NUREG/CP-0301
Volume 2 of 2

EPRI 3002000267

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)-2010

Module 4: Fire Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)

Based on the Joint
NRC-RES/EPRI Training Workshops
Conducted in 2010

September 27 and October 25, 2010
Bethesda, MD

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August 2013

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This report describes research sponsored jointly by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and EPRI.

The report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)-2010, NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 2 – Module 4: Human Reliability Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, NUREG/CP-0301 and EPRI 3002000267.

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted a joint public meeting consisting of a fire PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) course on September 27 – October 1 and October 25 - 29, 2010 at the Legacy Hotel and Conference Centre in Rockville, MD. The purpose of the course was to provide detailed, hands-on training on the fire PRA methodology described in the technical document, NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) entitled "EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities." This fire PRA methodology document supports implementation of the risk-informed, performance-based rule 10CFR50.48(c) endorsing National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, as well as other applications such as exemptions or deviations to our current regulations and fire protection Significance Determination Process phase 3 applications.

RES and EPRI provided training in four subject areas: Fire Analysis, PRA, Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and Electrical Analysis. Participants selected one of these subject areas and spent the duration of the course in the module that covered the subject area that they selected. 2010 was the first year that a separate HRA module was included in the course. It covered the newly developed HRA guidance provided in draft NUREG-1921, "EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines." This volume and its accompanying DVD contain the materials presented in the HRA module.

The material in this NUREG/CP was recorded at the workshops conducted in 2010, and adapted by RES Fire Research Branch members for use as an alternative training method for those who were unable to physically attend the training sessions. This report can also serve as a refresher for those who attended one or more training sessions and would be useful preparatory material for those planning to attend a session.

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ACKNOWLEGMENTS

The authors of this report greatly appreciate the contributions made by instructors and presenters at the 2010 NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop. We would also like to thank the NRC audio visual team members for their efforts in video recording the hours of workshop presentations.

In addition, we want to extend our gratitude to Kathleen Henry of the Information Technology and Infrastructure Branch for her quick responses in addressing our computer needs and issues. We also greatly appreciate the support of Tojuana Fortune-Grasty (the NRC's publications specialist) and Guy Beltz (the NRC's printing specialist), whose invaluable support and expertise were critical to ensuring the published report's quality. We also extend a special thanks and appreciation to Carolyn Siu (RES/DRA administrative assistant) for providing the Tech-edit to this report.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC	Alternating Current
ACRS	Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards
AFW	Auxiliary Feedwater
ANS	American Nuclear Society
AOP	Abnormal Operating Procedure
AR	Annunciator Response
ARP	Alarm Response Procedure
ASD	Alternate Shutdown
ASME	American Society for Mechanical Engineers
ASP	Alternate Shutdown Panel
ATHEANA	A Technique for Human Event ANAlysis
ATWS	Anticipated Transient Without Scram
BHEP	Basic HEP
BWR	Boiling Water Reactor
BWROG	Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group
CBDT	Cause-Based Decision Tree
CBDTM	Cause-Based Decision Tree Method
CCDP	Conditional Core Damage Probability
CCW	Component Cooling Water
CDF	Core Damage Frequency
CLERP	Conditional Large Early Release Probability
CO	Control Operator
CR	Control Room; Main Control Room
CS	Containment Spray
CSFST	Critical Safety Function Status Tree
CVCS	Chemical and Volume Control System
DC	Direct Current
DF	Dependent Failure
DHR	Decay Heat Removal
ECCS	Emergency Core Cooling System
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EOC	Error of Commission
EOM	Error of Omission; EOO
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedure
EOO	Error of Omission; EOM
EP	Emergency Plan
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
ERF	Emergency Response Facility
ERFBS	Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System
ESW	Essential Service Water
ET	Event Tree
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
FEP	Fire Emergency Procedure
FPC	Fuel Pool Cooling

FR	Functional Restoration
FRP	Functional Restoration Procedure
HCR/ORE	Human Cognitive Reliability/Operator Reliability Experiment
HEP	Human Error Probability
HFE	Human Failure Event
HI	Human Interaction; also called Operator Action
HMI	Human-Machine Interface
HPI	High-Pressure Injection
HPSI	High-Pressure Safety Injection
HPSR	High-Pressure Safety Recirculation
HRA	Human Reliability Analysis
HVAC	Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
IE	Initiating Event
IEF	Initiating Event Frequency
IPE	Individual Plant Examination
IRT	Independent Review Team
ISLOCA	Interfacing Systems Loss-of-Coolant Accident
JPM	Job Performance Measure
LER	Licensee Event Report
LERF	Large Early Release Frequency
LLOCA	Large Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LOCA	Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LOOP	Loss of Offsite Power
LPI	Low-Pressure Injection
LPSD	Low Power and/or Shutdown
LPSI	Low-Pressure Safety Injection
LPSR	Low-Pressure Sump Recirculation
LTOP	Low Temperature Over-Pressurization
LWR	Light Water Reactor
MCR	Main Control Room; Control Room
MLOCA	Medium Loss-of-Coolant Accident
MOV	Motor Operated Valve
MSO	Multiple Spurious Operations
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NOP	Normal Operating Procedure
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC-RES	NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
NSSS	Nuclear Steam Supply System
NUREG	Nuclear Regulatory Commission document
OA	Operator Action; also called Human Interaction
OMA[1]	Operator Manual Action (typically in response to a fire)

[1] In 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, these are local manual actions (outside the MCR).
In fire PRA, these may be operator actions added in response to a fire, such as to address spurious indications or

OP	Operating Procedure
OSC	Operations Support Center
PM	Project Manager
PORV	Power-Operated Relief Valve
POS	Plant Operational State; Plant Operating State
PPE	Personnel Protective Equipment
PRA[2]	Probabilistic Risk Assessment; PSA
PSA	Probabilistic Safety Assessment; PRA
PSF	Performance Shaping Factor
PTS	Pressurized Thermal Shock
PWR	Pressurized Water Reactor
PWROG	Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group
RAW	Risk Achievement Worth
RCS	Reactor Coolant System
RI/PB	Risk-Informed, Performance-Based
RNO	Response Not Obtained
RPS	Reactor Protection System
RT	Reactor Trip
RSP	Remote Shutdown Panel
RWST	Refueling Water Storage Tank
SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SD	Shutdown
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SG	Steam Generator
SGTR	Steam Generator Tube Rupture
SISBO	Self-Induced Station Blackout
SI	Safety Injection
SLOCA	Small Loss-of-Coolant Accident
SSC	Systems, Structures, and Components
STA	Shift Technical Advisor
THERP	Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
TSC	Technical Support Center
TT	Turbine Trip
UB	Upper Bound
UPS	Uninterruptable Power Supply
V&V	Verification and Validation
WOG	Westinghouse Owners Group (now the Pressurized Water Reactor Owner Group PWROG)

[2] PRA and PSA are often used interchangeably.

1 INTRODUCTION – HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

In 2010, Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) was added to the NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop as a separate module for the first time. In previous years HRA was covered as a part of the PRA module (Module 1) and presented the guidance provided in EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR- 6850, Volume 2, Section 12. In 2009, EPRI 1019196, NUREG 1921 "EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines[3]" was released as a draft for public comment. The guidance in that report was intended to build upon the fire HRA guidance in NUREG/CR-6850. The separate HRA module covers guidance from NUREG-1921 draft for public comment. It covers the technical tasks related to modeling human failure events (i.e., the failure of operator responses) in a fire context. The guidance in NUREG-1921 presents a three tiered, progressive approach for fire HRA quantification. The quantification approaches included are a screening approach per NUREG/CR-6850 guidance, a scoping approach, and detailed quantification using either EPRI's Cause Based Decision Tree (CBDT) and HCR/ORE or the NRC's ATHEANA approach with modifications to account for fire effects.

The Human Reliability Analysis Module is comprised of the eight presentations listed and described below. These presentations elaborate on the basic steps for performing a fire HRA as outlined in NUREG-1921 [1]. Although these steps are presented sequentially it is important to remember that in practice the HRA process is iterative.

1) Fire HRA Training Overview – This presentation includes an overview of the structure and objectives of the HRA module as well as a high level summary of the EPRI/NRC-RES Fire HRA Guidelines.

2) Identification and Definition – This presentation includes a description of the "identification and definition" steps in the HRA process. Identification and definition refers to the identification of operator actions and associated instrumentation necessary for successful mitigation of fire scenarios and definition of the human failure events (HFEs) at the appropriate level of detail to support qualitative analysis and quantification.

3) Qualitative Analysis – This presentation describes the qualitative analysis step in the HRA process. Qualitative analysis may include development of the fire specific context, review of historical experience, review of plant operations, evaluation of the feasibility of HFEs, and the identification/development of performance shaping factors (PSFs). (See NUREG 1921 [1] Chapter 4)

4) Screening - This presentation describes the process of simplifying the PRA fire model by eliminating items from further consideration based on their negligible contribution to the probability of an accident. (See NUREG-1921 Chapter 5.)

5) Scoping - This presentation describes the simplified HRA quantification approach developed specifically for the guidance described in NUREG-1921. The scoping

[3] At the time of the 2010 NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop NUREG 1921 (EPRI 1023001) "EPRI//NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines" was a draft report. The presentations and information presented in this workbook are based on information in the draft report. The report has since been finalized and some information has been revised. These revisions will be reflected in MARIAFIRES 2012.

approach is intended to provide less conservative human error probabilities (HEPs) than screening but slightly more conservative HEPs than a detailed HRA approach.

6) EPRI Approach – This presentation describes the detailed HEP quantification approach recommended by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The EPRI approach uses one or more of the following methods: human cognitive reliability/operator reliability experiment (HCR/ORE) [3] and/or cause-based decision tree method (CBDTM) [4] for cognition, and the technique for human error rate prediction (THERP) [5] for execution.

7) ATHEANA Approach – This presentation describes the detailed HRA methodology developed by NRC/RES and its contractors called A Technique for Human Event ANAlysis (ATHEANA) [6].

8) Recovery Dependency & Uncertainty – This presentation describes the guidance given in NUREG-1921 on recovery, dependency, and uncertainty analysis. (See NUREG-1921 Chapter 6.)

In the sections that follow the subject matter presentation slides, are the example slide presentations. In these presentations, example scenarios were presented to illustrate the use of the four HRA quantification methods presented in the course; screening, scoping, the EPRI approach and the ATHEANA approach. Participants in the course were talked through applying each method with the given scenario details to quantify the human error probability (HEP).

The slide presentations in the sections that follow correspond with the video recordings on the DVD that accompanies this volume. To most effectively use this volume it is recommended that the user watch the DVD with the text opened to the corresponding presentation slides and follow along with the slides as they are presented on the video.

1.1 References

[1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Electric Power Research Institute, NUREG-1921 EPRI 1023001, *EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Guidelines.* July 2012.

[2] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Electric Power Research Institute, NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989, *EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities*. September 2005.

[3] *Operator Reliability Experiments Using Nuclear Power Plant Simulators*. EPRI, Palo Alto CA: 1990.NP-6937, as supplemented by EPRI TR 100259 [4].

[4] *An Approach to the Analysis of Operator Actions in Probabilistic Risk Assessment*. EPRI, EPRI Palo Alto, CA: 1992.TR-100259.

[5] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG/CR-1278, *Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications*, (THERP), A.D. Swain and H.E. Guttman, 1983.

[6] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG-1880, *ATHEANA User's Guide*, June 2007.

2 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS SLIDES

Presentation 1

Fire HRA Training Overview
Video: HRA Day 1 Part 1

Slide 1



EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY

Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA
Fire HRA Training Overview

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September-October 2010
Rockville, MD

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

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Outline of the Presentation

1. **Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines**
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

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Slide 2
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Notes:

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Notes:

EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines Overview

- Purpose of the Fire HRA training course module
- Training objectives
- Background on the Fire HRA Guidelines
- Fire HRA development team, approach & timeline
- Fire HRA Guidelines, public review & path forward
- Summary of EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines scope & contents

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SRL1

EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
Purpose of Training Course

- Provide training on guidance from EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines (NUREG-1921/EPRI 1019196)
- Opportunity for face-to-face, real-time interactions between authors and potential future users
- Opportunity to improve training
  - This is the first time a full separate fire HRA session has been presented in the Fire PRA Workshop
  - It is important for us to get student/audience feedback for future presentations

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Slide 5

Fire HRA Module Training Objectives

1: Be able to name the **steps in the process** for conducting a Fire HRA.

2: Be able to list the **different categories** of Fire HRA human failure events.

3: Demonstrate a knowledge of ASME/ANS PRA Standard **high level requirements** related to HRA.

4: Be able to identify **context and performance shaping factors** used in the analysis of post-fire human failure events.

5: Be able to list the **quantification methods** available for HEPs.

6: Understand the concept and importance of addressing **dependencies** between post-fire HRA events.

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Background on the Issue of Fire HRA

- Almost 50% of USA plants transitioning to NFPA-805
  - Using NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] for the Fire PRA Guidance
- NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] addresses:
  - Identifying human failure events (HFEs)
  - Assigning conservative screening human error probabilities (HEPs)
  - Post-fire Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) information
- NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] does not:
  - Describe a methodology for developing best-estimate HEPs (given fire related effects)
  - Address the requirements of:
    - ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008, Standard for Level 1 / Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications," Chapter 4 for fires
- Consequently, there was a need for fire-specific guidance for best-estimate HRA quantification in fire PRA

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Notes:

EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
High Level Objectives

- Through joint NRC and industry efforts, address the need for HRA guidance, especially for best-estimate quantification, for use in fire PRAs
  - Address methodology
  - Address guidance for implementing the methodology
- Develop a joint EPRI/NRC report (similar to NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989])
- Consider ASME/ANS PRA Standard requirements and user needs

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Notes:

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EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
Development Team



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

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Slide 10



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Notes:

Fire HRA Guidelines Public Review & Comment

- NUREG-1921/EPRI 1019196 issued in November 2009 for public review and comment
- Prior to public review period, obtained comments during presentation to ACRS PRA Subcommittee
- Received 265 public comments, 75 of which were editorial, from
  - PWROG
  - BWROG
  - EPRI HRA User's Group
  - Exelon
- Revision underway
  - Approach is not fundamentally different, but
  - Some important changes (e.g., reduced requirements for assessing feasibility of operator actions during screening and scoping analyses)

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Task 12: Post-Fire HRA - Overview

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Fire HRA Guidelines Path Forward

- Final Guidelines document to be issued by end of 2010
- It is anticipated that this guidance will be used by the industry as part of transition to NFPA 805 and possibly in response to other regulatory issues
- This is the first report addressing fire-related HRA for fire PRA that goes beyond the screening level
- As the methodology is applied at a wide variety of plants, the document may benefit from future improvements to better support industry-wide issues being addressed by fire PRA

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Fire HRA Guidelines Summary
Objectives and Scope

- Identify/analyze **existing post-initiator** HFEs
  - Changes to previously modeled HFEs due to fire effects
- Identify/analyze **post-initiator fire response** HFEs
  - New category of HFE to be analyzed
    - Procedures, training, cues typically different from existing post-initiator HFEs
  - Includes alternative shutdown (such as MCR abandonment due to habitability or transferring command and control to outside the MCR)
- Identify/analyze **post-initiator HFEs in response to spurious actuations and indications**
  - New category of HFE to be analyzed

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Fire HRA Guidelines Summary
Objectives and Scope (continued)

- Implement post-initiator fire HEPs in fire PRA model(s)
  - Initial quantification using screening or scoping approach
  - Identification of risk significant events for later detailed HRA (e.g., to meet ASME/ANS Part 2 supporting requirement HR-G1, Capability Category II)
  - Including dependency analysis
- Out of Scope
  - Pre-initiators (per NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989])
  - Fire brigade response (except for impacts on fire PSFs)

Notes:

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Notes:

Fire HRA Guideline Summary
Major Topic Areas

1. Standard HRA **process** used for Fire HRA modeling:
   - Based on other processes and guidance
     - ASME/ANS PRA Standard
     - NUREG-1792
     - Fire Manual Actions, NUREG-1852
     - SHARP1
     - ATHEANA
2. Fire HRA **process steps**:
   - **Identification & definition** of human failure events (HFEs):
     - Substantial guidance provided, including feasibility test
     - Feasibility Evaluation (Go / No-Go) example criteria
       - Sufficient time available to complete action
       - Procedures & cues exist
       - Sufficient manpower

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Notes:

Fire HRA Guideline Summary
Major Topic Areas (continued)

2. Fire HRA **steps**: (continued)
   - **Qualitative analysis**
     - Certain activities required for all analyses; others only for specific detailed HRA method
     - Iterative process that continues throughout quantification steps
     - Further evaluation of HFE feasibility under fire conditions
     - As fire PRA develops, fire HRA must consider additional fire scenario-specific details that become available
   - **Quantification Methods – three levels**
     - **Screening Quantification**
       - Refinement/relaxation for areas identified in NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] implementation
       - Typically used in NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] Task 7 first/screening quantification

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Fire HRA Guideline Summary
Major Topic Areas (continued)

2. Fire HRA **steps**: (continued)
   - **Quantification (cont'd, 2nd of 3 methods)**
     - **Scoping Fire HRA** method added (new):
       - Developed to address the majority of HFEs, thereby conserving HRA resources
       - Decision tree format
       - Guidance being developed to aid reproducibility & reviewability
       - Typically used during NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] Tasks 7 or 8 or early quantification of detailed fire scenarios in Tasks 11/14

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Fire HRA Guideline Summary
Major Topic Areas (continued)

2. Fire HRA **steps**: (continued)
   - **Quantification (cont'd, 3rd of 3 methods)**
     - **Detailed Fire HRA**
       - Uses existing methods
       - Performance shaping factors modified for the fire context:
         - EPRI Cause-Based Decision Tree & HCR/ORE; & THERP
         - ATHEANA
       - Typically used in NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] Tasks 11/14 quantification of detailed fire scenarios as needed
   - **Dependency**: Typically part of NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] Tasks 11/14 quantification of detailed fire scenarios
   - **Uncertainty**: Typically used in Fire Risk Evaluation of separation issues as part of the transition to NFPA-805.

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Fire HRA Process Steps

NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] Task	Fire HRA Process Step
Task 2 – Component Selection	**Identification** of previously existing HFEs & potential response to spurious
Task 5 – Fire-Induced Risk Model	**Identification and Definition** of fire response HFEs
Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA	**Qualitative Analysis -** context & performance shaping factors
Task 7 – First/Screening Quant.	**Quantification –** typically screening or scoping
Task 8 – Scoping Quantification	**Quantification –** typically scoping
Tasks 11/14 – Detailed Scenario Quantification	**Quantification & Dependency** could be screening, scoping or detailed HRA
Task 15 – Uncertainty	**Uncertainty**

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Fire HRA Technical Overview

- **Fire HRA Process Summary:**
  - Identification and Definition
  - Qualitative Analysis
  - Quantification Methods:
    - Screening
    - Scoping
    - Detailed
  - Recovery, Dependency, & Uncertainty
- Each Fire HRA process step is further described in subsequent presentations

Presentation 2

Identification and Definition of Post-Fire Human Failure Events
Video: HRA Day 1 Part 2

Slide 1

Notes:



EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY

Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA – Part 1

Identification & Definition of Post-Fire Human Failure Events

Kaydee Kohlhepp (Scientech) & Stuart Lewis (EPRI)
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September-October 2010
Rockville, MD

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Slide 2

Notes:

Course Overview

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. **Identification and Definition of post-fire human failure events**
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

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Fire HRA Module Training Objectives

1: Be able to name the **steps in the process** for conducting a Fire HRA.

2: Be able to list the **different categories** of Fire HRA human failure events.

3: Demonstrate knowledge of ASME/ANS PRA Standard **high level requirements (HLRs).**

- **For the HLRs associated with Identification & Definition**

4: Be able to identify **context and performance shaping factors** used in the qualitative analysis of post-fire human failure events.

5: Be able to list the **quantification methods** available for HEPs.

6: Understand the concept and importance of addressing **dependencies** between post-fire HRA events.

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Outline of the Identification/Definition Module

- Introduction/Relation to NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) Tasks
- Applicable PRA Standard High Level Requirements
- Identification
- Categories of Fire Human Failure Events
- Definition & Fire Context
- Feasibility – Initial Assessment
- Summary

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Notes:

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Notes:

Introduction – What is *Identification*?

- Human Reliability Analysis starts with developing understanding of role(s) of operators in responding to an event
- Actions relevant to post-initiator (or post-fire) response are identified via
  - Review of plant emergency and other operating procedures
  - Review of PRA Event trees, Fault trees, & Results (sequences and/or cutsets)
  - Operator interviews
- Once relevant actions are understood, corresponding ***human failure events*** are ***identified*** for the PRA models

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Notes:

Introduction – Depiction of Identification



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PRA Standard Requirements for Identification

Relevant HLRs from Internal-Events Section (Ch. 2 of Standard)

HLR-**HR**-E

A **systematic review** of the **relevant procedures** shall be used to identify the set of operator responses required for each of the accident sequences

Relevant HLRs from Fire Section (Ch. 4 of Standard)

HLR-**HRA**-A (from the HRA element)

The Fire PRA shall identify human actions relevant to the sequences in the Fire PRA plant response model

HLR-**ES**-C (from the Equipment Selection element)

The Fire PRA shall identify instrumentation whose failure including spurious operation would impact the reliability of operator actions associated with that portion of the plant design to be credited in the Fire PRA.

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Introduction – What is ***Definition***?

- After HFE Identification, ***Definition*** gives the initial basis for justifying inclusion of the action in the PRA model.
- Consists of objective, qualitative data:
  - Procedures
  - Cues (the prompts to initiate actions)
    - Alarms, indications, and/or procedure steps
  - Timing (Time Window & Time Required)
  - Staffing (may require more than for internal event response)
- Provides input to the subsequent Qualitative Analysis of the factors affecting human reliability
- Requires Initial Feasibility Evaluation

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Notes:

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Notes:

PRA Standard Requirements for Definition

Relevant HLRs from Internal-Events Section (Ch. 2 of Standard)

HLR-**HR**-F

Human failure events shall be defined that represent the impact of not properly performing the required responses, consistent with the structure and level of detail of the accident sequences.

Relevant HLRs from Fire Section (Ch. 4 of Standard)

HLR-**HRA**-B

The Fire PRA shall include events where appropriate in the Fire PRA that represent the impacts of incorrect human response associated with the identified human actions.

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Notes:

Fire HRA Process Steps

NUREG/CR-6850 Task	Fire HRA Process Step
Task 2 – Component Selection	**Identification of previously existing HFEs & potential response to spurious actuations/signals**
Task 5 – Fire-Induced Risk Model	**Identification & Definition of Fire Response Actions**
Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA	**Qualitative Analysis:** starts with **context definition**
Task 7 – First/Screening Quant.	**Quantification –** typically screening
Task 8 – Scoping Quantification	**Quantification –** typically scoping
Tasks 11/14 – Detailed Scenario Quantification	**Quantification & Dependency** could be screening, scoping or detailed HRA
Task 15 – Uncertainty	**Uncertainty**

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Categories of Post-Fire Operator Actions

1. Existing operator actions from the internal events PRA
   – From the Level1/LERF PRA model used to develop the Fire PRA
2. Fire Response Actions
   – New actions contained in the fire procedures
   – New actions to address recovery of spurious actuation
   – MCR abandonment is a subset of fire response actions
3. HFEs Corresponding to Undesired Operator Responses
   – New actions to address undesired operator actions in response to spurious indications per Fires (Ch. 4) in the ASME/ANS Combined PRA Standard
   – EOCs are specifically addressed in FPRA

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Identification of Fire PRA HFEs (General)

- Review Event Tree Sequences with applicable procedure/s:
  – Understand operator requirements to control plant response
    - Functions or systems manually initiated, controlled, or isolated
  – Typically a function of the initiating event
- Review System Fault Trees with applicable procedure/s:
  – Understand what is required of operators in controlling system or component response
    - Functions manually initiated or controlled
    - Potential recovery (e.g., align standby or alternate)
  – Typically independent of initiating event
- Review PRA Results sequences & cutsets
- Discussions with Operators to confirm operator response

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Identification of Fire PRA HFEs (General cont'd)

Review ET sequences, system FT, and PRA results to:

1. Understand what the operators are doing
2. Identify **cue(s)** & **procedure steps**, **&** **time window**
3. Identify procedural path leading to the step with cue
4. Document the PRA **context** from Event or Fault Tree
   - Initiating event
   - Preceding operator actions in the sequence
   - Hardware/system successes and failures

Good Practice (collect if the data is available)

- Identify secondary cues or alternate success paths
  - Examples: Critical Safety Function Status Trees, alarms or indications.

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Review of Plant Operations & PRA Data

- Best Practice for HRA analysts to confirm with plant **operations personnel** at the start of the HRA:
  - Staffing during fire (number of operators & roles)
  - Procedural usage for fire (EOPs, AOPs, & Fire Response)
  - Main control room (MCR) staff interaction with fire brigade
  - Expected MCR staff response after detection of fire
  - Review of plant-specific fire history for insights
- Review of **PRA Data**:
  - Additional information beyond Event & Fault Trees
  - Success criteria: Determine Time Window (Time Available)
  - Internal events HRA: to understand initial model basis

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Notes:

Identification:
Operator Actions in Internal Events PRA

- Identify fire-induced initiating events included the FPRA
  - Done in NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) Tasks 2 & 5
  - Examples of actions carried into the FPRA
    - General transients which may include spurious SI actuation
    - Loss of support system(s), e.g., loss of instrument air or loss of electrical bus
    - LOCA (e.g., due to spuriously opened relief valve)
    - Station blackout
- Identify operator actions modeled as delineating the plant response to the fire-induced initiators.
  - In event trees, fault trees, and in cutset recovery
- Includes manual start of safe shutdown components
  - Sometimes these are not "pre-existing" in the current PRA

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Notes:

Fire HFEs from Internal Events PRA - Examples

INCLUDE

- Open a steam dump or steam relief valve and conduct a post-LOCA cooldown
- Manual start of an emergency diesel generator
- Manual start of auxiliary feedwater following automatic actuation failure
- Manually align a back-up power supply

EXCLUDE

- Actions associated with internal events initiated not included in FPRA, for example:
  - Operators fails to diagnosis SGTR

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Identification: Fire Response Operator Actions

- Required in response to a fire, as directed by the fire procedure(s), such as
  - Mitigate or prevent damage to equipment (e.g., pump dead-heading from fire-induced spurious valve closure)
  - Mitigate the effects of spurious indications or actuations (e.g., shut off above pump)
  - Abandon main control room and perform safe shutdown outside the main control room
- Identification process can be
  - Iterative as required in fire PRA strategy
    - Often not credited during initial quantification
  - Comprehensive based on fire procedure/s
- Examples on next slide

Notes:

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Fire Response Action Examples

- Identify protected instrumentation channels (to mitigate spurious indications)
- Defeat solid state protection system (to prevent spurious safety injection)
- Control auxiliary feedwater locally by throttling valves manually and starting / stopping pumps
- Place remote shutdown location back-up indication panels in service
- Obtain steam generator level locally
- De-energize all ADS valves
- Close HPCI steam supply valve locally
- Align 4 kV bus by locally operating breakers

Notes:

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Identification: MCR Abandonment Actions

- MCR abandonment actions are a sub-set of fire response
- Operators will abandon if control room becomes uninhabitable, or due to loss of required control
- Identification process can be
  - Iterative as required in fire PRA
  - Comprehensive based on review of the MCR abandonment procedure
- Some FPRAs credit scenarios where the operators remain in the control room for monitoring and announcing; but perform local actions
  - In this case the fire specific scenario is to be identified and defined by the FPRA analyst
  - HRA analysts identify the procedure guidance operators will follow

Notes:

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Identification: HFEs Corresponding to Undesired Operator Response to Spurious Signals

- An undesired operator action is a well intentioned operator action, taken in response to a spurious indication, that unintentionally exacerbates the scenario
  - Operators are generally trained to (1) believe their instrumentation and (2) follow their procedures
- Identified within the context of the accident progression
  - Review annunciator response procedures (primarily)
  - Review emergency operating procedures (best practice)
- Defined in terms of their impact on the function, system, train or component.
  - Although these actions are well-intended & not operator errors as such, the undesired consequences have the same impact as an error & are therefore modeled as HFEs

Notes:

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Identification & Definition of Factors for Undesired Operator Response to Spurious Signals

- Cue parameter/s
  - Single or multiple (redundant or diverse)
- Cue (procedural) hierarchy
  - Continuously monitored or procedurally checked only
- Cue verification
  - Required for immediate actions
- Degree of redundancy/diversity for a given parameter
  - Redundant/diverse channels mitigate consequences of single spurious indication

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Examples of Potential HFEs Corresponding to Undesired Operator Responses based on Review of ARPs

Spurious Annunciator	Undesired Action	Consequence
ESW PUMP MOTOR INSTANT TRIP	Place the affected pump's control switch in LOCKOUT.	One train of service water stopped, thereby reducing ESW prob. of success in CCDP calculation. Can be restarted.
CCW PUMP MOTOR INSTANT TRIP	Place the affected pump's control switch in LOCKOUT.	Stopping one CCW pump increases operating temp. on many components in CCDP calculation. Can be restarted.
EAST RHR PUMP SUCTION VALVES NOT FULL OPEN	Immediately open 1-IMO-310, East RHR Pump Suction, or 1-ICM-305.	Depending on scenario (size of LOCA or not) could lead to cavitation of the pump. Loss of pump in Recirc. mode
RHR PUMPS MOTOR INSTANT TRIP	Place pump control switch in LOCK-OUT.	Delay start of RHR if not on or halts RHR if on. Impacts CCDP. Can be manually started.

