Event Notification Report for May 24, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/23/2001 - 05/24/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38016 38020 38024 38025 38026 38027
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38016 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/20/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 03:56[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. C. MAURER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| VALID HIGH LEVEL DRAIN SECONDARY ALARM |
| |
| At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain |
| Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave |
| Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be |
| operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The |
| autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the |
| alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal. The autoclave was removed |
| from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable |
| by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Autoclave # 1 was removed from service |
| and is inoperable. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1709 BY BEASLEY TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Following the WICS activation, System |
| Engineering lead a troubleshooting effort by Instrument and Control |
| Maintenance and Operations personnel. This included inspection of the |
| drain, testing of the WICS system using the approved autoclave functional |
| test procedure, and a review of the recorded system data. This effort |
| concluded that the actuation was initiated by an invalid signal from the |
| secondary condensate probe. Testing indicated that the sensitivity band of |
| the secondary probe had shifted in the conservative direction and alarmed |
| without the presence of water. Based on the conclusion that the actuation |
| was caused by an invalid signal and not a condition the WICS is designed to |
| protect against, the reporting criteria is not met. Therefore the subject |
| notification is being retracted. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Essig) were informed. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38020 |
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| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:04[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 05/21/2001|
| COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 07:59[EDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: RICHLAND STATE: SC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1107 AGREEMENT: Y |LEONARD WERT R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001151 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: NEWMYER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER(PLC) CAUSED LOSS OF ACTIVE |
| ENGINEERED CONTROLS ON CONVERSION LINE 4 |
| |
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN |
| |
| At approximately 0759 the decanter tripped off line on conversion line 4. |
| Subsequently line 4 was shutdown at 0805. An error in the display program |
| was initially suspected. |
| |
| With conversion line 4 shut down, instrument technicians were called. The |
| technicians attempted to correct the problem with the display program to no |
| avail. An instrumentation and controls (I/C) engineer was called and |
| tracked the problem to the line 4 PLC. Since it was determined that the PLC |
| processor for line 4 had faulted, the processor was reset and tested. The |
| test was satisfactory. |
| |
| Line 4 was restarted at approximately 1000. At approximately 1030 line 4 |
| was shut down due to a plugged duplex valve at the inlet of the calciner. |
| During this shutdown, a process engineer was informed about the earlier |
| events. The process engineer became concerned about the status of the |
| safety significant controls on line 4 and contacted a nuclear criticality |
| safety (NCS) engineer at approximately 1130. The NCS engineer was present |
| in the control room at approximately 1140. |
| |
| A time-line of events was reconstructed. The NCS engineer reviewed the |
| sequence of events with the I/C engineer. It was determined that an output |
| fault in an I/O card caused the processor to go into fault mode but all |
| outputs did not go to their correct (OFF) state. |
| |
| The NCS engineer determined that in the time period from 0759 until line 4 |
| was secured at approximately 0805, the active engineered safety significant |
| controls (SSCs) on line 4 were unavailable, and less than double contingency |
| protection existed in the vaporization system during that time period. The |
| SSCs are considered to have been in place for the 1000 startup and remained |
| in place until the shutdown at 1030, although the cause of the initial |
| failure had not been determined. Conversion operators on line 4 were |
| instructed by the NCS engineer to not restart line 4 until the cause of the |
| PLC failure was determined and corrected. Line 4 remains shutdown pending |
| further investigation. |
| |
| Justification for Continuing Operations on Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5: |
| |
| Line 4 utilizes a unique Numalogic PLC system while Lines 1, 2, 3, and 5 |
| utilize a different programmable logic system. There is no reason to |
| believe the Numalogic error is possible on the other lines. The |
| manufacturer of the other programmable logic system (utilized on Lines 1,2,3 |
| and 5) was contacted and stated that their cards cannot fail into any state |
