



Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

CNL-17-077

June 30, 2017

10 CFR 50.4

Attn: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68
NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296

Subject: **Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant's Sixth Six-Month Status Report in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)**

- References:
1. NRC Order Number EA-13-109, "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions," dated June 6, 2013 (ML13143A321)
 2. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2013-02, "Compliance with Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions," Revision 0, dated November 14, 2013 (ML13304B836)
 3. NEI 13-02, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with Order EA-13-109, BWR Mark I & II Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions," Revision 1, dated April 23, 2015 (ML15113B318)
 4. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Tennessee Valley Authority's Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated June 30, 2014 (ML14181B169)

5. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant First Six-Month Status Report in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated December 19, 2014 (ML14353A428)
6. Letter from NRC to TVA, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 1 of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) (TAC Nos. MF4540, MF4541 and MF4542)," dated February 11, 2015 (ML14356A362)
7. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2015-01, "Compliance with Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions," Revision 0, dated April 29, 2015 (ML15104A118)
8. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated June 29, 2015 (ML15181A338)
9. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Third Six-Month Status Report and Phase 1 and Phase 2 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated December 29, 2015 (ML15365A554)
10. Letter from TVA to NRC "Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fourth Six-Month Status Report in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated June 30, 2016 (ML16182A517)
11. Letter from TVA to NRC "Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant's Fifth Six-Month Status Report in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated December 22, 2016 (ML16357A577)

On June 6, 2013, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an Order (Reference 1) to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Reference 1 was immediately effective and directed TVA to install a reliable hardened venting capability for instances of pre-core damage and under severe accident conditions, including those involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris. Specific requirements are outlined in Attachment 2 of Reference 1.

Reference 1 required submission of a Phase 1 and Phase 2 Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) pursuant to Section IV, Condition D for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1, 2, and 3. References 2 and 7 endorse industry guidance document Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 13-02, Revision 1 (Reference 3) with clarifications and exceptions identified in References 2 and 7. Reference 3 provides direction regarding the content of the Phase 1 and Phase 2 OIPs and includes guidance for combining the OIPs.

Reference 4 provided TVA's Phase 1 OIP. The NRC issued its Interim Staff Evaluation relating to the BFN Phase 1 OIP on February 11, 2015 (Reference 6).

Reference 1 also requires submission of status reports at six-month intervals following submittal of the OIP. Reference 3 provides direction regarding the content of the status reports. TVA submitted the first six-month status report on December 19, 2014 (Reference 5), the second six-month status report on June 29, 2015 (Reference 8), the third six-month status report on December 29, 2015 (Reference 9), the fourth six-month status report on June 30, 2016 (Reference 10), and the fifth six-month status report on December 22, 2016 (Reference 11).

The purpose of this letter is to provide the combined Phase 1 and Phase 2 OIP six-month status report pursuant to Section IV, Condition D of Reference 1, which delineates progress made in implementing the requirements of Reference 1. The Enclosure provides an update of milestone accomplishments since submittal of the Phase 1 OIP (Reference 4) with previous updates (References 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11) and the initial Phase 2 OIP (Reference 9) with previous updates (References 10 and 11), including any changes to the compliance method, schedule, need for relief, and the basis for these changes.

There are no new regulatory commitments resulting from this submittal. If you have any question regarding this submittal, please contact Mike Oliver at (256) 729-7874.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 30th day of June 2017.

Respectfully,



J. W. Shea
Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs & Support Services

Enclosure

cc: See Page 4

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Enclosure: Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant's Sixth Six-Month Status Report for the Implementation of Order EA-13-109, "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions"

cc (w/Enclosure):

NRR Director - NRC Headquarters
NRO Director - NRC Headquarters
NRR JLD Director - NRC Headquarters
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II
NRR Project Manager - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
NRR JLD Project Manager - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

ENCLOSURE

Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant's Sixth Six-Month Status Report for the Implementation of Order EA-13-109, "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions"

1 Introduction

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) developed an Overall Integrated Plan (Reference 1 in Section 8) documenting the installation of a Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS) that provides a reliable hardened venting capability for instances of pre-core damage and under severe accident conditions, including those involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris, in response to Reference 2. Updates of milestone accomplishments will be based on the combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan dated December 29, 2015.