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Notes:

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Notes:

Human Failure Event Definition (General)

- Define a set of HFEs as unavailabilities of functions, systems or components as appropriate to the level of detail in the accident sequence and system models
- Include in the definition:
  - Accident sequence specific timing of cues, and time window for successful completion, and
  - Accident sequence specific procedural guidance (e.g., AOPs, and EOPs), and
  - The availability of cues and other indications for detection and evaluation errors, and
  - The specific detailed tasks (e.g., component level) required to achieve the goal of the response. (Cat III)
- Cognitive and execution elements

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Notes:

Definition during Fire PRA Tasks

- HFE Definition starts during Identification with:
  - Cues/alarm or other indications, Procedure, Staffing, Time available
- Feasibility evaluation initially done during Definition, then expanded as HFE is developed
- Fire PRA Context typically varies with NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) Task
  - **Context starts in Definition & continues during Qualitative Analysis**
  - Task 7a – Screening HEPs often use qualitative info from Definition
  - Task 12 – Scoping HRA often uses qualitative info (context & PSF) associated with the scoping HRA trees
  - Task 14 – For risk significant HFEs perform Detailed HRA using qualitative context & PSFs associated with the detailed quant. method

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Definition during a Fire PRA

- Definition of existing internal events HFEs should be reviewed & revised for fire-specific impacts
- New fire response HFEs require definition
- Definitions should include:
  - Fire impact on instrumentation & indications used for detection & diagnosis
  - Fire impact on timing of (1) cues, (2) response, (3) execution, and on (4) time available
  - Fire impact on success criteria
  - Fire impact on manpower resources, which affect recovery
  - Fire impact on local actions, e.g., accessibility, atmosphere, lighting
- Some data may not be initially available, but will be filled in during Qualitative Analysis

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Initial Assessment of Feasibility

- Purpose: To decide whether an operator action can be accomplished or not, given the plant-specific & scenario-specific fire impacts.
- Feasibility Evaluation – Set HEP to 1.0 for any of the following (as the action would not be feasible)
  - Failed **instrumentation** (so no cues for operator action)
  - Insufficient **time available** to complete action
  - Insufficient **manpower**
  - **Procedural guidance** does not exist
  - Other Factors that may preclude credit
    - Fire is in same location as required actions
    - Inaccessible tools or equipment
- Feasibility is like a “continuous action step” that is re-visited as the NUREG-6850/EPRI 1011989 tasks progress.

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Identification & Definition Summary

- HFE ***Identification*** finds where operator actions occur
  - In the plant response to initiating events & in the PRA model
- Identification consists of:
  - Review plant operating procedures & understand operator response
  - Review PRA Event trees, Fault trees, Results & Success Criteria
- HFE ***Definition*** gives the initial justification for inclusion of the action in the FPRA & provides input to Qualitative Analysis
- Definition consists of documenting objective, qualitative data:
  - Procedures
  - Cues
  - Timing
  - Staffing
- Initial Feasibility Evaluation is the Go/No-Go check

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Course Overview

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. **Identification and Definition of post-fire human failure events**
3. Qualitative analysis **– NEXT!**
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

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Notes:

Presentation 3

Qualitative Analysis
Video: HRA Day 2 Part 1

Slide 1

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

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY

Qualitative Analysis

Kaydee Kohlhepp (Scientech)
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September-October 2010
Rockville, MD

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Outline of the Presentation

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. **Qualitative analysis**
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

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Fire HRA Module Training Objectives

1: Be able to name the **steps in the process** for conducting a Fire HRA.
2: Be able to list the **different categories** of Fire HRA human failure events.
3: Demonstrate a knowledge of ASME/ANS PRA Standard **high level requirements** for fire PRA.
4: Be able to identify **context and performance shaping factors** used in the analysis of post-fire human failure events.
5: Be able to list the **quantification methods** available for HEPs.
6: Understand the concept and importance of addressing **dependencies** between post-fire HRA events.

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Outline of the Qualitative Analysis Module

- Introduction
- Applicable PRA Standard High Level Requirements
- Definition & Fire Context
- Historical Experience Input
- Plant Operations Input
- Feasibility
- Performance Shaping Factors

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Notes:

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Notes:

Introduction

- Regardless of the HRA quantification method, qualitative information is needed to support evaluation
  - Provides the data "foundation" used in each Fire HRA process step
  - Objective information, called the FPRA context
  - Evaluated information, such as performance shaping factors (PSFs)
- Assumptions likely to be needed relative to the amount of information available at different stages of the FPRA model development
- All PSFs addressed in Part 2 of the ASME/ANS standard (high-level requirements HR-F & HR-G) need to be considered, but may or may not be explicitly used during quantification
  - Some contribute to the overall "story"
  - NUREG-1792 gives insights on good practices

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Notes:

Introduction (continued)

- Qualitative analysis includes:

1. Developing fire-specific context
2. Review of historical experience
3. Review of plant operations
4. Evaluating HFE feasibility
5. Performance Shaping Factor identification/development

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Applicable HLRs (from the PRA Standard*)
Qualitative Analysis

Relevant HLRs from Internal-Events Section (Part 2) of PRA Standard*

- HLR-AS-A: The accident sequence analysis shall describe the plant-specific scenarios that can lead to core damage following each modeled initiating event. These scenarios shall address system responses and operator actions, including recovery actions that support the key safety functions necessary to prevent core damage (11 SRs)
- HLR-HR-E: A systematic review of the relevant procedures shall be used to identify the set of operator responses required for each of the accident sequences (4 SRs)
- HLR-HR-F: Human failure events shall be defined that represent the impact of not properly performing the required responses, in a manner consistent with the structure and level of detail of the accident sequences (2 SRs)

* ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency PRA for Nuclear Power Plant Applications"

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Applicable HLRs (per the PRA Standard)
Qualitative Analysis (Continued)

Internal Events (non-fire) HLRs (cont'd)

- HLR-HR-G: The assessment of the probabilities of the post-initiator HFEs shall be performed using a well-defined and self-consistent process that addresses the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, and addresses potential dependencies between human failure events in the same accident sequence. (8 SRs)

Relevant HLRs from Fire Section (Part 4) of PRA Standard

- HLR-HRA-B: The Fire PRA shall include events where appropriate in the Fire PRA that represent the impacts of incorrect human responses associated with the identified human actions (2 SRs; consistent with HLR-HR-F)
- HLR-HRA-C: The Fire PRA shall quantify HEPs associated with the incorrect responses accounting for the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, particularly including the effects of fires (1 SR)

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Review of Historical Experience

- To gain a better understanding of the plant response following an event, evaluate the effect of such incidents, and gain insight into the context in which accidents can occur
- May reveal potential influences on operator performances (e.g., plant conditions and associated gaps in procedures or training) and challenging conditions or situations the operators might encounter
- Review plant-specific events as well as industry-wide incidents (e.g., NRC Information Notices)
- Usually focuses on a specific type or class of events (e.g., a particular type of initiating event such as a fire or small LOCA)

Notes:

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Review of Plant Operations

- Prior to quantification, HRA analysts should review plant specific fire histories for insights and confirm with operational personnel:
  - Staffing during fire
  - Fire procedural usage during fire
  - How control room staff will interact with fire brigade
  - Expected staff response after detection of fire
- After preliminary quantification, analysts should conduct operator interviews and specifically address risk significant HFEs
  - Operator interviews should confirm:
    - Specific procedural usage for each action
    - Scenario and plant specific timing information
    - Expected operator response for specific scenario
  - Operator interviews could also include walkdowns and observation of simulator exercises

Notes:

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Notes:

Definition and Fire-Specific Context

- HFE Definition starts during Identification with:
  - Cues/alarm or other indications
  - Procedure
  - Staffing
  - Time available
- Feasibility evaluation initially done during Definition, then repeated/updated as HFE is developed
- Fire PRA Context typically varies with NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] Task
  - Task 7a – Screening HEPs often use qualitative info from Definition
  - Task 12 – Scoping HRA often uses qualitative info (context & PSF) associated with the scoping HRA trees
  - Task 14 – For risk significant HFEs, perform Detailed HRA using qualitative context & PSFs associated with the detailed quant. method

Corresponding PRA Standard SRs: Part 2, HR-F2 & Part 4, HRA–B2

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Notes:

Feasibility Assessment

- The evaluation of HFE feasibility begins at the Identification and Definition stage and continues throughout the Qualitative and Quantitative analyses as further information becomes necessary and available
- Fire HRA should also address the particular feasibility considerations of ex-MCR actions given a fire.
- NUREG-1852 defines a feasible operator manual action as one "that is analyzed and demonstrated as being able to be performed within an available time so as to avoid a defined undesirable outcome."

Corresponding PRA Standard SRs: Part 2, HR-G4 & HR-G5; Part 4, HRA-C1

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Notes:

Preliminary Feasibility Evaluations

- There may be limited fire modeling or fire PRA model sequence information available for the HRA at the time screening or scoping is scheduled to be performed
- Existing information from previous analyses & demonstrations may be used to assess operator action feasibility at any point of the Fire HRA process
- <u>Examples of existing timing data/demonstrations</u> include:
  - Prior Appendix R walkdowns
  - Prior Operator Manual Action (OMA) feasibility analyses
  - Results of training exercises (simulator for MCR actions; Fire Response Actions outside MCR)
  - Established job performance measures (JPMs)

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Feasibility Assessment for Scoping and Detailed Fire HRA

- Re-consideration of feasibility issues such as timing, staffing, tools, and accessibility are important as more information becomes available
  - Scoping for more reasonable estimates than screening
  - Detailed for risk-significant fire HFEs, including recovery actions
- Feasibility analysis at this stage typically examines further details regarding the action, context, scenario and timing
- Best evaluated through reliable existing information, structured interviews and, if possible, walkthroughs with operations and training personnel, including photo-documentation of locations to be accessed, equipment to be actuated & tools to be used

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Influences on Feasibility

- There are a number of activities that may influence the feasibility, particularly time to respond. In general, if the following conditions are identified then HFE is considered not to be feasible.
  - Not enough crew
  - Not enough time
  - Equipment is in-accessible – This could include factors such as smoke and heat that prevent the operators from reaching the location.
  - Cues and indications are failed such that there is no operator success path
  - The execution has no training and walk-downs show that not all crew members could perform the execution
- In performing the assessment of feasibility, the time available needs to asses the key fire effects

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Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs)

PSFs are those factors which can impact operator performance (no new ones for fire):

- Cues & Indications
- Timing (time required & time available)
- Procedures & Training
- Complexity
- Workload, stress, pressure
- Human-Machine Interface
- Environment
- Special Equipment
- Crew Communication, Staffing & Dynamics

Corresponding PRA Standard SRs: Part 2, HR-G3 to G5; Part 4, HRA–C1 Note 1

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Cues and Indications

- Cues are the prompts to initiate actions
  - Alarms, indications, and/or procedure steps
- Need to evaluate availability of cues given the fire impact
  - Verify (by cable tracing if necessary) that either
    - (1) instrumentation is not affected by fire, or
    - (2) it is known that required instrumentation is sufficiently protected and can be identified (e.g., procedurally) as such
  - If primary cues or indications are impacted, identify diverse cues & indications that could be credited
    - From the procedure
    - From discussions with plant operators

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Timing

- Obtain the following timing for each HFE
  - Total time available (thermal-hydraulic data)
    - Time to damage (core damage or component damage)
    - This is usually assessed with a bounding calculation that can be applied in many situations
  - Time that plant response cue occurs relative to the initiating event (thermal-hydraulic data)
  - Time it takes operators to formulate a response
    - Detection, diagnosis & decision-making
    - Data from operator interviews, generic simulator data or observations
  - Time it takes to execute response
    - Includes travel, equipment/tools, & manipulation
    - Data from operator interviews, JPMs, training records or observations

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Workload, Pressure and Stress

- For HRA methods that categorize stress into different levels, such as low, moderate and high, a further increase in the level of stress may be considered for fire HRA
  - Due to the potential for larger combinations of negative PSFs that could occur during a fire and increase the stress above what is considered high stress for internal events HRA
  - Whether or not there is a need to assume higher stress is a major industry comment that is under discussion
- Example - the scenario may be unfamiliar, the procedures & training for the fire scenario may only be considered adequate, the time available to complete the action may be shortened due to fire, and/or the time required may be longer
  - The analyst may therefore decide that stress will have a significant impact on performance, where it may not have been as significant in the internal events HRA

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Human Machine Interface

- For control room abandonment actions, the adequacy of the remote shutdown and local panels needs to be verified
  - Remote shutdown panels are plant specific and design reviews and improvements have not always been completed
  - Remote shutdown panels are typically not designed for mitigation of all initiating events
  - Additionally, the operators may not be as familiar with the panel layout as they are in control room scenarios
- Local actions that require the use of equipment that has been damaged such that manipulation could be difficult or unlikely to succeed should not be credited in the PRA
  - For example, a hot short on a control cable has caused a valve to close and drive beyond its seat, possibly making it impossible to open manually

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Environment

- For local actions, there is the potential that the fire could impact ideal travel path to locations. Less direct routes and longer travel times need to be considered
- For control room actions, even if fire does not directly impact control room, environmental conditions outside the control room may still impact operator performance inside the control room. (ie. smoke entering CR from HVAC system)
- For main control room abandonment, actions may need to consider operators' use of SCBA gear
  - Consider effects of smoke, heat and toxic gas for main control room abandonment
    - NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] Section 11.5 provides guidance for impact of smoke

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Environmental Effects on Feasibility

- Radiation
  - Fire could damage equipment in a way that radiation exposure could be an issue in the location in which the action needs to be taken, causing the need to don personnel protection clothing (extra time)
- Smoke and toxic gas effects
- Increased noise levels from fire fighting activities, operation of suppression equipment, or personnel shouting instructions
- Water on the floor, possibly delaying the actions
- Obstruction from charged fire hoses or large wheeled portable extinguishers
- Heat stress which requires special equipment, limiting time in the area & other precautions; or too many people (getting in each others' way)

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Special Equipment

- Due to varying environmental conditions during a fire, the crew may require the use of special equipment such as:
  - Keys
  - Ladders
  - Hoses
  - Flashlights
  - Clothing to enter containment areas
- Tools need to be checked to ensure they can be located and accessed during a fire, and that they will likely be functional
- The call for abandoning the MCR might also require use of protective gear or self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The hindrance of the special clothing on the operators' actions needs to be addressed

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Crew Communication, Staffing and Dynamics

- Per NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989], most plants can be operated from the control room with two or three operators as the minimum, but a crew may consist of four or five licensed operators
  - thus assigning one to the fire brigade usually does not diminish the control room capability below what is required
- Crew credited for recovery in internal events may no longer be applicable for fire
- For MCR abandonment actions, verify that there are adequate control room members necessary to fulfill the needs of proper shutdown actions from RSP
- MCR abandonment actions as well as some local actions may require the use of SCBA and could impact communications

Notes:

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Notes:

Factors That Could Impact MCR Crew

- MCR staff actions that can influence the time to respond; such as the time to
  - obtain the correct fire plan & procedures once the fire location is confirmed
  - inform the plant staff of the fire & call for fire brigade assembly & actions
  - alert and/or communicate with local staff responsible for completing various actions
  - provide any specific instructions to the responsible local staff for the actions

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Factors That Could Impact Local Crew

- Timing considerations of Local staff actions can influence the time to respond; such as the time to
  - collect any procedures, establish communications, obtain needed special tools or don personnel protective equipment (PPE)
  - perform preparatory actions such as donning Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) or personnel protective clothing
  - travel to the necessary locations
  - implement the desired actions; if more than 1 action they may have to be coordinated or done sequentially
  - inform MCR staff and others that the actions have been successfully completed & the desired effect achieved

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Crew to Crew Variability

- Physical size, strength and dexterity differences that may be important for performing the actions
- Cognitive differences (e.g., memory ability, analytic skills)
- Different emotional responses to the fire/smoke
- Different responses to wearing SCBAs to accomplish a task (i.e., some people may be more uncomfortable than others with a mask over their faces, thus affecting action times)
- Differences in individual sensitivities to “real-time” pressure
- If the action has training, it is typically assumed that all crew members could complete the action, and crew to crew variability is treated as a sensitivity.

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Qualitative Analysis Summary

- Regardless of the HRA quantification method, qualitative information is needed to support evaluation.
  - Provides the data “foundation” used in each Fire HRA process step
  - Objective information, called the FPRA context
  - Evaluated information, such as performance shaping factors (PSFs)
- All PSFs addressed in Part 2 of the ASME/ANS standard (high-level requirements HR-F & HR-G) need to be considered, but may or may not be explicitly used during quantification
  - Some contribute to the overall “story”
  - NUREG-1792 gives insights on good practices
- **Qualitative analysis includes**:
  1. Developing fire-specific context
  2. Review of historical experience
  3. Review of plant operations
  4. Evaluating HFE feasibility
  5. Performance shaping factors identification/development

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EXAMPLES

1. FIRE SPECIFIC CONTEXT DEFINITION
2. CUES AND INDICATION CONFIRMATION
3. PROCEDURES AND TRAINING
4. TIMING

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Example of Fire Specific Context Definition

Description: Locally open valve (8804A) for high pressure recirculation following a spurious PORV LOCA

1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power
2. Initiating Event:
   - Fire in Area 5A2
   - The fire starts in transformer and impacts targets in the plume and vertical trays adjacent to the flames
   - PORV spuriously opens resulting in small LOCA
3. Accident sequence (functional failures and successes):
   - Reactor trip, Turbine trip
   - No ATWS
   - No containment spray required
   - AFW successful
   - SI actuates due to open PORV
   - Cooldown and depressurization required
   - Switch over to recirculation required

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Example of Fire Specific Context Definition
(Continued)

4. Preceding operator error or success in sequence:
   - Operators fail to detect spurious PORV opening prior to auto SI actuation
   - Operators controlled ECCS flow to match make-up flow with leakage rate
   - RHR pumps tripped
   - Cooldown and depressurization either failed or failed to be completed before RWST reaches 33%
5. Operator action success criterion:
   - Recognize 8804A cannot be opened from the control room due to fire damage
   - Locally open 8804A located at 73' RHR Access or 100'
6. Timing (Typically determined from MAAP)
   - Time to RWST 33% = 180 minutes
   - Time to RWST 0% = 300 minutes
   - Time required to perform local valve operation = 25 minutes

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Example of Fire Specific Context Definition
(Continued)

7. Consequence of failure: Time to drain RWST
8. Availability of Cues and Indications:
   - RCS Pressure decreasing would be the primary cue operators would be focused on for diagnosing stuck open PORV; RCS pressure indicators are not failed by the fire
   - RWST Level indications are not impacted by fire
   - Monitor light boxes: The indicators at the switch would not be available to alert the operators that the valve failed to close but the monitor light boxes would be giving conflicting information and the operators tend to look at both the position switch and the monitor light boxes

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Example of Cues and Indication Confirmation

Description: Locally open valve (8804A) for high pressure recirculation following a spurious PORV LOCA

- Operator interview insights
  - The operators stated that it would be obvious that 8804A failed to open when attempted from the control room. In addition to the position switches in the control room, the valve positions are also monitored on monitor light boxes. The cabling for the monitor light boxes are separate from the valve cabling
  - The operators stated that they are aware that switch-over to recirculation is imminent and they will have an operator preview E1.3 (step 13 of E-1 PREVIEW EOP E-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION). They anticipate that the preview will alert the operators to a failed valve.
- Review of Cable Tracing
  - The RWST level indicators are not failed by the fire
  - RCS pressure indicators are protected per Appendix R requirements and remain available during the fire
  - The indicator switch in the control room is failed by the fire

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Procedures and Training Example

Description: Locally open valve (8804A) for high pressure recirculation following a spurious PORV LOCA

Procedures:
Cognitive: ES 1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation) Revision: 26
Step: 8.g. - Check for charging pump (pp or pps) amps, Charging injection flow and SI Pp flow if pps are in operation
Execution: ES 1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation) Revision: 26
Other: Fire Procedure Revision: 21A

Procedure Notes:
By the time switch over to cold leg recirc is required, the operators will also be looking at CP-M-10 (The fire procedure)
The procedure step in CP-M-10 reads:
Manually close 8804A Power will be isolated (by opening 480V MCC feeder breaker 52-1G-58 to preclude spurious operation of 8982A. If 8982A has opened, then locally close valve 8980 after opening its power breaker 52-1F-31
The operators are trained bi-annually on ES 1.3 but they are not specifically trained on ES 1.3 following a fire with various valve failures

Training – For Non Fire Scenario
Classroom, Frequency: 0.5 per year
Simulator, Frequency: 0.5 per year
There is no fire specific training for this scenario.

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Timing Example

Description: Locally open valve (8804A) for high pressure recirculation following a spurious PORV LOCA



- T_{sw} = 300 min = time to RWST depleted
- T_{delay} = 180 min = switchover to recirc. RWST <33%
- T_{action} [availableTime Window] = 300 -180 = 120 min
- $T_{1/2}$ = 2 min = Estimated time to attempt to close CR switch and realize that valve must be closed locally
- T_m = 25 minutes from operator interviews

Time Margin Calculation

$$TM = \frac{t_{action} - (t_{1/2} + t_m)}{(t_{1/2} + t_m)} * 100\%$$

$$\frac{120 - (2 + 25)}{2 + 25} * 100 \sim 360\%$$

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Presentation 4

Fire HRA Training Overview
Video: HRA Day 2 Part 2

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Sandia National Laboratories

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

CURTISS WRIGHT Flow Control Company SCIENTECH

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation



EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY

Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA – Part 1

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September – October 2010
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Applicable HLRs (per the PRA Standard)
Quantitative Analysis

- HLR-HR-G: The assessment of the probabilities of the post-initiator HFEs shall be performed using a well-defined and self-consistent process that addresses the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, and addresses potential dependencies between human failure events in the same accident sequence (8 SRs)
- HLR-HRA-C: The Fire PRA shall quantify HEPs associated with the incorrect responses accounting for the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, particularly including the effects of fires (1 SR)

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Outline of the Presentation

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analyses:
   a) **Screening**
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Identification and evaluation of recovery actions
6. Treatment of dependency
7. Uncertainty analysis

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HRA Screening - Post-Fire HRA Objectives

- To verify that reasonable and feasible human actions and associated post-fire human failure events (HFEs) are
  - Identified and evaluated for fire effects
  - Included in Fire PRA
- To simplify PRA fire model by appropriately assigning screening HEPs for fire induced accident scenarios
  - Establish HEP screening values for developing Fire PRA model
  - Help focus analysis resources on the higher risk sequences

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PRA Standard Definitions

- Screening – "a process that eliminates items from further consideration based on their negligible contribution to the probability of an accident or its consequences."
- Screening criteria – "the values and conditions used to determine whether an item is a negligible contributor to the probability of an accident sequence or its consequences."

- Corresponding PRA Standard SRs: Part 2, HR-G1 and Part 4, HRA-C1

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Notes:

Fire HRA Screening Analysis

- Method similar to that presented in NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989)
- Supports assignment of screening values by:
  - addressing the key conditions that can influence crew performance during fires,
  - ensuring that the time available to perform the necessary action is appropriately considered (given the other on-going activities in the accident sequence), and
  - evaluating potential dependencies among HFEs modeled in a given accident sequence
- To facilitate simplified level of analysis, HFEs are sorted into "screening sets"

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Post-Fire HRA Screening
Inputs

- Mitigating equipment and diagnostic indications from Task 2 (Fire PRA Component Selection)
- Human actions carried over from Internal Events PRA from Task 5 (Fire-Induced Risk Model development)
- EOPs and Fire Emergency Procedures (FEPs) - to identify new potentially risk important human actions that support Appendix R assumptions
- Equipment failures, spurious operations and indications; timing and fire location information for feasibility assessment – if available when screening is performed:
  - Task 3 (Fire PRA Cable Selection),
  - Tasks 9 (Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis) & 10 (Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis)
  - Tasks 8 (Scoping Fire Modeling) and 11 (Detailed Fire Modeling)

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Post-Fire HRA Screening
Outputs

- May identify other equipment and indications that are needed to carry out a human action for Task 2 (Fire PRA Component Selection)
- May identify HFE modeling additions needed in Task 5 (Fire-Induced Risk Model) to account for pre-emptive procedure-driven actions to avoid fire-induced spurious equipment actuations
- Provide screening HEPs for Task 7 (Quantitative Screening)
- Identify HFEs requiring additional analysis (scoping or detailed)

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Post-Fire HRA Screening

Screening Criteria Sets

- NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) screening criteria produced HEPs for longer term actions (>1 hour after fire initiation and plant trip) that were overly conservative, even for screening, so this has been modified
- Criteria summary:
  - Set 1: Internal events PRA HFEs that are only indirectly affected by the fire scenario
  - Set 2: Internal events HFEs that have added complications from spurious actuations
  - Set 3:
    - new fire-related HFEs
    - HFEs modeled in internal events PRA that need to be significantly revised to reflect fire effects
  - Set 4: HFEs associated with Alternative Shutdown (including MCR Abandonment)

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Notes:

Post-Fire HRA Screening Criteria

Set 1 - Existing Level 1 IE PRA HFEs

- Plant trip with no significant damage to safe shutdown equipment or related instrumentation beyond IE PRA
- No spurious cues or equipment actuations for safety-related equipment
- Necessary immediate responses are not attributed to fire
- One train/division of safe shutdown-related equipment and instrumentation is completely protected from fire
- MCR crew responsible for safe shutdown have no significant additional responsibilities

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Post-Fire HRA Screening Criteria
Set 1 - Existing Level 1 IE PRA HFEs (Continued)

- No significant environmental impact or threat to MCR crew (e.g., smoke)
- Time available to diagnose and implement the action(s) is not significantly different than IE PRA-related scenario(s) where HFE(s) apply
- Ex-MCR manual actions from IE PRA are not significantly affected by smoke or toxic gases, loss of lighting, radiation threat
- Staff, special tools and communication capability are available to perform ex-MCR actions
- Dependency between multiple HFEs in IE PRA sequences is still applicable to Fire PRA

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Post-Fire HRA Screening Criteria
Set 2 - Modification to Existing HFEs for Spurious Effects

- Set 2 screening criteria same as Set 1, except when
  - Significant spurious electrical effects are likely occurring in one (and only one) safety-related train/division of equipment and/or instrumentation important to the critical safety functions
- Presumes that some corrective responses on the part of the crew may be needed
- In Set 2, the crew might have to attend and respond to the spurious activity in the affected train/division to make sure it does not affect their ability to reach safe shutdown (e.g., causing a diversion of all injection).
- However, the crew would likely detect the spurious activity quickly and not be confused by it

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Post-Fire HRA Screening Criteria
Set 3 - New or significantly modified HFEs

- These criteria address
  - new HFEs added to the Fire PRA or
  - prior Internal Events PRA HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions
- In such cases, pre-existing Internal Events PRA HEPs either do not exist, or are not appropriate as a basis for the Fire PRA
- If action is within 1st hour of fire initiation, set HEP to 1.0 for screening
- If action is long term, apply 0.1 or 10 times IE HEP, whichever is lower

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Post-Fire HRA Screening Criteria
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown HFEs

- All HFEs involved in reaching safe shutdown from outside the MCR, including HFEs representing the decision to abandon the MCR, should be assigned screening values of 1.0 since more detailed analysis is needed
- As discussed in Section 11.5.2.10 of NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989), an overall probability value to represent the failure of reaching safe shutdown using alternate means can be used if the value is evaluated conservatively and a proper basis is provided
  - this approach was used in several IPEEE submittals
  - in many cases, 0.1 was used as a point value estimate for the probability

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Post-Fire HRA Screening
Basis for Screening Values

- Conservative HEP values have no direct empirical basis
- Qualitative basis comes from experience with
  - Range of screening values used and accepted in HRA
  - Quantifying HEPs for events in nuclear power plant HRAs
  - Applying range of HRA methods and values associated with those methods
  - Performing HRA for Fire PRAs, including pilots
- Other inputs
  - Peer review comments
  - Not so low so as to miss potential dependencies among HFEs

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Notes:

Slide 16

Post-Fire HRA Screening
Quantification

- Assign screening HEPs on a fire scenario specific basis
- Four sets of screening criteria :
  - Set 1 (Existing Level 1 HFEs) : multiply internal events HEP by 10 to account for effects of potential fire brigade interaction and other minor increased workload/distraction issues. Examine dependencies across scenario
  - Set 2 (Modification to existing HFEs re: Spurious events): Spurious events impact one critical safety-related train/division: increase internal events HEP to 0.1, or 10 times original value, whichever is greater. Examine dependencies across scenario
  - Set 3 (New or significantly modified HFEs): applies to new HFEs and existing HFEs not meeting Set 1 or 2. Use 1.0 if action has to be performed within one hour of fire initiation. Use 0.1, or 10 times existing HEP, if > 1 hour, whichever is lower (relaxation of original screening guidance)
  - Set 4 (Alternative Shutdown HFEs): Use screening value of 1.0 or use overall value of 0.1 with documented justification (relaxation of original screening guidance)

