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**JAF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT
FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA
NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATION 2.3 SEISMIC**

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for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic**

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James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Walkdown Report

for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic

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1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

The Great Tohoku Earthquake of March 11, 2011 and the resulting tsunami caused an accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan. In response to this accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a systematic and methodical review of NRC processes and regulations and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. On March 12, 2012 the NRC issued a 10CFR50.54(f) Letter, Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Subsection 54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident [Ref. 10.1], requesting information from all licensees to support the NRC staff's evaluation of several of the NTTF recommendations. To support NTTF Recommendation 2.3, Enclosure 3 to the NRC requested that all licensees perform seismic walkdowns to gather and report information from the plant related to degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions with respect to its current seismic licensing basis.

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), with support and direction from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), published industry guidance for conducting and documenting the seismic walkdowns. The guidance represented the results of extensive interaction between NRC, NEI, and other stakeholders. This industry guidance document, EPRI Report 1025286 [Ref. 10.2], hereafter referred to as "the Guidance," was formally endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. Entergy James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant has committed [Ref. 10.12] to using this NRC-endorsed guidance as the basis for conducting and documenting seismic walkdowns for resolution of NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic.

Entergy fleet procedure EN-DC-168, "Fukushima Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walk-Down Procedure" [Ref. 10.11], outlines the steps required to gather information as needed to respond to the March 12, 2012, 10CFR50.54(f) Letter as it pertains to the USNRC Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3, Seismic.

The objective of this report is to document the results of the seismic walkdown effort undertaken for resolution of NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic in accordance with the Guidance, and provide the information necessary for responding to Enclosure 3 to the 50.54(f) Letter.

2.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS SUMMARY

JAF is a single unit BWR-4 (Boiling Water Reactor) with a Mark I containment, located in Oswego County, New York. General Electric (GE) designed the nuclear steam supply system and the turbine-generator. Stone & Webster was the Architect/Engineer for the plant. JAF began commercial operation in July of 1975, and is currently rated at 2,536 MWt power [Ref. 10.3, Section 1.2] and has a rated gross electrical output of approximately 881 MWe when operating at full power. This section summarizes the seismic licensing basis of structures, systems and components (SSCs) at JAF, which bound the context of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program.

2.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE)

The seismic design for Class I structures (including the reactor building and all engineered safeguards) is based on dynamic analysis using acceleration response spectrum curves which are normalized to a ground motion of 0.08 g, for the Operating Basis Earthquake, and 0.15 g, for the Design Basis Earthquake. The basis of this design criterion is presented in Reference 10.3, Section 2.6. Class I seismically designed structures may be referred to as "Seismic Class I" structures [Ref. 10.3, Section 12.4.6.1].

The horizontal seismic forces were determined using a lumped mass frequency response analysis considering flexural, translational and rocking (in some cases) response. These analyses take into account rock-structure interaction.

The vertical response spectrum is assumed to be two-thirds the horizontal response spectrum of each earthquake and is considered to act simultaneously. Where applicable, the stresses are added directly.

The damping value of 2 percent of critical for concrete structures under Operating Basis Earthquake is less than the range of 3 to 5 percent for design within code allowable stresses recommended by Newmark and Hall in their paper "Design Criteria for Nuclear Reactors Subject to Earthquake Hazards." Under the Operating Basis Earthquake, the stresses are within the allowable code stresses; therefore, little cracking will occur in the concrete.

Newmark suggests a value of 7 to 10 percent of critical damping for stress levels at or just below yield point. To be conservative and minimize cracking in the concrete under the Design Basis Earthquake, 5 percent of critical damping is used.

Horizontal and vertical displacements due to Operating Basis and Design Basis Earthquakes are determined for all Class I structures. Based on calculated displacements, adequate space is provided between adjacent structures to ensure that basic structural elements do not strike each other when subjected to the worst combination of rocking, bending and shear deflections and translation movements that might be induced by an earthquake. All Class I

systems passing between adjacent structures are designed to withstand the maximum combination of movement between the adjacent structures without loss of function. The effect of the relative movement between buildings is considered in the piping stress analysis and in the design and location of supports.

2.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS

Class I structures and equipment are those that are necessary to ensure: a) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, b) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe, shutdown condition, or c) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines of 10 CFR 100. Class II structures and equipment are those which may be essential to operation of the plant, but are not included in Class I. Class III structures and equipment are those that are not included in Class I or Class II. A "Component Quality Assurance Category List" further defines "Class I", "Class II", or "Class III" structures, systems, and components as "Quality Assurance" (QA) SR, QP, or NSR. QA Categories SR, QP and NSR are synonymous with the previously used I, M and II/III (or II or III separately) categories, respectively. [Ref. 10.3, Section 12.2.1].

The Reference 10.8 document provides the basic criteria for the safety related Balance of Plant (BOP) pipe stress analysis and pipe support qualification and/or design for the JAFNPP. BOP piping systems are those systems which are not part of the General Electric (GE) Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS). A listing of the seismically qualified BOP pipe lines is provided in Reference 10.8, Section 7.0.

Class IE - The safety classification of the electric equipment and systems, including their supporting systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal, or otherwise are essential in mitigating the consequences of an accident [Ref. 10.10].

Mechanical Equipment and Piping Code Applicability

- USAS (ANSI) B31.1, 1967 Edition through 1969 Addenda, Power Piping Code.
- ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Nuclear Vessels, Section III, Subsection B, 1968 Edition including the 1968 Summer Addendum.

Pipe Support Code Applicability

- USAS (ANSI) B31.1, 1967 Edition through 1969 Addenda, Power Piping Code.
- AISC Specification for Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings.

Applicable USNRC Regulatory Guides

Because JAFNPP was designed before the establishment of Regulatory Guides, no Regulatory Guide is directly applicable. However, the Regulatory Guide 1.61, Revision O, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973, was used for fluid transient analyses [10.8].

The USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.92, Section 1.2.1 "The Grouping Method," [Ref. 10.3, Section 12.5.4], was used for combining modal responses in the seismic reanalysis for the Wide Range and Narrow Range reactor water level piping systems.

Applicable IE Bulletins

- IE Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts.
- IE Bulletin 79-07, Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping.
- IE Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems including all supplements.
- IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design.

Mechanical Equipment and Equipment Support Analysis

- Overall equipment structural response includes loads from nozzles, equipment deadweight, design pressure, operating temperature, equipment earthquake loads and other dynamic loads. Reference 10.8, Section 5.0, Tables 5.0-1 and 5.0-2A through 2E show the accepted equipment nozzle loads that were established during the plant design stage and later during the as-built stress analysis effort.
- The criteria, method of analysis, and summary of critical stresses for various equipment are included in UFSAR Table 16.2-7. [Ref. 10.3]

Structures and Seismic Input to Structures and Equipment

- The seismic motion induced at the pipe supports in the structure is likely to be different from the ground motions. Since the various parts of the structures oscillate in different magnitudes and directions, the piping systems are essentially subjected to different excitations at each pipe anchor and restraint location. Therefore, amplified response spectra (ARS) for the maximum acceleration at various elevations throughout the structures are determined and the spectrum which is closest to and higher in elevation than the center of mass of piping is used. The JAF ARS curves are provided in

Attachment 3-3 (Vol. II), the design criteria for BOP piping stress and supports. [Ref. 10.8]

- The amplified response spectra were developed using the "Frequency Response Method", a modified Biggs method. A response spectrum is an envelope of the maximum accelerations of a damped single-degree-of-freedom system with variable frequencies due to the building motion at a specific elevation. The building motion at a specific elevation is approximated by a series of sinusoidal motions with the calculated building frequencies and their corresponding acceleration amplitudes at that elevation. Specifically, the amplified response spectra were developed for several selected elevations of each building for Operating Basis and Design Basis Earthquakes for an equipment (piping) damping value of 0.5% and 1.0%, respectively. [Ref. 10.8]

Electrical Raceways

- Reference 10.9 provides a standard for the routing of conduit and the selection of conduit supports. This standard applies to Nuclear Generation personnel, and to any organization which performs design of seismic electrical conduit and conduit supports. This applies to Safety Related, Augmented Quality, and Non-Safety Related structures, systems and components [Ref. 10.9].