| other than all OFF. Conversion Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5 remain in operation. |
| |
| Double Contingency Protection |
| |
| Double contingency protection for the vaporizer is based upon control of |
| mass (prevent/detect a UF6 leak) and geometry (prevent/detect accumulation |
| of moderator in a non-favorable configuration in the bottom of the |
| vaporizer). Double contingency protection on the cylinder (in vaporizer) is |
| based upon moderation control (prevent back-flow of moderator from the |
| hydrolysis column into the cylinder). It was determined that less than |
| double contingency protection remain for these systems and greater than a |
| safe mass was involved. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License |
| (SNM-1107), paragraph 37.3 (c.5), this event meets the criteria for a 24 |
| hour notification because it constitutes a "nuclear criticality safety |
| incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented |
| double contingency protection remains . . and: greater than a safe mass is |
| involved, but a sufficient number of the controls that were lost are |
| restored within four (4) hours such that double contingency protection is |
| restored." |
| |
| As Found Condition |
| |
| See "Reason for Notification" above. |
| |
| Summary of Activity |
| |
| An unknown PLC failure led to the shutdown of conversion line 4. It was |
| determined that less than double contingency protection existed on the line |
| 4 from 0759 to 0805. Therefore, the NCS engineer directed that line 4 could |
| not be restarted until the cause of the failure was determined and |
| corrected. |
| |
| Conclusions |
| |
| Loss of double contingency protection occurred. |
| At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or |
| member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. |
| This notification is the result of equipment failure, not a deficient NCS |
| analysis. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1120 ON 05/23/01 FROM BILL NEWMYER TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Westinghouse has proceeded with investigation of the cause of the Numalogic |
| PLC failure on Conversion Line 4. This investigation has discovered that |
| the design of the Line 4 - Numalogic 700 PLC may fault to an undesirable |
| state. A service bulletin update for the Numalogic PLC describes this |
| condition." |
| |
| "A modification to the PLC (described in the manufacturer's bulletin) is |
| necessary to correct this condition. This modification was completed on the |
| PLC. The PLC was subsequently tested by faulting the PLC, and the correct |
| output condition was achieved." |
| |
| "Further testing of the control logic was performed to ensure that the |
| output from the PLC, when faulted, will produce the correct valve responses |
| for Conversion Line 4. This functional test revealed that even though the |
| PLC faulted to the correct output values, the valves did not respond |
| correctly." |
| |
| "Discovery of the problem with Conversion Line 4 prompted investigation to |
| determine if the other Conversion Lines (1, 2, 3, and 5) would experience a |
| similar error (i.e., the PLC faults to the correct output but the valves |
| fail to respond correctly). Testing of Conversion Line 5 (which uses a |
| different PLC logic system) revealed the same deficiency." |
| |
| "Based on this information, Conversion Lines 1, 2, 3, and 5 have been |
| shutdown pending further evaluation of the correct system response assuming |
| a PLC fault condition. Modifications will be made to each Conversion Line |
| to correct the PLC system response prior to restarting each Conversion |
| line." |
| |
| The licensee notified onsite NRC headquarters inspectors. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R2DO (Bernhard) and NMSS EO (Hickey and |
| Broaddus). |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38024 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
|LICENSEE: TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EDT]|
| CITY: FLINT REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 05/22/2001|
| COUNTY: GENESEE STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: 11:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 37-19640-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
| |DOUG BROADDUS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT DURKIN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAE1 20.2202(b)(1) PERS OVEREXPOSURE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| APPEARANCE THAT A TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS RADIOGRAPHER EXCEEDED |
| THE 5-REM ANNUAL LIMIT |
| |
| The licensee is reporting this event due to the appearance that a |
| radiographer exceeded the 5-rem limit for the year. The individual's dose |
| (year to date) is 5,050 millirem. |
| |
| The licensee's initial investigation indicates that the individual did not |
| actually receive all of the indicated dose. Apparently, the individual |
| routinely put his badge in his tool box at the end of the day, and the |
| second shift crew used the individual's tool box without realizing that the |
| badge was inside. Therefore, the badge received additional exposure during |
| the course of the second shift. Apparently, the tool box was located in a |
| vehicle which was parked inside the boundary ropes in a refinery lay-down |
| area where the crew shoots weld coupons. It was reported that the second |