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Notes:

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Quantitative Screening Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 – like Internal Events HFE, but with some fire effects	Required within first hour of trip/fire	10x IE HEP	Performed ~one hour after fire/trip (fire effects no longer dynamic, equipment damage understood, fire does not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action)	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - like Set 1, but with spurious equipment or instrumentation effects in 1 safety-related train/division		0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater		0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly modified due to fire conditions		1		0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternate Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)	1 for HFE, or 0.1 for single overall probability representing failure to reach safe shutdown			

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Notes:

Presentation 5

Scoping Quantification Approach
Video: HRA Day 2 Part 3

Slide 1



EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY

Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA

Scoping Quantification Approach

Mary Presley (ARES)
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September-October 2010
Rockville, MD

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Notes:

Slide 2

Outline of the Presentation

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

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Notes:

Notes:

Slide 3

Three General Approaches to HRA Quantification

- Screening: Slightly modified from NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) to cover late (after fire is out) events
- **Scoping fire HRA quantification approach (new)**
  - Less conservative than screening, but designed to be slightly more conservative than detailed approaches
  - Some actions may not be able to meet some of the criteria (result in an HEP of 1.0)
- Two detailed fire HRA quantification approaches, modified for application in fire scenarios
  - EPRI Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) & HCR/ORE; THERP
  - ATHEANA

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Notes:

Slide 4

Purpose of Scoping Approach

- Provide less conservative HEPs for HFEs surviving screening
  - Straightforward approach without requiring too much detailed analysis
- Intent is to provide HEPs that are more realistic, and therefore, some detailed analysis required
  - HEPs thought to be somewhat more conservative than might be obtained with more detailed analysis
  - Expected to limit need for detailed analyses for many HEPs
- Relies on assessment of feasibility of actions and a time margin to account for many of the uncertainties associated with fire scenarios (e.g., per NUREG-1852)
- Requires simple judgments about PSFs

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Notes:

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Categories of Actions Addressed in Scoping Flowcharts

- New and existing main control room (MCR) actions
- New and existing ex-control room actions
- Actions associated with using alternative shutdown means due to MCR habitability issues or due to difficulties in controlling the plant from the MCR because of the effects of the fire
- Recovery of Errors of Commission (EOCs) or Errors of Omission (EOOs) due to spurious instrumentation
  - Supports addressing spurious instrument effects as described in Part 4 (Internal Fires) of ASME/ANS Combined PRA Standard (HLR-ES-C1 and C2)

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Notes:

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Steps for Using Scoping Fire HRA Approach

1. Ensure minimum criteria are met
2. Assess feasibility of operator actions
3. Calculate time margin
4. Assess key conditions and PSFs
5. Use flowcharts to quantify - Search scheme directs to one of the following:
   - INCR = In MCR actions
   - EXCR = ex-MCR actions (actions normally performed locally)
   - ASD = Alternative Shutdown (including MCR Abandonment due to habitability or transferring command and control to outside the MCR due to an inability to control the plant)
   - SPI = recovery of errors due to spurious instrumentation

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Notes:

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Minimum Criteria

1. Procedures
   - Plant procedures covering each operator action being modeled
   - Support both diagnosis & execution of the action
   - Exceptions:
     - Execution of skill-of-the-craft actions
     - Recovery of EOO or EOC in some cases
2. Training – on the procedures and the actions
3. Availability and Accessibility of Equipment

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Notes:

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Assessment of Feasibility

- Show that a given action or set of actions for a particular HFE can be diagnosed and performed within the time available

  time available > time required

- The time required for operator performance should consider 3 aspects:
  - Time at which the cue occurs relative to the initiating event
  - Time it takes the operators to formulate a response (detect, diagnose, decide)
  - Time to execute the response (including travel time and acquiring equipment, if necessary)
- Internal events that involve MCR actions can be assumed to be feasible and do not need to be re-evaluated for feasibility considerations, provided the fire does not affect MCR habitability or functionality

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Slide 9

Determining Time Required for an Action for Assessment of Feasibility: Alternatives

- Job performance measures (JPMs)
- Demonstration through training exercises
- Appendix R feasibility demonstration
- Assessment of feasibility to meet criteria in NUREG-1852
- Assessment of feasibility of similar action
- Talk-through with operators and/or trainers
- Walk-through of action and/or procedures
- Simulation

Notes:

Notes:

Slide 10

Talk-Throughs and Walk-Throughs

- Talk-throughs with operators, trainers or other appropriate plant personnel can be used to estimate timing for determining feasibility for the scoping approach
  - Per Capability Category II as defined in ASME/ANS requirement HR-G2.
- Walk-throughs of actions and/or procedures (or simulation) are recommended when:
  - detailed HRA is needed for significant events
  - insufficient information is available to support a valid talk-through

Slide 11

Notes:

Guidance for Performing Talk-Throughs

- Operators, trainers and other knowledgeable plant staff should be involved to the extent possible.
  - Those that would have to perform the action (or set of actions) should be interviewed.
  - More than one expert should be involved if possible, i.e., get more than one opinion.
- Do a thorough task breakdown so that the necessary actions and their locations, including access to and egress from, are clear.
- Evaluate relevant procedures (diagnosis and execution) in determining the time requirements.
  - How the procedures will be used, e.g., followed carefully in a step by step way or used more generally.

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Notes:

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Guidance for Performing Talk-Throughs
(Continued)

- Determine the key indicators for the action
  - Assess how soon the operators would be expected to detect and begin responding to the cues.
  - Expected delays in detecting and responding to the cues should be included in estimating crew response time
- Consider list of factors that could influence performance (next slide) in conducting an assessment of feasibility
- The team should thoroughly discuss the tasks to be performed and the likely impacts on performance before making estimates about the time required.
- When reasonable, use an expert elicitation process such as that described in the ATHEANA Users Guide (NUREG-1880) to estimate the time requirements.

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Slide 13

Considerations in Conducting Feasibility Assessment

- Environment
- Equipment functionality and accessibility
- Available indications and MCR response
- Communications
- Portable equipment
- Personnel protection equipment
- Procedures and training
- Staffing
- Other aspects (e.g., travel path, smoke)

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Notes:

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Time Margin

- Extra time included to account for potential unexpected fire effects and variabilities such as:
  - Uncertainties in the demonstrations and conditions unable to be simulated
  - Potential variability in crew response times and individual differences
  - Variations in fire type and related plant conditions
- Within the scoping approach, time margins are required to be calculated for all actions or set of actions.
- Similar to guidance in NUREG-1852

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Notes:

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Calculation of Time Margin



$$TM = \frac{t_{action} - (t_{1/2} + t_M)}{(t_{1/2} + t_M)} * 100\%$$

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Notes:

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Calculation of Time Margin (2)

- Times used should be based on realistic (average) times, not the worst case analysis
- Some actions may involve either or a mix of both serial and parallel actions, with overlapping tasks. In these cases, determination of the time margin may not be as straightforward as illustrated. For more guidance, see Appendix A of NUREG-1852.

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Notes:

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Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs within the Scoping Flowcharts

- How well the procedures match the scenario
  - The procedures should be relatively easy to follow given the pattern of indications
  - Serves as a proxy for diagnostic complexity

- Response execution complexity
  - Assessed as high or low
  - Complexity is usually considered **low** if:
    - Requires a single step
    - Performed by a single crew member
    - Multiple simple steps performed by single crew members working independently
    - Clear procedures or skill-of-craft
  - Complexity is usually considered **high** if:
    - Multiple steps that may be ambiguous or difficult
    - Multiple crew members performing coordinated steps
    - Multiple location steps if coordination/communication required
    - Multiple functions (e.g., both electrical and mechanical alignment)

Notes:

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Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs within the Scoping Flowcharts (2)

- Timing of cues for the action relative to expected fire suppression time.
  - If fire type unknown, fire suppression assumed to be 70-minutes ("all fires")
  - If fire type is known, may use the 99th %ile value (yellow) from FAQ 08-0050
  - Fire must be considered on-going for the fire types in red

Time (min)	T/G fires	High energy arcing . .	Outdoor transformers	Flammable gas	Oil fires	Electrical fires	Transient fires	PWR containment	Welding	Control Room	Cable fires	All Fires
0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
5	0.883	0.947	0.836	0.881	0.684	0.602	0.531	0.687	0.392	0.189	0.446	0.714
10	0.780	0.897	0.698	0.776	0.468	0.362	0.282	0.472	0.153	0.036	0.199	0.510
15	0.689	0.850	0.584	0.683	0.320	0.218	0.150	0.325	0.060	0.007	0.089	0.364
20	0.609	0.805	0.488	0.602	0.219	0.131	0.080	0.223	0.024	0.001	0.040	0.260
25	0.538	0.762	0.408	0.530	0.150	0.079	0.042	0.153	0.009	*	0.018	0.186
30	0.475	0.722	0.341	0.467	0.102	0.048	0.023	0.105	0.004	*	0.008	0.133
35	0.419	0.684	0.285	0.411	0.070	0.029	0.012	0.072	0.001	*	0.004	0.095
40	0.370	0.647	0.238	0.362	0.048	0.017	0.006	0.050	*	*	0.002	0.068
45	0.327	0.613	0.199	0.319	0.033	0.010	0.003	0.034	*	*	*	0.048
50	0.289	0.581	0.166	0.281	0.022	0.006	0.002	0.024	*	*	*	0.035
55	0.255	0.550	0.139	0.248	0.015	0.004	*	0.016	*	*	*	0.025
60	0.226	0.521	0.116	0.218	0.010	0.002	*	0.011	*	*	*	0.018
65	0.199	0.493	0.097	0.192	0.007	0.001	*	0.008	*	*	*	0.013
70	0.176	0.467	0.081	0.169	0.005	*	*	0.005	*	*	*	0.009
75	0.155	0.443	0.068	0.149	0.003	*	*	0.004	*	*	*	0.006
80	0.137	0.419	0.057	0.131	0.002	*	*	0.002	*	*	*	0.005
85	0.121	0.397	0.047	0.116	0.002	*	*	0.002	*	*	*	0.003
90	0.107	0.376	0.040	0.102	0.001	*	*	0.001	*	*	*	0.002
95	0.095	0.356	0.033	0.090	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.002
100	0.084	0.337	0.028	0.079	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.001

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Notes:

Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs within the Scoping Flowcharts (3)

- Action time window
  - Time from the occurrence of the cues for action until the action is no longer beneficial
  - Short time window = 30 minutes or less
  - Long time window = greater than 30 minutes
- Level of smoke and other hazardous elements in the action areas
  - Need for special equipment (e.g., SCBA)
  - Impairment of vision or prevention of the execution of the action
- Accessibility
  - Location of action
  - Travel path

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Notes:

Use of Scoping Flowcharts

- HFEs quantified based on:
  - Assessment of key PSFs
  - Location of the actions associated with the HFE
  - Condition of relevant instrumentation
- A *Search Scheme* directs the analyst to the correct flowchart for quantification:
  - In-MCR action (INCR)
  - Ex-MCR action (EXCR)
  - Alternative Shutdown (ASD)
  - Recovery of error due to spurious instrumentation (SPI)
- Some HFEs quantified within the Search Scheme lead to HEP = 1.0

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Search Scheme

- Directs analyst to correct quantification flowchart



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Search Scheme

- Direct to ASD or SPI tree
- Cues are not necessary to answer yes to D1, but likely their absence will still result in HEP = 1.0 later on



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Search Scheme

- Directs analyst to correct quantification flowchart



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Search Scheme



- Direct to INCR or EXCR

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INCR – In-MCR Actions

- Used for the following HFEs:
  - New HFEs identified outside the Internal Events PRA
  - Existing HFEs from the Internal Events that survive quantitative screening
- Addresses diagnosis and execution of the action in the MCR
  - Presumes no challenge to MCR habitability or functionality from fire (see ASD)

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INCR

- Scoping HRA for in MCR Actions



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INCR

- Fire Suppressed?
  - 70 minutes from reactor trip
  - Fire specific timing [FAQ-08-0050]
  - Challenging fires (e.g., turbine generator fires) assume fire has not been suppressed.



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INCR

- Scoping HRA for in MCR Actions



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INCR

- Fire on-going
- Short time window (<30 min)



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INCR

- Scoping HRA for in MCR Actions



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INCR

- Fire on-going
- Long time window (>30 min)



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EXCR – Ex-MCR Actions

- Used for the following HFEs:
  - New HFEs identified outside the Internal Events PRA
  - Existing HFEs from the Internal Events that survive quantitative screening
- Addresses diagnosis and execution of the action(s)
  - Diagnosis within the MCR
  - Execution locally (i.e., ex-MCR)
    - If action is require both in the MCR and locally, this tree should be used

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EXCR

- Scoping HRA for ex-MCR Actions



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EXCR

- Fire Suppressed?
  - 70 minutes from reactor trip
  - Fire specific timing [FAQ-08-0050]
  - Challenging fires (e.g., turbine generator fires) assume fire has not been suppressed.



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EXCR

- Scoping HRA for ex-MCR Actions



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Slide 36

EXCR

- Fire on-going
- Short time window (< 30 min)



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Fire HRA Scoping Method

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EXCR

- Scoping HRA for ex-MCR Actions



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EXCR

- Fire on-going
- Long time window (> 30 min)



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ASD – Alternative Shutdown

- Application to 2 situations:
  - Uninhabitable environment in MCR
  - Transfer of command and control to outside the MCR due to an inability to control the plant (loss of MCR functionality)
    - If the crew decides to stay in the MCR (i.e., direct the crew response and perform actions from the MCR to the extent possible), but collect some information or take some actions outside the MCR as necessary to reach safe shutdown (referred to as *remote shutdown*), actions should be quantified as ex-MCR actions and the EXCR flowchart should be used
- Additional information needed:
  - Identification of the cues necessary for diagnosis and verification that the instruments supporting these cues are protected from the fire effects
  - Determination of whether the action must take place in the direct vicinity of the fire.
  - Estimated level of smoke in the area

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ASD

- Scoping HRA for Alternative Shutdown Actions



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ASD



- D41 refers to diagnosis
- D42 refers to execution

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ASD

- Scoping HRA for Alternative Shutdown Actions



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ASD



- Short time window (< 30 min)

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ASD

- Scoping HRA for Alternative Shutdown Actions



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ASD

- Long time window (> 30 min)



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SPI – EOC or EOO Due to Spurious Instrumentation

- Assumes the EOC or EOO has been committed & quantifies the probability that the error would remain uncorrected
- Assume an EOC or EOO if:
  - The cables are, or cannot definitively be known not to be (exclusion approach), routed through the fire area (Need cable routing information!)
  - The instrumentation is not required for an Appendix R action, such that it cannot be assumed to be protected by a fire barrier wrap
  - A single affected instrument can lead to the action
- Don't assume an EOC or EOO if:
  - Operator is suspicious of the equipment or instrument because it may be "suspect" due to location of fire
  - Demonstrated redundancy and diversity

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Notes:

Notes:

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SPI – Spurious Instrumentation

- Spurious instrumentation refers to the instrumentation necessary for the operator to diagnose the action (e.g., expected cues from the procedure)
- Analyst judgment required in cases of partial spurious indication (e.g., 2 out of 4 instruments fail vs. 2 out of 10 instruments fail). In these cases the analyst should consider:
  - How do the instruments fail?
  - Is it likely to cause the operator to fail to diagnose the problem?

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SPI – Recovery of an EOC or EOO

- Recovery prompted by either:
  - Procedural guidance
  - Contextual information or subsequent cues in conjunction with existing procedures
- Recognition for need to recover may be either through:
  - Recognition of an error
  - Recognition of the need for the function
- Recovery possible by:
  - Reversal of the action (EOC)
  - Use of alternative system (EOC)
  - Performance of the necessary action (EOO)

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

SPI
Scoping HRA for EOC or EOO due to spurious instrumentation
SPI
D56. Are there: - Procedural guidance, - Subsequent cues, or - Contextual information Informing them of the need for recovery?
D57. Is there a way to recover?
HEP = 1.0 (SPI2)
HEP = 1.0 (SPI1)
D58. Can the action be done in the MCR?
D59. Is the action time window greater than 30 minutes?
D68. Is the area accessible?
HEP = 1.0 (SPI6)
D69. Is the action time window greater than 30 minutes?
D75. Is the execution complexity high?
HEP = 1.0 (SPI10)
D76. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the vicinity?
HEP Lookup Table AX
HEP = 1.0 (SPI9)
D70. Is the execution complexity high?
D71. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the vicinity?
HEP Lookup Table AT
D74. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the vicinity?
HEP Lookup Table AW
HEP = 1.0 (SPI8)
D72. Is SCBA required?
HEP Lookup Table AU
D73. Dense smoke (or other effect) largely impairing visibility?
HEP Lookup Table AV
HEP = 1.0 (SPI7)
D63. Is the execution complexity high?
D60. Is the execution complexity high?
HEP = 1.0 (SPI3)
D61. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
HEP Lookup Table AM
D62. Is SCBA required?
HEP Lookup Table AN
HEP = 1.0 (SPI4)
D64. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
HEP Lookup Table AO
D65. Is SCBA required?
HEP Lookup Table AP
HEP Lookup Table AQ
D66. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
HEP Lookup Table AR
D67. Is SCBA required?
HEP Lookup Table AS
HEP = 1.0 (SPI5)
Yes
No
No (< or = 30)
Yes (> 30)
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SPI

Initial questions



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SPI

Scoping HRA for EOC or EOO due to spurious instrumentation



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

SPI
Action completed within the MCR
No (< or = 30)
Yes (> 30)
D60. Is the execution complexity high?
Yes
HEP = 1.0 (SPI3)
No
D61. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
No
HEP Lookup Table AM
Yes
D62. Is SCBA required?
No
Yes
HEP Lookup Table AN
HEP = 1.0 (SPI4)
D63. Is the execution complexity high?
No
Yes
D64. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
No
HEP Lookup Table AO
Yes
D65. Is SCBA required?
No
Yes
HEP Lookup Table AP
HEP Lookup Table AQ
D66. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
No
HEP Lookup Table AR
Yes
D67. Is SCBA required?
No
Yes
HEP Lookup Table AS
HEP = 1.0 (SPI5)
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SPI



Scoping HRA for EOC or EOO due to spurious instrumentation

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
SPI
Action completed locally (ex-MCR)
D68. Is the area accessible?
Yes
No
HEP = 1.0 (SPI6)
D69. Is the action time window greater than 30 minutes?
No (< or = 30)
Yes (> 30)
D75. Is the execution complexity high?
No
Yes
HEP = 1.0 (SPI10)
D76. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the vicinity?
No
Yes
HEP Lookup Table AX
HEP = 1.0 (SPI9)
D70. Is the execution complexity high?
No
Yes
D71. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the vicinity?
No
HEP Lookup Table AT
Yes
D72. Is SCBA required?
No
HEP Lookup Table AU
Yes
D73. Dense smoke (or other effect) largely impairing visibility?
No
Yes
HEP Lookup Table AV
HEP = 1.0 (SPI7)
D74. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the vicinity?
No
Yes
HEP Lookup Table AW
HEP = 1.0 (SPI8)
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HEP Values

- Base HEP = 1E-3 (minimally attainable value)
- Within a flowchart, HEP values are based on:
  - Timing of the cue for an action relative to start of fire
  - Length of action time window
  - Level of diagnosis complexity
  - Level of execution complexity
  - Level of smoke (area of action & travel path)
  - Accessibility of action site (area of action & travel path)

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Notes:

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Multipliers Applied to HEPs Within Flowchart

- HEPs adjusted within a flowchart
  - Fire effects ongoing – significant increase
  - Action time window ≤ 30 mins – moderate increase
  - High execution complexity – moderate increase
  - Increases in smoke level – slight increase
  - Decrease in time margin – moderate increase
- HEPs based in part on amount of time margin (TM) available
  - TM < 50%
  - 50% < TM < 100%
  - TM ≥ 100%

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Notes:

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Multipliers Applied to HEPs Across Flowcharts

HEP in Base Flowchart	Adjustment Value	HEP in Scoping Flowchart
INCR	2	EXCR
EXCR	2	ASD
INCR for in-MCR actions; EXCR for ex-MCR actions	5	SPI

Change in PSF	Scoping Approach Multipliers
Fire effects ongoing (i.e., < 70 minutes from the start of the fire)	10
Action time window ≤ 30 minutes	5
High execution complexity	5
Increases in smoke level	2
Decreases in time margin: from ≥ 100% to 50%-99% from ≥ 50% to < 50%	 5 Set HEP = 1.0

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Summary of Scoping Quantification

- Purpose:
  - Offers less conservative and more realistic HEPs compared to the screening approach
  - More conservative but less resource intensive than more detailed HRA methods
- Categories:
  - In-MCR or local (ex-MCR) actions
  - Alternative shutdown
  - Recovery of errors due to spurious instrumentation
- Quantification:
  - Relies on assessment of feasibility of actions, time margin, and simple judgments about a few PSFs
  - Quantification is through the use of flowcharts

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INCR Look-up Table

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
A	≥ 100%	0.005	INCR2
	50 – 99%	0.025	INCR3
	< 50%	1.0	INCR4
B	≥ 100%	0.025	INCR5
	50 – 99%	0.125	INCR6
	< 50%	1.0	INCR7
C	≥ 100%	0.001	INCR8
	50 – 99%	0.005	INCR9
	< 50%	1.0	INCR10
D	≥ 100%	0.005	INCR11
	50 – 99%	0.025	INCR12
	< 50%	1.0	INCR13
E	≥ 100%	0.05	INCR14
	50 – 99%	0.25	INCR15
	< 50%	1.0	INCR16
F	≥ 100%	0.1	INCR17
	50 – 99%	0.5	INCR18
	< 50%	1.0	INCR19
G	≥ 100%	0.2	INCR20
	< 100%	1.0	INCR21
H	≥ 100%	0.25	INCR22
	< 100%	1.0	INCR23
I	≥ 100%	0.5	INCR24
	< 100%	1.0	INCR25
J	≥ 100%	0.01	INCR26
	50 – 99%	0.05	INCR27
	< 50%	1.0	INCR28
K	≥ 100%	0.02	INCR29
	50 – 99%	0.1	INCR30
	< 50%	1.0	INCR31
L	≥ 100%	0.04	INCR32
	50 – 99%	0.2	INCR33
	< 50%	1.0	INCR34
M	≥ 100%	0.05	INCR35
	50 – 99%	0.25	INCR36
	< 50%	1.0	INCR37
N	≥ 100%	0.1	INCR38
	50 – 99%	0.5	INCR39
	< 50%	1.0	INCR40
O	≥ 100%	0.2	INCR41
	< 100%	1.0	INCR42

Note that some tables (e.g., G) "absorb" the 50-99% TM into one <100% because multiplying the >100% TM by 5 already causes HEP=1

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EXCR Look-up Table

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
P	≥ 100%	0.01	EXCR6
	50 – 99%	0.05	EXCR7
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR8
Q	≥ 100%	0.05	EXCR9
	50 – 99%	0.25	EXCR10
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR11
R	≥ 100%	0.002	EXCR12
	50 – 99%	0.01	EXCR13
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR14
S	≥ 100%	0.01	EXCR15
	50 – 99%	0.05	EXCR16
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR17
T	≥ 100%	0.5	EXCR18
	< 100%	1.0	EXCR19
U	≥ 100%	0.1	EXCR20
	50 – 99%	0.5	EXCR21
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR22
V	≥ 100%	0.2	EXCR23
	< 100%	1.0	EXCR24
W	≥ 100%	0.4	EXCR25
	< 100%	1.0	EXCR26
X	≥ 100%	0.02	EXCR27
	50 – 99%	0.1	EXCR28
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR29
Y	≥ 100%	0.04	EXCR30
	50 – 99%	0.2	EXCR31
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR32
Z	≥ 100%	0.08	EXCR33
	50 – 99%	0.4	EXCR34
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR35
AA	≥ 100%	0.1	EXCR36
	50 – 99%	0.5	EXCR37
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR38
AB	≥ 100%	0.2	EXCR39
	< 100%	1.0	EXCR40
AC	≥ 100%	0.4	EXCR41
	< 100%	1.0	EXCR42

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ASD Look-up Table

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP*	HEP Label
AD	≥ 100%	0.2	ASD9
	< 100%	1.0	ASD10
AE	≥ 100%	0.4	ASD11
	< 100%	1.0	ASD12
AF	≥ 100%	0.8	ASD13
	< 100%	1.0	ASD14
AG	≥ 100%	0.04	ASD15
	50 – 99%	0.2	ASD16
	< 50%	1.0	ASD17
AH	≥ 100%	0.08	ASD18
	50 – 99%	0.4	ASD19
	< 50%	1.0	ASD20
AI	≥ 100%	0.16	ASD21
	50 – 99%	0.8	ASD22
	< 50%	1.0	ASD23
AJ	≥ 100%	0.2	ASD24
	< 100%	1.0	ASD25
AK	≥ 100%	0.4	ASD26
	< 100%	1.0	ASD27
AL	≥ 100%	0.8	ASD28
	< 100%	1.0	ASD29

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SPI Look-up Table

AM	≥ 100%	0.25	SPI11
	< 100%	1.0	SPI12
AN	≥ 100%	0.5	SPI13
	< 100%	1.0	SPI14
AO	≥ 100%	0.05	SPI15
	50 – 99%	0.25	SPI16
	< 50%	1.0	SPI17
AP	≥ 100%	0.1	SPI18
	50 – 99%	0.5	SPI19
	< 50%	1.0	SPI20
AQ	≥ 100%	0.2	SPI21
	< 100%	1.0	SPI22
AR	≥ 100%	0.25	SPI23
	< 100%	1.0	SPI24
AS	≥ 100%	0.5	SPI25
	< 100%	1.0	SPI26
AT	≥ 100%	0.1	SPI27
	50 – 99%	0.5	SPI28
	< 50%	1.0	SPI29
AU	≥ 100%	0.2	SPI30
	< 100%	1.0	SPI31
AV	≥ 100%	0.4	SPI32
	< 100%	1.0	SPI33
AW	≥ 100%	0.5	SPI34
	< 100%	1.0	SPI35
AX	≥ 100%	0.5	SPI36
	< 100%	1.0	SPI37

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Conclusions on Scoping Analysis

- Useful to address actions for which
  - Screening analysis is inadequate
  - Additional resources required for detailed analysis may be unwarranted
- More detailed analyses should be pursued when
  - Conditions are beyond those addressed by scoping approach
  - Resulting HFEs continue to be significant contributors to risk
- Examples via Handouts

Presentation 6

EPRI Approach to Detailed Fire HEP Quantification
Video: HRA Day 3 Part 1

Slide 1



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Sandia National Laboratories

EPRI | ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company SCIENTECH

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY

Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA

EPRI Approach to Detailed Fire HEP Quantification

Kaydee Kohlhepp (Scientech) & Stuart Lewis (EPRI)
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September-October 2010
Rockville, MD

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Notes:

Slide 2

Course Overview

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification & Definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

Notes:

Slide 3

Fire HRA Module Training Objectives

1: Be able to name the **steps in the process** for conducting a Fire HRA.
2: Be able to list the **different categories** of Fire HRA human failure events.
3: Demonstrate knowledge of ASME/ANS PRA Standard **high level requirements (HLRs).**
   - For the HLRs associated with Identification & Definition
4: Be able to identify **context and performance shaping factors** used in the analysis of post-fire human failure events.

5: Be able to list the quantification methods available for HEPs.

6: Understand the concept and importance of addressing **dependencies** between post-fire HRA events.

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Task 12: Post-Fire HRA – EPRI Detailed Analysis
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Notes:

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Outline of the EPRI Approach to Detailed Fire HRA Module

- Introduction/Relation to NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) Tasks
- Applicable PRA Standard High Level Requirements
- Overview of Quantitative Methods in the EPRI Approach:
  - Cause-Based Decision Tree Overview (Cognitive)
  - HCR/ORE Overview (Cognitive for Time-Critical)
  - THERP (Execution)
- Definition & subsequent Qualitative Analysis
  - Fire Context
  - Performance Shaping Factor
- Method Selection & Quantification
- Summary

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Task 12: Post-Fire HRA – EPRI Detailed Analysis
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What is *Detailed Fire HRA*?