Seismic Interaction (spatial, fire, and flood)

- The separation distance criteria between redundant electrical raceways at the time of JAF construction required separation of 3ft horizontally and 7ft vertically. Using this criteria will result in conservative separation distances for redundant circuits. JAF-RPT-ELEC-02075, Table 1 provides minimum allowable separation distances for redundant cables in General Plant Areas that may be used as alternate reduced separation distance criteria only for installations where the 3 feet horizontal / 7 foot vertical criteria stated in the UFSAR, Section 7.1.9 cannot be met [Ref. 10.10].
- A safety design basis for the Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System is to ensure closure of Group A (communicate with the Reactor Vessel) and Group B (communicate with Primary Containment Free Space) automatic isolation valves is initiated, when required, with sufficient reliability. UFSAR, Section 7.3.2, states there is sufficient electrical and physical separation between trip channels monitoring the same essential variable to prevent environmental factors, electrical faults, and physical events, such as a fire, from impairing the ability of the system to respond correctly.
- The use of Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) For Seismic Adequacy of Equipment and Parts, as modified and supplemented by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 2 and SSER No. 3,

may be used as an alternative method to existing methods for the seismic design and verification of existing, modified, new and replacement equipment and parts classified as Class 1. Only those portions of the GIP listed in "Use of Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for New and Replacement Equipment and Parts (NARE)" shall be used. The other portions of the GIP are not applicable since they contain administrative, licensing, and documentation information which is applicable only to the Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 program [Ref. 10.3, Section 12.5.6].

- Automatic water sprays, are provided in the Reactor Building at various area boundaries to isolate fire areas from each other. The water spray piping is seismically supported. [Ref. 10.3, Section 9.8.3.1.4]

All fire protection water piping and mechanical equipment up to and including flow control valves in the Fire Protection Systems protecting Class I systems and components listed below are designed to QA Category QP criteria.

1. High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump.
2. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump.
3. Emergency Diesel-Generator Rooms.
4. Diesel Driven Fire Pump.
5. Standby Gas Treatment System Charcoal Filters.

The fire protection piping for the Battery Room Corridor is seismically supported from the alarm check valve on manifold No. 7 through the sprinkler discharge piping. The system is QA class QP, seismically supported to prevent it from interfering with any safety related system or components in the Battery Room Corridor or Cable Tunnels.

3.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

JAF has committed, per JAFP-12-0075 [Ref. 10.12], to conduct and document seismic walkdowns for resolution of NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic in accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance [Ref. 10.2]. The approach provided in the Guidance for addressing the actions and information requested in Enclosure 3 to the 50.54(f) Letter includes the following activities, the results of which are presented in the sections shown in parenthesis:

- Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0)
- Reporting of actions taken to reduce or eliminate the seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program (Section 5.0)
- Selection of structures, systems and components (SSCs) to be evaluated (Section 6.0)
- Performance of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys (Section 7.0)
- Evaluation and treatment of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing basis of the plant (Section 8.0)
- Performance of peer reviews (Section 9.0)

The coordination and conduct of these activities was initiated and tracked by Entergy corporate leadership, which provided guidance to each Entergy site throughout the seismic walkdown program, including JAF. Entergy contracted with an outside nuclear services company to provide engineering and project management resources to supplement and assist each individual site. JAF had dedicated engineering contractors, supported by their own project management and technical oversight, who worked closely with plant personnel.

4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

The NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program involved the participation of numerous personnel with various different responsibilities. This section identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities and provides brief experience summaries for each. Training certificates of those qualified as Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) are included in Attachment H.

Table 4-1 summarizes the names and responsibilities of personnel used to conduct the seismic walkdowns. Experience summaries of each person follow:

Table 4-1

Name	Equipment Selection Personnel	Seismic Walkdown Engineer	Licensing Basis Reviewer	IPEEE Reviewer
Richard Casella (Entergy)	X	X	X	
Alan Porch (Entergy)		X		X
Jeffrey Cooney (Entergy)	X			
Yaroslav Losev (ENERCON)		X ²	X	X
Pouria Pourghobadi (ENERCON)		X		
Donald Koberg (ARES)		X		
Harpreet Ghuman (ARES)		X		
Chris Sawatzke (Entergy)		X		
Bob Kester (Entergy)		X		
Roger Locy (Entergy)	X ¹			

Notes:

1. Plant operations representative
2. Designated lead SWE

Richard Casella

Mr. Casella graduated from the Pennsylvania State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in May 1976. Mr. Casella is a Registered Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Mr. Casella successfully completed the SQUG Walkdown Training course in June 2007. Mr. Casella's related experience is summarized below.

Mr. Casella has 36 years of experience in the Engineering Design of nuclear power plants. He spent 19 years at Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) associated with

the design, startup, and operation of the Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) station. The first 7 years of his career were spent in the SWEC design office as a Pipe Stress analyst for ASME III Class 2, 3 and USAS B31.1 Class 4 piping systems. The remaining 12 years of his SWEC service were spent at NMP2 in Lycoming, NY. During this time, Mr. Casella was a Pipe Stress supervisor, then Lead Engineer for Pipe Stress and Supports, and then supported the transition of design responsibilities from SWEC to the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC). After plant startup, Rick worked as a Civil/Structural Design Engineer under NMPC authority until 1995.

Mr. Casella joined the New York Power Authority in October 1995 as a Civil/Structural Design Engineer at the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) plant. His primary role in his 17 year tenure at JAF has been pipe stress. He has worked with ISI Class 1, 2, 3 and non-ISI piping. He has been involved with and has an understanding of the Mark I Containment work performed for JAF by the Teledyne Corporation. He has dealt with numerous seismic piping issues at JAF including many times assisting the Shift Manager with Operability determinations related to seismic piping and support issues. Mr. Casella has worked 9 Refuel Outages and several LCOs at JAF which have given him valuable "hands and eyes on" experience and knowledge of the plant and how it operates. Rick has also been associated with many plant modifications with seismic evaluations and calculations including Responsible Engineer for the replacement of 2-Stage Main Steam Safety Relief Valves with 3-Stage models. He is also experienced in Seismic Qualification of plant equipment and the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel Internals Program (BWR-VIP).

Alan Porch

Mr. Porch graduated from the Drexel University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in June 1974. He is a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of New York. Al successfully completed the EPRI Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 – Plant Seismic Walkdowns in July 2012.

Mr. Porch has 34 years of experience in the Engineering Design of nuclear power plants. He spent 13 years at Stone and Webster Engineering Corp. (SWEC) associated with the design, startup support, and operation of the Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) Station. The first year of his career was spent in the SWEC design office as a structural design engineer performing steel and concrete design activities associated with the design of the Nine Mile Point NPP. The next 5 years he worked at the Fermi II NPP as a pipe support design engineer and the remaining 7 years of his SWEC service were spent at NMP2 in Lycoming, NY. During this time, Mr. Porch was a Pipe Support engineer and Modification engineer, and then supported the transition of design responsibilities from SWEC to the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC). After plant startup, Al worked as a Civil/Structural Design Engineer under NMPC authority until 1995.

Mr. Porch joined the New York Power Authority in September 1995 as a Civil/Structural Design Engineer at the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) plant. His primary role in his 17 year tenure at JAF has been structural design support with a special attention given to pipe support design and acceptance. He has worked with ISI Class 1, 2, 3 and non-ISI piping systems. He has dealt with numerous seismic piping issues at JAF including assisting the Shift Manager with Operability determinations related to seismic piping and support issues. Mr. Porch has worked 9 Refuel Outages as well as forced outages and down powers and at JAF which have given him valuable "hands and eyes on" experience and knowledge of the plant and how it operates. He has also been associated with many plant modifications which have included seismic evaluations and calculations including performing as Responsible Engineer for JAF's Pipe Support Program.

