Event Notification Report for March 10, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/09/2000 - 03/10/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36776 36777 36778 36779 36780 36781 36782
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36776 |
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| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:16[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:35[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL HILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |EDWARD MCALPINE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING |
| |
| The licensee has two control room chillers. The 'A' chiller tripped because |
| of low freon. The 'B' chiller was started and then tripped on two |
| occasions. Based on the unreliability of the 'B' chiller, the licensee |
| considered both chillers inoperable and entered Tech Spec 3.0.3 as a result. |
| The licensee will start reducing power of all three units at 1 percent per |
| hour at 1130. However they expect that they will have one chiller back in |
| service prior to reaching the 2235, the time the units need to be in mode |
| 3. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/9/00 @ 1329 BY CLARKSON TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| Actions were undertaken to restore the 'B' Chilled water train to operable |
| status. At 1246 hours, on March 9, 2000, the 'B' Chilled Water train was |
| returned to operable status and Technical Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.7.16, |
| Condition E were exited. The shutdown of all three Oconee units was also |
| halted at approximately 98% power and the units are being returned to 100%. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. |
| |
| The Reg 2 RDO (McAlpine) was notified. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36777 |
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| REP ORG: INSPECTION SERVICES COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|LICENSEE: INSPECTION SERVICES COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:40[EST]|
| CITY: PLYMOUTH REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: 10:30[EST]|
|LICENSE#: 21-26744-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ROGER LANKSBURY R3 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KRUZEL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| INSPECTION SERVICES CO. REPORTED THAT A HUMBOLDT MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE |
| MODEL 5001 SERIAL # 2996 WAS STOLEN FROM THEIR PICKUP TRUCK WHILE IT WAS |
| PARKED IN THEIR FACILITY PARKING LOT IN PLYMOUTH, MI. THE GAUGE WAS BOLTED |
| TO THE TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE THEFT. THE DEVICE CONTAINED 8 MILLICURIES |
| OF Cs-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES OF Am-241. THE LOCAL POLICE WERE NOTIFIED. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36778 |
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| REP ORG: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS CO. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|LICENSEE: BFGOODRICH COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:15[EST]|
| CITY: HANCOCK'S BRIDGE REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NJ |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GREG CRANSTON R1 |
| |VERN HODGE (via fax) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SUE SIMPSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT |
| |
| Replacement emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start motors were supplied |
| to PSE&G with grease on the bendix drive shafts. This did not meet the |
| requirements of the purchase order which stated: "Do not grease the bendix |
| drive: as per the vendor manual this is to be lubricated with SAE 10 oil." |
| Excessive grease on the bendix shaft could harden and prevent the drive |
| pinion from engaging the ring gear on the EDG flywheel during starting. |
| |
| The air start motors were supplied by: |
| |
| BFGoodrich Company (formerly Coltec Industries) |
| Fairbanks Morse Engine Division |
| 701 White Avenue |
| Beloit, WI 53511 |
| |
| Affected FMED Part #s: 21800136-1, 21800145, 21800146 and 21800147 |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36779 |
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| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:42[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:54[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERICK MATZKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| CONTROL ROOM DOSE RATE EXCEEDS STANDARD REVIEW PLAN LIMIT |
| |
| "The Fort Calhoun Station is in the process of revising and reanalyzing the |
| radiological consequences analysis for the plant as a result of corrective |
| actions for LERs 1998-012 and 1998-013. In the process it has been |
| determined that some of the assumptions made when the plant was constructed |
| in the early 1970s, about 30 years ago, need to be validated. An important |
| assumption that was brought into question was that the Control Room has zero |
| (0) standard cubic feet per minute (SCFM) unfiltered inleakage. The control |
| room envelope was recently tested and the unfiltered inleakage was |
| determined to be very small at 8 SCFM. This level of leakage leads to a |
| thyroid dose to the operators of about 32 rem. The Fort Calhoun Station USAR |
| commits the station to NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) section 6.4 which |
| states that the thyroid dose to the operators shall be no higher than 30 |
| rem. Higher thyroid doses have been approved for other plants and the dose |
| projected certainly would not incapacitate an operator. The calculated dose |
| is in excess of the current plant design basis. |
| |
| "Plant actions to date have included putting in place an Safety Analysis for |
| Operability (SAO) (similar to a Justification for Continued Operation [JCO]) |
| to allow the plant to continue operating in this condition. The plant has |
| been in communication with the NRC staff on the progress of this |
| radiological consequences reanalysis." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this report by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36780 |
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| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:54[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:47[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CALVIN WARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |EDWARD MCALPINE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| UNITS OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS DUE TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE |
| |
| Following is the abstract of an engineering document submitted to the NRC |
| Operations Center: |
| |
| "As part of the continuing resolution of fire protection program issues |
| identified during a Follow-up Fire Protection Functional Inspection at St. |
| Lucie in December 1999, a detailed review of Appendix R circuit separation |
| and protection for the Units 1 & 2 containment was performed. This review |
| considered the design and licensing basis for these features as described in |
| the Unit 1 & 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs), associated |
| NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs), Appendix R requirements and guidance |
| provided in Generic Letter 86-10. The review has identified a number of |
| separation issues for various safe shutdown circuits and/or components |
| credited for post-fire safe shutdown operations following a fire in |
| containment. The affected equipment is hi/lo pressure interface equipment |
| along with control and indication equipment associated with the reactor |
| coolant system." |
| |
| The discrepancies noted in the report affect the power operated relief |
| valves (PORVs), as well as pressurizer pressure and level instrumentation. |
| The licensee has determined that the conditions do not affect operability of |
| the affected equipment due to the low combustible material loading inside |
| the containment and the low probability that a fire would occur inside the |
| containment. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this report by |
| the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36781 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:56[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:18[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHITWOOD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION PLACED IN PRESSURIZATION MODE DUE TO SMOKE |
| |
| At 0906 PST, rod drive motor/generator set 1-2 tripped due to overcurrent. |
| Heavy smoke from burnt insulation was observed in the vicinity. In order to |
| prevent the smoke from entering the control room, the shift foreman directed |
| operators to manually place the control room ventilation system in |
| pressurization mode (mode 4). |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this report by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36782 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:04[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/09/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 03:32[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/09/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |ROGER LANKSBURY R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |THOMAS ESSIG NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "At 0332 hours on 03/09/2000, it was identified that an error had been made |
| in connecting a cell calibration test buggy, covered by NCSA-PLANT069, at |
| X-330 building cell 31-3-9. The cell was connected to the HI DAT (HI DATUM) |
| port instead of the PROCESS inlet port. The NCSA identifies installed |
| chemical traps on the test buggy as a passive design characteristic relied |
| upon to prevent an accumulation of uranium in the vacuum pump oil. The |
| installed traps are also a control contingency in preventing back flow of |
| vacuum pump oil to the cell manifold. Connection of the process system to |
| the HI DAT port bypassed these chemical traps and provided a direct flow |
| path between the process gas system and vacuum pump. |
| |
| "Establishing a connection between the vacuum pump and cell process gas |
| manifold constitutes a loss of one control of the double contingency control |
| principle. The cell calibration buggy was disconnected and it was determined |
| that no oil from the vacuum pump had migrated through the buggy to the cell |
| manifold. The potential for a criticality to occur is precluded based on the |
| amount of oil contained in the vacuum pump and by the assay of the material |
| at that point of the cascade. Pull compliance with NCSA-PLANT069 was |
| regained when the calibration buggy was disconnected from the cell |
| manifold. |
| |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "This event has a low safety significance. Due to operator error, the cell |
| was connected to the wrong inlet port This allowed the possibility that |
| process gas could bypass the chemical trap(s) and then collect in the oil |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump. The oil reservoir (limited to <= one quart) is |
| sized such that it is safe for 100% enriched material. The process gas that |
| may have entered the oil reservoir of the pump is approximately 2.25% |
| enriched. There is insufficient oil In the vacuum pump for a criticality to |
| occur. Additionally the test buggy has been disconnected from the cell. |
| Thus, there is no possibility of adding additional uranium to the oil |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "For a criticality to occur, sufficient UF6 would need to collect in the oil |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump and the vacuum pump would need to be replaced |
| with a different model such that the oil reservoir is large enough (greater |
| than 3 quarts) for a criticality to occur. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "This NCSA relied on preventing the accumulation of process gas from |
| collecting in the vacuum pump oil by placing a chemical trap upstream of the |
| vacuum pump. This control was lost. The second control was to limit the |
| amount of oil in the vacuum pump to less than 1 quart, which is less than |
| the minimum volume of oil required for a criticality at 100% U235. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "At this time it is not known if any UF6 reached the oil reservoir for the |
| vacuum pump. Enrichment in cell 31-3-9 is estimated to be 2.25% U-235. If |
| process gas reached the oil reservoir, it would be in the form of UF4/oil |
| mixture. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| "Nuclear criticality safety is maintained by two controls, the first Is the |
| placement of chemical traps upstream of the vacuum pump. This control was |
| lost. The second control was on the allowed volume of oil in the reservoir |
| of the vacuum pump. This control was maintained throughout the event. Thus, |
| one control relied on for double contingency was lost." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification. |
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