Consists of HRA tasks that develop human error probabilities (HEPs) for the modeled human failure events (HFEs)
- HEP used in FPRA quantification
- HEP development provides qualitative insights on results drivers

Typically done to PRA Standard Capability Category II

Uses most of the steps in the **HRA Process**:
1. Identification & Definition of HFE
2. Qualitative analysis – context & performance shaping factors
3. Quantitative analysis – method selection & quantification of HEP
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) Detailed HRA: EPRI approach or ATHEANA
4. Provides input to subsequent Fire HRA tasks
   - Dependency analysis
   - Uncertainty analysis

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General Approaches to Quantification

1. Screening: Slightly modified from NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) to reduce the HEPs for late HFEs (after fire is out) – covered previously
2. Scoping FHRA quantification approach – covered previously
   - Less conservative than screening, but designed to be slightly more conservative than detailed approaches
   - Some actions may not be able to meet some of the criteria (result in an HEP of 1.0)
3. Two detailed fire HRA quantification approaches, modified for application in fire scenarios
   - EPRI – covered in this module
     - Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) & HCR/ORE; THERP
   - ATHEANA – covered after this module

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Fire HRA Process Steps

NUREG/CR-6850 Task	Fire HRA Process Step
Task 2 – Component Selection	**Identification** of previously existing HFEs & potential response to spurious actuations/indications
Task 5 – Fire-Induced Risk Model	**Identification and Definition** of fire response HFEs
Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA	**Qualitative Analysis -** definition, context & performance shaping factors
Task 7 – First/Screening Quant.	**Quantification –** typically screening or scoping
Task 8 – Scoping Quantification	**Quantification –** typically scoping
Tasks 11/14 – Detailed Scenario Quantification	**Quantification & Dependency** could be screening, scoping or detailed HRA
Task 15 – Uncertainty	**Uncertainty**

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Relationship of Detailed Fire HRA to FPRA Tasks

- Detailed Fire HRA supports FPRA quantification
  - Developed, and typically used, for detailed fire scenarios
    - Detailed Fire Scenarios (Tasks 11 & 14)
    - Uncertainty/Sensitivity (Task 15)
  - But can be used at any level, such as:
    - Screening / First Quantification (Task 7*)
    - Scoping (Task 8)
- Detailed Fire HRA uses inputs from most, prior FPRA tasks
  - Identification & Definition of HFEs (Tasks 2, 5, 7 & 8)
  - Qualitative Analysis (Task 12 – Fire HRA)

*** All task numbers refer to NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989**

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PRA Standard Requirements for HRA Quantification

Relevant HLRs from Internal-Events Section (Ch. 2)

HLR-HR-G (from the internal events HRA element)

The assessment of the probabilities of the post-initiator HFEs shall be performed using a well-defined and self consistent process that addresses the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performances, and addresses potential dependencies between human failure events in the same accident sequence

Relevant HLRs from Fire Section (Ch. 4 of Standard)

HLR-HRA-C (from the Fire HRA element)

The Fire PRA shall quantify HEPs associated with incorrect responses accounting for the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, particularly including the effects of fire

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EPRI Quantification Methods

- CBDTM (Cause Based Decision Tree Method)
  - 8 Decision trees based on simulator experiment insights
  - Default method for cognitive portion (detection/diagnosis)
- HCR/ORE Correlation (Human Cognitive Reliability / Operator Reliability Experiment)
  - Used for time-critical operator actions
  - Normalized time reliability correlation (function of $T_{available}$ / $T_{required}$)
- THERP (NUREG/CR-1278) for execution
- Methods are implemented in EPRI *HRA Calculator*® software, but can be quantified on paper

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Post-Initiator HFE Representation: EPRI TR-100259



Pe = Execution is quantified using THERP

Pc = Cognitive is quantified using

CBDTM (default)

HCR/ORE (time critical HFEs)

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EPRI Timeline for a Post-initiator HFE



T_{SW} = System time window

T_{delay} = Time from start of transient until cue is reached

T_M = Manipulation time (includes transit, tools, PPE & executing each task)

$T_{1/2}$ = Median response time (detection, diagnosis, & decision-making)

T_W = Time window for cognitive response = $T_{SW} - T_{delay} - T_M$

$T_w - T_{1/2}$ = Time available for recovery

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CBDTM Overview – Cognitive Method

- Analytical approach based on identification of failure mechanisms and compensating factors
- Applicable to rule-based behavior, such as when procedures are used
- Two high-level failure modes:
  - Plant information-operator interface failure
  - Operator-procedure interface failure
- Each failure mode is decomposed into contributions from several distinct failure mechanisms
- Default method, especially if not time-critical

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CBDT - Summary of Failure Mechanisms

Type	Designator	Description
Failures in the Operator–Information Interface	p_c a	Data not available
	p_c b	Data not attended to
	p_c c	Data misread or miscommunicated
	p_c d	Information misleading
Failures in the Operator-Procedure Interface	p_c e	Relevant step in procedure missed
	p_c f	Misinterpret instruction
	p_c g	Error in interpreting logic
	p_c h	Deliberate violation (not sabotage)

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CBDTM decision tree: pc-a Data not available



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CBDTM decision tree: pc-b Data not attended to



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-c Data misread or miscommunicated



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-d Information misleading



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

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

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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-g Error in interpreting logic



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-h Deliberate violation



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Post-Initiators: CBDTM Recovery Factors

Tree	Branch	Self-Review	Extra Crew	STA Review	Shift Change	ERF Review
Pca	all	NC	0.5	NC	0.5	0.5
Pcb	all	X	NC	X	X	X
Pcc	all	NC	NC	X	X	X
Pcd	all	NC	0.5	X	X	0.1
Pce	a-h	X	0.5	NC	X	X
Pce	i	0.5	0.5	X	X	X
Pcf	all	NC	0.5	X	X	X
Pcg	all	NC	0.5	X	X	X
Pch	all	NC	X	X	NC	NC

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CBDTM - Recovery Factors

Recovery Factor	Time Effective
Self Review	At any time there is a subsequent cue, other than the initial cue that would prompt the operator to revisit the decision OR Is there a procedural step that either returns the operator to the initial step where the error was made, or that repeats the initial instruction?
Other (Extra) Crew	At any time that there are crew members over and above the minimum complement present in the CR and not assigned to other tasks
Shift Technical Advisor	10 to 15 minutes after reactor trip.
Emergency Response Facility/ Technical Support Center	1 hour after reactor trip – if constituted
Shift Change	6 hours after reactor trip given 8 hour shifts 9 hours after reactor trip given 12 hour shifts

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HCR/ORE Overview – Cognitive Method

- **Cognitive** modeling of **time-critical operator actions**
  - For example, less than 30 minute time window
- Empirical method, a **time-reliability curve**
- Fitted to successful response times
- Data points in which crews were totally on the wrong path not included in the fitting ("outliers")
- P_c therefore conditional on a correct decision, or the initial error was discovered in a timely manner
- Normalized time to be limited to time windows on which observations were made. Extrapolation not valid
- Guidance in **EPRI-TR100259**:
  - If P_c < 1E-02, use the CBDTM
  - If P_c believed to be conservative, use CBDTM

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HCR/ORE – Equation

$$P_C = 1 - \Phi\left[\frac{\ln\left(\frac{T_W}{T_{1/2}}\right)}{\sigma}\right]$$

- ***P_C* = Probability of cognitive non-response**
- σ = Logarithmic standard deviation (Determined based on cue response structure – next slide)
- Φ = Standard normal cumulative distribution
- $T_W = T_{SW} - T_{delay} - T_M$ = time window available for cognitive response
- $T_{1/2}$ = Crew median response time

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HCR/ORE - Sigma Values
based on cue-response structure

Plant Type	Cue-Response Structure	Values for σ		
		Average	Upper Bound	Lower Bound
BWRs	CP1	0.70	1.00	0.40
	CP2	0.58	0.96	0.20
	CP3	0.75	0.91	0.59
PWRs	CP1	0.57	0.88	0.26
	CP2	0.38	0.69	0.07
	CP3	0.77	*	*

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Categorization of Type CP Actions

CP1 IF

CP2 WHEN

CP3 BEFORE



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Quantification: Fire HEPs for HFEs from the Internal Events PRA

- If HFE has been quantified using EPRI HRA Approach for internal events, quantification for fire is a relatively simple modification in following areas:
  - **Timing**
  - **Cue** and indications impacts
  - Increase in **stress**
  - Increase in **workload**
  - Use of multiple **procedures**
  - For local actions, consider alternate **routes** if fire impacts the normal or ideal travel path

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Fire Impacts on Timing



T = 0 is considered the start of the fire – For existing HFEs T=0 is typically reactor trip. In most cases, the FPRA assumes the fire and reactor trip coincide.

T_{delay} = Time from start of transient until cue is reached. If the cue is considered to be procedure step the **fire may cause delays in the procedure implementation**.

$T_{1/2}$ = If the fire impacts some but not all of the **instrumentation** $T_{1/2}$ will be increased from the internal events case to account for the time required for the operators to asses the situation & determine which instrumentation is correct or diagnose based on secondary cues.

T_m = For **main control room** actions in which there is no fire in the control room, T_m is considered to be the **same for the internal events case and the fire case**.

For **local actions, T_m will account for any detours caused by the fire**. T_m must also account for PPE & tools.

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Fire Impacts on Timing (cont'd)

- If time available for recovery is reduced due to fire impacts on timing, then the recoveries previously credited in the internal events PRA within the CBDTM are to be revisited
- If time-critical action and cues/indications are impacted, then consider using upper bound for sigma when applying HCR/ORE

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Fire Impacts on Instrumentation

- If all **instrumentation is impacted** and there are no cues for diagnosis then HEP =1.0
- **Partial instrumentation** impacted is modeled in decision tree **Pc-a & Pc-d** (HEP range 1E-2 to 1.0)
- If the fire causes **no impact on instrumentation** then Pc-a and Pc-d typically evaluate to "Negligible"





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CBDT Example - Fire Impacts on Workload (Pc)

- Increased workload:
  - modeled explicitly
  - decision tree Pc-b
  - if fire causes increase in workload
  - select high workload
  - part of the cognitive phase (detection & diagnosis)
  - potentially recover if have additional staff



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CBDT Example - Fire Impacts on Workload (Pe)

- Increase in workload is reflected by an increase in stress



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Fire Impacts on Procedure Usage

- If EOPs are implemented in parallel to fire procedures, then multiple procedures are used
- If EOPs are suspended while fire procedures are being used, then only one procedure is credited and any time delays are accounted for in the timeline



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Fire Impacts on Execution

- Stress is often increased from internal events case
  - Except for control room actions when operator actions occurring more than 70 minutes after the fire started, because
    1. 99% of fires are extinguished within 70 minutes per FAQ 50
    2. On average, a fire is extinguished in 13 minutes
- For local actions, additional factor of 2 can be applied
  - Account for smoke, communication impacts, or
  - Additional equipment required by fire
    - Examples: SCBA, ladders, keys, tools

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Fire Response HFEs

- Method selection depends on timing
  - CBDT approach to quantification applied first
  - HCR/ORE for time critical fire response actions
    - May se upper bound based on sigma value
- Ex-control room actions required due to loss of control are not substantially different from other local actions (e.g., during SBO) provided that local actions are not credited in close proximity to fire location
- No separate guidance for MCR abandonment
  - MCR typically is completely abandoned due to uninhabitability, not due to loss of control/functionality initial results show that frequency is low enough to not be a concern
    - If required, additional decision trees may be developed to model locus of control moving outside the control room

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Fire Response HFEs

- Same considerations as internal events actions and the following **additional considerations**
  - **Ambiguously worded procedures**: Fire procedures are not standardized like EOPs. Modeled in decision tree $P_c f$. For internal events HFEs $P_c f$ typically evaluates to negligible.



  - **Local controls** may not be as easily accessible and as well trained on as for internal events actions. In this case, higher Error of Omission is selected from THERP
  - **No base case** from which to build the analysis, so entire analysis must be developed

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Undesired Response to Spurious Indication or Actuation

- The following can be screened from consideration during identification:
  - Actions for which multiple indications are available for different parameters or via redundant channels
  - Actions that have a proceduralized verification step, if verification will be effective given the fire scenario

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Quantification of Undesired Operator Responses to Spurious Signals

- HEPs for actions that do not screen from consideration are initially to be set to 1.0 (failed)
- EPRI approach to quantification
  - Assume the Error of Commission has occurred, then
  - Identify, define and quantify a recovery action

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EPRI HRA Uncertainty

- For fire, the EPRI approach applies the same error factors (based on final HEP) as for internal events

HEP Error Factor		
HEP	Reference	EF
HEP < 0.001	THERP Table 20-20	10
HEP > 0.001	THERP Table 20-20	5
HEP > 0.1	Mathematical convenience	1

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Detailed Fire HRA Summary

Consists of HRA tasks that develop human error probabilities (HEPs) for the modeled human failure events (HFEs)
- HEP used in FPRA quantification
- HEP development provides qualitative insights on results drivers

Uses most of the steps in the **HRA Process**:
1. Identification & Definition of HFE
2. Qualitative analysis – context & performance shaping factors
3. Quantitative analysis – **method selection** & quantification of HEP
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) Detailed HRA
      a) EPRI approach (CBDTM or HCR/ORE & THERP)
      b) ATHEANA
4. Provides input to subsequent Fire HRA tasks
   - Dependency analysis
   - Uncertainty analysis (HRA Calculator error factors are kept the same for fire HRA)

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Notes:

Course Overview

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and Definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
      a) EPRI Examples (See handouts)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

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Notes:

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Presentation 7

EPRI/NRC-RES Fire HRA Methodology
Detailed Quantification: ATHEANA
Video: HRA Day 3 Part 2

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

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE HRA METHODOLOGY

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop

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Notes:

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Outline of the Presentation

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
    - a) Screening
    - b) Scoping
    - c) EPRI approach (detailed)
    - **d) ATHEANA (detailed)**
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

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

Detailed Quantification: ATHEANA

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Notes:

ATHEANA - Outline

1. Introduction to ATHEANA
2. ATHEANA – What's Going To Be Different For Fire PRA?
3. ATHEANA HRA Process
4. ASME/ANS PRA Standards Addressed
5. Steps For Performing ATHEANA
6. Addressing Fire-Specific Issues With ATHEANA
7. Fire HRA Exercises Using ATHEANA

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Notes:

Introduction to ATHEANA

- ATHEANA is…
  - A Technique for Human Event ANAlysis
  - A second-generation HRA method
  - A development of NRC/RES and its contractors
  - An input to NRC's *Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)*, April 2005
- ATHEANA is documented in:
  - NUREG-1624, Rev. 1, *Technical Basis and Implementation Guidelines for A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA)*, May 2000.
  - NUREG-1880, *ATHEANA User's Guide*, June 2007.

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Notes:

Introduction to ATHEANA (continued)

- ATHEANA is…
  - A knowledge-base* for (mostly) at-power, post-initiator HFEs, including:
    - Relevant psychological literature
    - Supporting analyses of historical events
  - A multidisciplinary framework for understanding human error
  - An HRA process (including detailed guidance for performing qualitative analysis)
  - A search scheme for HFEs (including errors of commission)
  - A quantification approach
- Also, ATHEANA provides a basis for performing retrospective analysis of historical events (including example analyses).

But, different knowledge bases* can be used or substituted.

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

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

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Notes:

Introduction to ATHEANA (continued)

- The basic premise of ATHEANA:
  - People behave “rationally,” even if reason for an action (or inaction) is wrong.
  - Often, when people make errors, they are “set up.”
  - People can be “set-up” by **contexts** that can create the *appearance* that the wrong response is correct when, in fact, it is not.
- Analyses of operating experience (particularly events with serious consequences) support this view, e.g.:
  - Nuclear power plant events (e.g., TMI 2, Browns Ferry, Chernobyl)
  - Incidents from a variety of other technologies (e.g., aviation, medicine, chemical processing, maritime)

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Notes:

Introduction to ATHEANA (continued)

Across industries, the following **contextual** factors often have been involved in serious events:

1. The plant behavior is outside the expected range (as represented by procedures, training, and traditional safety analyses).
2. The plant’s behavior is not understood.
3. Indications of the actual plant state and behavior are not recognized (sometimes due to instrumentation problems).
4. Prepared plans or procedures are not applicable or helpful for the specific plant conditions.

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Introduction to ATHEANA (continued)

Consequently, the principal motivators for developing ATHEANA were:

1. HFEs modeled in most HRA/PRAs are not consistent with the roles played by operators in actual operational experience.
2. The accident record and advances in behavior sciences both support a stronger focus on **context**.
3. Recent advances in psychology ought to be used and integrated with the disciplines of engineering, design, operations and training, human factors, and PRA in modeling HFEs.

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Introduction to ATHEANA (continued)

…so, the principal objectives were:

1. To improve the HRA state-of-the-art , including:
   - To more realistically incorporate kinds of human-system interactions found important in accidents and near misses
   - To address dependencies among sequential human actions
   - To address errors of commission (EOCs), including their identification and quantification
2. To support the development of insights to improve plant safety and performance *from HRA results*
3. To support resolution of regulatory and industry issues *from HRA results*

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Introduction to ATHEANA (continued)

Key characteristics are:

- Focuses on the **error-forcing context** (i.e., the context that sets up operators), but also addressed the nominal context
- Uses a structured search for problem scenarios (i.e., **error-forcing contexts**) and associated unsafe actions (i.e., operator failures)
- Links plant conditions, performance shaping factors (PSFs) and human error mechanisms through the **context**
- Is experience-based, both in its development and application (e.g., uses knowledge of domain experts such as operators, pilots, trainers)
- Uses multidisciplinary approach and underlying cognitive model of operator behavior
- Explicitly considers operator dependencies (including recovery actions) by developing entire accident sequences
- Uses a facilitator-led, expert elicitation approach for quantification (that allows the plant-specific experience and understanding from operators, operator trainers, and other operations experts to be directly reflected)

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Introduction to ATHEANA (continued)

Example ATHEANA applications:

- HRA/PRAs in a prospective analysis of regulatory and industry issues such as pressurized thermal shock (PTS) (3 plants – Oconee, Beaver Valley, Palisades)
- International HRA Empirical Study (Steam Generator Tube Rupture and Loss of Feedwater scenarios)
- DOE's license application for Yucca Mountain waste repository (preclosure facility)
- Qualitative analyses of spent fuel handling (misloads and cask drops) (two NUREG/CRs – to be published)
- Retrospective event analyses and development of a knowledge-base for fire-specific human performance issues (NUREG/CR – to be published)
- HRA/PRA to evaluate design features of a facility to dismantle chemical weapons

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ATHEANA – What's Going To Be Different For Fire PRA?

1. NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] and supporting documents indicate the need for adjustments for a fire-specific knowledge-base (e.g., fire-specific human performance issues).
2. EOCs are limited to those stated in the ASME/ANS PRA Standard.
3. Many *Fire HRA Guidelines* qualitative analysis tasks overlap; may already be performed or started before detailed quantification is performed.
4. The fire **context** may already be sufficiently challenging for operators; ATHEANA steps and activities related to finding an **error-forcing context** may not be needed.

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The ATHEANA HRA Process

- Step 1: Define and interpret issue of concern
- Step 2: Define scope of analysis
- Step 3: Describe base case scenarios
- Step 4: Define HFEs and unsafe actions (UAs)
- Step 5: Identify potential vulnerabilities
- Step 6: Search for deviations from base case
- Step 7: Evaluate recovery potential
- Step 8: Quantification
- Step 9: Incorporation into PRA

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Notes:

The ATHEANA HRA Process

- Not all of these steps are needed for every HRA/PRA job.
- For fire HRA/PRA, certain steps will not need to be performed by ATHEANA, e.g.,
  - NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] and the ANS/ASME PRA Standard already address Steps #1 and #2 (i.e., define and interpret the issue of concern, define the scope of analysis)
  - Deviations from the base case scenario (i.e., Step #6) are **usually** not needed for fire; most fire scenarios are generally challenging enough for operators that we do not have to look for even more unusual conditions
- So, later when we talk about ATHEANA steps, we'll highlight those needed specifically for fire HRA/PRA.

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ANS/ASME RA-Sa-2009 Requirements for Fire – At Power High Level Requirements for HEP Quantification

- ATHEANA includes a fully capable detailed HRA quantification approach that satisfies requirements such as:
  - Part 2, HLR-HR-F: Human failure events shall be defined that represent the impact of not properly performing the required responses, in a manner consistent with the structure and level of detail of the accident sequences
  - Part 2, HLR-HR-G: The assessment of the probabilities of the post-initiator HFEs shall be performed using a well-defined and self consistent process that addresses the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performances, and addresses potential dependencies between human failure events in the same accident sequence
  - Part 4, HLR-HRA-B: The Fire PRA shall include events where appropriate in the Fire PRA that represent the impacts of incorrect human responses associated with the identified human actions
  - Part 4, HLR-HRA-C: The Fire PRA shall quantify HEPs associated with incorrect responses accounting for the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, particularly including the effects of fire
- …and supporting level requirements such as:
  - Part 2, SRs HR-F1, HR-G3, HR-G7, HR-G8; Part 4 SRs, HRA-B1 [Note 1] and HRA-C1

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
Steps in the ATHEANA Process
Objectives and technical concerns of the analysis
1. Define and Interpret the Issue
2. Define the Scope of the Analysis
PRA perspective and model development (initiating events, sequences, success criteria, relevant human actions)
3. Describe the PRA Scenario and Its Nominal Context
4. Define the Corresponding HFE or UA (or EOC)
Nominal Context
5. Assess Human Performance Information And Characterize Factors That Could Lead to Potential Vulnerabilities
6. Search for Plausible Deviations of the PRA Scenario
Error-Forcing Context
7. Evaluate Potential to Recover from the HFE/UA
8. Estimate the HEPs for The HFEs/UAs
9. Incorporate HFEs/UAs and Corresponding HEPs into the PRA
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Mapping ATHEANA Process Steps to Fire HRA Guidelines Process

ATHEANA Process Step	Fire HRA Guideline Process Step
Steps 1 & 2: Define issue & scope of analysis	Defined by fire PRA & its scope of analysis – **no additional work needed**
Step 4: Define HFEs and unsafe actions (UAs)	**Covered*** by Chapter 3: Identification and Definition
Steps 3 & 5: Describe PRA scenario & assess human performance information, etc.	Some additional information needed for detailed HRA; but, **mostly covered** by Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis
Step 6: Search for deviation scenarios	**Probably not needed**; fire scenarios are already "deviations"
Step 7: Assess potential for recovery	Similar to Chapter 6: Recovery
Step 8: Quantification (explicitly addresses dependencies & develops uncertainty distributions)	Different approach than scoping trees (Chapter 5) or CBDT (Appendix C); different approach to dependency & uncertainty (Chapters 7 & 8)

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Notes:

The ATHEANA HRA Process – Highlighting the needs for implementing Fire HRA Guidelines

- Step 1: Define and interpret issue of concern
- Step 2: Define scope of analysis
- Step 3: Describe base case scenarios
- Step 4: Define HFEs and unsafe actions (UAs)
- Step 5: Identify potential vulnerabilities
- Step 6: Search for deviations from base case
- Step 7: Evaluate recovery potential
- Step 8: Quantification
- Step 9: Incorporation into PRA

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Notes:

The ATHEANA HRA Process – Needs for implementing Fire HRA Guidelines (continued)

- So, in this presentation, we will only discuss the following steps in the ATHEANA process:
  - Step 3: Describe the base case scenario
  - Step 5: Identify potential vulnerabilities
  - Step 6: Search for deviations from base case (often not needed)
  - Step 7: Evaluate recovery potential
  - Step 8: Quantification
- As for the entire process in applying the Fire HRA Guidelines, these steps are **iterative**.

Note: If Step 6 is needed, HFEs may need to be redefined (as in any HRA/PRA, if warranted by plant conditions, timing of plant behavior, etc.). But, Fire HRA Guidelines can address this situation without using Step 2 of ATHEANA explicitly.

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Step 3: Describe the PRA Scenario and its Nominal Context

- The base case scenario:
  - represents most realistic description of expected plant and operator behavior for selected issue and initiator
  - provides basis to identify and define deviations from such expectations (found in Step 6)
- Ideally, base case scenario:
  - has a consensus operator model (COM)
  - is well-defined operationally
  - has well-defined physics
  - is well-documented
  - is realistic
- Scenario description often based on FSAR or other well-documented analyses

  In practice, the available information defining a base case is usually less than ideal - analysts must supplement information deficiencies or simply recognize them.

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Sources of Information Needed for Step 3

- Plant-specific FSAR (& other design basis documents)
- Safety analyses (e.g., plant-specific, vendor)
- Procedures (e.g., plant-specific EOPs, vendor, basis documents)
- Operator experience (actual & simulator)
- Operator training material & its background documentation
- Plant staff, especially operators, operator trainers, T-H experts
- Plant-specific & industry generic operating experience

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Description of Base Case Scenario

- Initial plant conditions
- Sequence of events and expected timing before and following reactor trip
- Plant system and equipment response
- What the operators will see
  - usually trajectories of key plant parameters & indications
- Key operator actions during the scenario progression

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Step 5: Assess Human Performance Information & Characterize Factors that Could Lead to Potential Vulnerabilities

- Identify and characterize factors (e.g., PSFs) that could contribute to crew performance in responding to the various accident scenarios
  - Factors that might increase the likelihood of the HFEs & UAs of interest
  - Helps focus later deviation searches
- Operators and trainers must play a role in this step
  - directly or through question/answer sessions
  - observation of simulator exercises (with relevant scenarios if possible)

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Notes:

Ways to Identify Potential Vulnerabilities

- Investigation of potential vulnerabilities due to biases in operator expectations (training, experience)
  - review training materials, interview trainers, operators
- Understanding of base-case scenario timeline and any inherent difficulties associated with required response
- Identification of operator-action tendencies based on
  - “standardized” responses to indications of plant conditions
  - informal rules
- Evaluation of formal rules and EOPs
  - critical decision points, ambiguities, sources of confusion, timing mismatches, special cases such as “preemptive actions,” etc.

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Notes:

Step 6: Search for Deviations From the Base Case

- Identify deviations from base case likely to result in risk-significant unsafe acts
- Deviations are plant behaviors or conditions that set up unsafe actions by creating mismatches between the proposed plant behavior and:
  - operators’ knowledge, expectations, biases & training
  - procedural guidance & timing
- ATHEANA search schemes guide analysts to find real deviations in plant behavior and conditions
  - not just false perceptions in the operators’ minds

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Four Search Schemes for Step 6

- Identify deviations from the base case scenario using "HAZOP" guide words to discover troublesome ways that the scenario may differ from base case
  - more, less, quicker, slower, repeat ...
- Identify deviations for vulnerabilities associated with procedures & informal rules
  - e.g., changes in timing, sequencing of decision points, etc.
- Identify deviations caused by subtle failures in support systems
  - cause problems for operators to identify what's happening
- Identify deviations that can set up operator tendencies and error types leading towards HFEs/UAs of interest

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Step 7: Evaluate Potential for Recovery

- Possibility of recovering from UAs is considered in this step
- However, when evaluated, recovery <u>always</u> considers both the complete EFC and the occurrence of the UA(s)
- Deviation description is extended to include the scenario characteristics up to the last opportunity for recovery
- Performance of this step linked with quantification - iteration between these steps is likely

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Notes:

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Guidance for Recovery Analysis

- Define the possible recovery action(s) given the initial error corresponding to the HFE/UA has occurred
- Consider the time available to diagnose the need for and perform the recovery action so as to avoid a serious or otherwise undesired condition
- Identify the existence and timing of cues as well as how compelling the cues are that would alert the operators to the need to recover and provide sufficient information to identify the most applicable recovery action(s)
- Identify the existence and timing of additional resources (e.g., additional staff, special tools), if necessary, to perform the recovery

Notes:

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Step 8: Quantification

- Very structured, facilitator led, expert opinion elicitation process
  - leads to consensus distributions of operator failure probabilities
- Considerations in elicitation process (covered in NUREG-1880):
  - Forming the team of experts (include experts familiar with important relevant factors during fire conditions, operator trainers, etc.)
  - Controlling for biases when performing elicitations
  - Addressing uncertainty

Notes:

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Notes:

ATHEANA Quantification: Asks the Experts Two Questions

1. Does the operational story make sense?
   - given the specific PRA scenario or sub-scenario
   - given what is known about operators & operations at this plant
2. What is the likelihood that operators will fail as described in the operational story?

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Notes:

Basic Formulation for Quantification Process

- $P\,(HFE|S) = \sum_{ij} P(EFC_i|S) \times P(UA_j|EFC_i,S)$
- HFEs are human failure events modeled in PRA
  - Modeled for a given PRA scenario (S)
  - Can include multiple unsafe actions (UAs) and error-forcing contexts (EFCs)
- First determine probability of the EFC (plant conditions and PSFs) being addressed
- Determine probability of UA given the identified EFC
- If multiple EFCs identified, then quantify a UA given each EFC separately

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Six Steps to Quantification Process

1. Discuss HFE and possible influences / contexts using a factor "checklist" as an aid
2. Identify "driving" influencing factors and thus most important contexts to consider
3. Compare these contexts to other familiar contexts and each expert independently provide the initial probability distribution for the HEP considering:
   - "Likely" to fail ~ 0.5 (5 out of 10 would fail)
   - "Infrequently" fails ~ 0.1 (1 out of 10 would fail)
   - "Unlikely" to fail ~ 0.01(1 out of 100 would fail)
   - "Extremely unlikely" to fail ~ 0.001 (1 out of 1000 would fail)

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Six Steps to Quantification Process (cont'd)

4. Each expert discusses and justifies his/her HEP estimate
5. Openly discuss opinions and refine the HFE, associated contexts, and/or HEPs (if needed) – each expert independently provides HEP (may be the same as the initial judgment or may be modified)
6. Arrive at a consensus HEP for use in the PRA

Notes:

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Addressing Fire-Specific Issues with ATHEANA

- ATHEANA should be applied in the same way for fire HRA, as for any other HRA/PRA.
- However, the fire-specific operator performance issues should be considered in performing ATHEANA steps (e.g., identifying potential vulnerabilities, quantification).
- Plus, some of the information needed to apply ATHEANA may be collected and analyzed already in order to have used either the screening values or scoping approach provided in the Fire HRA Guidelines.