Jeffrey Cooney

Mr. Cooney is employed as a PSA Engineer for Entergy Nuclear Operations. He has been employed with the company over 4 years. His expertise is in Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) which includes maintaining/updating the active site PSA model and ensuring that current industry standards, experience, and technology are incorporated appropriately into the model.

Yaroslav Losev

Mr. Losev graduated from the New Jersey Institute of Technology with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering in June 2008. He has worked as an ENERCON Mechanical Engineering for three years. For the past 2 years, he has been working in the Structural Engineering department. Mr. Losev has successfully completed Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Plant Walkdowns in 09/13/2012. Some of Mr. Losev's related experience has been summarized below.

As part of Exelon's ongoing commitments to comply with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements for post-fire safe shutdown promulgated in 10CFR50 certain scenarios have been identified by the Exelon Expert Panel that are related to the safe shutdown of Limerick Generating Station (LGS). Plant design changes are required to address issues related to Multiple Spurious Operations (MSOs) as outlined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 00-01, Rev. 2 (Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis) and ensure compliance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, Rev 2 (Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants). Mr. Losev prepared technical evaluations and revised existing plant calculations on the capacity of existing raceway supports to support the additional dead weight load of the fire barrier systems including seismic requirements and considerations. He also developed technical evaluations for seismic temporary supports in number of other locations at LGS.

Engineering change package implementation in Indian Point (IPEC), Units 2 and 3, coating of the walls of the transformer moats for Main Transformers. During the stone removal to install

coating, various existing non-safety related conduits and pipes had to be temporarily supported as part of this work activity. The supports were temporarily attached to existing structural steel and the steel columns, beams and foundations which were evaluated for the additional load. Mr. Losev designed and evaluated 27 uniquely different temporary supports to be installed while the stone was removed. Mr. Losev demonstrated extreme flexibility and imagination in designing these supports. He also showed technical rigor, fast adaptation to new designs into evaluation, clear client communications, and timely deliverable of the calculation despite fast track schedule of this project.

Mr. Losev provided support in walkdowns and design inputs for Honeywell at Metropolis Works (MTW) UF6 Processing Facility in determination and suggestions of seismic supports for their piping systems and equipment. He reviewed seismic calculations on equipment and provided conceptual designs for supports on the equipment and piping runs to meet NRC's requirements.

Mr. Losev provided mechanical/structural engineering support for American Electrical Power (AEP) D.C. Cook Generating Station on "Pipe Stress Analysis" re-evaluation. As part of D.C. Cook Generating Station's Large Bore Pipe Reconciliation Project (LBPRP), numerous safety related pipe stress calculations had to be re-evaluated. The objective of these calculations was to structurally qualify the piping, pipe supports, including integral welded attachments, penetrations/nozzles, and valve accelerations in accordance with the design limits for dead weight, thermal, flow transients, and seismic conditions, and to provide the technical basis for any recommended modifications to the system that would be required to meet the D.C. Cook Generating Station's acceptance criteria.

Pouria Pourghobadi

Mr. Pourghobadi has worked as an ENERCON Civil/Structural Engineer for the past year. Mr. Pourghobadi has successfully completed Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Plant Walkdowns in 09/13/2012. Some of Mr. Pourghobadi's related experience has been summarized below.

As part of commitment to NRC, the Zion Solutions contracted ENERCON to provide Architectural and Engineering (A/E) Services for the design of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), various Fuel Handling Building modifications and operations. Mr. Pourghobadi reviewed calculations and drawings for a new set-down pad with a loaded MAGNASTOR Transfer CASK (MTC) in the lower level of the Reactor Building cavity floor and evaluation of the capacity of existing floor slab to support the additional dead weight load with seismic requirements and considerations of the loaded MTC.

Mr. Pourghobadi provided civil/structural engineering support to Exelon Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) to design a 75 ft high lighting arrestor as part of an Engineering Change Package. Site unique topography dictated adoption of a more creative approach

rather than the conventional methods of mast foundation design. Mr. Pourghobadi provided design inputs for development of the foundation and evaluated the dead load of the lighting arrestor onto the foundation design.

Donald Koberg

Mr. Koberg earned a Bachelor's degree from Washington State University in Mechanical Engineering in 2010. He has been working as a Mechanical Engineer at ARES Corporation for over 2 years. Throughout his two plus years at ARES Corporation he has performed many technical calculations relating to anchorage and support design of piping systems for seismic activities. Mr. Koberg has successfully completed Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Plant Walkdowns on 07/26/2012. Some of Mr. Koberg's related experience is summarized below.

Mr. Koberg's experience with anchorage design consists of designing and analyzing anchorage of piping support system to ASME B31.3 requirements. Tasks included selection of material, support configuration, and general layout design of the pipe supports for stainless steel piping for use in waste retrieval activities at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, Hanford, WA. Mr. Koberg has also analyzed various systems, structures and components for adherence to ASME B31.3, "Process Piping".

Mr. Koberg's activities include design and analysis of waste transfer piping systems including assisting on equipment design and system analysis. As part of the ASME B31.3 analyses, Mr. Koberg has analyzed multiple sections of piping systems and their supports for structural adequacy during seismic events. Analyzed equipment includes pump assemblies, waste distribution assemblies, and stainless steel piping assemblies.

Harpreet Ghuman

Mr. Ghuman earned a Bachelor's degree from Washington State University in Civil Engineering in 2008. He has been working as a Structural Engineer at ARES Corporation for the past 4 years. Throughout his four years at ARES Corporation he has performed many technical calculations relating to anchorage design, footing/slab design, and pipe support design for seismic activities. Mr. Ghuman has successfully completed Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Plant Walkdowns on 07/26/2012. Some of Mr. Ghuman's related experience is summarized below.

Mr. Ghuman's experience in anchorage design consists of designing expansion or cast in place threaded rod/headed anchors for placement within concrete of various thicknesses and edge distance constraints in accordance with ACI-318, Appendix D. Also included within anchorage design is the design of at grade or embedded base plates. Mr. Ghuman also has experience in designing welds for mechanical supports. Mr. Ghuman's footing/slab design experience consists of designing the appropriate size concrete foundation including rebar for various mechanical supports.

Mr. Ghuman has experience in Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Plant Walkdowns. He was part of a team that performed these walkdowns for Duke Energy at the McGuire Nuclear Station Units A and B near Huntersville, NC from August 27, 2012 thru September 13, 2012. Mr. Ghuman's responsibilities during these walkdowns consisted of aiding in filling out the Area Walk-by (AWC) and Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWC) for various areas and equipment within the plant. He also assisted in the preparation of packages, such as finding drawings/calculations that pertained to equipment on the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), and determined which components should be considered as part of the required 50% design verification components in accordance with EPRI Report 1025286.

Mr. Ghuman has worked in Hanford, WA on the contaminated groundwater in the 100 areas that reactor sites were required to be treated then pumped back into the river basin. Mr. Ghuman's task was for these projects was to design pipe supports for the piping line to allow for safe distribution of contaminated water during seismic or wind events. The design included, fabricating members from structural steel which includes weld and bolt design or constructing pipes supports out of UNISTRUT members. Mr. Ghuman also designed concrete foundations and sized the appropriate expansion or cast in place anchors for the pipe supports or various other mechanical equipment.

Chris Sawatzke

Mr. Sawatzke graduated from Michigan State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in September 1981. He has an Engineer-In-Training (EIT) in the State of Michigan. Chris successfully completed the EPRI Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 – Plant Seismic Walkdowns in July 2012. He has also successfully completed EPRI Training on Visual Examination Level II – Containment Inspection Program in September 2005 and the EPRI Comprehensive Coating Training in April 2002.

Mr. Sawatzke has 31 years of experience in the Engineering Design of nuclear power plants. He spent 13 years with Niagara Mohawk associated with the design and operation of the Nine Mile Point – Unit 2 Nuclear Plant. The first seven years of his career were spent working for Gilbert/Commonwealth at Washington Power Unit 2, Perry Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant and Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant; and Nuclear Power Services (NPS) at South Texas Project Nuclear Plant. During this time, Mr. Sawatzke was a Design Engineer supporting the Civil/Structural Engineering Department performing steel and concrete design activities associated with the design of each of the specific nuclear power plants.

