



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 27, 2014

Mr. Ernest Kapopolous
Vice President
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562

**SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 – STAFF
ASSESSMENT OF THE FLOODING WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3
RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0233)**

Dear Mr. Kapopolous:

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Section 50.54(f) (the 50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions that may be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tōhoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures.

By letter dated November 27, 2012, Duke Energy submitted a Flooding Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 site. By letter dated January 29, 2014, Duke Energy provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the staff to complete its assessments.

The licensee was to complete the delayed walkdown items during the November 2013 refueling outage, consistent with its regulatory commitment. By letter dated June 26, 2014, the licensee submitted the results of the delayed walkdown items.


The NRC staff has determined, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, that sufficient information has been provided to be responsive to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.

E. Kapopolous

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If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-2760 or by e-mail at Martha.Barillas@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Martha Barillas".

Martha Barillas, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

Enclosures:

1. Staff Assessment of Flooding Walkdown Report

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STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE FLOODING WALKDOWN REPORT
NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO
THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT

DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, INC.

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-400

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2012,¹ the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f) (the 50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 4, "Recommendation 2.3: Flooding,"² to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct flooding walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC.

The 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to include the following:

- a. Describe the design basis flood hazard level(s) for all flood-causing mechanisms, including groundwater ingress.
- b. Describe protection and migration features that are considered in the licensing basis evaluation to protect against external ingress of water into structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety.
- c. Describe any warning systems to detect the presence of water in rooms important to safety.
- d. Discuss the effectiveness of flood protection systems and exterior, incorporated, and temporary flood barriers. Discuss how these systems and barriers were evaluated using the acceptance criteria developed as part of Requested Information item 1.h.
- e. Present information related to the implementation of the walkdown process (e.g., details of selection of the walkdown team and procedures) using the documentation template

¹ Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340.

² ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A050.

Enclosure

discussed in Requested Information item 1.j, including actions taken in response to the peer review.

- f. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision 1, Revision to the NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the corrective action program.
- g. Document any cliff-edge effects identified and the associated basis. Indicate those that were entered into the corrective action program. Also include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these effects.
- h. Describe any other planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures including flood barriers that further enhance the flood protection. Identify results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.

In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 4, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the flooding walkdown guidance. By letter dated May 21, 2012,³ the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff submitted NEI 12-07, Revision 0, "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features" to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31, 2012,⁴ the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance.

By letter dated November 27, 2012,⁵ Duke Energy (the licensee), provided a response to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. The NRC staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) to the licensee regarding the available physical margin (APM) dated December 23, 2013.⁶ The licensee responded by letter dated January 29, 2014.⁷ The licensee provided the results of the delayed walkdown items by letter dated June 26, 2014.⁸

The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The SSCs important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of Appendix A "Seismic and Geological Criteria for Nuclear

³ ADAMS Package Accession No. ML121440522.

⁴ ADAMS Accession No. ML12144A142.

⁵ ADAMS Accession No. ML12335A289.

⁶ ADAMS Accession No. ML13325A891.

⁷ ADAMS Accession No. ML14030A102.

⁸ ADAMS Accession No. ML14177A574.

Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” Criterion 2: “Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena;” and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100. Criterion 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.

For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions to be performed by an SSC, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design.

The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.

The current licensing basis (CLB) is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, and a licensee’s written commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis that are in effect.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Design Basis Flooding Hazard for the Harris Nuclear Power Plant

The licensee reported that the design basis flood hazard for the Harris site is a probable maximum flood event (PMF) occurring in combination with wave runup and wind setup. The licensee reported that the elevation corresponding to the PMF for the HNP site is 257.7 feet (ft) above mean sea level (MSL). The grade elevation for the power block and other safety-related SSCs at the HNP site is 261 ft MSL.

The principal water source for the Harris site is a man-made reservoir (hereafter the Main Reservoir) formed by the impoundment of Buckhorn Creek whose stillwater elevation is reported to be 220 ft MSL. There is also an adjoining yet independent so-called Auxiliary Reservoir that is available for emergency cooling purposes whose stillwater elevation is reported as 252 ft MSL. During the PMF event, the licensee estimated that these water bodies have a combined effects elevation (taking into account both wave runup and wind setup) of, respectively, 243.1 ft and 258 ft MSL. The licensee reported for the purposes of the site’s PMF, the 258-ft flood elevation for the Auxiliary Reservoir was applied to the Emergency Service Water (ESW) intake channel connecting that reservoir to the site. By superimposing a combined wind wave and run-up effects elevation of 1.7 ft generated in that channel with the existing 258-ft flood elevation for the Auxiliary Reservoir, the combined design basis flood hazard elevation of 257.7 ft MSL for the site was obtained.