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Notes:

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Mapping ATHEANA Process Steps to Fire HRA Guidelines Process

ATHEANA Process Step	Fire HRA Guideline Process Step
Steps 1 & 2: Define issue & scope of analysis	Defined by fire PRA & its scope of analysis – **no additional work needed**
Step 4: Define HFEs and unsafe actions (UAs)	**Covered*** by Chapter 3: Identification and Definition
Steps 3 & 5: Describe PRA scenario & assess human performance information, etc.	Some additional information needed for detailed HRA; but, **mostly covered** by Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis
Step 6: Search for deviation scenarios	**Probably not needed**; fire scenarios are already "deviations"
Step 7: Assess potential for recovery	Similar to Chapter 6: Recovery
Step 8: Quantification (explicitly addresses dependencies & develops uncertainty distributions)	Different approach than scoping trees (Chapter 5) or CBDT (Appendix C); different approach to dependency & uncertainty (Chapters 7 & 8)

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Notes:

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The ATHEANA HRA Process – Highlighting the needs for implementing Fire HRA Guidelines

- Step 1: Define and interpret issue of concern
- Step 2: Define scope of analysis
- Step 3: Describe base case scenarios
- Step 4: Define HFEs and unsafe actions (UAs)
- Step 5: Identify potential vulnerabilities
- Step 6: Search for deviations from base case
- Step 7: Evaluate recovery potential
- Step 8: Quantification
- Step 9: Incorporation into PRA

Notes:

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Additional ATHEANA Needs for Fire HRA

1. Some additional qualitative analysis to support Steps 3, 5, (6), 7, and 8, including:
   - Information collection
   - Interviews of operator trainers
2. ATHEANA approach for quantification and recovery
   - With dependency considerations embedded
   - With uncertainty distribution being explicitly developed as part of quantification
3. Adjustments to knowledge-base (per considerations in NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989] and others)

Notes:

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Notes:

Example Qualitative Analysis Results - Chapter 4

- In applying the Fire HRA Guidelines, the following are examples of information already collected and/or analyzed:
  - Procedures used in fire scenarios
  - Usage of procedures
  - Potential fire effects and their impacts on human performance
  - Fire PRA scenarios with associated equipment and indication failures
  - Possible crew responses to fire scenarios
    - Errors of Commission
    - Errors of Omission

Notes:

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Examples of Additional Qualitative Analysis to Support ATHEANA

1. Identify:
   - important decision points or branching, and other possible places in procedures where operators may make different choices
   - plant-specific "informal rules" and other guidance that may supplement or slightly deviate from relevant procedural guidance
   - tradeoffs (e.g., impromptu choices between alternatives) or other difficult decisions that operators may need to make
   - potential situations where operators may not understand the actual plant conditions (e.g., spurious indications)
   - different ways by which an HFE could occur, starting with the fire PRA scenario description, different procedural paths or choices, and the reasons for these different choices

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Notes:

Examples of Additional Qualitative Analysis to Support ATHEANA (continued)

2. Develop:
   - insights from training, experience, or demonstration of fire-related operator actions (in- and ex-MCR), including use of specialized equipment
   - timelines or other ways of representing the time sequencing of events in fire scenarios
3. Objective or final result of ATHEANA qualitative analysis:
   - A full operational scenario description, or "operational story," including accident progression and as many "bells and whistles" as are reasonable, such that operator trainers can "put themselves into" scenario
     - Because, in quantification, you will be asking them, "what would your crews do in this situation?"

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Notes:

Examples of Additional Qualitative Analysis to Support ATHEANA (continued)

- The resulting operational scenario description may include:
  - Additional plant conditions that will need to be quantified as part of the HFE (unless accident sequence analyst wants to revise event trees or fault trees).
  - Distinctions on timing of plant behavior (that might need to be addressed as part of the HFE, unless logic is revised).
  - Instrument or indication issues (including failures) that will need to be reflected (for fire, might be explicitly part of PRA model, or may not).
  - Different possible procedure paths or response strategies that operators might rationally take.
  - Reasons why operators might take different procedure paths.
  - Credible **recovery actions**.

Likely to need help from operational experts on the last three elements.

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Notes:

Remember…Basic Quantification Formula?

First, let's simplify; only one EFC for each scenario, S.

So, we have:

$$P(HFE|S) = \sum_{j} P(UA_j|EFC,S)$$

- S = Full operational story (might not be equivalent to PRA scenario)
- UAs = Different procedure paths leading to undesired outcomes, and associated reasons for taking them
- EFCs = Plant conditions, behavior, PSFs, etc., that are not explicitly modeled in PRA, but needed to represent S

- Probability of each UA is conditional on EFC/S

Notes:

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ATHEANA – Iterating Between Qualitative Analysis and Quantification

- Development of operational scenario descriptions should be both for and by operational experts (e.g., trainers).
- Even "during quantification," the analyst should be alert to the need to modify, refine, and/or add details to the operational description of the scenario. For example:
  - During quantification, very different failure probabilities are provided by the expert panel of trainers.
  - When explaining answers, one trainer brings up a possible influence (e.g., a specific plant condition or equipment failure) that no one else has considered.
  - Because everyone agrees to the validity and importance of this factor, the analyst either:
    - Has everyone include this factor in their quantification, or
    - Defines a new HFE to address this newly defined scenario

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Notes:

ATHEANA – Iterating Between Qualitative Analysis and Quantification

- Based on experience in applying ATHEANA, most of the effort is in identifying and developing the elements of an "operational story" that represents what the experts think is important to operator behavior.
- Once this agreement is reached, reaching a consensus in final quantification by the operational experts is usually not difficult (if using the tools and techniques for facilitating expert elicitation, such as that given in the ATHEANA User's Guide.)

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Notes:

ATHEANA – Addressing Uncertainty in Fire HRA/PRA

- Performed as usually would, i.e.,
  - Expert elicitation process for quantification includes:
    - Detailed qualitative discussions to ensure all the available information (evidence) is brought to the table, shared, and agreed upon to the extent possible
    - Detailed identification of the key factors contributing to aleatory and epistemic uncertainty
  - The HEP developed for an HFE in a fire scenario (as for any other scenario) may be made up of combinations of distributions of multiple unsafe actions that have been evaluated separately.
  - Individual distributions combined mathematically into a single distribution.

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Presentation 8

EPRI/NRC-RES Fire HRA Methodology
Task 12- Post Fire HRA –Part 2
(Recovery Analysis, Dependency Analysis, Uncertainty Analysis)
Video: HRA Day 4 Part 2

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

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EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA METHODOLOGY

Task 12 – Post-Fire HRA – Part 2

Erin Collins (SAIC)
Kaydee Kohlhepp (Scientech)

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop
September-October 2010
Rockville, MD

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Notes:

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Outline of the Presentation

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. **Recovery analysis (as in cutset post-processing)**
6. Dependency analysis
7. Uncertainty analysis

Notes:

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Applicable HLRs (per the PRA Standard)
Recovery

- HLR-AS-A: The accident sequence analysis shall describe the plant-specific scenarios that can lead to core damage following each modeled initiating event. These scenarios shall address system responses and operator actions, including recovery actions that support the key safety functions necessary to prevent core damage (11 SRs)
- HLR-HR-H: Recovery actions (at the cutset or scenario level) shall be modeled only if it has been demonstrated that the action is plausible and feasible for those scenarios to which they are applied. Estimates of probabilities of failure shall address dependency on prior human failures in the scenario (3 SRs)
- HLR-QU-A: The level 1 quantification shall quantify core damage frequency and shall support the quantification of LERF (5 SRs, 1 specific to recovery)
- HLR-HRA-D: The Fire PRA shall include recovery actions only if it has been demonstrated that the action is plausible and feasible for those scenarios to which it applies, particularly accounting for the effects of fires (2 SRs)

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Recovery per NFPA 805

- Recovery actions as defined under NFPA 805 are what used to be generally referred to in the fire protection community as "operator manual actions" (or OMAs).
- In this context, recovery refers only to actions performed outside of a primary control station (PCS). Note that the MCR is not the only PCS.
- Under NFPA 805, total transfer of control from the MCR to a dedicated or alternate shutdown location means there is a new PCS, and operations conducted there are not recovery actions (and neither are the actions required to transfer control).
- All actions away from a primary control station are considered recovery actions under NFPA 805, whether or not they are considered recovery actions in the PRA, and plant licensees must evaluate the additional risk of their use according to NFPA 805.
- **THIS IS NOT THE DEFINITION OF RECOVERY USED IN THE FIRE HRA GUIDELINES**

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Notes:

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Notes:

Recovery Types

There are three types of recovery actions of concern for fire HRAs. These are:

- Type 1 – Recovery within the same HFE, which is treated in the evaluation of the basic HEP
- Type 2 - Standard PRA concept of recovering cutsets by adding a new human action to the sequence

  (focus of this course segment)
- Type 3 - Modeling the fire brigade and their actions to extinguish the fire. According to NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989), this type of recovery action is treated in the fire modeling task via statistical models derived from fire suppression event data (as updated via FAQ 08-0050)

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Notes:

Recovery within the Same HFE

- Treated in the evaluation of the basic HEP
- Examples include:
  - Self-review
  - Peer checking within a shift or after shift change
  - Shift Technical Advisor (STA) review
  - Procedure-related checks
- EPRI HRA Calculator – addressed via Cognitive Recovered and Execution Recovered modules - CBDTM recoveries applied consistent with EPRI TR-100259
  - Based on the time available for recovery, a minimum level of dependency applicable to recovery actions is suggested by the program
- ATHEANA - treated directly via conditional probabilities
  - When qualitative information is first converted into a quantitative estimate of the HEP, recovery of any initial error is addressed to the extent appropriate

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Recovery at the Cutset Level

- PRA Standard definition – "Restoration of a function lost as a result of a failed system, structure, or component (SSC) by overcoming or compensating for its failure. Generally modeled by using HRA techniques."
- Adding cutset level recovery actions is common practice in PRA
- Credits other reasonable actions the operators might take to avoid severe core damage and/or a large early release that are not already specifically modeled
- Corresponding PRA Standard SRs: Part 4, HRA-D1 and –D2

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Recovery at the Cutset Level (continued)

- For example, in PRA modeling of an accident sequence involving loss of all injection, it would be logical and common to credit operators attempting to locally align an independent firewater system for injection
- Failure to successfully perform such an action would subsequently be added to the accident sequence model
- Further lowers overall accident sequence frequency because additional failures of these actions would be required before the core is actually damaged

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Recovery vs. Repair (per RG 1.200)

- Recovery action is defined as:
  - a PRA modeling term representing restoration of the function caused by a failed system, structure, or component (SSC), by bypassing the failure.
  - Such a recovery can be modeled using HRA techniques regardless of the cause of the failure.
- Repair is defined as:
  - a general term describing restoration of a failed SSC by correcting the failure and returning the failed SSC to operability.
  - HRA techniques cannot be used since the method of repair is not known without knowing the specific causes

Notes:

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Recovery Analysis
Fire HRA

- Similar analysis process as for other fire HFEs
- Identification and Definition
  - Take note of existing Internal Event PRA recovery actions
  - From cutset review, identify risk-significant sequences with recovery potential
  - From fire and post-trip action procedures, use recovery-related steps to identify new recovery HFEs
  - Initial feasibility analysis
    - NUREG-1792, HRA Good Practices
    - NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989)

Notes:

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Recovery Analysis

Fire HRA (continued)

- Qualitative Analysis
  - Review cutsets again to define key functional scenarios that the operators must address in each fire area (scenario)
  - Talk-through procedure-based recovery actions with operators or training personnel
- Quantification using same approaches
  - Screening
  - Scoping
  - Detailed (recommended to ensure thorough analysis of timing, PSFs and context)
- Incorporation into FPRA Model
  - Recovery Rules file

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Recovery Actions

Considerations for Identification (per NUREG-1792)

- Cues are clear and provided in time to indicate need for recovery action(s) and failure(s) that need(s) to be recovered
- Sufficient time available for recovery action(s) to be diagnosed and implemented to avoid undesired outcome
- Sufficient crew resources exist
- There is procedural guidance
- Quality and frequency of training on recovery action(s)
- Equipment needed is accessible and in non-threatening environment (e.g., fire, extreme radiation)
- Equipment needed is available in context of other failures and initiator for sequence/cutset

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Recovery Actions

Not to be Credited (per NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989])

Actions should not be credited as recoveries that:

- require significant activity and/or communication among individuals while wearing SCBAs (unless SCBAs contain internal communication devices)
- require performing numerous and strenuous actions wearing SCBAs
- require operators or other personnel to travel through fire or areas where fire effects (e.g., smoke, heat) are severe
- involve restoring systems or equipment damaged by fire
- have insufficient time available

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Recovery Actions

Relaxation from original 6850 guidance

- Reconsider Internal Event PRA assumptions (e.g., HRA recoveries of systems or components previously assumed failed)
  - re-evaluate WHY the component was assumed failed for internal events. If it was for conservatism, then may want to consider it for fire HRA
- Non-proceduralized HFEs can be credited, provided they meet the requirements of ASME/ANS SR HRA-H2
  - operator training includes the action, or justification for lack of procedures or training is provided
  - "cues" (e.g., alarms) exist to alert the operator to the recovery action
  - attention is given to the relevant PSFs
  - there is sufficient manpower to perform the action

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Recovery Considerations

- Details of the fire context in a specific fire area are well defined for most areas via the Fire PRA model iteration that factors in fire modeling and circuit analysis
- Fire scenario complexity can then be understood from the cutsets and fire area components failed
- Evaluation of HFEs is sensitive to the types of conditions that appear to the operators in the MCR
  - For example, fire impact can range from:
    - all conditions are normal
    - some degraded cues
    - significantly degraded cues and additional spurious operations

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Recovery and Use of Procedures

- Since the procedures generally address one type of functional loss at a time, the operators responding to severe fire conditions will often be in multiple procedures to address multiple impacts that fires have on the system
- Need to review postulated recovery scenarios with operations and training personnel to verify procedure steps used and interactions between fire procedures and EOPs

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Recovery Analysis Consideration of Circuit Analysis *(per NUREG/CR-6850 [EPRI 1011989])*

- In some cases, electrical cable failures will result in permanent damage to electrical or mechanical equipment that precludes certain types of recovery actions
- For example, spurious operation of a valve due to a hot short that bypasses the valve's torque switch might cause permanent binding of the valve, precluding manual operation of the valve at a later time
- Cases of this nature should be documented and discussed with systems analysts to ensure recovery actions accurately reflect the prevailing conditions

- Corresponding PRA Standard SR: Part 4, HRA-D2, Note (1)

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Qualitative Definitions of Fire Recovery Actions

Fire Initiated Scenario Type	Operator Objective (not recovery)	Selected HFE for recovery
Fire induced loss of DC power causes spurious ESFAS with normal cues	Override and control MSIS during fire, if nothing done then primary safeties lift in about 80 min.	OP FT control ESFAS and ADV given Fire
Fire induced trip with Loss of CST Makeup for AFW with normal cues	Provide makeup to CST 121 following a fire	OP FT Provide Makeup to CST given fire
Fire induced LOCA: Pzr valve 3/4 inch line open	Respond to loss of primary coolant and establish secondary cooling during fire	OP FT Depressurize to Containment Spray Pump Shutoff Head given fire with sample line open

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Consideration of Procedures and Timing for Fire Recovery Actions

Fire scenario	Operator Actions for fire	HFE description	Action Time (diag. plus impl.)	Time Window (Tsw)	STD POST TRIP ACTIONS EOI SO23-12-1 R22	FIRE AOI SO23-13-21 R18
MSIS isolation (spurious from fire) with normal cues	Override and control MSIS during fire, if nothing done then primary safeties lift in about 80 min.	OP FT control ESFAS and ADV given Fire with **Normal Cues**	40	80	Step 8 VERIFY RCS Heat Removal criteria satisfied MSIS isolation OK use ADVs and AFW	Attachment 2- 12.0 AFW, MSS, MFW OPERATIONS then go to 3.0 ADV Operations (3.1.3) "When an ADV is needed, then OPERATE HV-8421 (for a Train A shutdown), or HV-8419 (for a Train B shutdown), in Local/Manual per SO23-3-2.18.1, Attachment for Local Manual Operation of HV-8419(HV-8421) Atmospheric Dump Valves. "

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Operator fails to stop spuriously started charging pump to prevent PORV lifting

- 1 charging pump is set to MANUAL, and is always set at 30 gpm.
- 1 charging pump is set to AUTO, so it varies between 0-60 gpm as required.
- 1 charging pump is in standby.
- If the charging pump in AUTO dials back to effectively 0 gpm when the third charging pump spuriously starts, then the increase in flow is only 30 gpm. Also, according to the PRA contact at the plant site, if all three charging pumps are running, the relief valve lifts. So it is assumed that the flow from the third charging pump is an additional 30 gpm (instead of the full 60 gpm capability).

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Notes:

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Notes:

Operator fails to stop spuriously started charging pump to prevent PORV lifting - 2

- Pressurizer Level is assumed to be at full power control level of 46%
- These are relevant parameters from MAAP parameter file. They are in metric units.
- VPZ 28.32 PRESSURIZER VOLUME
- APZ 3.575 PRESSURIZER CROSS-SECTIONAL AREA
- So just to check, the volume = 28.32 m3 = 1000 ft3. Agrees.
- So the cross-sectional area = 3.575 m2 = 38.5 ft2, and thus the radius = 3.5 ft.
- So the volume of the hemisphere is ~90 ft3 each (top and bottom), and the volume of the cylinder is 820 ft2.

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Notes:

Operator fails to stop spuriously started charging pump to prevent PORV lifting - 3

- If the water level is 46%, then the water volume is 0.46 x 820 + 90 = 467.2 ft3 = ~3495 gal
- At 55% there is 0.55 x 820 + 90 = 541 ft3 = ~4045 gal
- At 85% there is 0.85 x 820 + 90 = 787 ft3 = ~5885 gal
- Full = 1000 ft3 = 7480 gal
- So at 60 gpm, it takes ~9 min to get to 55%, ~40 min to get to 85% and reactor trip, and ~66 min to go solid.
- The time window would thus be 66 – 40 = 26 min between RT and water solid.
- So would get Alarm 1 in ~9 minutes, then Alarm 2 in ~38 minutes with Alarm 3 shortly afterwards at ~40 minutes when the second PZR channel satisfies the trip logic based on channel accuracy. The pressurizer goes solid in ~66 min.

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Operator fails to stop spuriously started charging pump to prevent PORV lifting - 4

- At RX Trip, the operators would go to Procedure KW-PROC-000-E-0 for Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. At Step 4, CHECK If SI Is Actuated, the RNO Step a.4 states: IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. INITIATE monitoring of CSF Status Trees per FR-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.

b. GO TO ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.

- Once in ES-0.1, the operators will follow down to Step 4 CHECK Charging Flow Established: where they are directed to:

a. CHECK charging pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

b. ADJUST charging pump speed and START second charging pump as necessary to establish pressurizer level between 21% and 40%.

- This is conservatively considered to be the maximum timeframe required for operator action, since it is likely that pzr level would be noticed earlier and the third charging pump would be stopped.

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Operator fails to stop spuriously started charging pump to prevent PORV lifting - 5

- However, since the pump is already in the off position in standby, it is likely that a local action would be required to shut off the pump. Therefore 10 minutes has been estimated for travel time. The actual local action is to actuate a push button to turn off the pump breaker.

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Operator fails to stop spuriously started charging pump to prevent PORV lifting - 6

- The timing is therefore set up as follows:
- Tsw = 66 minutes (from spurious pump trip on fire to going solid)
- Tdelay = 40 minutes (to Rx trip)
- T1/2 (diagnosis) = 5 minutes (to go through procedures and get to charging step 4 in ES-01)
- Tm (execution) = 10 minutes to travel to Aux Building to charging pump
- In this scenario, the t=0 is presumed to be the fire that causes spurious pump actuation. Reactor Trip on high pzr level will occur when 85% pzr level is reached on 2/3 channels.

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Notes:

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Editing Cutsets to Address Recovery

- The specific process of modifying models or results to account for recovery actions is PRA software-specific
- Some system, function, or sequence cutset equations may require editing before being used to quantify or merge event tree sequence equations
- Editing might include removal of disallowed cutsets, or the addition of recovery events
- Fire HRA analysts should work with the PRA model quantification team to understand the risk significant cutsets and how recovery actions are incorporated in the model in order to provide the appropriate inputs

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Notes:

Outline of the Presentation

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
   a) Screening
   b) Scoping
   c) EPRI approach (detailed)
   d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. **Dependency analysis (inter- vs. intra-dependence)**
7. Uncertainty analysis

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Notes:

Dependency Analysis
Evaluation Process

- Dependency evaluation
  - ASME/ANS PRA standard requires that multiple human actions in an accident sequence or cutset be identified, degree of dependency assessed, and joint HEP calculated
- Steps
  - Identify combinations of multiple operator actions in fire scenario (**regardless if screening, scoping or detailed quantification**)
  - Evaluate dependencies within scenario
  - Incorporate dependency evaluation into Fire PRA model
- Application
  - For Fire PRA, preliminary dependency analysis performed in combination with NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) Task 11, Detailed Fire Modeling and finalized as part of Task 14, Fire Risk Quantification

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Applicable HLRs (per the PRA Standard)
Dependency

- HLR-AS-B: Dependencies that can impact the ability of the mitigating systems to operate and function shall be addressed (7 SRs)
- HLR-HR-G: The assessment of the probabilities of the post-initiator HFEs shall be performed using a well-defined and self-consistent process that addresses the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, and addresses potential dependencies between human failure events in the same accident sequence (8 SRs)
- HLR-QU-C: Model quantification shall determine that all identified dependencies are addressed appropriately (3 SRs)
- HLR-FQ-C: [Fire Risk] Model quantification shall determine that all identified dependencies are addressed appropriately (1 SR)

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Dependency Analysis
Scope

- Similar to Recovery, Dependency within the same HFE is treated in the evaluation of the basic HEP through
  - Consolidation at the basic event level, e.g., miscalibrations of redundant channels are modeled in one basic event
  - THERP rules ranging from zero dependence (ZD) to complete dependence (CD)
- Fire HRA Dependency analysis primarily focuses on post-initiator HFEs occurring in the same cutset (i.e., pre-initiator HFEs are not affected by fire context)
- Corresponding PRA Standard SRs: Part 2, AS-B2, HR-G7 and -H3, QU-C1 and –C2; Part 4, FQ-C1

Notes:

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Notes:

Dependency Analysis
Approaches

1. Use actual data from simulators
   – Highly resource intensive
2. Analyze each HFE combination in detail
   – Highly resource intensive
   – Best results
3. Assume complete dependence (only credit 1 HFE per cutset)
   – Not resource intensive
   – Impact on risk metric could be unacceptably over-conservative
4. Apply a systematic set of rules to assign different levels of dependence
   – Moderate resource requirements
   – Impact on risk metric could be acceptable
   – Recommended approach

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Notes:

Dependency Analysis
Definitions

- Dependence Importance (DI) of HEP Combination
  – Risk metric given all HEPs in a given chronological combination, except the first HEP, are set to 1.0
- Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) of HEP Combination
  – Risk metric given all HEPs in the combination are set to 1.0

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Notes:

Dependency Analysis
Definitions (Continued)

- Simultaneous
  - For two HFEs in a chronological sequence, if the cue or requirement for a successive HFE occurs before the preceding HFE can be completed, the HFEs are *simultaneous.*



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Dependency Analysis
Basic Dependency Rules

- Dependence impact is one-directional in chronological order
- The THERP positive dependence model is adopted, i.e., failure of an event increases the probability of failure of a subsequent event
- The first HFE in a sequence is always independent
- In a chronological sequence, an HFE depends only on the immediately preceding HFE (given no common cognitive element)
- An HFE is independent of an immediately preceding success

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Dependency Analysis
THERP Dependency Formulas

Dependence Level	Equation	Approximate Value for HEP < 0.01
Zero (ZD)	HEP	HEP
Low (LD)	(1+19 X HEP) / 20	0.05
Medium (MD)	(1+ 6 X HEP) / 7	0.14
High (HD)	(1 + HEP) / 2	0.5
Complete (CD)	1.0	1.0

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Dependency Analysis
Levels of Dependence

- **Dependency Factors**
  - Same Crew
  - Cognition (cues/procedure)
  - Simultaneity
  - Resources
  - Location
  - Timing
  - Stress



Figure 1: HRA Dependency Rules for Post-Initiator HFEs

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ATHEANA Consideration of Dependency

- Unsafe Action (UA): Actions inappropriately taken (~ EOCs), or not taken when needed (~ EOOs), by plant personnel that result in a degraded plant safety condition
- In ATHEANA, the potential for multiple UAs contributing to a particular HFE is considered
- Modeling and analyzing at the UA level provides the means to explicitly investigate the potential impact of different UAs on the plant response, as well as on other human actions
- ATHEANA considers dependency when there is a significant perceived dependency between a particular UA associated with the HFE and some other human failure modeled in the PRA (either upstream or downstream in the chain of events depicted by the PRA sequence)

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ATHEANA Consideration of Dependency *(continued)*

- By breaking the HFE into UAs, the specific dependency can be modeled more appropriately and explicitly
- If multiple human failures in the same sequence are not foreseen during the initial quantification of the various UAs and their contexts, then as with any PRA/HRA methodology, there will be an obligation of the analysts to identify such combinations once the PRA is initially “solved” and the human error combinations can be readily identified
- Based on this information, HEP evaluation may have to be revisited/redone if the results of these evaluations are potentially significant contributors to the risk and sufficiently strong dependencies are considered to likely exist among certain HFE/UAs

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Outline of the Presentation

1. Overview of the EPRI/NRC Fire HRA Guidelines
2. Identification and definition of post-fire human failure events
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
    a) Screening
    b) Scoping
    c) EPRI approach (detailed)
    d) ATHEANA (detailed)
5. Recovery analysis
6. Dependency analysis
7. **Uncertainty analysis**

Notes:

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Uncertainty Definitions *per the PRA Standard*

- Uncertainty in the context of PRA and HRA is defined as the representation of the confidence in the state of knowledge about the parameter values and models used in constructing the PRA
- Uncertainty analysis: the process of identifying and characterizing the sources of uncertainty in the analysis, and evaluating their impact on the PRA results and developing a quantitative measure to the extent practical
- Guidance now available via NUREG-1855 and EPRI 1016737 on parameter and modeling uncertainties in PRA

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Applicable HLRs (per the PRA Standard)
Uncertainty

- HLR-HR-G: The assessment of the probabilities of the post-initiator HFEs shall be performed using a well-defined and self-consistent process that addresses the plant-specific and scenario-specific influences on human performance, and addresses potential dependencies between human failure events in the same accident sequence (8 SRs)
- HLR-QU-E: Uncertainties in the PRA results shall be characterized. Sources of model uncertainty and related assumptions shall be identified, and their potential impact on the results understood (4 SRs)
- HLR-UNC-A: The Fire PRA shall identify sources of CDF and LERF uncertainties and related assumptions and modeling approximations. These uncertainties shall be characterized such that their potential impacts on the results are understood (2 SRs)

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Uncertainty Overview

- For fire HRA, uncertainties are addressed in the same manner as for internal events HRA
- The HRA should characterize the uncertainty in the estimates of the HEPs consistent with the quantification approach, and provide mean values for use in quantification
- In fire HRA, key assumptions may include timing or selections of performance shaping factors

- Corresponding PRA Standard SRs: Part 2, HR-G8, QU-E3

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Notes:

Qualitative Issues Contributing to FHRA Uncertainty

- Some actions use screening values in the Internal Events PRA and these may be carried over to the fire HRA model as screening values
- Operators dealing with fire scenarios may use multiple Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures (EOPs and AOPs) at the same time to deal with multiple failure conditions, such as loss of inventory and loss of heat sink due to electrical cable failures
- Operators rely on the plant computer information to supplement the primary safety related instruments as diverse information sources. However, the computer systems are not usually considered in the fire model

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Notes:

Qualitative Issues Contributing to FHRA Uncertainty (*continued*)

- The operators may not have specific procedures/plans for returning to the control room after a fire is out
- In case of fire, the MCR instrument response can degrade the flow of information to the operators
- Procedures dealing with fire are accurate in addressing Appendix R concerns, but can be complex for specific fire areas and may require some counterintuitive steps for the operators

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Uncertainty Analysis
Examples (Cont'd)

- Completeness Uncertainty
  - According to Reg Guide 1.174, reflects an unanalyzed contribution due to:
    - Scope limitations
    - Methods not available
      - influences of organizational performance
    - Methods not refined to level of internal events analysis
      - analysis of some external events
      - low-power and shutdown modes of operation
  - Addressed through review process to either
    - expand upon original analysis, or
    - provide justification for scope constraints (risk-informed process described in RG 1.174)

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Uncertainty in Detailed HRA
EPRI HRA Calculator

- EPRI HRA Calculator approach to addressing uncertainty
  - is based on THERP Table 20-20 and guidance in THERP Chapter 7
  - applies the same error factors as for internal events
  - THERP's assessment of uncertainty
    - assumes a lognormal distribution
    - assigns an error factor solely based on the final HEP
  - Since the approach is not based on the initiating event, it can be applied to all initiators including fire
- Contrast with ATHEANA, which develops probability distributions using expert elicitation

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Notes:

EPRI HRA Calculator Uncertainty Categories for Detailed Analysis

Estimated HEP	REFERENCE	ERROR FACTOR
< 0.001	THERP Table 20-20	10
> 0.001	THERP Table 20-20	5
> 0.1	Mathematical convenience	1

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Notes:

Uncertainty in Detailed HRA
ATHEANA

- ATHEANA uncertainty analysis is performed by developing probability distributions using expert elicitation
- The facilitator, with the assistance of the experts, puts forth two questions that progressively move the entire group from a qualitative evaluation to a quantitative estimate of the HEP and its uncertainty distribution:
    1. Given all the relevant evidence, how difficult or challenging is the action of interest for the scenario/context and why?
    2. Hence, what is the probability distribution for the HEP that best reflects this level of difficulty or challenge considering uncertainty?
- Applications of ATHEANA have found it useful to first provide a calibration mechanism for the experts to begin to interpret their qualitative conclusions into a probability

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Notes:

ATHEANA - Suggested Set of Initial Calibration Points for the Experts

Circumstance	Probability	Meaning
The operator(s) is "Certain" to fail	1.0	Failure is ensured. All crews/operators would not perform the desired action correctly and on time.
The operator(s) is "Likely" to fail	~ 0.5	5 out of 10 would fail. The level of difficulty is sufficiently high that we should see many failures if all the crews/operators were to experience this scenario.
The operator(s) would "Infrequently" fail	~ 0.1	1 out of 10 would fail. The level of difficulty is moderately high, such that we should see an occasional failure if all of the crews/operators were to experience this scenario.
The operator(s) is "Unlikely" to fail	~ 0.01	1 out of 100 would fail. The level of difficulty is quite low and we should not see any failures if all the crews/operators were to experience this scenario.
The operator(s) is "Extremely Unlikely" to fail	~ 0.001	1 out of 1000 would fail. This desired action is so easy that it is almost inconceivable that any crew/operator would fail to perform the desired action correctly and on time.