Mr. Sawatzke joined Entergy Nuclear Operations in October 2001 as a Senior Civil/Structural Design Engineer at the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant. His role in his 11 year tenure at JAF has been structural steel and concrete design for Systems, Structures and Component's (SSC's). He has worked with ISI Class 1, 2, 3 and Non-ISI piping systems. He has dealt with numerous seismic piping and structural issues at JAF including assisting the

plant Shift Manager with Operability Determinations related to seismic piping and pipe support issues. Mr. Sawatzke has worked 6 Refuel Outages as well as forced outages and down powers at JAF, 5 refuel outages at other Entergy Fleet plants, and 7 refuel outages as well as forced outages at Nine Mile Nuclear Plant Unit 2; which has provided him valuable "hands on" experience and knowledge of the various plants and systems and how they operate. Mr. Sawatzke has also been associated with many plant modifications as a Responsible Engineer which included seismic evaluations and formal calculations for the JAF Pipe Support Program.

Bob Kester

Mr. Kester graduated from Lafayette College with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in May 1980. Mr. Kester successfully completed the SQUG Walkdown Training course in August 1993, and performed SQUG USI A-46 walkdowns for James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant in 1995.

Mr. Kester has 32 years of experience in the Engineering Design of nuclear power plants. He spent 10 years at Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) associated with the design of the River Bend and Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) stations. During this period, Bob's experience was primarily associated with pipe stress and support design, and included over 8 years as a field engineering, which provided valuable experience that integrated aspects of design criteria, design changes, construction and inspection requirements.

Mr. Kester's career shifted to an operating nuclear power station, working for the utility company at the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) plant since December 1989. In addition to being involved in Plant Modification designs and the JAF SQUG program, Bob has had diverse experiences in civil, structural, and mechanical engineering disciplines as a Plant Engineer. This role has often required a practical approach to seismic evaluations in support of Operability determinations related to plant condition reports. Mr. Kester has worked numerous plant Refuel Outages and system LCOs at JAF which have given him valuable "hands and eyes on" experience and knowledge of the physical plant, and how it operated and maintained. Bob's involvement with numerous plant modifications has included seismic evaluations for structures, piping, tubing, raceways, and miscellaneous equipment, which has entailed formal design calculations, simplified qualitative evaluations, and also the use of EPRI's GIP & STERI methodology. For over 15 years in a Plant Support Engineering group, Bob has been the primary responsible engineer at JAF for structural evaluations of temporary conditions in the plant including scaffolding, shielding, leak repairs, freeze seals, as well as staging & storage of transient equipment.

Roger Locy

Mr. Locy's education and training is summarized as follows: Machinist Mate "A" School, U.S. Navy, completed May 1966. Basic Nuclear Power School, U.S. Navy, completed April 1967.

Naval Reactor Prototype, U.S. Navy, completed October 1967. BWR Technology, General Electric, completed December 1972. Site training programs, Duane Arnold Energy Center. Numerous courses for RO cold license and requalification. License number OP-3424. Site training programs, Duane Arnold Energy Center. Numerous courses for SRO license and requalification. License Number SOP-2849. Site training programs, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Numerous courses for SRO license and requalification. License number SOP-3218. Regents College, The University of the State of New York. Presently have earned 110 credits toward a Baccalaureate Degree in Nuclear Technology.

From November 1967 to April 1972, U.S.S. Enterprise-Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier. From May 1972 to July 1977, Operations Department, Duane Arnold Energy Center. From August 1977 to February 1982, Shift Supervisor, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. From March 1982 to March 1985, Waste Management General Supervisor, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Established Decontamination and Shipping section of Radiological Waste Group in the Operations Department. Responsible for operation of the Radwaste Facility, all Radwaste shipments for disposal and area/equipment decontamination. From April 1985 to March 1989, Assistant Operations Manager, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Assisted the Operations Manager with the day to day operations of the plant. From April 1989 to March 1997, Operations Manager, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the plant. Provide management over view of operating shifts, operation support and Radwaste Facility operation. Held a SRO license. From March 1997 to November 2000, Training Manager, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Responsible for the design, development, implementation and evaluation of training programs ensuring regulatory compliance, cost effectiveness and plant staff qualification. From November 2000 to June 2006, Project Manager Operations Support, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, responsible for operations input to outage planning, maintenance rule operations representative, BWROG Scram Frequency Reduction Committee representative, perform root cause analysis for department events and operations department training coordinator. From September 2006 to April 2007, Project Manager Operations Training Improvement Program, Ginna Nuclear Power Station. Responsible for the completion of the Operations Training Excellence Plan completion. Monitored both quality and timeliness of action close out. Oversight of a Operation Lesson Plan Upgrade Program. Supervised 5 contract lesson plan developers. From October 2007 to August 2009, Operations Procedure Group Lead, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. Responsible for the development and maintenance of all Operations Procedures for both units. Oversight of the WordPerfect to Word conversion of all site procedures. Revised procedures to support outage activities and modifications. From November 2009 to Present, License Renewal Project Senior Project Manager, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Responsible for identification, performance and documentation of One-Time Inspections. Assisted with monitoring progress of completion of NRC License Renewal Commitments.

4.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PERSONNEL

A total of 3 individuals served as Equipment Selection Personnel – see Table 4-1.

4.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS

A total of 8 individuals served as Seismic Walkdown Engineers – see Table 4-1.

4.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEWERS

A total of 2 individuals served as Licensing Basis Reviewers – see Table 4-1.

4.4 IPEEE REVIEWERS

A total of 2 individuals served as IPEEE Reviewers – see Table 4-1.

4.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM

Table 4-2 summarizes the names and responsibilities of personnel used to conduct peer reviews of the seismic walkdown program. Experience summaries of each person follow.

Table 4-2

Name	SWEL Peer Reviewer	Walkdown Peer Reviewer	Licensing Basis Peer Reviewer	Submittal Report Peer Reviewer
Tom Panayotidi (ENERCON)		X ²		X ^{1,2}
Alan Porch (Entergy)	X		X	
Richard Sullivan (Entergy)	X ²			
Laura Maclay (ENERCON)		X		X
Jeffrey Horton (ENERCON)			X ²	
Richard Casella (Entergy)				X

Notes:

1. Peer Review Team Leader
2. Lead peer reviewer of particular activity

Tom Panayotidi

Dr. Panayotidi has graduated with a Doctorate of Engineering Science in Civil Engineering/Engineering Mechanics, with emphasis in finite element analysis, particularly for seismic and other dynamic loads. He has worked as an ENERCON Civil/Structural Consulting Engineer for the past year, and has successfully completed Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Plant Walkdowns on 09/13/2012. Dr. Panayotidi has

over 30 years' experience as a Structural/Seismic Engineer in the nuclear field. Some of his related experience is summarized below.

Dr. Panayotidi prepared submittal report for OPPD Fort Calhoun Station per NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. He reviewed calculations and drawings for the OPPD Fort Calhoun Station Flood Recovery and Geotechnical/Seismic Evaluation.

Dr. Panayotidi also has experience in Standard Plant Design of Nuclear Island for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries – US Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor: Seismic Soil-Structure Interaction Analysis of Reactor Building Complex, Foundation Stability for sliding, overturning, bearing pressure (uplift condition), shear key design, nonlinear transient displacement calculation to predict foundation sliding, and Slope stability under seismic loading.

Dr. Panayotidi also has experience in Standard Plant Design of new generation compact 125 MW nuclear station for B&W mPower Project: Seismic Soil-Structure-Interaction analysis of underground (buried) nuclear island, he development of ground motion synthetic time history from high frequency CEUS design spectrum, as well as NRC 1.60 spectrum, and generation of in-structure-response-spectra (ISRS).

