| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/02/2007 - 02/05/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43135 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #: 3669-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 01/30/2007
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2006
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
ILTAB (e-mailed) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS GAS CHROMATOGRAPH
Following Agreement State Report was received via e-mail
"Licensee reported loss of gauge. Last seen during 2/06 inventory. Roof over storage area was replaced in 03/06 and all instruments/equipment had to be moved. Repairs were complete in 5/06. The gauge was noted missing in 8/06 inventory. Licensee reports an extensive search was conducted for several months. The loss was reported to this office 1/30/07. Licensee will submit a written report. Florida is investigating."
Device Type: Gas Chromatograph
Manufacturer: Hewlett-Packard
Model Number: 5890
Serial Number: SN L4479
Isotope(s): Ni-63
Activity: 15.8 millicuries in 1988 (13.2 millicuries now)
Material Form: Sealed Source
Incident Category: Loss of Control - Lost, Abandoned, or Stolen Materials
Location Classification: Controlled Area
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43139 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: STUART BRANTLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 02/02/2007
Notification Time: 21:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2007
Event Time: 13:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOW PRESSURE INJECTION (LPI) NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD FLOW REQUIREMENTS NOT MET FOR CERTAIN ACCIDENT SEQUENCES
"At 1350 hours on February 2, 2007, with the plant at 100% power, it was determined [that] the low pressure injection (LPI) system net positive suction head calculation does not account for the additional flow through the failed LPI pump recirculation line during certain accident scenarios. The additional flow is upstream of the flow element used by control room operators to throttle system flow to maintain net positive suction head flow requirements. The additional flow could result in net positive suction head below required design limits. The system design is not affected in events where both LPI trains perform as designed.
"Emergency operating procedures direct control room operators to open the LPI system discharge flow cross-connect line isolation valves, if accessible, following a LPI pump failure. Operators are then directed to throttle system flow through the operable LPI pump to maintain proceduralized values. These values are designed to provide sufficient design flow and maintain pump NPSH. During a simulator training scenario, operators identified when the discharge cross-connect line isolation valves were opened, the idle Building Spray train indicated flow. Follow-up investigation identified the increased flow was due to back flow through the failed LPI pump minimum flow recirculation line. This additional flow is upstream of the flow element used by operators to maintain adequate net positive suction head for the operable LPI pump. The additional flow could result in not meeting NPSH design requirements.
"The licensee entered the 72 hour Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) for one inoperable LPI train. The licensee is revising calculations and emergency operating procedures to account for the additional flow.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) and (b)(3)(v) as an unanalyzed condition, and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the LPI system to mitigate the consequences of an accident, respectively. "
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43140 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM GRAFFNEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 02/03/2007
Notification Time: 19:51 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2007
Event Time: 12:32 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 ENTERED DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE TESTING OF CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLIES (CEA'S)
"On 2/3/2007 at approximately 12:32 MST, Palo Verde Control Room operators were performing a routine surveillance test. The purpose of this test is to demonstrate the operability of each full strength CEA not fully inserted in the core by verifying freedom of movement (trippability) by moving each individual full strength CEA that is not fully inserted in the core at least 5 inches (SR 3.1.5.3).
"While performing this test on Shutdown Group 'B', Subgroup 6, the 4 CEA's in the sub-group failed to withdraw after successfully inserting the CEA's the requisite 5 inches. The CEA's were inserted beyond the limit of 144.75" withdrawn as required per PVNGS TS LCO 3.1.6 to a position of 144" withdrawn. It was determined that this was not an analyzed condition.
"On 2/3/2007 at 13:15 MST, the Control Room staff identified the unanalyzed condition and PVNGS Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3. It was determined that the unanalyzed condition had existed since 12:32 MST.
"On 2/3/2007 at 16:16 MST, following corrective maintenance to replace a phase sequence card, the 4 CEA's were recovered above the TS 3.1.6 insertion limit of 144.75", and Unit 2 exited LCO 3.0.3.
"The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. The required offsite power sources are operable and the electrical grid is stable.
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event." | |