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Notes:

Uncertainty Analysis References

- NUREG-1855, "Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making," March 2009
- EPRI 1016737, "Treatment of Parameter and Model Uncertainty for Probabilistic Risk Assessments," December 2008
- NUREG-1880, "ATHEANA User's Guide," June 2007
- EPRI 1009652, "Guideline For Treatment of Uncertainty In Risk-Informed Applications," December 2005
- NUREG-1792, "Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)," Sandia National Laboratories, 2005
- NUREG/CR-1278, "Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications," (THERP) Swain, A.D. and Guttmann, H. E., August 1983

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3 EXAMPLE EXERCISES

3.1 Screening Examples

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

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General Assumptions for Screening Examples

- Actions have applicable plant emergency procedures and fire procedures
- Fire does not impact control room environment
- Limited information is available on fire locations and equipment impacts since fire modeling and circuit analysis are usually still in early stages
- Fire PRA model needs preliminary fire HEPs to test model logic and ensure that HFEs are not lost in the noise
- Fire effects minimized after one hour

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Quantitative Screening Approach Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 - similar to Internal Events (IE) situation, but including some fire effects		10x IE HEP	fire effects no longer dynamic and changing, any equipment damage assessed and understood, environmental effects stabilized and do not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - similar to Set 1, but with spurious equipment/instrumentation effects in one safety-related train/division	required within first hour of a trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater	not expected to be performed until at least one hour after fire initiation and plant trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions	either MCR or local (i.e., ex-control room) manual action and performed within approx. 1 hour of fire initiation	1	action not necessary within first hour	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)	1 for HFE, or 0.1 for single overall probability representing failure to reach safe shutdown			

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Example 1:
Operator fails to switch turbine building SW header

- While in an at power condition with normal alignment of Service Water, a low Service Water pressure condition develops. At the same time fire causes a reactor trip
- Annunciators activate and Service Water pressure indicates less than 72 psig
- Operator fails to respond per appropriate ARP and swap the turbine building SW header selector switch to the opposite header

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Example 1:
Operator fails to switch turbine building SW header

- MCR action
- Short term action (14 minutes) according to Internal Events HRA
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 4 minutes
  - Execution time = 1 minute
- Internal Events HEP using HCR/ORE/THERP in EPRI HRA Calculator = 1.7E-03
- Similar to Internal Events situation, but some potential fire effects

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Example 1: Screening Selection Criteria

1. Operator Action timeframe
   - Short (<1 hour)
   - Long (> 1 hour)

2. Spurious Instrumentation/Equipment effects in one safety-related train
   - Yes
   - No

3. New Fire HFE or Existing HFE needs to be significantly altered to reflect fire effects
   - Yes
   - No

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Example 1: Quantitative Screening Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 - similar to Internal Events (IE) situation, but including some fire effects		10x IE HEP 1.7E-03 * 10 = 1.7E-2	fire effects no longer dynamic and changing, any equipment damage assessed and understood, environmental effects stabilized and do not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - similar to Set 1, but with spurious equipment/instrumentation effects in one safety-related train/division	required within first hour of a trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater	not expected to be performed until at least one hour after fire initiation and plant trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions	either MCR or local (i.e., ex-control room) manual action and performed within approx. 1 hour of fire initiation	1	action not necessary within first hour	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)	1 for HFE, or 0.1 for single overall probability representing failure to reach safe shutdown			

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Example 2: Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps

- The auxiliary feedwater pumps take water from the auxiliary feedwater storage tank.
- With low low level in the tank, the operator would align the FPS (fire protection system) to the pumps.
- Consider the tank low low level would be reached in 10 hours.
- The operator has to open manual valves. (At least one valve)
- With the level in the AFWST at 80% there is a sound alarm and a light alarm from a panel in the MCR. The MCR operator knows the need to align the FPS.
- At 10% low low level the local operator must align the FPS.

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Example 2:
Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps

- Local action
- Cable tracing for AFWST level transmitters has been performed and the cues are not impacted by fire
- Long term action (10 hours)
- Time available is large (200 minutes)
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 7 minutes
  - Execution time = 10 minutes

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Example 2: Screening Selection Criteria

1. Operator Action timeframe
   - Short (<1 hour)
   - Long (> 1 hour)

2. Spurious Instrumentation/Equipment effects in one safety-related train
   - Yes
   - No

3. New Fire HFE or Existing HFE needs to be significantly altered to reflect fire effects
   - Yes
   - No

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Example 2: Quantitative Screening Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 - similar to Internal Events (IE) situation, but including some fire effects		10x IE HEP	fire effects no longer dynamic and changing, any equipment damage assessed and understood, environmental effects stabilized and do not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - similar to Set 1, but with spurious equipment/instrumentation effects in one safety-related train/division	required within first hour of a trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater	not expected to be performed until at least one hour after fire initiation and plant trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions	either MCR or local (i.e., ex-control room) manual action and performed within approx. 1 hour of fire initiation	1	action not necessary within first hour	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)	1 for HFE, or 0.1 for single overall probability representing failure to reach safe shutdown			

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Example 3: Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps with failed alarm

- Same basic scenario as Example 2
  - The auxiliary feedwater pumps take water from the auxiliary feedwater storage tank.
  - When low low level in the tank is reached, the operator needs to align the FPS (fire protection system) to the pumps.
- Cable tracing has not been done therefore assumed that fire fails the AFWST alarm at the 80% level
  - spurious indication assumed
- Fire procedures direct operator to check tank level locally and consider refilling if needed
- Action still must be done before AFWST hits 10% low low level; therefore, timing remains the same

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Example 3: Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps with failed alarm

- Local action
- Long term action (10 hours)
- Time available is large (200 minutes)
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 7 minutes
  - Execution time = 10 minutes
- No change in timing from Example 2

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Example 3: Screening Selection Criteria

1. Operator Action timeframe
   - Short (<1 hour)
   - ➡ Long (> 1 hour)
2. Spurious Instrumentation/Equipment effects in one safety-related train
   - ➡ Yes
   - No
3. New Fire HFE or Existing HFE needs to be significantly altered to reflect fire effects
   - Yes
   - ➡ No

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Example 3: Quantitative Screening Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 - similar to Internal Events (IE) situation, but including some fire effects		10x IE HEP	fire effects no longer dynamic and changing, any equipment damage assessed and understood, environmental effects stabilized and do not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - similar to Set 1, but with spurious equipment/instrumentation effects in one safety-related train/division	required within first hour of a trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater	not expected to be performed until at least one hour after fire initiation and plant trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions	either MCR or local (i.e., ex-control room) manual action and performed within approx. 1 hour of fire initiation	1	action not necessary within first hour	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)	1 for HFE, or 0.1 for single overall probability representing failure to reach safe shutdown			

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Example 4: Operator fails to initiate bleed & feed and use of fire procedures

- The action to initiate bleed and feed will be done when the SGs are almost in dry out
- Cue to initiate bleed and feed is when 2 SGs are at less than 15% WR level
- Some of the indications are inaccurate and the fire procedures must be used to determine which can be trusted
- With the main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems unavailable at the beginning of the initiating event, the SG goes to dry out in 35 minutes

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Example 4: Operator fails to initiate bleed & feed and use of fire procedures

- MCR action
- Total system time window = 45 minutes for the SGs to dry out
- Time from cue = 25 minutes
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 8 minutes [additional time than standard bleed & feed due to using multiple procedures]
  - Execution time = 8 minutes

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Example 4: Screening Selection Criteria

1. Operator Action timeframe
   - Short (<1 hour)
   - Long (> 1 hour)
2. Spurious Instrumentation/Equipment effects in one safety-related train
   - Yes
   - No — Potentially multiple effects
3. New Fire HFE or Existing HFE needs to be significantly altered to reflect fire effects
   - Yes — Simultaneous use of multiple procedures
   - No

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Example 4: Quantitative Screening Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 - similar to Internal Events (IE) situation, but including some fire effects		10x IE HEP	fire effects no longer dynamic and changing, any equipment damage assessed and understood, environmental effects stabilized and do not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - similar to Set 1, but with spurious equipment/instrumentation effects in one safety-related train/division	required within first hour of a trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater	not expected to be performed until at least one hour after fire initiation and plant trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions	either MCR or local (i.e., ex-control room) manual action and performed within approx. 1 hour of fire initiation	1	action not necessary within first hour	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)	1 for HFE, or 0.1 for single overall probability representing failure to reach safe shutdown			

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Example 5:
Operator fails to establish containment spray sump recirculation when RWST depleted

- Operator action to align containment spray (CS) to sump recirc when the RWST is depleted
- The operators cue on RWST level <37%, per the foldout page in Procedure E-1 Transition to ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation.
- The following assumptions are made:
  - All equipment operates as designed
  - Conditions requiring CS exist

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Example 5:
Operator fails to establish containment spray sump recirculation when RWST depleted

- MCR action
- Since CS is needed, fire is presumed to be severe in its consequences
- RWST level indicators have cable tracing and the cues are not impacted by fire
- Total system time window = for the 37% RWST level to have been reached, more than 60 min are assumed to have passed since the reactor trip
- Internal Events HEP using CBDTM/THERP in EPRI HRA Calculator = 3.6E-03

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Example 5:
Screening Selection Criteria

1. Operator Action timeframe
   – Short (<1 hour)
   – Long (> 1 hour)

2. Spurious Instrumentation/Equipment effects in one safety-related train
   – Yes
   – No   Uncertain what multiple effects might occur

3. New Fire HFE or Existing HFE needs to be significantly altered to reflect fire effects
   – Yes
   – No

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Example 5: Quantitative Screening Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 - similar to Internal Events (IE) situation, but including some fire effects		10x IE HEP	fire effects no longer dynamic and changing, any equipment damage assessed and understood, environmental effects stabilized and do not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - similar to Set 1, but with spurious equipment/instrumentation effects in one safety-related train/division	required within first hour of a trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater	not expected to be performed until at least one hour after fire initiation and plant trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions	either MCR or local (i.e., ex-control room) manual action and performed within approx. 1 hou initiatio	1	action not necessary within first hour	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)		, or 0.1 for single overall probability ting failure to reach safe shutdown		

3.6E-03 * 10 = 3.6E-2

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Example 6: Operator fails to maintain control from alternate shutdown location

- Multiple MCR and local actions
- Procedures exist but actions require significant coordination and communication among operators
- In such cases, presume detailed analysis will be required if risk-significant in Fire PRA model

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Example 6: Quantitative Screening Summary

Screening Criteria	Short Term Human Actions		Long Term Human Actions	
	Definition	Value	Definition	Value
Set 1 - similar to Internal Events (IE) situation, but including some fire effects		10x IE HEP	fire effects no longer dynamic and changing, any equipment damage assessed and understood, environmental effects stabilized and do not significantly affect ability of operators to perform action	same as IE HEP
Set 2 - similar to Set 1, but with spurious equipment/instrumentation effects in one safety-related train/division	required within first hour of a trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is greater	not expected to be performed until at least one hour after fire initiation and plant trip	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 3 - new fire HFEs or prior IE HFEs needing to be significantly altered or modified because of fire conditions	either MCR or local (i.e., ex-control room) manual action and performed within approx. 1 hour of fire initiation	1	action not necessary within first hour	0.1, or 10x IE HEP, whichever is smaller
Set 4 – Alternative Shutdown (including MCR abandonment)	1 for HFE, or 0.1 for single overall probability representing failure to reach safe shutdown			

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Task 12: Post-Fire HRA

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3.2 Scoping Examples

Slide 1



Slide 3

General Assumptions for Examples

- Actions have applicable plant emergency procedures and fire procedures
- Fire does not impact control room environment
- There is a full area burn out
- At least one train of heat removal is available as demonstrated by Appendix R

Slide 4

Example 1A: Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps

- The auxiliary feedwater pumps take water from the auxiliary feedwater storage tank.
- With low low level in the tank, the operator would align the FPS (fire protection system) to the pumps.
- Consider the tank low low level would be reached in 10 hours.
- The operator has to open manual valves. (At least one valve)
- With the level in the AFWST at 80% there is a sound alarm and a light alarm from a panel in the MCR. The MCR operator knows the need to align the FPS.
- At 10% low low level the local operator must align the FPS.

Slide 5

Example 1A:
Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps

- Local action
- Long term action (10 hours)
- Time available is large (200 minutes)
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 7 minutes
  - Execution time = 10 minutes

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Example 1A: Minimum Criteria

1. Procedures
   – Plant procedures covering each operator action being modeled
   – Support both diagnosis & execution of the action

2. Training – on the procedures and the actions

3. Availability and Accessibility of Equipment

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Example 1A: Feasibility

- Timing Analysis:
  - Time available (200 mins) > Time required (17 mins)
- Cues available to aid diagnosis
  - Cable tracing was done on AFWST alarms
- Fire activity would not prevent the execution of the actions
- Enough crew members available to complete the action

Slide 8

Example 1A: Time Margin

$$\text{Time Margin} = \frac{t_{action} - (t_{1/2} + t_m)}{(t_{1/2} + t_m)} * 100\% = \frac{200 - (7 + 10)}{(7 + 10)} * 100\% = 1076\%$$



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Example 1A: Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs

Condition	Status
Do the procedures match the scenario?	Yes
Is the execution complexity high?	No
Is the fire suppressed when the cue is received?	Yes
What's the action time window?	200 min
Is there any smoke or other hazardous elements in the action areas?	No
Is the action area accessible?	Yes

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
Example 1A:
Search Scheme
Start
D1.
Have the entry criteria been met?
No
HEP = 1.0
(SS1)
D2.
Is command-and-control located outside the MCR?
Yes
Go to
ASD
(Fig 5-5)
D3.
Are the primary cues or instruments spuriously affected by the fire?
Yes
Go to
SPI
(Fig 5-6)
D4.
For the given action, do the procedures match the scenario?
No
HEP = 1.0
(SS2)
D5.
Is the action within the MCR?
Yes
Go to
INCR
(Fig 5-3)
D6.
Is one of the following conditions met: 1) there are procedures for executing the ex-MCR action or 2) it is skill-of-the-craft?
Go to
EXCR
(Fig 5-4)
No
HEP = 1.0
(SS3)
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

Example 1A:
EXCR
EXCR
D22.
Has the fire been suppressed before the cue is received?
D23.
Is the action time window greater than 30 minutes?
No
No
(< or = 30 mins)
Yes
D26.
Are both conditions met: 1) the area is accessible and 2) there is no fire in the vicinity of the action?
HEP = 1.0
(EXCR1)
No
D24.
Is the execution complexity high?
D25.
Is the execution complexity high?
No
Yes
Yes
HEP
Lookup Table
P
HEP
Lookup Table
Q
HEP
Lookup Table
R
HEP
Lookup Table
S
Yes
D27.
Is the action time window greater than 30 minutes?
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Example 1A: EXCR Lookup Table

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
R	≥ 100%	0.002	EXCR12
	50 – 99%	0.01	EXCR13
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR14

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Example 1B: Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps with failed alarm

- Same basic scenario as Example 1A
  - The auxiliary feedwater pumps take water from the auxiliary feedwater storage tank.
  - When low low level in the tank is reached, the operator needs to align the FPS (fire protection system) to the pumps.
- Cable tracing has not been done, therefore assume fire fails the AFWST alarm at the 80% level
  - Assumed that the action would not occur (error of omission) and the spurious indication flowchart must be used!
- Fire procedures direct operator to check tank level locally and consider refilling if needed
- Action still must be done before AFWST hits 10% low low level; therefore, timing remains the same

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Example 1B: Operator fails to align FPS water to AFW pumps with failed alarm

- Local action
- Long term action (10 hours)
- Time available is large (200 minutes)
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 7 minutes
  - Execution time = 10 minutes
- No change in timing from Example 1A
  - The cue for the action (from the FP) would likely occur later than if the alarm was received. However, in this case the analysis determined that the FPs should cue the crew to check the level in plenty of time.

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Example 1B: Minimum Criteria

1. ✓ Procedures
   - Fire procedures covering each operator action being modeled
   - Support both diagnosis & execution of the action
2. ✓ Training – on the procedures and the actions
3. ✓ Availability and Accessibility of Equipment

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Example 1B: Feasibility

- Timing Analysis:
  - Time available (200 mins) > Time required (17 mins)
- Cues available to aid recovery
- Fire activity would not prevent the execution of the actions
- Enough crew members available to complete the action

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Example 1B: Time Margin

$$\text{Time Margin} = \frac{t_{action} - (t_{1/2} + t_m)}{(t_{1/2} + t_m)} * 100\% = \frac{200 - (7 + 10)}{(7 + 10)} * 100\% = 1076\%$$



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Example 1B: Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs

Condition	Status
Do the procedures match the scenario?	Yes
Is the execution complexity high?	No
Is the fire suppressed when the cue is received?	Yes
What's the action time window?	200 min
Is there any smoke or other hazardous elements in the action areas?	No
Is the action area accessible?	Yes

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
Example 1B:
Search Scheme
Start
D1.
Have the entry criteria been met?
No
HEP = 1.0 (SS1)
D2.
Is command-and-control located outside the MCR?
Yes
Go to ASD (Fig 5-5)
D3.
Are the primary cues or instruments spuriously affected by the fire?
Go to SPI (Fig 5-6)
D4.
For the given action, do the procedures match the scenario?
No
HEP = 1.0 (SS2)
Yes
D5.
Is the action within the MCR?
No
D6.
Is one of the following conditions met: 1) there are procedures for executing the ex-MCR action or 2) it is skill-of-the-craft?
Yes
Go to EXCR (Fig 5-4)
Yes
Go to INCR (Fig 5-3)
No
HEP = 1.0 (SS3)
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
Example 1B:
SPI
SPI
D56.
Are there:
- Procedural guidance,
- Subsequent cues, or
- Contextual information
Informing them of the
need
for recovery?
No
HEP = 1.0
(SPI1)
D57.
Is there a
way to
recover?
No
HEP = 1.0
(SPI2)
D58.
Can the
action be done
in the MCR?
Yes
D59.
Is the action time
window greater
than 30 minutes?
D68.
Is the area
accessible?
No
HEP = 1.0
(SPI6)
D69.
Is the action time
window greater
than 30 minutes?
No
(< or = 30)
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Example 1B: SPI



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Example 1B:
EXCR Lookup Table

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
AT	≥ 100%	0.1	SPI27
	50 – 99%	0.5	SPI28
	< 50%	1.0	SPI29

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Example 2A: Operator fails to initiate bleed & feed

- The action to initiate bleed and feed will be done when the SGs are almost in dry out
- Cue to initiate bleed and feed is when 2 SGs are at less than 15% WR level
- In this case all indications of level are accurate
- With the main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems unavailable at the beginning of the initiating event, the SG goes to dry out in 45 minutes

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Example 2A:
Operator fails to initiate bleed & feed

- MCR action
- Total system time window = 45 minutes for the SGs to dry out
- Time remaining after cue = 25 minutes
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 3 minutes
  - Execution time = 8 minutes

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Example 2A: Minimum Criteria

1. Procedures
   - Plant procedures covering each operator action being modeled
   - Support both diagnosis & execution of the action
2. Training – on the procedures and the actions
3. Availability and Accessibility of Equipment

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Example 2A:
Feasibility
• Timing Analysis:
– Time available (25 mins) > Time required (11 mins)
• Cues available to aid diagnosis
– All indications of SG level are accurate
• Fire activity would not prevent the execution of the actions
• Enough crew members available to complete the action
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Example 2A: Time Margin

$$\text{Time Margin} = \frac{t_{action} - (t_{1/2} + t_m)}{(t_{1/2} + t_m)} * 100\% = \frac{25 - (3+8)}{(3+8)} * 100\% = 127\%$$



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Example 2A: Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs

Condition	Status
Do the procedures match the scenario?	Yes
Is the execution complexity high?	No
Is the fire suppressed when the cue is received?	No
What's the action time window?	25 min
Is there any smoke or other hazardous elements in the action areas?	No
Is the action area accessible?	Yes

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Example 2A: Search Scheme



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Example 2A: INCR (part 1)



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Example 2A: INCR (part 2)



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Example 2A: INCR Lookup Table

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
E	> 100%	0.05	INCR14
	50 – 99%	0.25	INCR15
	< 50%	1.0	INCR16

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Example 2B: Operator fails to initiate bleed & feed and use of fire procedures

- The action to initiate bleed and feed will be done when the SGs are almost in dry out
- Cue to initiate bleed and feed is when 2 SGs are at less than 15% WR level
- In this case half of the indicators of SG level are failed and fire procedures must be used to identify which indicators are accurate
- With the main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems unavailable at the beginning of the initiating event, the SG goes to dry out in 45 minutes

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Example 2B: Operator fails to initiate bleed & feed and use of fire procedures

- MCR action
- Total system time window = 45 minutes for the SGs to dry out
- Time remaining after cue = 25 minutes
- Time for carrying out action:
  - Diagnosis time = 8 minutes
  - Execution time = 8 minutes

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Example 2B: Minimum Criteria

1. Procedures
   - Fire procedures covering each operator action being modeled
   - Support both diagnosis & execution of the action

2. Training – on the procedures and the actions

3. Availability and Accessibility of Equipment

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Example 2B: Feasibility

- Timing Analysis:
  - Time available (25 mins) > Time required (16 mins)
- Cues available to aid diagnosis
  - Some indications of SG level are accurate
  - Fire procedures used to determine which indicators to trust
- Fire activity would not prevent the execution of the actions
- Enough crew members available to complete the action

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Example 2B: Time Margin

$$\text{Time Margin} = \frac{t_{action} - (t_{1/2} + t_m)}{(t_{1/2} + t_m)} * 100\% = \frac{25 - (8+8)}{(8+8)} * 100\% = 56\%$$



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Example 2B: Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs

Condition	Status
Do the procedures match the scenario?	Yes
Is the execution complexity high?	No
Is the fire suppressed when the cue is received?	No
What's the action time window?	25 min
Is there any smoke or other hazardous elements in the action areas?	No
Is the action area accessible?	Yes

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
Example 2B:
Search Scheme
Start
D1.
Have the entry criteria been met?
No
HEP = 1.0
(SS1)
D2.
Is command-and-control located outside the MCR?
Yes
Go to
ASD
(Fig 5-5)
D3.
Are the primary cues or instruments spuriously affected by the fire?
Yes
Go to
SPI
(Fig 5-6)
D4.
For the given action, do the procedures match the scenario?
No
HEP = 1.0
(SS2)
D5.
Is the action within the MCR?
No
Go to
INCR
(Fig 5-3)
D6.
Is one of the following conditions met: 1) there are procedures for executing the ex-MCR action or 2) it is skill-of-the-craft?
Yes
Go to
EXCR
(Fig 5-4)
No
HEP = 1.0
(SS3)
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Example 2B: INCR (part 1)



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
Example 2B:
INCR (part 2)
D12. Is the execution complexity high?
Yes
D15. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
No
HEP Lookup Table H
Yes
D16. Is SCBA required?
No
HEP Lookup Table I
Yes
HEP = 1.0 (INCR1)
D13. Is there smoke or other hazardous elements in the MCR?
HEP Lookup Table E
Yes
D14. Is SCBA required?
No
HEP Lookup Table F
Yes
HEP Lookup Table G
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Example 2B: INCR Lookup Table

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
E	≥ 100%	0.05	INCR14
	50 – 99%	0.25	INCR15
	< 50%	1.0	INCR16

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3.3 EPRI Approach Examples

Slide 1



Slide 2

EXAMPLES
- EPRI APPROACH
- DETAILED FIRE HRA

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EPRI Approach Examples

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Slide 3

EPRI HRA Calculator™

- EPRI software was used, but is not required.
- EPRI HRA Calculator ™ version 4.1.1 used for following examples.



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EPRI Approach Examples

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Assumptions for Examples

- Example Plant is a 2-loop Westinghouse PWR using Standard Westinghouse EOPs
- Fire PRA modeling is developed sufficiently
  - Detailed scenario descriptions & information available
- Fire Response Procedures
  - Implemented in parallel to the EOPs, and
  - Operators enter the fire procedures at the same time as they enter the EOPs
- Fire & reactor trip modeled to occur at the same time (T=0)

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Crew Composition For Example Problems

Staffing: Minimum staffing of the plant is as follows:

Inside Control Room:



Outside Control Room:

Position	Crew #
Auxiliary Operators	3
Turbine Hall Operator	2
Aux bldg/Water Treatment	2

The crew composition is plant specific

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Division of Labor During Fire Scenario

Following detection of fire, some crew members become members of the fire brigade and are unable to assist in actions directed by the control room. The fire brigade's only duty is to extinguish the fire.

Crew Member	Total Available Before Fire	# Assisting with fire	# Available to assist with plant response
Shift Manager	1	1	0
Shift Supervisor	1	0	1
STA	1	0	1
Control Room Operators	2	1	1
Plant operators	7	3	2

The EPRI approach reflects the plant practice that while the fire is ongoing no members of the fire brigade are available to assist with local or control room actions.

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Generic Fire Response Timeline

Time (Minutes)	
T=0	Fire causes reactor trip
T=0	Control room receives fire alarm and actives fire brigade Control room sends local RO to investigate fire
T=5	Control room starts implementing Fire procedures in parallel to EOPs
T=10	Fire brigade is expected to be assembled and fighting fire within 10 minutes of activations
T=15	ERF activated and unusual event declared. Typical, plant policy states that if a fire is not under control within 15 minutes must declare unusual event.
T=60	99% of all fires are extinguished (NUREG 6850 Appendix P)

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Example 1 - Operator fails to manually align 115kV bus (SBO)

- **Initial Conditions**:
- Steady state, full power operation.
  - Night shift with minimal staff onsite.
  - No out-of-service safe shutdown equipment.
- **Initiating Event**: Fire in turbine hall causes SBO
- **HFE:** Operator fails to manually align 115kV (alternate power) power following loss of both buses.



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Accident Sequence & Success Criteria

Accident Sequence

- Fire cause reactor trip
- Turbine trip successful.
- AFW failed due to the fire
- Primary PORV spuriously opens due to the fire
- The Main Generator breaker opens and the BOP busses are powered through XTF0001 (reverse) and XTF0002.
- EDG B starts and the ESF Loading Sequencer loads onto bus.
- EDG B trips due to fire damage. The ESF Loading Sequencer is still sending a signal to trip the normal and alternate feeder breakers (for EDG protection) to the bus.
- All diesels failed - SBO

Operators Success Criteria

- Locally trip the alternate feeder breaker by removing power from the ESFLS to remove the trip open signal.
- Energized XSW1DA or 1DB from the alternate power source.