Based on analyses described in its Walkdown Report, the licensee noted that the Harris site is not considered to be susceptible to flooding by local intense precipitation, dam failures, ice/snow melt, or channel migration. The site is also not adjacent to any coastal area and, therefore, not vulnerable to flooding by tsunami, tidal surge, or seiche.

The HNP site is underlain by ground water; the depth to the water table is reported by the licensee to be 251 ft MSL. The licensee reported that all substructures below the 251-ft elevation at the site are designed to withstand a full hydrostatic head of groundwater. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have described the design basis flood hazard level requested in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance.

3.2 Flood Protection and Mitigation

3.2.1 Flood Protection and Mitigation Description

The licensee stated that the CLB flood protection of all structures at the Harris site is to an elevation of 261 ft MSL, with the plant grade at 260.0 ft MSL. The licensee reported that the maximum flood water elevation estimated by the licensee is 257.7 ft MSL.

The licensee reported that most of the principle buildings and structures at the Harris site are defined to withstand the effects of a design basis flood or flood condition. The licensee also stated that the site's drainage characteristics are generally down-grade and away from the plant site. A site storm drainage system has also been installed to divert surface runoff away from plant buildings. The integrated drainage system relies on artificial contour grading, drainage ditches, and storm drain pipes. Collectively, this man-made system passively conveys surface water away from site structures to the Main Reservoir, the Auxiliary Reservoir, or the ESW intake channel.

3.2.2 Incorporated and Exterior Barriers

The licensee reported that flood protection measures intended to protect safety-related systems and equipment are passive features that were incorporated into the original Harris site design and are now credited in the CLB. For example, the Main Dam and Spillway, Auxiliary Dam and Spillway, Dikes, Intake Channel, and ESW systems are reported by the licensee to be designed to withstand the effects of the design basis flood hazard level. Other safety-related SSCs are reported by the licensee to be above the design basis flood elevation.

The licensee stated that the maximum water elevation that would occur during a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) event due to local intense precipitation would be 261.27 ft MSL; this flood elevation is based on the assumption that the site's drainage systems are blocked. Although this flooding scenario produces a higher water elevation, by definition, it is a short-term event and was not considered by the licensee to be the controlling flooding event given its limited duration. Nevertheless, the licensee noted that PMP-related surface ponding would not affect the ability of the site to achieve a safe shutdown state. For example, the licensee reported that safety-related structures that have entrances below 261 ft MSL are protected against ponding by virtue of watertight doors and structural barriers such as entrance curbs whose minimum elevation is 262 ft MSL. The licensee further stated that the ponded storm water expected to collect between the Retaining Wall and Fuel Handling Building is pumped into the storm drainage system using dedicated sumps and pumps. The licensee stated that the CLB includes the possibility that all storm drainage system-related pumps fail, which would result in water ponding to an elevation of 236.0 ft MSL in the Powerhouse Yard. As a

precaution, the licensee reported that penetrations below the 236-ft elevation, adjacent to both the Fuel Handling Building and the Waste Processing Building, have been sealed.

The licensee reported that the Containment Building (CB) was water-proofed using an impervious PVC membrane positioned between the foundation mat and the underlying bedrock. The PVC membrane is reported to function by preferentially directing percolating ground water into a dedicated CB sump/pump system. The license reported that the CB sump pump system is a two-unit redundant system. In the event that this system fails, the licensee reported that the sump contents will overflow into the CB floor drain system whose threshold elevation is 194 ft MSL; the reported bottom elevation of the Unit 1 reactor steel liner is 210 ft MSL, so no hydrostatic loads are expected given the amount of freeboard.

The licensee noted that openings at an elevation below 234 ft MSL in the Unit 2 buildings have been closed and are waterproofed to minimize water seepage into Unit 1 (the Unit 2 nuclear plant project was cancelled). Any storm water that happens to collect within the Unit 2 Auxiliary and the Containment Buildings, by design, is to drain into a centrally-located sump/pump system that has been sized to the estimated PMP. The wall heights in these buildings are reported to be adequate for the water levels expected should this dedicated sump/pump system fail.

The licensee stated that all safety-related structures as well as the Tank Building are designed to withstand roof ponding during the PMP event. The maximum depth of ponding on safety-related structures is 1.5 feet. There are two areas in the Tank Building that have no roof, therefore, the walls of this building are reported to have been designed to withstand a maximum ponding water depth of 23.36 ft.

The licensee discussed the robustness of electrical manholes, duct runs, and other underground cable systems to surface water flooding. The licensee reported that all below-grade electrical conveyances can perform their intended functions under the design basis flood; it was also noted that all electrical manholes have dedicated sumps that can be pumped dry with portable pumps.

The licensee discussed the Main Reservoir sacrificial spoil fill berm, whose elevation is reported to be 245 ft MSL, and is located between the Powerhouse Yard and the Main Reservoir. In the event of a probable maximum hurricane, the berm, whose width is 300 ft, will be allowed to erode.

