERS State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD CURTIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 02/14/2007
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/11/2006
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
O. TABATABAI E-MAIL (NRR)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
MARK RING (R3)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Event Text PART 21 CONCERNING MATERIAL VERIFICATIONS ON HIGH PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE STEAM AND WATER GLOBE VALVES
During a Nuclear Utilities Group Audit (NUPIC) on December 11, 2006, several problems were identified at CONVAL related to valve material verification. The problems relate to material verification for 1/2 inch to 4 inch forged body high pressure and temperature steam and water valves produced by this vendor. Since the audit, CONVAL has examined the issues and determined that they are reportable under 10 CFR 21.
Issue 1: CONVAL states that the pressure boundary material of the valves in question was not procured to ASME Section III, NCA-3800 program. CONVAL states that the valve material was procured as specified with Certified Material Test Reports (CMTRs) and some independent material over-checking and chemical analysis but the formal verification of the material did not meet NCA-3800.
Issue 2: CONVAL states that there was also improper material verification of a safety related part within these valves. The split ring, which retains the closure disc to the stem within these valves, had inadequate material verifications performed for those valves that were ordered to Appendix B with upgraded material verifications. In this case, the split rings have CMTRs but no additional over-checks of the material were performed by CONVAL.
None of the valves identified in issues 1 or 2 above were ordered with N-Stamps. CONVAL believes that up to 20 nuclear plants may possess these valves. CONVAL noted that their material verification process has remained unchanged for many years so that this is not a new or recent development.
Issue 3: While performing the engineering analysis related to the two issues identified above, CONVAL also determined that under a worst case combination of physical properties for the split ring material in combination with worst case stress conditions, that split ring may not perform its function. CONVAL believes that the likelihood of the split ring failing under these extreme conditions is very remote.
CONVAL does not believe there is any safety concern associated with these issues.
CONVAL is in the process of identifying and notifying the affected customers. CONVAL plans to provide all customers and the NRC formal documentation of the nature of these Part 21 related deficiencies within the next five business days. | |