Event Notification Report for February 5, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/04/2002 - 02/05/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38316 38667 38668 38669
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38316 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE:
09/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/25/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RITCHIE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
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|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "At 0930, uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a |
| block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA |
| 0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential |
| collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) |
| amount of uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of |
| NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system |
| piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE |
| 0705_076.E03." |
| |
| "Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of |
| material, which may affect this report." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is |
| potentially high (at this time) because the exact amount of Uranium bearing |
| material that could have entered the opening in the block wall is unknown. |
| Measurements to quantify the material are in progress. The apparent block |
| wall construction (as evidenced by visual inspection of wall openings in the |
| other areas of Recovery) indicates the potential for the presence of |
| unfavorable geometry voids within and between the blocks compromising the |
| exterior building wall." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing |
| material entered the void spaces of the block wall, 2) the material has |
| collected in the multiple voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry |
| configuration, 3) the material has a high enrichment and uranium |
| concentration, and 4) the material would become sufficiently moderated, then |
| a potentially critical configuration could result. Note that no spills or |
| leaks of uranium bearing material from present X-705 systems has occurred at |
| this time. The material in question has apparently been there for some |
| time." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.): |
| Double contingency for inadvertent containers relies upon the physical |
| integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of |
| material. An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment |
| of the material. Double contingency also relies upon administrative |
| controls limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume |
| containers that could collect a spill or leak." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): Unknown at this time. Enrichment |
| could be greater than 90% based upon historical operations. The form is |
| most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2. Measurements for determination of mass |
| and assay are currently in progress." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The openings leading to the interior |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of |
| NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential |
| collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) |
| amount of uranium bearing material that has spilled (at some time in the |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature 1 of |
| NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system |
| piping. This would represent a loss of the second leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken |
| to determine amounts of material and assay." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| notified. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM JIM McCLEERY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1942 ON 09/27/01 ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "Update #1 - Conservative NDA analysis of the area near column A-16 |
| indicates a total maximum mass of 225+/-113 grams 235U with an enrichment of |
| 8.2% is present (preliminary NDA analysis reported less conservative |
| values), which is less than the safe mass limit for uranium. Investigations |
| to determine the extent of condition have identified three additional areas |
| of potential concern in X-705 Recovery. These areas are: the wall near the |
| A-loop overflow column, the wall adjacent to the Calciner system, and the |
| wall near the top of the B-38 storage columns. Each of these areas has |
| received preliminary scans via NDA analysis to determine the potential for |
| uranium material holdup in the block walls. Preliminary results indicate |
| that the amount of material, if any, in the wall near the A-loop overflow |
| and near the Calciner are bounded by the amount quantified near column A-6. |
| More detailed [quantitative] NDA scans for these two locations (to |
| differentiate between surface contamination, uranium holdup, and background) |
| are currently in progress and will be reported when available. Preliminary |
| results indicate that no material is suspect in the wall near the B-38 |
| storage column (near background readings). Additional NDA scans are |
| currently in progress to locate any other potential areas of concern in the |
| Recovery Area. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is |
| now low because the amount of uranium bearing material that entered the |
| openings in the block wall is known to be less that 338 grams 235U which is |
| less than the safe mass limit for uranium." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips) and NMSS EO (Holahan). |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM MIKE RITCHIE TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1626 ON 10/01/01 ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "Update #2 - More detailed quantitative NDA scans for the wall near the |
| A-loop overflow column indicate a total maximum mass of 92+/-46 grams 235U |
| with an enrichment of 86% is present (less than a safe mass). Quantitative |
| NDA scans for the wall adjacent to the Calciner system indicate a total |
| maximum mass of 201+/-101 grams 235U with an enrichment of 5.3% (also less |
| than a safe mass). It should be noted that these results incorporate |
| conservative assumptions about the distribution of uranium bearing material |
| in the wall matrix, and total amount of uranium present may be found to be |
| much less upon final disposition." |
| |
| "Preliminary results indicate that no material is suspected in the wall near |
| the B-38 storage column (near background readings): therefore, |
| quantification was not performed in this area." |
| |
| "[...]" |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Brown). |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.) |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM CURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 0408 ON 02/05/02 ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "Update #3 - To reestablish compliance, an approximately 24" X 80" section |
| of block wall was removed in accordance with NCSA-0705_135. Following |
| removal of the primary area, five locations around the perimeter were then |