The licensee reported that because safety-related equipment would not be jeopardized during the PMF (or transient PMP), it would not be necessary to place the reactor into a cold shutdown condition.

3.2.3 Temporary Barriers and Other Manual Actions

The licensee did not identify any temporary barriers and other manual actions in its Walkdown Report that require manual operator action in the event of a flood threat.

3.2.4 Reasonable Simulation and Results

The licensee noted that the Harris site does not include any temporary or active features that would require the implementation of a procedure for the performance of manual or operator actions for the flood protection features to perform their intended functions. The licensee reported that there were unspecified numbers of doors and hatches that would be manually closed in the event of a flood risk. The licensee reported that these features are monitored under an existing monitoring and maintenance program for the site, and based on past experience, require minimal operator actions to secure.

3.2.5 Conclusion

Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have described protection and mitigation features as in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance.

3.3 Warning Systems

The licensee reported that the Harris site has no external warning systems intended to identify flooding of the site. The licensee did note that there are internal systems in-place that monitor internal floods. Nevertheless, the licensee noted that this internal water-level warning system would also be available to detect water from external sources.

Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have provided information to describe any warning systems as requested in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance.

3.4 Effectiveness of Flood Protection Features

The licensee stated that the worst hydrological condition at the Harris site is a combined PMF event occurring within the Powerhouse yard. The licensee's statements concluding that the credited flood protection features are effective are based on observations made during the walkdown and reasonable simulations performed by the licensee. All features inspected that were not immediately acceptable were entered into the licensee's CAP. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have discussed the effectiveness of flood protection features as requested in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance.

3.5 Walkdown Methodology

By letter dated June 11, 2012,⁹ the licensee responded to the 50.54(f) letter that it intended to utilize the NRC-endorsed walkdown guidelines contained in NEI 12-07, "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features."¹⁰ The licensee's walkdown submittal dated November 27, 2012, indicated that the licensee implemented the walkdowns consistent with the intent of the guidance provided in NEI 12-07. The licensee did

⁹ ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A199.

¹⁰ ADAMS Accession No. ML12173A215.

not identify any exceptions from NEI 12-07.

Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have presented information related to the implementation of the walkdown process as requested in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance.

3.6 Walkdown Results

3.6.1 Walkdown Scope

The licensee performed walkdowns of CLB flood protection features at the Harris site. The exact number of features inspected was not specified, but the licensee reported that walkdowns were performed on the following broad classes of flood protection features: safety-related concrete structures (and their walls), penetration seals, floor hatches, and credited non-watertight doors. The licensee also reported that inspections were conducted on the site's drainage features, such as rip-rap (wall of broken stone), swales and channels, to ensure that they were still functional and had not been degraded by erosion or overgrowth. The licensee relied on visual inspections, comparison of as-built designs to original design drawings, and reviews of maintenance and monitoring programs to determine the physical condition of the features inspected.

The licensee noted that flood protection features at the Harris site do not include any temporary or active features that would require the implementation of a procedure for the performance of those manual/operator actions, therefore the licensee stated that no reasonable simulations were performed. The licensee reported that there are testing, monitoring, and maintenance programs in-place to ensure the functionality of site SSCs.

The licensee did not discuss the modes of operation and concurrent environmental conditions that were considered for the walkdowns.

The licensee used acceptance criteria consistent with the intent of NEI 12-07. Items that did not meet the NEI 12-07 acceptance criteria were documented in the Harris CAP.

3.6.2 Licensee Evaluation of Flood Protection Effectiveness, Key Findings, and Identified Deficiencies

The licensee performed an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the Harris site's flood protection features. As a result of its walkdown inspections, flood protection mitigation measures were found to be acceptable, not degraded, and capable of performing their intended design function as credited in the CLB. There are no operator actions that are credited for external flood protection for the Harris site.

NEI 12-07 defines a deficiency as follows: "a deficiency exists when a flood protection feature is unable to perform its intended function when subject to a design basis flooding hazard." The licensee identified deficiencies during the course of the flood walkdowns. The licensee noted 39 deficiencies with regard to inadequate, degraded or missing seals, building curb gaps, and floor openings at specific building locations with missing waterstops. The licensee further noted that

the identified deficiencies were to be resolved through corrective work orders, engineering changes, or condition reports to be addressed in the context of the CAP for the site.

NEI 12-07 specifies that licensees identify potential deficiencies in the CAP that were not yet dispositioned at the time the walkdown report was submitted. The licensee identified twelve potential deficiencies in its Walkdown Report (pages 8 through 11) awaiting disposition.

3.6.3 Flood Protection and Mitigation Enhancements

There are no recently implemented or planned enhancements to the Harris site identified by the licensee that are intended to improve or increase flood protection and mitigation.