BFN developed an updated and combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan (Reference 7 in Section 8) documenting:

1. The installation of a Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS) that provides a reliable hardened venting capability for instances of pre-core damage and under severe accident conditions, including those involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris, in response to Reference 2.
2. An alternative venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a drywell vent is needed to protect the containment from overpressure related failure under severe accident conditions, including those that involve a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris, in response to Reference 2

This enclosure provides an update of milestone accomplishments since submittal of the combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan and previous update (Reference 10) including any changes to the compliance method, schedule, or need for relief/relaxation and the basis, if any.

2 Milestone Accomplishments

The following milestone(s) have been completed since the previous update (Reference 10). The status is current as of June 1, 2017.

Phase 1 Unit 2 Design Engineering on-site/Complete

Phase 1 Unit 2 Implementation Outage

Phase 1 Unit 2 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test

Phase 1 Unit 3 Design Engineering On-site/Complete

Phase 2 Modifications Evaluation

3 Milestone Schedule Status

The following provides an update to Part 5 of the combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan. It provides the activity status of each item and whether the expected completion date has changed. These dates are planning dates subject to change as design and implementation details are developed.

The revised milestone target completion dates do not impact the order implementation date.

Milestone	Target Completion Date	Activity Status	Comments {Include date changes in this column}
Phase 1 and 2 HCVS Milestone Table			
Submit Overall Integrated Plan	June 2014	Complete	
Submit 6 Month Updates:			
Update 1	December 2014	Complete	
Update 2	June 2015	Complete	
Update 3 [Simultaneous with Phase 2 OIP]	December 2015	Complete	
Update 4	June 2016	Complete	
Update 5	December 2016	Complete	
Update 6	June 2017	Complete with this submittal	
Update 7	December 2017	Not Started	
Update 8	June 2018	Not Started	
Update 9	December 2018	Not Started	

Phase 1 Specific Milestones			
Phase 1 Modifications:			
Hold preliminary/conceptual design meeting	November 2014	Complete	
Modifications Evaluation	November 2015	Complete	
Unit 1 Design Engineering On-site/Complete	April 2016	Complete	June 2016
Unit 1 Implementation Outage	November 2016	Complete	
Unit 1 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test	November 2016	Complete	
Unit 2 Design Engineering On-site/Complete	June 2016	Complete	December 2016
Unit 2 Implementation Outage	March 2017	Complete	
Unit 2 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test	April 2017	Complete	
Unit 3 Design Engineering On-site/Complete	July 2017	Complete	
Unit 3 Implementation Outage	March 2018	Not Started	
Unit 3 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test	April 2018	Not Started	
Phase 1 Procedure Changes Active			
Operations Procedure Changes Developed	July 2016	Complete	
Site Specific Maintenance Procedure Developed	July 2016	Complete	
Procedure Changes Active	November 2016	Complete	
Phase 1 Training:			
Training Complete	September 2016	Complete	

Phase 1 Completion			
Unit 1 HCVS Implementation	December 2016	Complete	
Unit 2 HCVS Implementation	April 2017	Complete	
Unit 3 HCVS Implementation	March 2018	Not Started	
Full Site HCVS Implementation	March 2018	Not Started	
Submit Completion Report [60 days after full site compliance]	June 2018	Not Started	
Phase 2 Specific Milestones			
Phase 2 Modifications:			
Hold preliminary/conceptual design meeting	January 2017	Complete	
Modifications Evaluation	April 2017	Complete	
Unit 3 Design Engineering On-site/Complete	May 2017	In Progress	September 2017
Unit 3 Implementation Outage	March 2018	Not Started	
Unit 3 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test	March 2018	Not Started	
Unit 1 Design Engineering On-site/Complete	December 2017	Not Started	
Unit 1 Implementation Outage	October 2018	Not Started	
Unit 1 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test	October 2018	Not Started	
Unit 2 Design Engineering On-site/Complete	May 2018	Not Started	
Unit 2 Implementation Outage	March 2019	Not Started	
Unit 2 Walk Through Demonstration/Functional Test	March 2019	Not Started	
Phase 2 Procedure Changes Active			
Operations Procedure Changes Developed	September 2017	In Progress	
Site Specific Maintenance Procedures Developed	December 2017	Not Started	
Procedure Changes Active	March 2018	Not Started	