Dr. Panayotidi performed evaluation for NPPD Cooper Nuclear Station. He provided analytical review of the Reactor Building Crane Upgrade: Re-rate analysis of Cooper Nuclear Station Reactor Building, due to an increase in refueling crane capacity. He also evaluated Reactor building integrity for all applicable loads, including earthquake, tornado, seismic, and crane lifted loads.

Dr. Panayotidi developed worked on Accelerator Production of Tritium, DOE, for Savannah River Site: Seismic analysis of reinforced concrete building, including 3-D soil-structure interaction effects due to 60ft embedment, using SASSI. He also performed calculation of strained (iterated) soil properties, convolution and de-convolution of input motion using SHAKE91. Dr. Panayotidi also performed seismic anchor motion and soil-structure-interaction analysis of 1-mile long underground accelerator tunnel.

Dr. Panayotidi worked on design of 250 MW single-shaft, in-line gas turbine/steam turbine/generator concrete pedestal for River Road Generating Project (WA), including design of batter and vertical foundation piles, steel framing to support hot/cold piping in generation building.

Richard Sullivan

Mr. Sullivan graduated from University of Tennessee with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Some of Mr. Sullivan's related experience and awards are summarized below.

Navy Achievement Medal for superior management of the ship's Quality Assurance Program during two heavy maintenance periods.

Extensive experience in the operation and maintenance of a variety mechanical and electrical systems including: steam systems, cooling water systems, hydraulic systems, atmospheric

controls, ventilation systems, electrical distribution, digital and logic systems, and electrical generation.

From January, 2001 to September, 2007 and from October, 2007 to present, in James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Mr. Sullivan coordinated and developed Operations schedule activities and tagout preparation. Contributed to INPO 1 rating in 2004 by outstanding simulator scenarios and professional shift operations. Aided in the development, implementation, and enforcement of high operational standards. Contributed to the record breaking capacity factor year at JAF in 2001. Developed plant start up procedures in a flow chart format on own initiative. From May, 1997 to December, 2000, Mr. Sullivan developed and implemented three site-wide Emergency Plan Drills which included scenario design and simulator interface. Coordinated with other departments in the development of plant Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Procedure. Developed JAF licensed operator annual requalification examination. From November, 1994 to April, 1997, Mr. Sullivan assisted in two error-free refueling outages as Refuel Floor SRO. In October, 1994 Mr. Sullivan earned Senior Reactor Operator License from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

From 1988 to February, 1992, in the United States Navy, Mr. Sullivan served on board USS Nevada (SSBN-733) as Tactical Systems Department Head, Strategic Missiles Officer, and Damage Controls Assistant. Quality Assurance Officer: Coordinated ship's force and shipyard maintenance on various systems on a Trident submarine ensuring all specifications were met. Also responsible for training 30 personnel ship-wide.

Laura Maclay

Ms. Maclay has over five years of experience as a structural engineer, three years with ENERCON Services. Ms. Maclay holds a Bachelor's degree in Structural Engineering from Drexel University and is a qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineer as stated on her EPRI training certificate dated July 26, 2012. Her tasks have ranged from assisting with the development and preparation of design change packages to performing design calculations and markups, comment resolutions, and drawing revisions. Ms. Maclay spent a year on site at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant preparing structural evaluations of SSC's for an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). Her work included designing safety related supports for computer and electrical equipment for the Turbine Digital Controls Upgrade package and other similar packages. Ms. Maclay's responsibilities also included the review of calculations, drawings and vendor documentation for the seismic evaluation of the Unit 3 Palfinger Crane inside containment and new platforms in the High Pressure Turbine enclosure.

Recent work includes Fukushima flooding walkdowns at Limerick Generating Station and seismic walkdowns at Plant Farley. As a member of a two person team, Ms. Maclay was responsible for evaluating equipment anchorage, spatial interactions and potentially adverse conditions.

Jeffrey Horton

Mr. Horton is a Licensed Professional Engineer with 39 years of experience in the structural design of nuclear power components, pipe systems and building structures. Mr. Horton is currently employed as a Lead Civil/Structural Engineer. He holds a B.S. in Aerospace Engineer from Park's College of St Louis University in Missouri and a M.S. in Material Science specializing in Solid Mechanics from Rutgers University in New Jersey. He is a qualified SWE with extensive experience in the seismic design of components and pipe systems in Nuclear power plants.

5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

During the IPEEE program in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-20 [Ref. 10.4], plant-specific seismic vulnerabilities were identified at many plants. In this context, "vulnerabilities" refers to conditions found during the IPEEE program related to seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

IPEEE Reviewers (see Section 4.4) reviewed the IPEEE final report [Ref. 10.5] and supporting documentation to identify items determined to present a seismic vulnerability by the IPEEE program. IPEEE Reviewers then reviewed additional plant documentation to identify the eventual resolutions to those seismic vulnerabilities not resolved by the completion of the IPEEE program.

The seismic vulnerabilities identified for JAF during the IPEEE program are reported in Attachment A. A total of 1 seismic vulnerability was identified by the JAF IPEEE program. For the identified seismic vulnerability, the table in Attachment A includes three pieces of information requested by Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) Letter:

- a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability
- whether the configuration management program has maintained the IPEEE action (including procedural changes) such that the vulnerability continues to be addressed
- date when the resolution actions were completed.

The list of IPEEE vulnerabilities provided in Attachment A was used to ensure that some equipment enhanced as a result of the IPEEE program were included in SWEL1 (see Section 6.1.2). Documents describing these equipment enhancements and other modifications initiated by identification of IPEEE vulnerabilities were available and provided to the SWEs during the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns.

6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SWEL) DEVELOPMENT

This section summarizes the process used to select the SSCs that were included in the SWEL in accordance with Section 3 of the Guidance. A team of equipment selection personnel with extensive knowledge of plant systems and components was selected to develop the SWEL. The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items:

- SWEL 1 consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintain containment integrity (five safety functions)
- SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool

The final SWEL is the combination of SWEL1 and SWEL2. The development of these two groups is described in the following sections.

6.1 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS

Safe shutdown of the reactor involves four safety functions:

- Reactor reactivity control (RRC)
- Reactor coolant pressure control (RCPC)
- Reactor coolant inventory control (RCIC)
- Decay heat removal (DHR)

Maintaining containment integrity is a fifth safety function

- Containment function (CF)

The overall process for developing a sample of equipment to support these five safety functions is summarized in Figure 1-1 of the Guidance. The equipment coming out of Screen #3 and entering Screen #4 is defined as Base List 1. The equipment coming out of Screen #4 is the first Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, or SWEL 1. Development of these lists is described separately in the following sections.

6.1.1 Base List 1

Based on Figure 1-1 and Section 3 of the Guidance, Base List 1 represents a set of Seismic Category (SC) I equipment or systems that support the five safety functions. The IPEEE program was intended to address the seismic margin of SSCs associated with each of the five safety functions. At JAF the EPRI Seismic Margin Assessment (EPRI SMA) method was used to complete the seismic IPEEE program, based on EPRI Report NP-6041 titled "A Methodology for assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin." Base List 1 was developed using both IPEEE report [Ref. 10.5] and A-46 Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) [Ref. 10.13]. This equipment list of SSCs

is consistent with the requirements of Screens #1 through #3 of the Guidance. Therefore, the components listed on both the USI-46 composite SSEL and the IPEEE Shutdown Equipment List are initially used as the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Base List 1. Base List 1 is presented as Table 9.4.1 in Attachment B, and has 699 total items. The following components were added to both Base List 1 and SWEL 1.

- Core Spray Pump 14P-1A and RHR Service Water Strainer 10S-5A (both on the IPEEE, but not on A-46 Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL))
- Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A Inlet Isolation valve 01-125MOV-14A (listed on the IPEEE, but not on A-46 SSEL)
- Administrative Building Ventilation Control Panel, 72HV-7A (although this is Safety Related component, it is not listed on either the IPEEE or A-46 SSEL)
- Emergency Diesel Generator A Air Start Compressor A1, 93AC-A1 (this is an Augmented Quality component and is the only component in compressor equipment class. It is not listed on either the IPEEE or A-46 SSEL)
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump, 13P-1 (this is an Augmented Quality component, which is included on the IPEEE report)
- Components 71ACUPS and 71PT-71ACUPS are currently classified as Non-Safety Related (per Equipment Database), these two components were on the original A-46 SSEL and support at least one of the 5 Safety functions.

