Event Notification Report for October 2, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/01/2002 - 10/02/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39234 39235 39236
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39234 |
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| FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:56[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/01/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:42[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM JOHNSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAY HENSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| VALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING TESTING ON ENGINEERED SAFETY |
| FEATURES |
| |
| "Station was conducting ESF testing on the 1B train with the 1B Diesel |
| Generator aligned to the 1B essential bus. While re-aligning from the test |
| alignment, the 1B emergency breaker tripped open due to a problem with the |
| Cutler-Hammer control switch. A valid blackout signal was sensed on the 1B |
| bus. The 1B emergency breaker immediately re-closed and the 1B essential |
| bus was re-energized from the 1B Diesel Generator. Switch repair is in |
| progress." |
| |
| The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39235 |
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| FACILITY: WOLF CREEK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:44[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/01/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVEN A. HENRY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATING TO CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION |
| |
| "On October 1 2002, conditions were discovered that if an evacuation of the |
| Wolf Creek Generation Station (WCGS) control room were required, due to a |
| fire, necessary steps could not be completed within committed time |
| requirements. The station is in Mode 1, at 100% power. |
| |
| "During a timed walk down of procedure OFN RP-017, 'Control Room |
| Evacuation,' it was identified that operators did not complete Phase A |
| actions of the procedure in the committed five minutes. Phase A provides |
| that control of the plant will be established at the Auxiliary Shutdown |
| Panel (ASP) and isolation of required instrumentation and other devices on |
| the ASP will be accomplished. Phase A was performed in approximately 8 |
| minutes. This does not meet our commitment to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R as |
| reflected in the WCGS Fire Protection Plan. The effect of additional time to |
| complete Phase A of the control room evacuation is being further analyzed to |
| determine the safety significance. |
| |
| "Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022 Revision 2, this situation |
| meets the criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an 8-hour ENS |
| notification, as it relates to being in an unanalyzed condition." |
| |
| The Licensee has implemented compensatory measures at 1900 CDT, 10/1/02. |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39236 |
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| REP ORG: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2002|
|LICENSEE: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:24[EDT]|
| CITY: San Jose REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/01/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
| |JAY HENSON R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+SONIA BURGESS R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JASON S. POST |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS |WILLIAM DEAN NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+VERN HODGE NRR |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PART 21.21 REPORT INVOLVING STABILITY OPTION III |
| |
| "Subject: Stability Option III: Possible Successive Confirmation Count |
| Resets |
| |
| "This letter provides notification of a 60 Day Interim Report per � 21.21 |
| (a)(2) for plants that have selected stability long-term solution Option |
| III. The basis for this notification is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) has not |
| completed the evaluation of a potential problem with the algorithm that |
| provides the licensing basis Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety |
| Limit protection for stability Option III. The algorithm determines |
| Successive Confirmation Count (SCC) of an oscillating power signal. A |
| reactor trip is generated when SCC and oscillation amplitude reach their |
| trip setpoints in accordance with the Option III and reactor protection |
| system configuration. The concern is that the oscillation period could |
| change for an oscillation that initiates while reactor state conditions are |
| changing rapidly (e.g., during a two-recirculation pump trip event) and |
| cause the SCC to reset, thus delaying the reactor scram. |
| |
| "GE believes that there is low potential for the MCPR Safety Limit to be |
| violated as a result of this concern. However, a 60 Day Interim Report is |
| required since the evaluation has not been completed. Further information is |
| provided in the attached notification. |
| |
| "(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component |
| supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which |
| fails to comply or contains a defect: |
| |
| "The affected basic component is the Period Based Detection Algorithm (PBDA) |
| of stability long-term solution Option III. The PEDA provides the licensing |
| basis MCPR Safety Limit protection for anticipated coupled thermal |
| hydraulic-neutronic reactor instabilities. The concern is that the |
| Successive Confirmation Count (SCC) could reset if an oscillation develops |
| while reactor state conditions are changing rapidly (e.g., during a two |
| recirculation pump trip event) and delay a reactor scram beyond that assumed |
| in the licensing basis analysis. The algorithm is more susceptible to SCC |
| resets with a period tolerance that is near to the minimum allowed by |
| licensing documents (e.g., 50 msec). SCC resets are less likely with higher |
| period tolerance values (e.g., 100 to 300 msec). |
| |
| "(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the |
| basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: |
| |
| "GE Nuclear Energy, San Jose, California |
| |
| "(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard which is |
| created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: |
| |
| "A reactor scram is only initiated by the PBDA when the SCC exceeds the |
| count setpoint and the oscillation amplitude exceeds the amplitude setpoint |
| The licensing basis is that the SCC will exceed the count setpoint before |
| the amplitude reaches the amplitude setpoint. If the SCC resets, then the |
| amplitude could exceed the amplitude setpoint before SCC reaches the count |
| setpoint. This could lead to violation of the MCPR Safety Limit. |
| |
| "If scram is delayed, boiling transition could be experienced on a portion |
| of some fuel bundles. This would be a violation of a Technical Specification |
| Safety Limit and is reportable under 10 CFR 21. However, it would not |
| produce a significant safety hazard or threat to public health and safety. |
| |
| "(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply |
| was obtained: |
| |
| "(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or failure to |
| comply, the number and locations of all such components in use at, supplied |
| for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to |
| the regulations in this part: |
| |
| "A defect has not been confirmed to exist. The potentially affected plants |
| are listed in Attachment 2. |
| |
| "(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the |
| name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the |
| length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action (note, |
| these are actions specifically associated with the identified Reportable |
| Condition): |
| |
| "GE has communicated this concern to the BWR Owners' Group Potential Issues |
| Resolution Team (PIRT) and to the Stability Detect & Suppress Committee. |
| |
| "GE is continuing to evaluate the potential for the SCC to be reset for |
| current licensed reactor operating conditions. This effort will be completed |
| by November 18, 2002. |
| |
| "(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the |
| facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be |
| given to purchasers or licensees: |
| |
| "It is recommended that potentially affected licensees keep informed through |
| the BWR Owners' Group. No specific plant actions are recommended at this |
| time." |
| |
| Plants listed on Attachment 2 |
| Clinton, Brunswick 1& 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Dresden 2 & |
| 3, LaSalle 1 & 2, Limerick 1 & 2, Peach Bottom 2 & 3, Quad Cities 1 & 2, |
| Perry 1, Susquehanna 1 & 2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1 & 2, and Browns Ferry 1, 2 & |
| 3. |
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