3.6.4 Planned or Newly Installed Features

The licensee noted that it was evaluating permanent options available to prevent low curb areas on the roof of the Auxiliary Reactor Building from becoming a flooding pathway. As an interim measure, the licensee reported that it would use sandbags to improve the amount of freeboard (3 inches) needed at this particular location.

3.6.5 Deficiencies Noted and Actions Taken or Planned to Address

The licensee noted specific deficiencies (listed in section 3.6.2, above), and the actions taken or planned to address those deficiencies. The licensee stated that most of the deficiencies were resolved through the CAP prior to submission of the Walkdown Report. The licensee analyzed the concrete curb gap at the Turbine Building including water flow through the gaps, and a resolution is being determined.

3.6.6 Staff Analysis of Walkdowns

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee Walkdown Report dated November 27, 2012. As part of the walkdown effort, the licensee evaluated the capability of flood protection features of the Harris site by conducting a series of visual inspections. Some deficiencies were identified by the licensee and are being remedied through corrective work orders, engineering changes, or condition reports. Only one enhancement to the site's flood protection features was identified as a result of the walkdowns by the licensee and is currently under review. Overall, the licensee confirmed that credited design features were in-place, available, and capable of performing their intended flood protection or mitigation functions. The licensee did not describe any temporary barriers and other manual actions that would require operator action in the event of a flood threat; the licensee made no reference to having performed a "Reasonable Simulation."

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee submitted information on the condition of the flood protection and corrective actions taken or being taken. Staff reviewed the procedure and processes the licensee used to perform the walkdown, which included visual inspections and comparison to design documents.

Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have provided results of the walkdown and has described planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation

measures as requested in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance. Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.

3.6.7 Available Physical Margin

NRC staff issued an RAI to the licensee regarding the APM on December 23, 2013.¹¹ The licensee responded with a letter dated January 29, 2014.¹² The licensee reviewed its APM determination process, and stated that all APMs were determined consistent with the intent of NEI 12-07. Staff reviewed the response and concluded that the licensee met the intent of the APM determination per NEI 12-07.

Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have documented the information requested for any cliff-edge effects, as requested in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance. Further, the staff reviewed the response and concludes that the licensee met the intent of the APM determination per NEI 12-07.

3.7 NRC Oversight

3.7:1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors

On June 27, 2012, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/187, "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns." In accordance with the TI, NRC inspectors independently verified that the licensee implemented the flooding walkdowns consistent with the intent of the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of flood protection features. The inspection report dated April 30, 2013,¹³ documents the results of this inspection. No findings of significance were identified.

4.0 STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS NOT WALKED DOWN

The licensee identified both restricted access and inaccessible features that were not inspected and provided a supplement to the NRC staff by letter dated June 26, 2014.

4.1 Restricted Access

The licensee identified 110 features or areas of the Harris plant for which there was restricted access as defined by NEI 12-07. These were wall penetration seals for which the licensee provided justification for the delay in walkdowns of restricted access features. The reasons provided included elevated seals that required equipment removal, confined space entry, hatches that required metal cover removal, and scaffolding construction required. The licensee inspected all features during the fall 2013 refueling outage.

¹¹ ADAMS Accession No. ML13325A891.

¹² ADAMS Accession No. ML14034A170.

¹³ ADAMS Accession No. ML13120A340.

4.2 Inaccessible Features

The licensee reported that there were 19 features in specific locations of the Harris plant that were not inspected because of physical inaccessibility. The licensee noted that the features in question generally included penetration seals and waterstops.

The licensee provided a basis for assurance that inaccessible features identified were available and would perform their credited flood protection functions. The licensee reported that inspection of accessible areas adjacent to these features revealed that they were generally in good condition and displayed no adverse conditions that might call into question the functionality of the feature in question. In a few instances, the licensee reported some signs of water leakage, and the features in question were repaired. The licensee also reported it relied on engineering design documents for the plant to aid in its review determinations, as well as the site's ongoing maintenance and monitoring programs. Based on these factors, the licensee has stated that there is assurance that the inaccessible features are available and functional.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of flooding walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The staff concludes that the licensee, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and in accordance with plant processes and procedures, verified the plant configuration with the current flooding licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed flooding conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore, the staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified. The NRC staff acknowledges that the licensee was to have completed the delayed walkdown items during the refueling outage completed in November 2013, consistent with the regulatory commitment. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.

E. Kapopolous

- 2 -

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-2760 or by e-mail at Martha.Barillas@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA by AHon for/

Martha Barillas, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-400

Enclosures:

1. Staff Assessment of Flooding Walkdown Report

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ADAMS Accession No.: ML14169A520

*** concurrence by e-mail**

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