Consequence of failure: Due to loss of power; stuck open PORV cannot be closed which results in core damage

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Expected Crew Response

- Fire and reactor trip occur at time. T= 0.
- Control room operators receive fire alarm and dispatch the fire brigade (3 of the 7 Plant Operators) to fight the fire, One control room operators enter EOPs and other control room operator enters fire procedures (FP).
- Within 1-2 minutes of reactor trip control room transfers to ECA 0.0 due to SBO conditions.
- STA will call a brief meeting (1-2 min) to notify everyone that they have a fire and SBO and are in procedure ECA 0.0.
- Control room operator dispatches local RO to investigate AFW pumps.
- Control room operator will go through ECA 0.0 and when he reaches step 10, he will notify the STA that they need to transition to AOP 304.

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Expected Crew Response (Con't)

- Shift supervisor will arrived in the CR and the STA will call another meeting to coordinate the FP and AOP. Looking at the FP, there are 7 suggested time critical (within 1 hr) actions, 2 of which are deemed necessary. The STA and Shift supervisor concur that the 2 FP actions will not interfere with the AOP actions and sufficient personnel are available to do both in parallel. They also decide to postpone non-time critical (>4hr) FP actions until they have recovered from the SBO.

- Control room operator will continue through AOP 304 and, when he reaches step 13, he will dispatch a Plant Operator to locally check transformers and verify no fire or other damage.

- Control room operator will continue through AOP 304 and, by the time he arrives at step 17, the Plant operator will have reported back that the transformers are OK and will notify the STA that he is ready to energize 1DA (i.e., perform step 17 and 18).

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Scenario Description Using EPRI HRA Calculator



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Procedures

- **Procedures**:
  - Upon Reactor Trip, enter EOP-0
    - Step 3 of EOP-0 verifies that buses are energized. Buses are de-energized; this will take the operator to ECA 0.0 [Station Blackout Procedure]
    - Step 10 of ECA 0.0 checks that buses 1DB and 1 DA are energized. Both buses are de-energized; this will take the operator to AOP 304 due to loss of bus with no EDG.
    - Steps 17 and 18 of AOP 304 are the critical steps for this HFE:

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION
17 **Locally remove power from the Train A ESF Loading Sequencer (XPN-6020 CB-436).** ☐	
18 **Energize XSW1DA from the normal power source:** a. Ensure BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch is in OFF. ☐ b. Close BUS 1DA NORM FEED Breaker. ☐ c. Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized. ☐	18 IF XSW1DA normal power source is NOT available, THEN energize XSW1DA from the alternate power source: a) Ensure BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch is in OFF. ☐ b) Close BUS 1DA ALT FEED Breaker. ☐ c) Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized. ☐

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

EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cue Cues Timing Screening Screening Depend.
Summary EXAMPLE1 Procedures
CBDTM/THERP
BE Data
Cue(s)
Procedures and Training
Scenario Description
Key Assumptions
Operator Interview Insigh
Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
BE ID
EXAMPLE1
Description: OPS FAIL TO MANUALLY ALIGN 115KV BUS
Procedures
Reference Revision Title
Cognitive: ECA 0.0 1 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
Select...
Step Number: 10
Instruction: Buses 1DB and 1 DA are energized
RNO enter AOP-304.1
Execution: AOP-304.1 2 LOSS OF BUS 1DA(1DB) WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE
Other: Reference Revision Title
Add...
Remove
Training
None
Frequency
Classroom 0.5 per year
Simulator 0.5 per year
JPM
Reference Revision
Title
Procedure and Training Notes
AOP-304.1 Steps 17 and 18 provide the execution steps
For Help, press F1
NUM 1

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Cues

Buses 1DB and 1 DA are NOT energized



Operators will determine loss of Bus by

- Bus voltages
- SBO lights

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Simulator Observation (SBO non-fire scenario)

Procedure/step	Time (Minutes)	Comments : Cue; Feedback; Confusing; Additional information required
Initial Conditions	0	G01 out of service
EOP-0 Step 1 & 2	0	Unit trip on loss of 1X03 and 1X04. Bus transfer H02 to H01 did not occur, 1a05 dead (G01 OOS, G02 failed to start) and 1A06 powered from G03. Lost power on 1A06, G03 tripped off – Transition to ECA-0.0 EOP-0 Immediate actions started
EOP-0 Step 3 RNO	2	Verify Safeguard buses energized Transition to ECA 0.0 There was a short team brief to make the announcement that there was a transition to ECA 0.0
ECA-0.0 Steps 1&2	5	Verify reactor trip and turbine trip
ECA-0.0 Step 3	7	Maintain RCS Inventory
ECA-0.0 Step 4 RNO	8	Verified 1P29 AFW pump on and feeding both SGs CRO makes call for local RO to investigate TDAFW and try and start AFW. Then briefs STA on status of TDAFW
ECA-0.0 Step6	9	Attempted start of G02, failed.
ECA-0.0 Step 7	9	Attempted start of G03, failed – GO to Step 10
ECA-0.0 Step 10	10	Check 1DB bus and 1DA are energized RNO If 1DA is de-energized Go to AOP-304.01 (LOSS OF BUS 1DA WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE) If 1DB is de-energized Go to AOP-304.02 (LOSS OF BUS 1DB WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE)

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

EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cues Timing Screening Screening Depend.
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Operator Interview Insigh
Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
BE ID
EXAMPLE1
Description: OPS FAIL TO MANUALLY ALIGN 115KV BUS
Operator Interview Insights
Procedure/step Time (Minutes) Comments : Cue; Feedback; Confusing; Additional information required
Initial Conditions 0 G01 out of service
EOP 0 Unit trip on loss of 1X03 and 1X04. Bus transfer H02 to H01 did not occur, 1a05 dead (G01 OOS, G02 failed to start)
Step 1 & 2 and 1A06 powered from G03.
Lost power on 1A06, G03 tripped off | Transition to ECA 0.0
Immediate actions started
EOP 0 2 Verify Safeguard buses energized
Step 3 RNO Transition to ECA 0.0
There is a short team brief to make the announcement that there is a transition to ECA 0.0
ECA 0.0 5 Verify reactor trip and turbine trip
Steps 1&2
ECA 0.0 7 Maintain RCS Inventory
Step 3
ECA 0.0 8 Verified 1P29 AFW pump on and feeding both SGs
Step 4 RNO CRO makes call for local RO to investigate TDAFW and try and start AFW.
RNO Then briefs STA on status of TDAFW
ECA 0.0 9 Attempted start of G02, failed.
Step6
ECA 0.0 9 Attempted start of G03, failed
Step 7 GO to Step 10
ECA 0.0 10 Check 1DB bus and 1DA are energized
Step 10 RNO
If 1DA is de-energized Go to AOP-304.01 (LOSS OF BUS 1DA WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE)
If 1DB is de-energized Go to AOP-304.02 (LOSS OF BUS 1DB WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE)
For Help, press F1
NUM
1

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Timing

- T = 0 Start of fire and reactor trip
- T_{SW} = 90 minutes
  Time to core damage based on an IPE thermal hydraulic run for loss of AFW and a station blackout with one primary PORV stuck open.
- T_{delay} = 15 minutes from reactor trip unit operators transfer to AOP 304
  - Based on Simulator observation for a similar scenario for SBO it took operators 10 minutes to get through ECA 0.0 step 10
  - Simulation based on non-fire SBO so an additional 5 minutes have been added to account for crew briefs and other distractions caused by fire.

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
Timing (cont'd)
T1/2 = 15 minutes based on operator interviews. Operators estimated that is would take 15 minutes to reach step 17 of AOP 304.
Majority of the steps in AOP 304 are checking indicators, so < 1min per step on average
This includes time to locally check out the buses for fire damage or other defects.
This includes time for the SS and STA to confer, coordinate with the fire procedures, approve the action and communicate to control room operators to commence steps 17 and 18.
Tm = 15 minutes
The action to locally remove power from the Train B ESF Loading Sequencer is trained on using Job Performance Measure (JPM) 12654 – Align ALT Feed Breaker.
This JPM has a time requirement to be able to complete the local portion of the actions within 15 minutes. This 15 minutes includes travel time and getting key from the control room.
As part of this JPM the operators train on putting on flash gear which is required to locally remove power from the Train B ESF Loading Sequencer. The flash gear is stored in a cabinet at the entrance to the relay room.
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
Timeline
T SW
90.00
Minutes
T delay
15
T 1/2
15
T M
15.00
Unit:
Minutes
Unit:
Minutes
Unit:
Minutes
Irreversible
DamageState
Cue
t=0
Time available for Cognition and Recovery = T(w) = T(sw) - T(m) - T(delay) =
60.00
Minutes
Time available for Recovery = T(sw) - T(m) - T(1/2) - T(delay) =
45.00
Minutes
SPAR-H Available time (cognition) =
60.00
Minutes
SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio =
4.00
Minimum level of dependence for recovery
LD
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
EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cues Timing Screening Screening Depend.
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Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
Equipment Accessability (Cognitive)
Location Control Room Edit...
Accessibility Accessible
Initial Estimate of Pc
pc Failure Mechanism Branch HEP
pca: Availability of information ?? 0.0e+00
pcb: Failure of attention ?? 0.0e+00
pcc: Misread/miscommunicate data ?? 0.0e+00
pcd: Information misleading ?? 0.0e+00
pce: Skip a step in procedure ?? 0.0e+00
pcf: Misinterpret instruction ?? 0.0e+00
pcg: Misinterpret decision logic ?? 0.0e+00
pch: Deliberate violation ?? 0.0e+00
Initial Pc = 0.0e+00
Effective Tw (Minutes) = 60.00
Complexity of Response (Cognitive)
Complex Simple
Notes/Assumptions:
Cue
Initial Cue: Buses 1DB and 1 DA are NOT energized
Procedure
ECA 0.0 Rev: 1
Step: 10
Buses 1DB and 1 DA are energized
RNO enter AOP-304.1
COGNITIVE UNRECOVERED – EPRI CBDTM
For Help, press F1
NUM 1

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CBDTM decision tree: pc-a Data not available

pc a	Indication Available in CR	Indication Accurate	Warning or Alternative in Procedure	Training on Indication



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
CBDTM decision tree:
pc-b Data not attended to
pcb
Low vs. high workload
Check vs. monitor
Front vs. back panel
Alarmed vs. not alarmed
Nominal probability
Yes
No
Low
High
Check
Monitor
Check
Monitor
Front
Back
Front
Back
Front
Back
Front
Back
Alarmed
Not alarmed
(a) neg.
(b) 1.5E-4
(c) 3.0E-3
(d) 1.5E-4
(e) 3.0E-3
(f) 3.0E-4
(g) 6.0E-3
(h) neg.
(i) neg.
(j) 7.5E-4
(k) 1.5E-2
(l) 7.5E-4
(m) 1.5E-2
(n) 1.5E-3
(o) 3.0E-2
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CBDTM decision tree: pc-c Data misread or miscommunicated



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CBDTM decision tree: pc-d Information misleading



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-e Relevant step in procedure missed



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CBDTM decision tree: pc-f Misinterpret instruction



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-g Error in interpreting logic



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-h Deliberate violation



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
EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cues Timing Screening Screening Depend.
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Cognitive Recovered
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Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
Equipment Accessability (Cognitive)
Location Control Room
Edit...
Accessibility Accessible
Initial Estimate of Pc
pc Failure Mechanism
Branch
HEP
pca: Availability of information a neg.
pcb: Failure of attention h neg.
pcc: Misread/miscommunicate data a neg.
pcd: Information misleading a neg.
pce: Skip a step in procedure g 6.0e-03
pcf: Misinterpret instruction a neg.
pcg: Misinterpret decision logic i 3.0e-04
pch: Deliberate violation a neg.
Initial Pc = 6.3e-03
Effective Tw (Minutes) = 60.00
Complexity of Response (Cognitive)
Complex
Simple
Cue
Initial Cue: Buses 1DB and 1 DA are NOT energized
Control room indications are not impacted by the fire
Step: 10
Buses 1DB and 1 DA are energized
RNO enter AOP-304.1
Notes/Assumptions:
Workload is considered to be high due to on going fire and station blackout.
Diagnosis of loss of busses 1DB and 1DA should be simple. There is a considerable amount of procedure checking to ensure that the bus can be re-energized and no
trip again.

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Post-Initiators: CBDTM Recovery Factors

Tree	Branch	Self-Review	Extra Crew	STA Review	Shift Change	ERF Review
Pca	all	NC	0.5	NC	0.5	0.5
Pcb	all	X	NC	X	X	X
Pcc	all	NC	NC	X	X	X
Pcd	all	NC	0.5	X	X	0.1
Pce	a-h	X	0.5	NC	X	X
Pce	i	0.5	0.5	X	X	X
Pcf	all	NC	0.5	X	X	X
Pcg	all	NC	0.5	X	X	X
Pch	all	NC	X	X	NC	NC

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

Branch		Initial HEP	Self Review	Extra Crew	STA Review	Shift Change	ERF Review	DF	Multiply By	Override Value	Final Value
pca:	a	neg.	NC	5.0e-1	NC	X	5.0e-1	N/A	1.0e+00		0.0e+00
pcb:	h	neg.	1.0e-1	NC	1.0e-1	X	1.0e-1	N/A	1.0e+00		0.0e+00
pcc:	a	neg.	NC	NC	1.0e-1	X	1.0e-1	N/A	1.0e+00		0.0e+00
pcd:	a	neg.	NC	5.0e-1	1.0e-1	X	1.0e-1	N/A	1.0e+00		0.0e+00
pce:	g	6.0e-03	1.0e-1	5.0e-1	NC	X	1.0e-1	LD	5.6e-02		3.4e-04
pcf:	a	neg.	NC	5.0e-1	1.0e-1	X	1.0e-1	N/A	1.0e+00		0.0e+00
pcg:	i	3.0e-04	NC	5.0e-1	1.0e-1	X	1.0e-1	LD	5.0e-02		1.5e-05
pch:	a	neg.	NC	1.0e-1	1.0e-1	NC	NC	N/A	1.0e+00		0.0e+00

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Execution PSFs

- **Environment:**
  - **Availability and Accessibility:** Given location of fire and layout of plant, the relay room is accessible and there is no degraded environment (e.g., no smoke) in the relay room or en route to the relay room.
  - **Visibility:** Given a SBO event, lighting will be significantly reduced (i.e., flashlights and/or emergency lighting). Training is performed in these conditions.
  - **Communications:** Communication lines are all intact and background noise levels are not expected to adversely impact the scenario.
  - **Heat/Humidity**: Normal – fire effects do not reach this area, however, after some time (>action window) there could be a rise in temperature due to SBO.
- **Special Requirements**:
  - Operators are required to wear flash gear to locally remove power from the Train B ESF Loading Sequencer.
  - Operators will need key to access relay rooms due to loss of power all doors will be locked.
  - Due to loss of power the operators will also need flashlights or other emergency lighting.

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
EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cue Cues Timing Screening Screening Depend.
Summary
EXAMPLE1
CBDTM/THERP
BE Data
Cue(s)
Procedures and Training
Scenario Description
Key Assumptions
Operator Interview Insig
Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
BE ID
EXAMPLE1
Description: OPS FAIL TO MANUALLY ALIGN 115KV BUS
Environment
Lighting
Normal
Emergency
Portable
Heat/Humidity
Normal
Hot / Humid
Cold
Radiation
Background
Green
Yellow
Red
Atmosphere
Normal
Steam
Smoke
Respirator required
Special Requirements
Tools Required Adequate Available
Parts Required Adequate Available
Clothing Required Adequate Available
Complexity of Response (Execution)
Complex
Simple
Equipment Accessibility
Location: Relay Room
Edit...
Accessibility: Accessible

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EPRI Stress Decision Tree



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Critical Steps (Execution)

- LOCALLY Reset ESFLS to clear trip signal
  - Plant Operator, stationed at or near the MCR, gets ESFLS panel key from the MCR and proceeds to the Relay Room
  - Dons flash gear
  - Opens left cabinet (~2ft from floor) and locally removes power from the loading sequencer
  - Alert control operator that the trip signal is clear and that break can closed from the control room
- Close Breaker in MCR
  - Ensure BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch is in OFF
  - Close BUS 1DA ALT FEED Breaker
  - Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized

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

EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cues Timing Screening Screening Depend.
Summary
EXAMPLE1
CBDTM/THERP
BE Data
Cue(s)
Procedures and Training
Scenario Description
Key Assumptions
Operator Interview Insig
Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
Step | Instruction | Omission | Commission | Total | Location
17 | Locally remove power from Train A ESF Loading Sequencer | 1.3E-3 | 3.8e-03 | 2.6e-02 | Relay Room
18.b | Close BUS 1DA NORM FEED breaker | 1.3E-3 | 3.8e-03 | 2.6e-02 | Control Room
18.c | Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized | 1.3E-3 | 0.0e+00 | 6.5e-03 | Control Room
Edit Step
Add Before
Add After
Remove
View All
Comment
HEP
Stress
Omission 1.3E-3 * 5 = 6.5e-03
Commission 3.8e-03 * 5 = 1.9e-02
Override
Total = 2.6e-02
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

Pexe Table Selection
Step No.
17
Select Event...
Stress:
High
Change Stress Value
Instruction
Locally remove power from Train A ESF Loading Sequencer
Error of Omission
Table Reference
20-7b
More Info...
Omission per item of instruction when using a step-by-step procedure (Table 20-7 - reduced by factor of 3)
Item Reference
2
Omission of item when procedures with checkoff provisions are correctly used. Long list, > 10 items.
Mean
1.3E-3
Error of Commission
Add
Remove
Remove All
Mean
3.8e-03
Double click on a Table Entry to select a Table Item. To enter a Description double click on the Description field. Use Ctrl-Enter for line breaks.
More Info...
Table Ref.
Group
Title
Item Ref.
Mean
Description
20-13
Locally Operated Valves
Selection (Table 20-13)
2
3.8E-3
Override:
Location:
Relay Room
Edit...
Comments:
OK
Cancel
Select From Library...
Add to Library
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

Execution Summary
EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cues Timing Screening Screening Dep
Summary
EXAMPLE1
CBDTM/THERP
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Scenario Description
Key Assumptions
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Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
Pexe with Recovery
Crit. Step | Recovery Step | Actions | CD | Prob. | Prob.
17 | | Locally remove power from Train A ESF Loading Sequencer | | | 1.5e-03
| 18.c | Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized | LD | 5.6e-02 |
18.b | | Close BUS 1DA NORM FEED breaker | | | 1.5e-03
| 18.c | Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized | LD | 5.6e-02 |
Total Pexe 2.9e-03
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
Summary Results
EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE1]
File Edit View Window Help
Open Save Pre Post All/Def. Screening Delete Copy Reports New Edit Proc. Criteria Cues Timing Screening
Summary
EXAMPLE1
CBDTM/THERP
BE Data
Cue(s)
Procedures and Training
Scenario Description
Key Assumptions
Operator Interview Insig
Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
BE ID
EXAMPLE1
Description: OPS FAIL TO MANUALLY ALIGN 115KV BUS
Revision Control
Analyst: Kaydee Kohlhepp, EPRI
Date: 09/16/2010
Reviewer:
Date:
Risk Significance
RAW: 0
FV: 0
Risk Significant: N/A
Complete Analysis Results
without Recovery
with Recovery
Pcog 6.3e-03 3.6e-04
Pexe 5.1e-02 2.9e-03
Total HEP 3.3e-03
Error Factor 5
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Example 2

- Operators fail to perform feed and bleed during a fire
- For this example, the HFE has been quantified in detail for internal events

SPAR-H		1.0e-02	1.0e-03	1.1e-02	-	
EXAMPLE2	Post					OPERATORS FAIL FEED AND BLEED (INTERNAL EVENTS)
Annunciator Response/THERP		2.7e-04	1.5e-03	1.7e-03	5	
ASEP		7.7e-03	1.5e-03	9.1e-03	5	
CBDTM/HCR Combination (Sum)		1.0e-03	1.5e-03	2.5e-03	5	
CBDTM/THERP	X	1.0e-03	1.5e-03	2.5e-03	5	
HCR/ORE/THERP		2.2e-10	1.5e-03	1.5e-03	5	
Screening HEP		-	-	1.0e+00	1	
SPAR-H		1.0e-02	1.0e-03	1.1e-02	-	

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Scenario Description

- **Initial Conditions**:
  - Steady state, full power operation. Night shift with minimal staff onsite.
  - No out-of-service unavailability pertinent to this scenario
- **Initiating Event**: Fire in turbine hall causes reactor trip. IE - TRANS
- **HFE:** Operators fail to perform feed and bleed (fire)
- **Fire Impacts:** The fire fails AFW, MFW and 2/4 SG level indicators in the control room.

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
Accident Sequence
T2
TRANSCIENT WITHOUT PCS
RT
REACTOR TRIP
AF2
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
FB1
RCS FEED AND BLEED
LC1
LONG TERM COOLING
Class
INIT-T2
GRT3100
GAFW100
GFB1100
GECC500
OK
OK
TEH
TEH
~ATWS-T
Operator fails to perform feed and bleed
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Timeline

- T = 0 reactor trip and start of the fire
- T_{sw} = 60 minutes Time to SG dryout
- T_{delay}= 20 minutes Time to cue
- T_m = 5 minutes Time to execute and procedurally verify execution steps. (Based on operator interviews)
- For internal events
  - $T_{1/2}$=1 minutes All cues and indications are accurate
- For fire case with 2/4 SG levels impacted
  - $T_{1/2}$=5 minutes To determine which SG levels indicators are accurate.

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
Timeline
BE ID
EXAMPLE2-FIRE
Description: OPERATORS FAIL FEED AND BLEED (FIRE)
T SW 60.00 Minutes ...
T delay 20.00 ...
T 1/2 5 ...
T M 5.00 ...
Unit: Minutes
Unit: Minutes
Unit: Minutes
Cue
Irreversible DamageState
For fire analysis dependency level assigned is MD
For internal events case dependency level assigned is LD
Time available for Cognition and Recovery = T(w) = T(sw) - T(m) - T(delay) = 35.00 Minutes
Time available for Recovery = T(sw) - T(m) - T(1/2) - T(delay) = 30.00 Minutes
SPAR-H Available time (cognition) = 35.00 Minutes
SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio = 7.00
Minimum level of dependence for recovery MD
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Procedure FR.H-1

UTILITY X		**NUMBER**	**EOP FR-H.1**
PWR		**REVISION**	**25**
		PAGE	**12 OF 28**
TITLE:	**Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink**	**UNIT**	**1**

ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE	**RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED**
10. CHECK S/G Levels:	
a. S/G NR Level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 15% [25%]	a. IF Feedflow to at least one S/G verified, • WR Level increasing • Core Exit TCs decreasing THEN Maintain flow to restore S/G NR Level to GREATER THAN 15% [25%]. IF Feedflow NOT verified, THEN GO TO Step 11.
11. Check For Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink: WR S/G Level LESS THAN 15% in 2 S/G	Return to Step 1

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Procedure FR.H-1

UTILITY X		**NUMBER**	**EOP FR-H.1**
PWR		**REVISION**	**25**
		PAGE	**13 OF 28**
TITLE:	**Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink**	**UNIT**	**1**

ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE	**RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED**

****

CAUTION: Steps 12 through 18 must be performed without delay in order to establish RCS heat removal by RCS bleed and feed.

****

ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
12. ACTUATE SI	
13. VERIFY RCS Feed Paths:	Manually start ECCS Pps and align ECCS Injection Valves to establish RCS feed path.
a. Check ECCS Pp status: • ECCS CCP - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING OR • SI Pps - AT LEAST ONE	IF An RCS feed path CANNOT be established, THEN Activate the monitor lights for monitor light Box C by turning the Monitor Test Light Switch to ON.
b. Verify ECCS valve alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT	Use White Status light to verify ECCS valve alignment.

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
Procedure FR.H-1
ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE
RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
14. RESET SI
IMPLEMENT OP B-6B, LOCAL SI RESET.
15. RESET Containment Isolation Phase A And Phase B
16. ESTABLISH Instrument Air To Containment:
a. Open FCV-584
b. Check Instrument Air Header Pressure GREATER THAN 90 PSIG, PI-380 (VB4 UNIT 1)
b. IMPLEMENT OP AP-9, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
17. ESTABLISH RCS Bleed Path:
a. Verify PZR PORV Block Vlvs - OPEN
• 8000A for PCV-474
• 8000B for PCV-455C
• 8000C for PCV-456
a. Restore power to block valves AND OPEN:
8000A: 52-1F-40 AND 52-1F-40R
8000B: 52-1G-46 AND 52-1G-46R
8000C: 52-1H-33 AND 52-1H-33R
b. Open all PZR PORVs
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

Fire Procedure
10/10/2010
Page 21 of 168
SAMPLE PLANT (UNIT 1)
ATTACHMENT 7.3
TITLE: Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment
4.0 Fire Area 3-BB (Continued)
Turbine Area, Elev. 115-ft
Affected Equipment
Available Equipment
Required Manual Action
6. MSS
SG Level Indicators:
SG 1-1: LT-517, LT-519
SG 1-2: LT-527, LT-529
SG 1-1: LT-516, -518,
SG 1-2: LT-526, -528,
SG Pressure Indicators:
SG 1-1: All Available
SG 1-1: PT-514, PT-515, PT-516
SG 1-2: PT-524, PT-525
SG 1-2: PT-526
ADV: PCV-19, PCV-20,
Manually open valves after isolating supply air (normal, backup and nitrogen supply):
PCV-19: AIR-I-1-4541
PCV-20: AIR-I-1-4350
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Cues and Indications



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-a Data not available

pc a	Indication Available in CR	Indication Accurate	Warning or Alternative in Procedure	Training on Indication





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CBDTM decision tree: pc-b Data not attended to



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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-c Data misread or miscommunicated



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

CBDTM decision tree:
pc-d Information misleading
p_cd
All cues as stated
Warning of differences
Specific training
General training
Nominal probability
Yes
No
(a) neg.
(b) 3.0E-3
(c) 1.0E-2
(d) 1.0E-1
(e) 1.0
Internal events selection
Fire selection
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CBDTM decision tree:
pc-e Relevant step in procedure missed



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
CBDTM decision tree:
pc-f Misinterpret instruction
$p_c f$
Standard, unambiguous wording
All required information
Training on step
Nominal probability
Yes
No
(a) neg.
(b) 3.0E-3
(c) 3.0E-2
(d) 3.0E-3
(e) 3.0E-2
(f) 6.0E-3
(g) 6.0E-2
Internal events selection
Fire selection
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
CBDTM decision tree:
pc-g Error in interpreting logic
pcg
"Not" statement
"And" or "or" statement
Both "and" and "or"
Practiced scenario
Nominal probability
Yes
No
(a) 1.6E-2
(b) 4.9E-2
(c) 6.0E-3
(d) 1.9E-2
(e) 2.0E-3
(f) 6.0E-3
(g) 1.0E-2
(h) 3.1E-2
(i) 3.0E-4
(j) 1.0E-3
(k) neg.
(l) neg.
Internal events selection
Fire selection
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
CBDTM decision tree:
pc-h Deliberate violation
pch
Belief in adequacy of instruction
Adverse consequence if comply
Reasonable alternative
Policy of verbatim compliance
Nominal probability
Yes
No
(a) neg.
(b) 5.0E-1
(c) 1.0
(d) neg.
(e) neg.
Internal events selection
Fire selection
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
EPRI HRA Calculator 4.1.1 - [Training example.HRA] - [EXAMPLE2-FIRE]
File Edit View Window Help
Summary
EXAMPLE2
EXAMPLE2-FIRE
Cues
CBDTM/THERP
BE Data
Cue(s)
Procedures and Training
Scenario Description
Key Assumptions
Operator Interview Insig
Manpower Requirement
Time Window
Cognitive Unrecovered
Cognitive Recovered
Execution PSFs
Execution Stress
Execution Unrecovered
Execution Recovered
Execution Summary
Recovery Factors Applied to Pc
Based on 34.00 Minutes for Recovery: Dependency should not be less than LD
Branch | Initial HEP | Self Review | Extra Crew | STA Review | Shift Change | ERF Review | DF | Multiply By | Override Value | Final Value
pca: e 5.0e-02 NC 5.0e-1 NC N/A 1.0e+00 5.0e-02
pcb: m 1.5e-02 1.0e-1 NC 1.0e-1 N/A 1.0e+00 1.5e-02
pcc: a neg. NC NC 1.0e-1 N/A 1.0e+00 0.0e+00
pcd: d 1.0e-01 NC 5.0e-1 1.0e-1 N/A 1.0e+00 1.0e-01
pce: a 1.0e-03 1.0e-1 5.0e-1 NC N/A 1.0e+00 1.0e-03
pcf: a neg. NC 5.0e-1 1.0e-1 N/A 1.0e+00 0.0e+00
pcg: k neg. NC 5.0e-1 1.0e-1 N/A 1.0e+00 0.0e+00
pch: a neg. NC 1.0e-1 1.0e-1 NC NC N/A 1.0e+00 0.0e+00
Recovery Factor - STA Review
Recalculate
Sum of recovered Pca through Pch = Recovered Pc 1.7e-01
Notes:
CBDTM Unrecovered = 1.7E-1
No credit has been given to the usage of the fire procedures
For Help, press F1
NUM

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Calculation of Recovery Factor

- Using CBDTM an HEP for operators fail to enter Fire Procedure and diagnose failed indications can be calculated.
- Cue – Fire alarm in the control room. The fire alarm will direct the operators fire procedure and correct attachment
- Timeline – This action occurs concurrently with other FRH-1 actions.
  - T_{sw}= 60 minutes - Time to SG dryout
  - T_{delay}= 5 minutes - Time to enter fire procedures
  - $T_{1/2}$ = 5 minutes - Time to determine which indications are correct.
  - T_m = 5 minutes - Tm is the time to implement feed and bleed. This time needs to be included to determine the correct time available for recovery.

