Event Notification Report for April 25, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/24/2001 - 04/25/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37806 37840 37858 37941
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37806 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/05/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:25[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/05/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:13[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRUCE BUTLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |STEPHEN CAHILL R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*INB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY DURING TESTING. |
| |
| Received RCIC "B" logic isolation signal causing RCIC in-board isolation |
| valve, 2E51-F007, to close resulting in RCIC trip signal. I&C personnel |
| were performing 57SV-CAL-003-25 ATTS transmitter calibration for RCIC "B" |
| steam line differential pressure transmitter 2E51-N057B when the isolation |
| occurred and this instrument caused the isolation. Investigation is in |
| progress to determine the cause. Received isolation signal at 1013 ET, I&C |
| backed out of the procedure returning 2E51-N057B transmitter to service and |
| RCIC isolation was reset and RCIC returned to standby at 1105 ET. |
| |
| All other Emergency Core Cooling systems were fully operable during the time |
| period RCIC was declared inoperable. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1453 ET BY S. HOWARD TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * |
| * |
| |
| Plant Hatch FSAR has been revised such that the Control Rod Drop accident |
| limiting event path evaluated in the safety analysis (subsection 15.3.2) |
| does not rely on RCIC to mitigate this Design Basis Accident (DBA). None of |
| the DBAs, as evaluated in the safety analysis (section 15.3), rely on RCIC |
| for event mitigation. RCIC will no longer be an NRC notification when |
| declared inoperable. Therefore, this NRC notification is being retracted. |
| R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37840 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:13[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:10[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROSS MOONITZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF EXHAUST LINE VACUUM RELIEF VALVES |
| TO FUNCTION DURING IST TESTING |
| |
| "During routine testing of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system |
| (HPCI) exhaust line vacuum relief valves (VRV), it was discovered that both |
| VRVs failed to open at their In Service Test (IST) required differential |
| pressure value. The Unit 2 HPCI system has been declared inoperable and |
| repairs are in progress. |
| |
| "This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due |
| to a failure of a single train system which prevents fulfillment of a safety |
| function." |
| |
| With HPCI inoperable this places Unit 2 in a 14-day Limiting Condition of |
| Operation. All other ECCS systems have been verified operable. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1254 ET BY STEVE BECK TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * |
| * |
| |
| The original design function of the affected vacuum relief valves was to |
| prevent damage to the HPCI exhaust line rupture disks. A failure of the |
| rupture disks would result in steam being discharged into the HPCI Room and |
| subsequent isolation of the HPCI system on high room temperature. A |
| modification to the rupture disk installed backing support plates to ensure |
| that repetitive vacuum conditions in the exhaust line would not result in |
| fatigue failure of the rupture disks. As a result of the modification, the |
| vacuum relief valves are no longer required to open to protect the rupture |
| disks. |
| |
| Based on an Engineering evaluation, it was concluded that the HPCI exhaust |
| line vacuum relief valves design function is not required to support HPCI |
| system operability. |
| |
| NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, allows "removal of a system or part of a system from |
| service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance |
| testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's |
| TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevent the system from |
| performing its function)." |
| |
| In this case, HPCI was removed from service for planned maintenance per |
| plant procedures and Technical Specifications. The condition found (vacuum |
| relief valve inoperability) would not have prevented HPCI from performing |
| its safety function; therefore this event is not reportable per |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(D) or 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v). R1DO (David Silk) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37858 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/22/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:10[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/22/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:10[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GUY GRIFFIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK LESSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*INB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RCIC DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| During an investigation of a ground on Div I 125/250 volt D.C. bus, the |
| source of the ground was determined to be 2E51-F008 primary containment |
| isolation valve. 2E51-F008 is the outboard steam supply to reactor core |
| isolation coolant (RCIC). It was closed and de-energized. 2E51-F008 |
| closure rendered RCIC system inoperable. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 04/24/01 AT 1453 ET BY S. HOWARD TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * |
| * |
| |
| Plant Hatch FSAR has been revised such that the Control Rod Drop accident |
| limiting event path evaluated in the safety analysis (subsection 15.3.2) |
| does not rely on RCIC to mitigate this Design Basis Accident (DBA). None of |
| the DBAs, as evaluated in the safety analysis (section 15.3), rely on RCIC |
| for event mitigation. RCIC will no longer be an NRC notification when |
| declared inoperable. Therefore, this NRC notification is being retracted. |
| R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified was notified of this retraction by |
| the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37941 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/24/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:23[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/24/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:06[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE MEYER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/24/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU |THOMAS KOZAK R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |STUART RICHARDS NRR |
|*AEC 50.72(a) (1) (i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |NADER MAMISH IRO |
| |GENE CANUPP FEMA |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A SMALL DEBRIS FIRE ON A STEAM |
| GENERATOR PLATFORM DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EDDY CURRENT TESTING |
| |
| At 0148 CDT, the control room was notified of a fire in the Unit 1 |
| containment. It is currently believed that a problem with eddy current |
| testing equipment (possibly an electrical fault) resulted in a fire |
| involving a small pile of debris on the 8-foot elevation steam generator 'A' |
| platform. The fire brigade was dispatched immediately, and the fire was |
| extinguished within 2 to 3 minutes of the time the extinguishing agent |
| (water) was applied. Offsite assistance was not required. At 0211 CDT, a |
| second team provided the control room with a confirmatory report that the |
| fire had been successfully extinguished. There were no reports of injuries |
| or the spread of contamination as a result of the fire. |
| |
| The exact time the extinguishing agent was applied to the fire was not known |
| at the time of this event notification. Because the exact duration of the |
| fire (i.e., less than or greater than 10 minutes) was not known, the |
| licensee declared an Unusual Event at 0206 CDT as a conservative measure. |
| |
| At the time of this event, Unit 1 was defueled, and Unit 2 was operating at |
| 100% power. |
| |
| The licensee notified Manitowac and Kewaunee Counties, the Sate of |
| Wisconsin, and the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 0343 EDT ON 04/24/01 FROM MIKE MEYER TO LEIGH TROCINE ***** |
| |
| The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0243 CDT. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify Manitowac and Kewaunee Counties, the Sate of |
| Wisconsin, and the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer |
| notified the R3DO (Kozak), NRR EO (Richards), IRO (Mamish), and FEMA |
| (Canupp). |
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