Event Notification Report for July 12, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/11/2000 - 07/12/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37160 37161 37162 37163
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37160 |
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| REP ORG: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2000|
|LICENSEE: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:33[EDT]|
| CITY: LEXINGTON REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 07/10/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: SC |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GEORGE BELISLE R2 |
| |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
+------------------------------------------------+DON COOL NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAJOR WROBEL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|IBAC 30.50(b)(1)(i) ACCESS DENIED >24 HRS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| TWO AIRCRAFT ENGINE SET OFF PORTAL ALARMS |
| |
| TWO AIRCRAFT ENGINES SENT TO CMC LEXINGTON IN LEXINGTON, SC SET OFF THE |
| PORTAL ALARMS AT THEIR FACILITY ON 6/7/00. CMC LEXINGTON NOTIFIED THE U.S. |
| AIR FORCE OF THE EVENT. THE AIR FORCE HAD INITIALLY ASSUMED THAT THE ALARMS |
| WERE CAUSED BY A MAGNESIUM THORIUM ALLOY USED IN THE ENGINES. HOWEVER, |
| SURVEYS CONDUCTED ON 7/6/00, DISCOVERED LOW LEVELS OF BOTH BETA/GAMMA AND |
| ALPHA CONTAMINATION. |
| |
| THE AIR FORCE IS SENDING A TEAM TO THE SITE TOMORROW TO FURTHER ANALYZE THE |
| CONTAMINANTS AND PLAN A COURSE OF ACTION. THE ISOTOPE(S) INVOLVED WERE NOT |
| KNOWN AT THE TIME OF THE REPORT. THE ENGINES HAVE BEEN PLACED IN A LOCATION |
| TO PREVENT ANY SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37161 |
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| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:33[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRANFORD STANLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT |
| |
| A licensed operator tested positive for illegal drug use during a random |
| test administered on 6/29/00. The individual's site access has been |
| suspended. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification |
| by the licensee. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37162 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:02[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:45[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM McCLEERY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "NCSA-PLANT-012 (Favorable Geometry Vacuum Cleaner) Control number 3 |
| requires a steel liner to be used in an F-can when enrichment is known or |
| expected to exceed >80%. At 0945 on 7/11/00, it was discovered that the |
| steel liner was constructed of expanded metal (grating), therefore the liner |
| would not perform its intended function as described in the associated NCSE. |
| The intended function is to reduce the internal diameter of the F-can to |
| less than five inches. The affected F-cans were verified to contain less |
| than the safe mass of U-235. The NCSA is deficient since it references a |
| drawing of a liner that cannot perform its intended function. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| Safety significance is low because the highest mass in any F-can on site |
| with greater than 80% enrichment material is 304 grams U-235 and the USEC |
| site limit for >20% enrichment material is 1000 grams U-235. The mass in the |
| F-cans and the site limit are well below the contingency limit for not using |
| an F-can liner(2500 grams U-235 at 80% enrichment) and current |
| NCSA-PLANT-012 operations are below 80% enrichment, in the unlikely event |
| that 2500 grams of high enriched U-235 was present in the F can, an |
| additional event, such as the presence of full reflection or spacing |
| violation would be required before obtaining a critical configuration |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "A critical configuration would require an F-can to be used to collect 80% |
| or greater enriched material that exceeded 2500 grams. In the unlikely event |
| of exceeding 2500 grams of 80% enriched material in the F-can, an additional |
| unlikely event, such as the F-can being exposed to full water reflection or |
| a spacing violation would have [been] necessary before a critical |
| configuration existed. The probability of all of these conditions existing |
| simultaneously is very low. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "Volume, geometry, moderation and interaction are controlled. Geometry |
| control could have been lost since the referenced drawing for the liner does |
| not meet the geometry requirements of the NCSE. Full reflection or an |
| interaction violation is required before a criticality configuration could |
| exist. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "The highest mass in any F-can with greater than 80% enriched material on |
| site is 304 grams U-235. Since this is 87% of safe mass, the safety |
| significance is low. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "The NCS control system is deficient since the NCSA references a steel liner |
| in a drawing that does not perform its intended function of reducing the |
| F-can liner diameter to 5 inches or less. The safety significance is low |
| since the mass in F-cans is low and an additional event such as full |
| reflection or a spacing violation would have to accompany an excessive F-can |
| mass before a criticality would be possible. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "A stop work notice was issued for favorable geometry vacuum cleaners when |
| enrichment is known or suspected to exceed 80%." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37163 |
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| FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:50[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSSELL BENNETT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
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| | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| UNIT OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS DUE TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE |
| |
| "At approximately 1610 on 7/11/2000, it was identified by plant walkdown |
| that in electrical switchgear Bus 142Y (1AP06B) cubicle 4 (for the Unit 1 B |
| Residual Heat Removal pump) that an unsealed borehole of approximately three |
| (3) inches in diameter existed. This borehole is located in the floor |
| separating the Unit 1 Division 2 Switchgear room from the Unit 1 Division 1 |
| switchgear room. The borehole is located in a three (3) hour rated fire |
| barrier that is required by Administrative Technical Requirement 3/4.7.6 |
| (Fire Rated Assemblies). This has been considered an event that is outside |
| the design basis due to required design basis protective features for safe |
| shutdown trains as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and Final Safety |
| Analysis Report [being] lacking. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have |
| been established per Administrative Technical Specifications and plans for |
| repairs are in progress." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee. |
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