Phase 2 Training:			
Training Complete	December 2017	Not Started	
Phase 2 Completion			
Unit 3 HCVS Implementation	March 2018	Not Started	
Unit 1 HCVS Implementation	October 2018	Not Started	
Unit 2 HCVS Implementation	March 2019	Not Started	
Full Site HCVS Implementation	March 2019	Not Started	
Submit Completion Report [60 days after full site compliance]	May 2019	Not Started	

4 Changes to Compliance Method

The following is a list of changes made to the information provided in the Combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan (Reference 7). These changes were made to clarify the OIP and provide more specific information because the design process is further along than previously anticipated. These changes meet the NEI 13-02 compliance method.

- Attachment 7. Added Phase 2 ISE Open Items.
- Attachment 7. Updated OIP Open Item 1 and 3 to include closure documentation for Units 2 and 3.
- Attachment 7. Updated OIP Open Item 4 to include closure documentation for Unit 2.
- Attachment 7. Updated ISE Open Items 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 to include closure documentation for Units 2 and 3.
- Attachment 7. Updated ISE Open Items 2, 8, 9, and 10 to include closure documentation for Unit 2.
- Page 29 of 86. Revised Key Parameter chart to include Unit 2 Component Identifiers.
- Page 52-54 of 86. Updated Part 5 Milestone Schedule.

There are no changes to the compliance method as documented in the combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan (Reference 7).

5 Need for Relief/Relaxation and Basis for the Relief/Relaxation

BFN expects to comply with the order implementation date and no relief/relaxation is required at this time.

6 Open Items from Combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan and Interim Staff Evaluations

The following tables provide a summary of the open items documented in the combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan or the Interim Staff Evaluation (ISE) and the status of each item.

Combined Phase 1 and 2 OIP Open Item	Status
Phase 1 Open Items	
<p>1. Perform an assessment of temperature and radiological conditions to ensure that operating personnel can safely access and operate controls at the Remote Operating Station based on time constraints listed in Attachment 2.</p>	<p>Closed - An assessment was completed and documented in the Design Change Technical Evaluation of DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, DCN 71391 for Unit 3, calculation MDQ0000642015000351 "HCVS Operator (Mission) Dose Calculation," and calculation MDQ0009992014000291 "Temperature Response of the Reactor Building Following an Extended Loss of AC Power." (This calculation also evaluates the temperature response in the Unit 1/2 and Unit 3 Diesel Building during an ELAP event.)</p>
<p>2. Perform an evaluation for HCVS ability to operate from the MCR and has the ability to be supplied adequate amounts of pneumatic pressure for 24 hour actions.</p>	<p>Closed - An evaluation was performed and documented in calculation MDQ0000322015000347 R0, HCVS Nitrogen System Sizing Analysis, and DCN 71389.</p>
<p>3. Perform an evaluation for FLEX portable generators and nitrogen cylinders use past 24 hour actions.</p>	<p>Closed - An evaluation was performed for FLEX portable generators and documented in a White Paper reviewed during FLEX audit and documented in "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Report for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051" (ML15069A358).</p> <p>A nitrogen cylinder use evaluation was performed and documented in DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, DCN 71391 for Unit 3 and calculation MDQ0000322015000347 "HCVS Nitrogen System Sizing Analysis." A combination of installed and dedicated nitrogen cylinder carts will be used to provide a seven-day supply of nitrogen.</p>
<p>4. Revise 1/2/3-EOI Appendix-13 to include venting for loss of DC power.</p>	<p>Closed for Unit 1 - 1-EOI Appendix-13, Revision 3 was revised to include venting for loss of DC power.</p> <p>Closed for Unit 2 - 2-EOI Appendix-13, Revision 9 was revised to include venting for loss of DC power.</p> <p>Unit 3 - In Progress</p>