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
Calculation of Recovery Factor
Recovery Factors Applied to Pc
Based on 30.00 Minutes for Recovery: Dependency should not be less than MD
Branch
Initial HEP
Self Review
Review
DF
Multiply By
Override Value
Final Value
pca: e 5.0e-02 NC 5.0e-1 NC N/A 1.0e+00 1.4E-1 7.0e-03
pcb: m 1.5e-02 1.0e-1 NC 1.0e-1 N/A 1.0e+00 1.4E-1 2.1e-03
pcc: a neg. NC NC 1.0e-1 N/A 1.0e+00 0.0e+00
pcd: d 1.0e-01 N/A 1.0e+00 1.4E-1 1.4e-02
pce: a 1.0e-03 N/A 1.0e-01 1.0e-04
MD Dependency
Recovery HEP
1.4E-1
Recovery HEP is calculated to be 6E-3 and does not include dependencies.
Based on timing a Moderate dependency is assigned.
Recovery HEP with dependency is (1+ 6 X6E-3) / 7 =1.4E-1
Pcog with recoveries is 2.3E-2
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Execution

- Same execution steps as for Internal Events

Step	Instruction	Omission	Commission	Total	Location
1	Actuate SI	1.3E-3	1.3e-03	1.3e-02	Control Room
2	Verify Adequate RCS Feed Path	1.3E-3	0.0e+00	6.5e-03	Control Room
3	Open 2 PORVS	1.3E-3	1.3e-03	1.3e-02	Control Room
4	Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path	1.3E-3	0.0e+00	6.5e-03	Control Room

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Execution Recovery

Pexe with Recovery

Crit. Step	Recovery Step	Actions	CD	Prob.	Prob.
1		Actuate SI			1.9e-03
	2	Verify Adequate RCS Feed Path	MD	1.5e-01	
3		Open 2 PORVS			1.9e-03
	4	Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path	MD	1.5e-01	
				Total Pexe	3.9e-03

Moderate dependency is assigned for recovery

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Execution PSFs

- Fire is outside the control room and has no impact on the control room.
- Stress is the same as for internal events



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HEP Summary

Operator fails to perform feed and bleed during fire with 2/4 SG levels impacted

Complete Analysis Results

	without Recovery	with Recovery		
Pcog	1.7e-01	2.3e-02	Total HEP	2.7e-02
Pexe	2.6e-02	3.9e-03	Error Factor	5

Operator fails to perform feed and bleed (internal events)

Complete Analysis Results

	without Recovery	with Recovery		
Pcog	1.6e-02	1.0e-03	Total HEP	2.5e-03
Pexe	2.6e-02	1.5e-03	Error Factor	5

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3.4 ATHEANA Examples

Slide 1



Slide 2

Steps 1&2: Objectives of the Analysis

- Step 1: Define and Interpret the Issue
  - Already defined by scope of fire PRA:
    - Need to identify, model and quantify relevant HFEs for Fire PRA sequences
- Step 2: Define the Scope of the Analysis
  - Already defined by scope of fire PRA:
    - Address human actions needed to prevent core damage in fire induced initiating events and subsequent accident sequences under full-power

Slide 3

Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Initial Conditions**: Single unit two loop PWR with two trains of electrical power. Steady state, full power operation. Night shift with minimal staff onsite.
  - No out-of-service unavailability pertinent to this scenario
- **Initiating Event**: Fire in turbine room causes SBO
- **HFE:** Operator fails to manually align 115kV (alternate power) power on loss of both buses and EDGs fail to start.



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Slide 4

Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Accident sequence**:
  - Reactor trip successful.
  - Turbine trip successful.
  - AFW failed due to the fire
  - PORV spuriously opens due to the fire
  - The Main Generator breaker opens and the BOP busses are powered through XTF0001 (reverse) and XTF0002.
  - EDG B will start and the ESF Loading Sequencer will load the bus.
  - Given the EDGs do not start (or start and trip) or if its breaker would not close, the ESF Loading Sequencer would still be sending a signal to trip the normal and alternate feeder breakers (for EDG protection) to the bus. To close the alternate feeder breaker (or reclose the normal feeder breaker), power must be removed from the ESFLS to remove the trip open signal.
  - XSW1DA or 1DB must then be energized from the alternate power source.
- **Consequence of failure of this action:** Core damage due to stuck open PORV

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Slide 5

Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Staffing**: Minimum staffing of the plant is as follows:

Inside Control Room:



*Normally outside CR. Will be in CR within 10 minutes of reactor trip.

Outside Control Room:

Position	Crew #
Auxiliary Operators	3
Turbine Hall Operator	2
Aux bldg/WaterTreatment	2

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Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Procedures**:
  - Upon Reactor Trip, enter EOP-0
    - Step 3 of EOP-0 verifies that buses are energized. Buses are de-energized; this will take the operator to ECA 0.0 [Station Blackout Procedure]
    - Step 10 of ECA 0.0 checks that buses 1DB and 1 DA are energized. Both buses are de-energized; this will take the operator to AOP 304 due to loss of bus with no EDG.
    - Steps 17 and 18 of AOP 304 are the relevant actions for this HFE:

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION
17 **Locally remove power from the Train A ESF Loading Sequencer (XPN-6020 CB-436).** ☐	
18 **Energize XSW1DA from the normal power source:**	18 IF XSW1DA normal power source is NOT available, THEN energize XSW1DA from the alternate power source:
a. Ensure BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch is in OFF. ☐	a) Ensure BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch is in OFF. ☐
b. Close BUS 1DA NORM FEED Breaker. ☐	b) Close BUS 1DA ALT FEED Breaker. ☐
c. Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized. ☐	c) Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized. ☐

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Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Interaction with Fire Procedures:**
  - Assume fire and reactor trip at Time = 0min.
  - SS dispatches the fire brigade (3 of the 7 Plant Operators) to fight the fire, notifies the fire department, and confers with CO1 to start the Fire Procedures (FPs)
  - Meanwhile, CO2 will start EOP-0. When he reaches step 3, he will notify the STA (who arrives at the CR in 1-2 min) that they are in a SBO.
  - STA will call a brief meeting (1-2 min) to notify everyone that they have a fire and SBO and are going to ECA 0.0.
  - CO2 will go through ECA 0.0 and when he reaches step 10, he will notify the STA that they need to transition to AOP 304.
  - By that point the SS will have arrived in the CR and the STA will call another meeting to coordinate the FP and AOP. Looking at the FP, there are 7 suggested time critical (within 1 hr) actions, 2 of which are deemed necessary. The STA and SS concur that the 2 FP actions will not interfere with the AOP actions and sufficient personnel are available to do both in parallel. They also decide to postpone non-time critical (>4hr) FP actions until they have recovered from the SBO. STA will also dispatch a Plant Operator to examine the AFW pumps.
  - CO2 will continue through AOP 304 and, when he reaches step 13, he will dispatch a Plant Operator to locally check the buses and verify no fire or other damage.
  - CO2 will continue through AOP 304 and, by the time he arrives at step 17, the Plant Operator will have reported back that the buses are clear and CO2 will notify the SS and STA that he is ready to energize 1DA (i.e., perform step 17 and 18).

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Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Operator action success criterion**: Reset ESFLS to clear trip signal and align alternate power source to XSW1DA.
- **Required Operator Actions:**
  - SS directs the CO2 to power 1DA
  - Reset ESFLS to clear trip signal (local action, skill-of-craft)
    - Plant Operator, stationed at or near the MCR, gets ESFLS panel key from the MCR and proceeds to the Relay Room
    - Dons flash gear
    - Opens left cabinet (~2ft from floor) and locally removes power from the loading sequencer
    - Alerts CO2 that the trip signal is clear and he can proceed to close the breaker
  - Close Breaker in MCR
    - CO2 will ensure BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch is in OFF
    - Close BUS 1DA ALT FEED Breaker
    - Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized

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Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Timing analysis:**
  - Fire ongoing throughout the scenario
    - Detailed fire modeling shows fire will last approximately one hour
  - Assume 90 minutes for the total window (IE to core damage) based on an IPE thermal hydraulic run for loss of AFW and a station blackout with one primary PORV stuck open.
  - T_delay = 28 min from reactor trip to receiving cue for action (step 17 AOP 304)
    - Based on Simulator observation for a similar scenario for SBO it took operators 10 minutes to get through ECA 0.0 step 10
      - Simulation based on non-fire SBO, so add an 3 additional minutes to account for the initial coordination
    - Based on operator interviews, estimated additional 15 minutes to reach step 17 of AOP 304.
      - Majority of the steps in AOP 304 are checking indicators, so < 1min per step on average
      - This includes time to locally check out the buses for fire damage or other defects

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Step 3: Describe the PRA scenario (nominal context/base case scenario)

- **Timing analysis (con't):**
  - T_action = 20 min for diagnosis and execution
    - Estimated 5 minutes for diagnosis, including time for the SS and STA to confer, coordinate with the fire procedures, approve the action and communicate to CO2 to commence steps 17 and 18.
    - The action to locally remove power from the Train B ESF Loading Sequencer is trained on using Job Performance Measure (JPM) 12654 – Align ALT Feed Breaker. This JPM has a time requirement to be able to complete the local portion of the actions within 15 minutes, and this has been verified by observations of the JPM. The timing starts once the operator is given the instructions to perform this action and ends once the MCR action had been complete (end of step 18).
      - As part of this JPM the operators train on putting on flash gear which is required to locally remove power from the Train B ESF Loading Sequencer. The flash gear is stored in a cabinet at the entrance to the relay room.
      - The fire context was examined and the 15 minutes was determined to be representative for this action even given the fire scenario

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

Step 4: Define HFE and Unsafe Actions
HFE
Operator fails to manually align 115kV power
Or
UAs
Operator fails to initiate manual alignment
Operator fails to properly align power
Or
Failure to locally remove power from ESFLS (step 17)
Failure to close breaker in MCR (step 18)
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Step 4: Define HFE and Unsafe Actions

- **HFE**:
  - Operator fails to manually align 115kV power (alternate power source) given an SBO.
  - HFE defined as part of previous steps of Fire HRA process (Identification and Definition) but unsafe actions must be defined here if applicable.
- **Cues**:
  - Multiple Indications of Loss of Buses1DA and 1DB with EDG not Available. SS/STA makes call to power 1DA after buses have been inspected.
  - AOP-304, Step 17: Locally remove from the Train A ESFLS (Local, Skill-of-Craft action).
  - AOP-304, Step 18: Energize XSW1DA from the normal power source (MCR, proceduralized action):
    - Ensure BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch is in OFF
    - Close BUS 1DA ALT FEED Breaker
    - Verify BUS 1DA potential lights are energized

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Step 5: Identify Potential Vulnerabilities (Assess PSFs)

- **Division of Labor during Fire Scenario:** The fire is ongoing during this scenario, so a portion of the staff will be unavailable to help with the EOPs as they will be in the fire procedures. Adequate personnel are available for the necessary actions in this scenario.

Crew Member	Total Available Before Fire	# assisting with fire	# Available for EOP actions	Required for Execution
Shift Manager	1	1	0	0
Shift Supervisor	1	0	1	0
STA	1	0	1	0
Control Room Operators	2	1	1	1
Plant operators	7	3	2 (one would be working to locally start TDAFW pump and one would be assisting with the fire procedures)	1

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Step 5: Identify Potential Vulnerabilities (Assess PSFs)

"identify factors that could create potential vulnerabilities in the crew's ability to respond to the scenario(s) of interest and increase the likelihood of the HFEs or UAs"

- **Procedures** : Procedures are clear and available for all necessary steps. Operators may spend extra time assessing if there are problems with the buses, but this is included in the timeline and is not expected to be a distraction (e.g., compromise the timeline or lead to divergent scenarios).
- **Training**: Operators trained on procedures, including applicable alternative actions. SBO scenarios are common in training and "Align ALT Feed Breaker" is a Job Performance Measure which is trained on bi-annually for non-fire SBO events. As part of this JPM, the operators also train on putting on required flash gear.
- **Complexity:** Examined complexity of local action to remove power from ESFLS and determined action to be simple, skill-of-craft.
- **Workload/Stress due to Fire:** Some stress due to on-going fire, but because duties are split (operators in charge of fire procedures are different than those who work EOPs), this is minimal. Everyone involved is well trained in this scenario and sufficient personnel are available that workload should not be an issue. Coordination in this scenario is well planned.

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Step 5: Identify Potential Vulnerabilities (Assess PSFs)

"identify factors that could create potential vulnerabilities in the crew's ability to respond to the scenario(s) of interest and increase the likelihood of the HFEs or UAs"

- **Environment:**
  - **Availability and Accessibility:** Given location of fire and layout of plant, the relay room is accessible and there is no degraded environment (e.g., no smoke) in the relay room or en route to the relay room.
  - **Visibility:** Given a SBO event, lighting will be significantly reduced (i.e., flashlights and/or emergency lighting). Training is performed in these conditions.
  - **Communications:** Communication lines are all intact and background noise levels are not expected to adversely impact the scenario.
  - **Heat/Humidity**: Normal – fire effects do not reach this area, however, after some time (>action window) there could be a rise in temperature due to SBO.
- **Special Requirements**:
  - Operators are required to wear flash gear to locally remove power from the Train B ESF Loading Sequencer.
  - Operators will need key to access relay rooms due to loss of power all doors will be locked.
  - Due to loss of power the operators will also need flashlights or other emergency lighting.
- **Time Pressure**: Long time window.

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Step 6: Plausible Scenario Variations

- Fire scenarios do not usually require the identification of significant scenario variations; overall scenario is challenging enough to find an “error-forcing context.”
  - No plausible scenario variations were found for this HFE

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Step 7: Evaluate Potential to Recover from HFE/UA

- High potential for recovery
  - Good cues for recovery
  - Long Time Frame
    - 90 minutes available
    - 48 minute total time for action (T_delay + T_action) leaves a 42 minute time margin for recovery
  - Diagnosis is largely performed by CR operators; plant operators must simply execute the required actions and report back to CR (for purposes of coordination)
  - Fire extinguished after 60 minutes

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Step 8: Quantification (6 Steps Overview)

1: Discuss HFE and possible influences / contexts using a factor "checklist" as an aid

2: Identify "driving" influencing factors and thus most important contexts to consider

3: Compare these contexts to other familiar contexts and each expert independently provide the initial probability distribution for the HEP based on a common calibration scale.

4: Each expert discuss and justify their HEP

5: Openly discuss opinions and refine the HFE, associated contexts, and/or HEPs (if needed) – each expert independently provides HEP (may be the same as the initial judgment or may be modified)

6: Arrive at a consensus HEP for use in the PRA

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Step 8: Quantification (Operational Story)

Operator fails to manually align 115kV (alternate power) power within 90 minutes on loss of both buses and EDGs fail to start.

- SBO during fire in turbine room
- Night time operations with minimal staff. Staff is sufficient to perform fire procedure and EOP actions, but no extra personnel available, so coordination must be done effectively.
- Upon Reactor Trip, enter EOP-0
  - Step 3 of EOP-0 verifies that buses are energized. Buses are de-energized; this will take the operator to ECA 0.0 [Station Blackout Procedure]
  - Step 10 of ECA 0.0 checks that buses 1DB and 1 DA are energized. Both buses are de-energized; this will take the operator to AOP 304 due to loss of bus with no EDG.
  - Steps 17 and 18 of AOP 304 are the relevant actions for this HFE
    - Local action is skill-of-craft
    - MCR action is well proceduralized
- Total time available is 90 minutes. Time to get through the procedure and take the action is 48 minutes, leaving 42 minutes available for recovery.
- Cues for recovery obvious (no power to plant)
- Operators proficiently trained on non-fire SBO

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Step 8: Quantification (Aleatory Influences)

- Efficiency of crew coordination.
  - Crew variations that could result in variability in the time to perform actions and effectiveness of communication back to control room.
- Too much focus on fire.
- Injury of personnel fighting fire.
- Aggressiveness of the crews with respect to anticipating actions, planning ahead, and “taking control” vs. methodically applying procedures.
- Additional aleatory influences affecting operator performance were also considered (but NOT explicitly modeled):
  - Time of day, weather, and random hardware/equipment problems could have an effect on the crew’s ability to complete the action.
  - Distractions (e.g., presence of nuisance alarms, unrelated spurious instrument effects, etc.)

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Step 8: Quantification (Aleatory Influences)

- Variations in timing (discussed in Operational Story):
  - Could there be variations in the scenario (e.g., additional minor distractions in working through procedure?
    - "Experts" estimate minor variations:
      - 10-15 additional minutes to get to critical procedure step
  - Could there be variations in the time to perform (especially with different crews, availability of equipment, communication)?
    - Experts" estimate minor variations:
      - 10-15 additional minutes to get to critical procedure step
- Overall, could reduce time for recovery to as little as 12 minutes; this is still judged to be more than adequate.

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Step 8: Quantification (Aleatory Influences)

- If variations were judged to be important (i.e., time left for recovery was questionably adequate), then:
  - Timing becomes a driving factor (not an aleatory factor) in the Operational Story
  - Would ask "experts" to develop a more detailed analysis of potential variations in timing (e.g., more explanations, more developed description of possible scenario variations, detailed histogram of probability of timing for both arrival at Step 17 and performance of required actions)
  - Might separate HFE into two or more separate HFEs to address different timing for different scenarios

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Step 8: Quantification (Calibrate Experts)

Circumstance	Probability	Meaning
Operator(s) is “Certain” to fail	1.0	Failure is ensured. All crews/operators would not perform the desired action correctly and on time.
Operator(s) is “Likely” to fail	~0.5	5 out of 10 operators would fail. The level of difficulty is sufficiently high that we should see many failures if all the crews/operators were to experience this scenario.
Operator(s) would “Infrequently” fail	~0.1	1 out of 10 would fail. The level of difficulty is moderately high, such that we should see an occasional failure if all of the crew/operators were to experience this scenario.
Operator(s) is “Unlikely” to fail	~0.01	1 out of 100 would fail. The level of difficulty is quite low and we should not see any failures if all the crews/operators were to experience this scenario.
Operator(s) is “Extremely Unlikely” to fail	~0.001	1 out of 1000 would fail. This desired action is so easy that it is almost inconceivable that any crew/operator would fail to perform the desired action correctly and on time.

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Step 8: Quantification (Numerical Assessment)

- Combining Multiple Contexts

$$P(HFE \mid S) = \sum_{j} \sum_{i(j)} P(EFC_i \mid S) * P(UA_j \mid EFC_i, S)$$

- Only one credible context, so this formula simplifies to:

$$P(HFE \mid S) = \sum_{i} P(UA_i \mid S)$$

- SMEs' decision that this HFE will be assessed as one action because:
  - UAs at too fine granularity to assess independently
  - High dependency between UAs
  - High potential for recovery across all UAs dominates probability
- Therefore, only one distribution needs to be estimated for $P(HFE \mid S)$

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Step 8: Quantification (Numerical Assessment)

- Very structured, facilitator led, expert opinion elicitation process
  - leads to consensus distributions of operator failure probabilities
- Considerations in elicitation process (covered in NUREG-1880):
  - Forming the team of experts (include experts familiar with important relevant factors during fire conditions, operator trainers, etc.)
  - Controlling for biases when performing elicitations
  - Addressing uncertainty
- Distribution characteristics:
  - the 99th percentile is the HEP for the worst coincident (but not too unlikely) set of negative influences representing a very strong EFC
  - the 1st percentile is the HEP for the best coincident set of positive influences representing a weak EFC (actually a very positive context
  - dependency considerations embedded
  - uncertainty distribution explicitly considered
- **For this illustrative example an HRA SME was used to derive the HEP; this would not normally be sufficient for an actual quantification.**

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Step 8: Quantification

- A tip for expert elicitation facilitators:
  - In order to get “experts” to better access their knowledge (i.e., not just what remember recent history), you can use examples from real events (i.e., “stories”) to illustrate how operators can do “surprising” things (but for good reasons.
    - You know that you’ve succeeded in getting access to this deeper knowledge when the “experts” start exchanging stories (e.g., “do you remember when ‘Charlie’ ….?” “I can remember a time or two kind of like that….”)

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Step 8: Quantification (Bases for Consensus Distribution)

Analyst	Percentiles 1st	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	99th
Larry	0.00001	0.0001	0.0007	0.001	0.005	0.007	0.01
Moe	0.0001	0.0003	0.001	0.002	0.007	0.03	0.05
Curly	0.00001	0.00005	0.0001	0.0007	0.005	0.01	0.03
Consensus	**1E-04**	**1E-04**	**7E-04**	**1E-03**	**5E-03**	**1E-02**	**5E-02**

- **Bases for Consensus Distribution:**
  - Initial action is "Unlikely" to fail and failure to recover is "Extremely Unlikely"
    - Holistically, on average the action was determined to be "Extremely Unlikely" because actions are well trained, proceduralized/skill-of-craft, have a high potential for recovery and cues are clear so little potential for confusion or mis-direction.
    - Probability capped at 1E-04
    - Worst case falls between "Unlikely" to fail and "Infrequently" fails
  - Main (aleatory) factors considered:
    - Efficiency of coordination between operators doing fire procedures and those in EOP. With minimal staff, poor coordination might delay availability of an operator to perform the task. Given the available time margin, it was not credible for the coordination to prevent the actions, but it would limit the recovery ability in those scenarios.
    - Crews "having a bad day" or weaker crew on shift

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Step 8: Quantification (Bases for Consensus Distribution)

- Depending on the PRA needs, you may:
  - Provide the entire consensus histogram as your answer.
  - Need to develop a mean value for the distribution using a software tool (e.g., Crystal Ball).
- NUREG-1880 provides some guidance and cautions on the development of mean values.

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SCOPING ANALYSIS OF FIRE SBO

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Review of HFE

- **Initial Conditions**: Single unit two loop PWR with two trains of electrical power. Steady state, full power operation. Night shift with minimal staff onsite.
  - No out-of-service unavailability pertinent to this scenario
- **Initiating Event**: Fire in turbine room causes SBO
- **HFE:** Operator fails to manually align 115kV (alternate power) power on loss of both buses and EDGs fail to start.



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Minimum Criteria

1. Procedures
   – Plant procedures covering each operator action being modeled
   – Support both diagnosis & execution of the action

   Local action (step 17) is skill-of-craft; MCR action (step 18) well proceduralized.

2. Training – on the procedures and the actions

   Regular training on non-fire SBO, including alternative actions.

3. Availability and Accessibility of Equipment
   – Key to ESFLS Panel needed, but available in MCR

   Key to ESFLS Panel needed, but available in MCR.
   Flash gear needed, but available locally.

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Feasibility

- **Timing analysis**:
  - Tsw: Assume 90 minutes for the total window (IE to core damage) based on an IPE thermal hydraulic run for loss of AFW and a station blackout with one primary PORV stuck open.
  - T_delay = 28 min from reactor trip to receiving cue for action (step 17 AOP 304)
  - $T_{1/2}$ + Tm = 20 min for diagnosis and execution

- **Feasible?** Yes time available (90 minutes) is greater than time for action (48 minutes).

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Time Margin

$$Time\_Margin = \frac{t_{action} - (t_{1/2} + t_m)}{(t_{1/2} + t_m)} * 100\% = \frac{62 - 20}{20} * 100\% = 210\%$$



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
Assessing Key Conditions & PSFs within the Scoping Flowcharts
• How well the procedures match the scenario
• Response execution complexity
• Timing of cues for the action relative to expected fire suppression time
• Action time window
– Short time window = 30 minutes or less
– Long time window = greater than 30 minutes
• Level of smoke and other hazardous elements in the action areas
– Need for special equipment (e.g., SCBA)
– Impairment of vision or prevention of the execution of the action
• Accessibility
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HFE Breakdown



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Search Scheme HFE$_1$

<u>**Scoping Analysis:**</u>

•**Define HFE:** Failure to locally remove power from ESFLS (step 17). This includes both the diagnosis and the execution.

•**Does it meet the minimum criteria**? Yes

1)Procedures are available

2)Training is performed on the procedure

3)The key to the Relay Room is determined to be accessible

•**Is the action Feasible?** Yes

1)Demonstrated sufficient time to perform action

•**Selection Scheme**:

1)D1: Entry criteria are met

2)D2: command and control in MCR

3)D3: primary cues/instrument not spuriously affected by fire

4)D4: procedures match the scenario

5)D5: some actions within MCR, but key actions outside MCR, so use EXCR tree

6)D6: procedures available/skill-of-craft

7)GO TO EXCR TREE



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HFE_1

- Local Action
  - D22: Fire is ongoing
  - D26: Area accessible and no fire in vicinity.
  - D27: Time window is greater than 30 min (90 – 28 = 62 min).
  - D33: Low complexity in execution
  - D34: No smoke.
  - **Look up Table X value = EXCR27 = 0.02.**



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Search Scheme HFE$_2$

<u>**Scoping Analysis:**</u>

•**Define HFE:** Failure to close breaker in MCR (step 18). This includes both the diagnosis and the execution.

•**Does it meet the minimum criteria**? Yes

1)Procedures are available

2)Training is performed on the procedure

3)The key to the Relay Room is determined to be accessible

•**Is the action Feasible?** Yes

1)Demonstrated sufficient time to perform action

•**Selection Scheme**:

1)D1: Entry criteria are met

2)D2: command and control in MCR

3)D3: primary cues/instrument not spuriously affected by fire

4)D4: procedures match the scenario

5)D5: actions within MCR, so use INCR tree

6)GO TO INCR TREE



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HFE_2

- MCR Action
  - D7: Fire is ongoing
  - D11: Time window is greater than 30 min (90 – 28 = 62 min).
  - D17: Low complexity in execution
  - D18: No smoke in MCR.
  - **Look up Table J value = INCR26 = 0.01.**



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HFE Calculation



$$
\begin{aligned}
HFE_0 &= HFE_1 \cup HFE_2 \\
&= 1-(1-HFE_1)(1-HFE_2) \\
&= 1-(1-0.02)(1-0.01) \\
&= 0.0298
\end{aligned}
$$

$$HFE_0 \approx 0.03$$

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Look-up Table Excerpts

EXCR Look-up Table Excerpt

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
X	≥ 100%	0.02	EXCR27
	50 – 99%	0.1	EXCR28
	< 50%	1.0	EXCR29

INCR Look-up Table Excerpt

HEP Lookup Table	Time Margin	HEP	HEP Label
J	> 100%	0.01	INCR26
	50 – 99%	0.05	INCR27
	< 50%	1.0	INCR28

NRC FORM 335 (12-2010) NRCMD 3.7

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

(See instructions on the reverse)

1. REPORT NUMBER (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev., and Addendum Numbers, if any.)

NUREG/CP-0301, Vol. 2

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Volume 2 - Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)-2010
Module 4: Fire Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)

3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

MONTH	YEAR
August	2013

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

5. AUTHOR(S)

Compiled and edited by K. Hill, T. Pennywell, F. Gonzalez, D. Stroup, and H. Woods(NRC)

6. TYPE OF REPORT

Conference Proceedings

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if contractor, provide name and mailing address.)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC 20555-0001
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94303

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type "Same as above", if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address.)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC 20555-0001
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94303

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshops conducted September 27 and October 25, 2010, in Bethesda, MD

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the risk-informed and performance-based alternative regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c) in July, 2004, which allows licensees the option of using fire protection requirements contained in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, "Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," with certain exceptions. To support licensees' use of that option, the NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) jointly issued NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) "Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities," in September 2005. That report documents the state-of-the-art methods, tools, and data for conducting a fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in a commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) application. Since the release of NUREG/CR-6850 in 2005, the NRC-RES and EPRI have conducted a number of joint public workshops to provide training in the use of the methodologies and tools contained in the document. The workshops have attracted both domestic and international attendees. The material in this NUREG/CP was recorded during the first day of each of two week-long workshops conducted in 2010, during which certain fundamental, basic principles were discussed that are prerequisite for the remaining days of the workshops. It was adapted by the NRC-RES Fire Research Branch (FRB) members for use by persons before they attend future workshops, in lieu of the basic discussions previously conducted on the workshops' first day - this will allow the first day of future workshops to be used to cover more advanced material. This report can also serve as a refresher for those who attended one or more previous training sessions.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.)

fire, performance-based, risk-informed regulation, fire hazard analysis (FHA), fire safety, fire protection, nuclear power plant, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), fire modeling, circuit analysis

13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

unlimited

14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(This Page) unclassified

(This Report) unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

NUREG/CP-0301, Vol. 2
EPRI 3002000267

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) - 2010

August 2013