The following components were replaced in SWEL 1 and are not currently shown on the Base List 1.

- SGT Filter Train A Inlet Isolation Valve 01-125MOV-14A replaced with SGT Filter Train B Inlet Isolation Valve 01-125MOV-14B due to component restrictions.

6.1.2 SWEL 1

Based on Figure 1-1 and Section 3 of the Guidance, SWEL 1 is a broad population of items on Base List 1 including representative items from some of the variations within each of five sample selection attributes. The selection of SWEL 1 items includes consideration of the importance of the contribution to risk for the SSCs. Equipment Selection Personnel (see Section 4.1) developed SWEL 1 using an iterative process. The following paragraphs describe how the equipment selected for inclusion on the final SWEL 1 are representative with respect to each of the five sample selection attributes while considering risk significance. In general, preference for inclusion on

SWEL 1 was given to items that are accessible and have visible anchorage. SWEL 1 is presented as Table 9.4.2 as in Attachment B, and has 117 total items.

Variety of Types of Systems

Items were selected from Base List 1 ensuring that each of the five safety functions was well represented. Additionally, components from a variety of frontline and support systems, as listed in Appendix E of the Guidance, were selected. The system type of each item on SWEL 1 is listed on Table 9.4.2 of Attachment B.

Major New and Replacement Equipment

With assistance from plant operations, equipment selection personnel identified items on Base List 1 which are either major new or replacement equipment installed within the past 15 years, or have been modified or upgraded recently. These items are designated as such on Base List 1 on Table 9.4.1 of Attachment B. A robust sampling of these items is represented on SWEL 1. The following components were chosen as items that have been replaced since completion of the original SSEL.

- 02RV-71E - Main-Steam Safety Relief Valve
- 71INV-3A - "A" LPCI Inverter
- 70RWC-2A (CND) - "A" Control Room Chiller Condenser
- 23MOV-14 - HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valve
- 23AOV-53 - HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Drain Trap T-3 Bypass Valve
- 10S-5A - RHRSW Strainer
- 71SB-2 - "B" Station Battery

Variety of Equipment Types

Items were selected from Base List 1 ensuring that each of the equipment classes represented there was also represented on SWEL 1, in the same approximate ratios. The different equipment classes considered are listed in Appendix B of the Guidance. The equipment class of each item on SWEL 1 is listed on Table 9.4.2 of Attachment B. Note that SWEL 1 does not include Class 13 components, because these are not represented on Base List 1. A single Class 12 component (93AC-A1) is included on the SWEL. Although it is only classified as Augmented Quality, there are no compressors designated as Safety Related at JAF.

Variety of Environments

Items were selected from Base List 1 located in a variety of buildings, rooms, and elevations. These item locations included environments that were both inside and

outside, as well as having high temperature and/or elevated humidity. The location and environment of each item on SWEL 1 is listed on Table 9.4.2 of Attachment B.

IPEEE Enhancements

The IPEEE does not include any specific vulnerabilities for components which could be considered for the SWEL 1 (see Section 5.0). However, the following components were chosen based on their "lower" seismic capabilities. Note that the bottom 3 listed components are associated with seismic induced anchorage failure at ground accelerations between 0.31g and 0.41g:

10E-2A	"A" RHR Heat Exchanger
10S-5A	"A" RHRSW Strainer
09-32	Channel "A" RHR/RCIC Relay Panel
71MCC-161	600V Motor Control Center (Bus 116100)
71DSC-11561	L15 Unit Substation Transformer T-13 High Side Disch SW

Risk Significance

Information from the plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant. Risk significance was determined by using Risk Importance Measures, Risk Achievement Worth (RAW), and Fussell-Vesely (FV). This risk was considered using a threshold value of $RAW \geq 2$ and $FV \geq 0.0001$. Higher risk components were given added consideration for selection as a SWEL 1 item.

6.2 SPENT FUEL POOL ITEMS

The overall process for developing a sample of SSCs associated with the spent fuel pool (SFP) is summarized in Figure 1-2 of the Guidance. The equipment coming out of Screen #2 and entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2. The equipment coming out of Screen #4 is the equipment that could potentially cause the SFP to drain rapidly. The equipment coming out of Screen #3 and Screen #4 is the second Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, or SWEL 2. Development of these lists is described separately in the following sections.

6.2.1 Base List 2

Based on Figure 1-2 and Section 3 of the Guidance, Base List 2 represents the Seismic Category (SC) I equipment or systems associated with the SFP. To develop Base List 2, Equipment Selection Personnel (see Section 4.1) reviewed plant design and licensing basis documentation and plant drawings for the SFP and its associated cooling system. Base List 2 is presented as Table 9.4.3 in Attachment B, and has 13

total items. The following components were replaced in SWEL 2 and are not currently shown on the Base List.

- Decay Heat Removal Strainer Bypass Valve 32DHR-5 replaced with Decay Heat removal Cooling Water Return Isolation Valve 32DHR-18 because of radiological considerations.
- Decay Heat Removal SFP Water Primary Pump A 32P-1A was removed from the list due to radiological reasons.

6.2.2 Rapid Drain-Down

Rapid drain-down is defined in EN-DC-168, Attachment 9.4 [Ref. 10.11], as lowering the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours after an earthquake. Consistent with the Guidance, the Equipment Selection Personnel (see Section 4.1) identified SSCs that could cause the SFP to drain rapidly by first reviewing the SFP documentation to identify penetrations below about 10 ft above the top of the fuel assemblies.

Because this review found no such SFP penetrations, there is no potential for rapid drain-down and no items were included on the rapid drain-down list to include on SWEL 2.

6.2.3 SWEL 2

Based on Figure 1-2 and Section 3 of the Guidance, SWEL 2 is a broad population of items on Base List 2 including representative items from some of the variations within each of four sample selection attributes (using sample process similar to SWEL 1), plus each item that could potentially cause rapid-drain down of the SFP. Due to the population of items on Base List 2 being much smaller than Base List 1, the sampling attributes are satisfied differently for SWEL 2 than for SWEL 1. The following paragraphs describe how the equipment selected from Base List 2 for inclusion on SWEL 2 are representative with respect to each of the four sample selection attributes. SWEL 2 is presented as Table 9.4.5 in Attachment B, and has 11 total items. The SFP at JAF has no qualified rapid drain-down (RDD) components, as described in EN-DC-168, Attachment 9.4 [Ref. 10.11]; therefore no RDDs were included in SWEL 2 list.

Variety of Types of Systems

There are 2 systems, Spent Fuel Cooling and Decay Heat Removal, associated with SFP. Each of these systems is represented on SWEL 2.

Major New and Replacement Equipment

New and Replaced components are identified in Table 9.4.5, Column "N/R". Out of 11 SWEL 2 components, 9 were not replaced within 15 years; therefore considered to be new, and 2 components are newly installed.

Variety of Equipment Types

There are 5 different equipment classes represented on Base List 2: 01, 05, 07, 20 and 21. Each of these equipment classes is represented on SWEL 2.

Variety of Environments

10 out of 11 SFP components noted on SWEL 2 are inside the Reactor Building and are thus located in similar environments. The remaining component is located outside.

6.3 DEFERRED, INACCESSIBLE ITEMS on SWEL

The intent of adding each item on the SWEL is for it to be walked down as part of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program. To be able to perform the seismic walkdowns of these items, it is necessary to have access to them and to be able to view their anchorage. In some cases, it was not feasible to gain access to the equipment or view its anchorage during the entire 180-day response period of Enclosure 3 to the 50.54(f) Letter. For these cases, walkdowns of these items have been deferred until the next refueling outage (RFO) in September of 2014, or the items were deleted from the list. An updated submittal report incorporating these deferred walkdowns will be provided 90 days after the end of RFO21.