<p>5. Perform an evaluation for FLEX portable generators use for post 24 hour actions in Severe Accident conditions.</p>	<p>Closed - An evaluation for FLEX portable generator use for post 24 hour actions was performed and documented in Engineering Information Record from AREVA (R06161114360), Projected Dose Rate Contour Map of Shine from the HCVS Vent Line Extending Above Refueling Floor (BFN).</p>
<p>6. Electrical load shedding will be performed in 1 hour of the event.</p>	<p>Closed (Reference 6) - Calculation EDQ0009992013000202 R3, 250V DC Unit Batteries, 1, 2, & 3 Evaluation for the Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE) ELAP, has been issued to determine load shedding impact on the unit batteries.</p>
<p>7. The implementation of the HCVS DCN's will be staged so that there is no effect on the operating units.</p>	<p>Closed (Reference 6) - A conceptual meeting was held in November 2014, and a staging plan was used to separate the existing HWWV from the HCVS.</p>
<p>8. The wetwell vent will be designed to remove 1% of rated thermal power at EPU conditions.</p>	<p>Closed (Reference 6) - The existing wetwell vent (CLTP) and the HCVS (EPU) have been designed for 1 percent of rated thermal power at EPU conditions.</p>
<p>9. Implement the Harris Radio System for communication between the MCR and the ROS.</p>	<p>Closed - A communication system has been implemented that uses hand held radios for communication between the main control room and the remote operating station. (DCN 70852)</p>

Phase 2 Open Items	
1. Perform an evaluation for the locations of the SAWA equipment and controls, as well as ingress and egress paths for the expected Severe Accident conditions (temperature, humidity, radiation) for the Sustained Operating period.	In Progress
2. Perform an hydraulic evaluation to ensure flow adequacy can be met for all 3 units using 1 FLEX pump to support SAWA flow requirement	In Progress
Phase 1 Interim Staff Evaluation Open Item	Status
1. Make available for NRC staff audit an evaluation of temperature and radiological conditions to ensure that operating personnel can safely access and operate controls and support equipment.	Closed - An assessment was completed and documented in the Design Change Technical Evaluation of DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, and DCN 71391 for Unit 3, calculation MDQ0000642015000351 "HCVS Operator (Mission) Dose Calculation", and calculation MDQ0009992014000291 "Temperature Response of the Reactor Building Following an Extended Loss of AC Power." (This calculation also evaluates the temperature response in the Unit 1/2 and Unit 3 Diesel Building during an ELAP event.) Documentation is available for audit.
2. Make available for NRC audit documentation that procedure 1/2/3-EOI Appendix-13 has been revised to include venting for loss of dc power.	Closed for Unit 1 - 1-EOI Appendix-13, Revision 3 was revised to include venting for loss of DC power. Closed for Unit 2 - 2-EOI Appendix-13, Revision 9 was revised to include venting for loss of DC power. Documentation is available for audit. Unit 3 - In Progress
3. Make available for NRC staff audit documentation demonstrating that all load sheds will be accomplished within one hour of event initiation and will occur in an area not impacted by a possible radiological event.	Closed - Calculation EDQ0009992013000202 R3, 250V DC Unit Batteries, 1, 2, & 3 Evaluation for the Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE) Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP), has been issued to determine load shedding impact on the unit batteries, and is available for audit.