| shift crew did not routinely use the individual's tool box, and there were |
| no unusual doses with the individual's partner or with any of the other |
| radiographers. |
| |
| The radiographer whose badge is in question is being restricted from |
| radiography work until the licensee's investigation has been completed. The |
| licensee is waiting on letters from the radiographer whose badge is in |
| question and from the radiographer who used the tool box containing the |
| badge during the second shift. |
| |
| The licensee plans to submit a written report within 30 days. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.) |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1426 BY DURKIN TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event since the event occurred in the State |
| of Ohio, an agreement state. They will report it to that State. |
| |
| Notified Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Hickey) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38025 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
|LICENSEE: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:05[EDT]|
| CITY: FT POLK REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/21/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: LA |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 19-30563-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MARK SHAFFER R4 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KUYKENDALL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR(CAD) |
| |
| The US Army in Aberdeen, Md. Reported that the 7th Chemical Co. 83rd |
| Chemical Battalion at Ft Polk, La. lost a Chemical Agent Detector in the |
| training area during a training exercise. The CAD contained 300 microcuries |
| of Am-241. A 100% inventory and complete search was conducted, but it was |
| not recovered. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38026 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:19[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/23/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATZKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK SHAFFER R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY OF CRIMINAL ACT INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL GRANTED ACCESS TO THE SITE. |
| |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED |
| |
| CONTACT NRC HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38027 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CONVAL INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
|LICENSEE: CONVAL INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:03[EDT]|
| CITY: SOMERS REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 05/23/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: CT |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
| |VERN HODGE fax NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CURTIN(via fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NONCOMPLIANCE INVOLVING FLOW COEFFICIENT VALUES OF 366 VALVES OF TWO BODY |
| STYLES SUPPLIED OVER THE COURSE OF 15 YEARS TO TWO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN |
| THE US |
| |
| The noncompliance involves flow coefficient values (Cv) of 366 valves of' |
| two body styles supplied over the course of 15 years to two nuclear power |
| plants in the United States. |
| |
| The breakdown is as follows: |
| |
| GPU, Oyster Creek; |
| |
| 122 Qty.- 1/2" Angle Body Ball Check Valves used in Charging Water Riser |
| Isolation |
| |
| Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point Unit 1; |
| |
| 114 Qty.- 1/2" Angle Pattern Ball Check Valves used in Charging Water Riser |
| Isolation |
| |
| 130 Qty.- 3/4" Tee Pattern Ball Check Valves used in SCRAM Discharge Riser |
| Isolation |
| |
| Information was developed that led to an engineering investigation and the |
| May 21, 2001 report by Conval's Quality Assurance Manager, Howard Smith II |
| of the potential safety related noncompliance deviation. |
| |
| The procurement document specifications for Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point |
| Unit 1 defined a Cv requirement of 3.5 for both the Angle and Tee Pattern |
| Ball Check Valves. The procurement document specifications for GPU, Oyster |
| Creek specified a Cv of 6 for the Angle Pattern Ball Check Valves. |
| |
| Preliminary laboratory test reports generated during Conval's recent |
| engineering investigation revealed actual Cv values of both valve styles to |
| be below 1.5, significantly lower than those required by the procurement |
| documents. |
| |
| While there are no indications that the valves will mechanically |
| malfunction, the fluid flow rates permitted in the forward direction will be |
| below those anticipated in the procurement document specifications and, |
| therefore, may constitute a safety related issue according to the intended |
| use of the valves. |
| |
| There are no nonconforming parts affecting the operation of the valves. The |
| lower Cv values are a consequence of the internal geometry of these Conval |
| valve designs. If requested, Conval's Engineering Manager, David Boyden, |
| will propose a retrofit of parts which, upon user acceptance, could be |
| implemented within 4 weeks following user approval. The changes would |
| significantly increase the flow capacity of the affected valves. |
| |
| The two (2) nuclear plants affected have been verbally notified of this |
| potential safety related noncompliance deviation. |
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