Deferred and deleted items are summarized in the table below. The reason is identified as either ACC (indicating that the item was deleted because of ALARA reasons) or CAB (indicating that the item requires opening cabinet/panel doors which was not permitted by plant Operations personnel during the walkdown period, due to being energized or otherwise). A total of 26 items from which 23 items are deferred, 3 are in high dose areas and will not be deferred. The 23 deferred items are cabinets/panels required to be opened.

SWEL#	Equipment ID	Description	Location	Reason
SWEL 1-163	12MOV-18	RWCU supply outbound isolation valve, is located in a Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA). Dose levels are high, both in outage and normal plant operation. This item is deleted from the SWEL list because of dose concern and will not be deferred.	RB. EL 300', Column 3, Line R	ACC

SWEL#	Equipment ID	Description	Location	Reason
SWEL 2-2	19FPC-32	The skimmer surge tank A condensate make-up check valve, is located in a LHRA behind the "A" Skimmer Surge Tank. This item is deleted from the SWEL list because of dose concern and will not be deferred.	RB. EL 369.6', Column 3.5, Line Y	ACC
SWEL 2-11	32P-1A	The decay heat removal SFP water primary pump "A", is located in a high radiological area. This item is deleted from the SWEL list because of dose concern and will not be deferred.	RB. 326', Column 3, Line T	ACC
SWEL1-52	09-3	The nuclear station main control board, is deferred. WO # 52389703 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 12/2012.	AD. 300', Column 10, Line F	CAB
SWEL1-430	71-10502	The 4160V switchgear distribution (BUS 10500) is deferred. WR # 309411 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 09/2013.	EG. 272', Column 24, Line A1	CAB
SWEL1-433	71-10560	The 4160V switchgear distribution (BUS 10500) is deferred. WO # 52448178 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 06/2014.	EG. 272', Column 26, Line A1	CAB
SWEL1-438	71-11502	The 600V switchgear distribution (bus 11500) breaker 02 is deferred. WO # 52450763 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 06/2014.	RB. 300', Column 26, Line A1	CAB
SWEL1-439	71-11602	The 4160V switchgear distribution (BUS 10600) is deferred. WR # 290278 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component.	EG. 272', Column 2, Line R	CAB
SWEL1-446	71BAT-3A	The LPCI inverter battery is deferred. WO # 52437751 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 08/2013.	RB. 344.6', Column 5.5	CAB
SWEL1-448	71BC-1A	The 125 VDC station battery charger is deferred. WO # 52440826 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 08/2014.	BR. 272, Column 12.5, Line E	CAB
SWEL1-450	71BCB-2A	The battery A control board is deferred. WO # 52421057 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 05/2013.	BR. 272, Column 13, Line C	CAB

SWEL#	Equipment ID	Description	Location	Reason
SWEL1-462	71DSC-11561	The L15 unit substation transformer T-13 high side discharge SW is deferred. WR # 290280 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component.	RB. 300', Column 2, Line R	CAB
SWEL1-470	71INV-3A	The LPCI MOV independent power supply A inverter is deferred. WO # 52391223 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 01/2013.	RB. 344.6', Column 5.5	CAB
SWEL1-474	71L25	The 600V switchgear distribution (BUS 12500) is deferred. WR # 290281 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 10/2014.	EB. 272', Column 18.5, Line A1	CAB
SWEL1-481	71MCC-161	The 600V motor control center (BUS 116100) is deferred. WR # 290282 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 09/2016.	EB. 272', Column 1.5, Line W	CAB
SWEL1-487	71MCC-252	The 600V motor control center (BUS 125200) is deferred. WO # 52404915 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 03/2013.	EB. 272', Column 18, Line A	CAB
SWEL1-489	71MCC-254	The 600V motor control center (BUS 125400) is deferred. WO # 52380939 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 11/2012.	EB. 272', Column 23, Line A1	CAB
SWEL1-624	93ECP-A	The EDG A engine control panel is deferred. WO # 52419775 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 05/2013.	EG. 272', Column 24	CAB
SWEL1-628	93ECSP-A	The EDG A engine control sub panel is deferred. WR # 290283 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component.	EG. 272', Column 24	CAB
SWEL1-629	93ECSP-B	The EDG B engine control sub panel is deferred. WR # 290284 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component.	EG. 272', Column 26, Line A3	CAB
SWEL1-636	93EGP-A	The EDG C generator control panel is deferred. WO # 52419771 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 05/2013.	EG. 272', Column 24, Line A1	CAB

SWEL#	Equipment ID	Description	Location	Reason
SWEL1-637	93EGP-B	The EDG B generator control panel is deferred. WO # 52427217 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 07/2013.	EG. 272', Column 26, Line A1	CAB
SWEL1-640	93FPAC	The EDG A & C forced paralleling panel is deferred. WO # 52286384 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 09/2014.	EG. 272', Column 24.5, Line A	CAB
SWEL2-013	71MCC-120-OE1	The 32P-1A(M) decay heat removal SFP water primary pump A motor is deferred. WR # 290285 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 03/2013.	YD. 293'	CAB
SWEL1-493	71MCC-264	The 600V Motor Control Center (BUS 126400) is deferred. WO # 52449942 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component on 10/2013.	EB. 272 Column 25.5, Line A1	CAB
SWEL1-456	71BMCC-6	The Reactor Building DC Motor Control Center is deferred. WR # 290578 was initiated to track the walkdown of this component.	EB. 272 Column 8, Line Y	CAB

7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS

The NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program conducted in accordance with the Guidance involves two primary walkdown activities, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys. These activities were conducted at JAF, by teams of two trained and qualified SWEs (see Section 4.2). JAF in house Civil Engineers performed a portion of the walkdowns. Both SWEs on these teams have several years of seismic experience. For the balance of the walkdowns (Performed by contractors), each team (2 teams total) included one engineer with at least several years of experience in seismic design and qualification of nuclear power plant SSCs, whereas the second engineer had somewhat less (though sufficient) experience. In certain instances, the teams (both JAF and contractors) periodically "shuffled" personnel to cross-check consistency between the two teams.

The seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were conducted over a span of approximately 6 weeks, starting in mid-September of 2012. Pre-job briefs were performed prior to walkdowns. This pre-job brief was used to outline the components and areas that would be walked down, to ensure consistency between the teams, to reinforce expectations and process for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions (and other non-seismic plant conditions), and to allow team members to ask questions and share feedback.

7.1 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS

Seismic walkdowns were performed in accordance with Section 4 of the Guidance for all items on the SWEL (SWEL 1 plus SWEL 2), except for those determined to be inaccessible and deferred (see Section 6.3). To document the results of the walkdown, a Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) with the same content as that included in Appendix C of the Guidance was created for each item. Additionally, photographs were taken of each item and included on the corresponding SWC.

In some cases, the SWE teams conducted preliminary "scouting" walkdowns to get a general understanding of plant layout and to identify items on the draft SWEL that were inaccessible. Items that were identified to be inaccessible on these "scouting" walkdowns were discussed with the Equipment Selection Personnel and were either deleted or deferred while ensuring that the overall integrity of the final SWEL was not compromised.

Prior to performance of the walkdowns, documentation packages were developed that contained the SWC with preliminary data entered and other pertinent information including the location drawings, response spectra information, previous IPEEE seismic walkdown documentation, and anchorage drawings where applicable. These documentation packages accompanied the SWE teams into the plant during the seismic walkdowns.

Walkdown inspections focused on anchorages and seismic spatial interactions, but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage, in all cases, was considered to specifically mean anchorage of the component to the structure where applicable. This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts or connections, such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered as equipment anchorage. These bolts and connections were evaluated by the SWEs and any potential adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions" rather than under "anchorage". Thus, components with no attachments to the structure are considered as not having anchorage. Nevertheless, the attachment of these components to other equipment was evaluated and inspected for potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Cabinets/panels on the SWEL that could be reasonably opened without undue safety or operational hazard were opened during the walkdown. This allowed visual observation of internal anchorage to the structure (where present), as well as inspection for "other adverse seismic conditions" related to internal components that could be observed without breaking the plane of the door. Where opening the cabinet/panel was considered to exhibit undue safety or operational hazards, it was considered inaccessible and the completion of the walkdown of that item was deferred to a later time (see Section 6.3). Where opening the cabinet/panel required extensive disassembly (e.g., doors or panels were secured by more than latches, thumbscrews, or similar), justification for how the inspection met the program goal without opening the cabinet/panel was included on the SWC and the walkdown of that item is considered complete.