Phase 1 Interim Staff Evaluation Open Item	Status
4. Make available for NRC staff audit documentation that demonstrates that operating units that have not implemented the order will be able to vent through the existing vent system unaffected by the implementation of HCVS on other units.	Closed - A conceptual meeting was held in November 2014, and a staging plan was used to separate the existing HWWV from the HCVS. Documentation is available for audit.
5. Make available for NRC staff audit analyses demonstrating that HCVS has the capacity to vent the steam/energy equivalent of one percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a lower value is justified), and that the suppression pool and the HCVS together are able to absorb and reject decay heat, such that following a reactor shutdown from full power containment pressure is restored and then maintained below the primary containment design pressure and the primary containment pressure limit.	Closed - The existing wetwell vent (CLTP) and the HCVS (EPU) have been designed for 1 percent of rated thermal power at EPU conditions. Analyses are available for audit.
6. Make available for NRC staff audit documentation that demonstrates adequate communication between the remote HCVS operation locations and HCVS decision makers during ELAP and severe accident conditions.	Closed - A communication system has been implemented that uses hand held radios for communication between the main control room and the remote operating station (DCN 70852). Documentation is available for audit.
7. Make available for NRC staff audit documentation of an evaluation verifying the existing containment isolation valves, relied upon for the HCVS, will open under the maximum expected differential pressure during BDBEE and severe accident wetwell venting.	Closed - An evaluation was performed and concluded that the containment isolation valves will open under the maximum expected differential pressure and is documented in FLOWSERVE Report RAL-70181, Design Review Report of Size 14 Class 150 Wafer Butterfly Valve with Pneumatic Actuator R1. Documentation is available for audit.
8. Make available for NRC staff audit documentation of a seismic qualification evaluation of HCVS components.	<p>Closed for Unit 1 and Unit 2 - All electrical and I&C components were procured as seismically qualified or as Seismic Class I to ensure their functionality following a seismic event. Seismic qualification reports of HCVS components are available for audit.</p> <p>Unit 3 - In Progress</p>

Phase 1 Interim Staff Evaluation Open Item	Status
9. Make available for NRC staff audit descriptions of all instrumentation and controls (existing and planned) necessary to implement this order including qualification methods.	Closed for Unit 1 and Unit 2-Instrumentation and controls necessary to implement this order including equipment description, location, and qualifications are available for audit. Unit 3 - In Progress
10. Make available for NRC staff audit the descriptions of local conditions (temperature, radiation and humidity) anticipated during ELAP and severe accident for the components (valves, instrumentation, sensors, transmitters, indicators, electronics, control devices, and etc.) required for HCVS venting including confirmation that the components are capable of performing their functions during ELAP and severe accident conditions.	Closed for Unit 1 and Unit 2 -Descriptions of local conditions (temperature, radiation and humidity) anticipated during ELAP and severe accident for the components (valves, instrumentation, sensors, transmitters, indicators, electronics, control devices, and etc.) required for HCVS venting including confirmation that the components are capable of performing their functions during ELAP and severe accident conditions are available for audit. Unit 3 - In Progress
11. Make available for NRC staff audit the final sizing evaluation for HCVS batteries/battery charger including incorporation into FLEX DG loading calculation.	Closed - HCVS batteries/battery charger final sizing evaluation was performed and documented in the Design Change Technical Evaluation of DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2 and DCN 71391 for Unit 3. There is no incorporation of the HCVS battery/battery charger required into the FLEX DG loading calculation due to no plans or requirements to recharge the HCVS battery after depletion. The HCVS electrical loads will be aligned back to their normal power supply which is the Unit Battery. The recharging of the Unit Battery is incorporated into the FLEX DG loading calculations. Calculation EDQ0003602014000281 R3 "Electrical Evaluation for Portable Power Supply for Unit Battery Chargers" and calculation EDQ0003602015000325 R1 "Electrical Evaluation for 4KV Spare FLEX Turbine Generators." Documentation is available for audit.
12. Make available for NRC staff audit documentation of the HCVS nitrogen pneumatic system design including sizing and location.	Closed - Evaluation has been completed and documented in calculation MDQ0000322015000347 R1, HCVS Nitrogen System Sizing Analysis, DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, and DCN 71391 for Unit 3. Documentation is available for audit.