| subjected to additional NDA analysis. Conservative NDA analysis indicated |
| less than 306 grams U235 total spread over the five additional locations. |
| In a second removal operation, additional blocks were removed at four |
| locations adjacent to the primary area where greater than 15 grams U235 was |
| indicated. When combining all NDA estimates which make conservative |
| assumptions about the distribution of uranium-bearing material in the wall |
| matrix, up to 705 [grams] U235 may have been distributed in this area. If |
| the mass were concentrated in one location, it would still be less than the |
| maximum subcritical mass [...] given in ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Tom Kozak) and NMSS EO (John Hickey). |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.) |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38667 |
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| REP ORG: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/04/2002|
|LICENSEE: KCCS, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:44[EST]|
| CITY: LAUDERDALE LAKES REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 02/03/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 09:20[EST]|
|LICENSE#: 3087-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/04/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MIKE ERNSTES R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLES ADAMS (fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
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|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING GAUGES STOLEN FROM KCCS, INC., IN
|
| KISSIMMEE, FLORIDA |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the state: |
| |
| "Abnormal Occurrence: No" |
| |
| "Followup Report: No" |
| |
| "Allegation: No" |
| |
| "Incident Date: 03-Feb-02" |
| |
| "Licensee or Owner: KCCS, Inc." |
| |
| "[...]" |
| |
| "City, State, and Zip Code: Lauderdale Lakes, FL 33319" |
| |
| "License #: 3087-1" |
| |
| "License Type, Category: Specific, 3L(1)" |
| |
| "[...]" |
| |
| "Isotope(s): Cs-137, Am-241" |
| |
| "Activity(s): CPN 10/50 each, Troxler 9/44" |
| |
| "Material Form; Chemical Form; physical Form: Solid, Special Form, |
| By-product" |
| |
| "Probable Disposition of Material: Unknown" |
| |
| "Exposure? No" |
| |
| "Number: N/A" |
| |
| "Type of Individual(s): N/A" |
| |
| "Exposure Source: N/A" |
| |
| "Dose Delivered to: N/A" |
| |
| "Maximum Dose Received: N/A" |
| |
| "Incident Category: Loss of Control - Lost, Abandoned, or Stolen |
| Materials" |
| |
| "Incident Location: [...], Kissimmee FL 34744" |
| |
| "Location Classification: Temporary Work Site" |
| |
| "Incident Description: [The] licensee discovered at 0920 hours on 2-3-02 |
| that a trailer and shed had been vandalized. This occurred sometime between |
| the evening of 2-1 and the morning of 2-3. The locks were cut, and |
| everything of value [was] taken. The locks on the gauge cases had also been |
| cut. The keys were locked in a desk drawer with other keys, [and] all were |
| taken. [The] City of Kissimmee PD and the Florida Bureau of Radiation |
| Control are investigating. The licensee has been strongly urged to post a |
| reward and is considering it. This office was notified of this event on |
| 2-4-02." |
| |
| "Device Type (Quantity): 1 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)" |
| |
| "Manufacturer: CPN" |
| |
| "Model Number: MC-3" |
| |
| "Serial Number(s): M3707771" |
| |
| "Device Type (Quantity): 2 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)" |
| |
| "Manufacturer: CPN" |
| |
| "Model Number: MC-3" |
| |
| "Serial Number(s): M34002262" |
| |
| "Device Type (Quantity): 3 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)" |
| |
| "Manufacturer: Troxler" |
| |
| "Model Number: 3450" |
| |
| "Serial Number(s): 278" |
| |
| "Emergency Groups at Scene: City of Kissimmee PD (Report # 01-02-000928)" |
| |
| "Organizations Notified: NRC, SWP" |
| |
| "Media Contacted: None" |
| |
| "[...]" |
| |
| "Date; Time Investigated: 04-Feb-02; (//)" |
| |
| "Region II, Dick Woodruff, has been notified. If you have any questions, |
| contact [the] Florida BRC." |
| |
| (Call the NRC Operations Center for licensee contact information, the |
| incident location, and state contact information.) |
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|Research Reactor |Event Number: 38668 |
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| FACILITY: UNIV OF MICHIGAN |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/04/2002|
| RXTYPE: 2000 KW POOL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:57[EST]|
| COMMENTS: |EVENT DATE: 02/01/2002|
| |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/04/2002|
| CITY: ANN ARBOR REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: WASHTENAW STATE: MI |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: R-28 AGREEMENT: N |THOMAS KOZAK R3 |
| DOCKET: 05000002 |FRED BROWN NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK DRISKAL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAA2 20.1906(d)(2) EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE BASED ON DOSIMETRY READING |
| |
| On 2/1/2002, the University Radiation Safety Officer received the |
| 10/15-11/14/2001 TLD results from their dosimetry processor (Landauer), |
| which indicated that an individual had received an extremity dose of 72.6 |
| rem to the hand. This result was based on readings from a ring dosimeter. |
| However, based upon results from another ring dosimeter worn by the |
| individual during the period (114 mrem) , the individual's whole body |
| dosimetery (33 mrem), and the individual's work duties, the RSO believes |
| that this result may be in error. The RSO has been in contact with NRC |
| Region III regarding this incident. |
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|Hospital |Event Number: 38669 |
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| REP ORG: VA NATIONAL HEALTH PHYSICS PROGRAM |NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/04/2002|
|LICENSEE: VA MEDICAL CENTER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:48[EST]|
| CITY: HOUSTON REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 01/10/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: [CST]|
|LICENSE#: 42-00084-06 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/04/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN PELLET R4 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ED LEINHOLDT | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| SMALL QUANTITY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MISSING |
| |
| The licensee reported that a bag of radioactive waste containing 132 |
| microcuries of I-125 was misplaced between 12/27/01 and 1/10/02. The |
| licensee believes that the waste may have been inadvertently disposed of as |
| biohazardous waste. In this case, the material would have been biologically |
| decontaminated and then sent to a sanitary landfill for disposal. Due to the |
| low penetrating nature of the radioactivity, the licensee does not believe |
| that a search of the landfill would be of much benefit. A calculation of the |
| possible dose resulting from the handling of this material indicated that an |
| individual would not receive a dose in excess of 1 mrem. |
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