Phase 1 Interim Staff Evaluation Open Item	Status
13. Make available for NRC staff audit the seismic and tornado missile final design criteria for the HCVS stack.	Closed - Tornado and seismic missile criteria are located in System 64A Design Criteria Document (DCD). As part of DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, and DCN 71391 for Unit 3 a markup reflecting these changes has been generated and will be incorporated in the next revision of the DCD per TVA process. Documentation is available for audit.
14. Provide a description of the final design of the HCVS to address hydrogen detonation and deflagration.	Closed - The final design of HCVS at BFN to address hydrogen detonation and deflagration is the installation of a check valve near the vent discharge release point. A description of this design is contained in the Technical Evaluation for DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, and DCN 71391 for Unit 3. Documentation is available for audit.
15. Provide a description of the strategies for hydrogen control that minimizes the potential for hydrogen gas migration and ingress into the reactor building or other buildings.	Closed -The HCVS provides a direct vent path from the wetwell to an exhaust point above the Reactor Building Roof in accordance with NEI 13-02 section 4.1.5. This is a leak tight system with no boundary valves outside the PCIV's that would allow hydrogen gas migration and ingress into the Reactor Building or other buildings. Per NEI 13-02 FAQ-04 an effluent release velocity of 8000 fpm will assure that the effluent plume will not be entrained into the roof recirculation zone of a given building. A description of this design is contained in the Technical Evaluation for DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, and DCN 71391 for Unit 3. Documentation is available for audit.
16. Provide design details that minimize unintended cross flow of vented fluids within a unit and between units on the site.	Closed -The BFN design includes a separate HCVS stack for each unit as well as meeting the testing criteria and valve requirements for PCIVs, control and boundary valves. A description of this design is contained in the Technical Evaluation for DCN 71389 for Unit 1, DCN 71390 for Unit 2, and DCN 71391 for Unit 3. Documentation is available for audit.

Phase 2 Interim Staff Evaluation Open Item	Status
1. Licensee to perform a hydraulic evaluation to ensure flow adequacy can be met for all 3 units using 1 FLEX pump to support SAWA flow requirement.	In Progress
2. Licensee to evaluate the SAWA equipment and controls, as well as the ingress and egress paths for the expected severe accident conditions (temperature, humidity, radiation) for the sustained operating period.	In Progress
3. Licensee to demonstrate how SAWA flow is capable to perform its intended function for the sustained operating period under the expected temperature and radiological conditions.	In Progress
4. Licensee to demonstrate that containment failure as a result of overpressure can be prevented without a drywell vent during severe accident conditions.	In Progress
5. Licensee to demonstrate how the plant is bounded by the reference plant analysis that shows the SAWM strategy is successful in making it unlikely that a drywell vent is needed.	In Progress
6. Licensee to demonstrate that there is adequate communication between the MCR and the operator at the FLEX pump during severe accident conditions.	In Progress

7 Interim Staff Evaluation Impacts

There are no potential impacts to the Interim Staff Evaluation(s) identified at this time.

8 References

The following references support the updates to the combined Phase 1 and 2 Overall Integrated Plan described in this enclosure.

1. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Tennessee Valley Authority's Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated June 30, 2014 (ML14181B169)
2. NRC Order Number EA-13-109, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions," dated June 6, 2013 (ML13143A321)
3. NEI 13-02, "Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-13-109, 'To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions,' Revision 1, dated April 2015 (ML15113B318)
4. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2013-02, "Compliance with Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions," Revision 0, dated November 2013 (ML13304B836).
5. NRC Endorsement of industry "Hardened Containment Venting System (HCVS) Phase 1 Overall Integrated Plan Template (EA-13-109) Rev 0," dated May 14, 2014 (ML14128A219).
6. JLD-ISG-2012-01, "Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events," dated August 29, 2012 (ML12229A174)
7. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Third Six-Month Status Report and Phase 1 and Phase 2 Overall Integrated Plan in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated December 29, 2015 (ML15365A554)
8. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2015-01, "Compliance with Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions," Revision 0, dated April 2015 (ML15104A118).
9. Letter from TVA to NRC "Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fourth Six-Month Status Report in Response to the June 6, 2013 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Order Number EA-13-109)," dated June 30, 2016 (ML16182A517)
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11. Letter from NRC to TVA, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 2 of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) (CAC Nos. MF4540, MF4541 and MF4542)," dated September 6, 2016 (ML16244A762)