In addition to the general inspection requirements, at least 50% of the SWEL items having anchorage required confirmation that the anchorage configuration was consistent with plant documentation. Of the 128 SWEL items, 81 were considered to have anchorage (i.e., removing in-line/line-mounted components). Of these 81 anchored components, the walkdowns of 54, not counting deferred components (See Section 6.3), included anchorage configuration verification, which is greater than 50%. When anchorage configuration verification was conducted, the specific plant documentation used for comparison to the as-found conditions was referenced on the SWC.

The SWC for each SWEL item, where a seismic walkdown has been initiated is included in Attachment C. A total of 128 SWCs are attached, 105 with completion status marked "Y" ("Y"- Yes, Walkdown is completed), 0 with completion status marked "N" ("N"- No, Walkdown has not been performed), and 23 with completion status marked "U" ("U"- Uncertain, More information on the component is required). SWCs considered and marked "Uncertain", are those where a walkdown was initiated, but whose completion was ultimately deferred because the cabinet/panel could not be opened during the walkdown period. Therefore, the

105 completed SWCs represent the completed walkdowns of the 128 SWEL items accessible during the walkdown period.

7.2 AREA WALK-BYS

Seismic area walk-bys were performed in accordance with Section 4 of the Guidance for all plant areas containing items on the SWEL (SWEL 1 plus SWEL 2). Area walk-bys were not deferred where components were deferred simply to open cabinets/panels. A separate Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC) with the same content as that included in Appendix C of the Guidance was used to document the results of each area walk-by performed. Photographs were taken of each area, and included on the corresponding SWC.

Area walk-bys were conducted once for plant areas containing multiple SWEL items in close proximity to each other. In cases where the room or area containing a component was very large, the extent of the area encompassed by the area walk-by was limited to a radius of approximately 35ft around the subject equipment. In some cases, the extent of the areas included in the area walk-bys is described on the AWC for that area. Because certain areas contained more than one SWEL item, there are fewer total area walk-bys conducted than seismic walkdowns. A total of 61 area walk-bys was necessary to cover all plant areas containing at least one SWEL item.

The AWC for each area walk-by completed is included in Attachment D. A total of 61 AWCs are attached, which represent all of the areas containing a SWEL item that were accessible during the walkdown period. No additional area walk-bys of areas need to be performed, since walk-bys for the deferred items have been completed (see Section 6.3).

8.0 LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

During the course of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, SWE teams sought to identify existing degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed plant conditions with respect to its current seismic licensing basis identify. This section summarizes the process used to handle conditions identified, what conditions were found, and how they were treated for eventual resolution.

CONDITON IDENTIFICATION

When a potentially adverse condition was observed by a SWE team in the field, the condition was noted on the SWC or AWC form and briefly discussed between the two SWEs to determine whether it was a potentially adverse seismic condition. These initial conclusions were based on conservative engineering judgment and the training required for SWE qualification.

For conditions that were reasonably judged as insignificant to seismic response, the disposition was included on the SWC or AWC checklist and the appropriate question was marked "Y", indicating that no associated potentially adverse seismic condition was observed. Unusual or uncertain conditions were reported to site personnel for further resolution (see Section 8.2). A total of 17 seismically insignificant conditions were identified. These conditions were generally related to either housekeeping or mild degradation.

For conditions that were judged as potentially significant to seismic response, then the condition was photographed and the appropriate question on the SWC or AWC was marked "N" indicating that a potentially adverse seismic condition was observed. The condition was then immediately reported to site personnel for further resolution and was documented for reporting in Attachment E. A total of 17 potentially adverse seismic conditions were identified. These conditions were generally related to non-conforming anchorage, spatial interaction, non-conforming support spacing, or inadequate line flexibility.

CONDITION RESOLUTION

Conditions observed during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys determined to be potentially adverse seismic conditions are summarized in Attachment E, including how each condition has been addressed and its current status. Each potentially adverse seismic condition is addressed either with a Licensing Basis Evaluation (LBE) to determine whether it requires entry into the Corrective Action Program (CAP), or by entering it into the CAP directly. The decision to conduct a LBE or enter the condition directly into the CAP was made on a case-by-case basis, based on the perceived efficiency of each process for eventual resolution of each specific condition.

Unusual conditions that were not seismically significant were immediately brought to attention to plant personnel. Further resolution of these conditions is not tracked or reported as part of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program, except by noting that the condition was observed by SWE and it was immediately brought to attention to plant personnel on the applicable SWCs and AWCs.

8.1 LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

Potentially adverse seismic conditions identified as part of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program may be evaluated by comparison to the current licensing basis (CLB) of the plant as it relates to the seismic adequacy of the equipment in question, as is described in Section 5 of the Guidance. If the identified condition is consistent with existing seismic documentation associated with that item, then no further action is required. If the identified condition cannot easily be shown to be consistent with existing seismic documentation, or no seismic documentation exists, then the condition is entered into the CAP.

Of the 17 identified potentially adverse seismic conditions, 14 did not require a LBE. All items summarized in Attachment E, are entered into the CAP or justification of their acceptability is provided in Attachment F.

8.2 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM ENTRIES

Conditions identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys that required further resolution were entered into the plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP) for further review and disposition in accordance with the plant's existing processes and procedures. Conditions entered into the CAP included three types of unusual conditions identified:

- Seismically insignificant unusual conditions
- Potentially adverse seismic condition that does not pass a LBE
- Potentially adverse seismic condition that bypasses a LBE

A total of 15 Condition Reports (CRs) were generated from the CAP as a result of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program. A total of 15 CRs were written relative to potentially adverse seismic conditions identified. The CR numbers, current status, and resolution (where applicable and available) are summarized for these potentially adverse seismic conditions in Attachment E.

8.3 PLANT CHANGES

The CAP entries (CRs) generated by the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program are being resolved in accordance with the plant CAP process, including operability evaluations, extent of condition evaluations, and root cause analysis (where applicable). Initial evaluations indicate that no immediate plant changes are necessary. Final and complete resolutions of

the CRs for seismically insignificant unusual conditions and potentially adverse seismic conditions will determine if future modifications to the plant are required. While no immediate plant modifications have been identified as a result of the seismic walkdowns and walk-bys, various cases were found where repairs are required or housekeeping issues are being addressed. Current status and resolutions (where applicable and available) for CRs related to potentially adverse seismic conditions are provided in Attachment E.

9.0 PEER REVIEW

9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS

The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with and in conformance to Section 6 of the Guidance. The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:

- review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);
- review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and area walk-bys
- review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and
- review of the final submittal report.

At least two members of the peer review team (see Section 4.5) were involved in the peer review of each activity, the team member with the most relevant knowledge and experience taking the lead for that particular activity. A designated overall Peer Review Team Leader provided oversight related to the process and technical aspects of the peer review, paying special attention to the interface between peer review activities involving different members of the peer review team.

The peer review team was provided with an early draft of this submittal report for peer review. The peer review team verified that the submittal report met the objectives and requirements of Enclosure 3 to the 50.54(f) Letter, and documented the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program performed in accordance with the EPRI Guidance. The peer review team provided the results of review activities to the SWE team for consideration. The SWE team satisfactorily addressed all peer review comments in the final version of the submittal report. The signature of the Peer Review Team Leader provides documentation that all elements of the peer review as described in Section 6 of the EPRI Guidance were completed.

9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS SUMMARY

The following sections summarize the process and results of each peer review activity.

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development

The selection of items for the SWEL was peer reviewed in accordance with Section 3 of the EPRI Guidance. Peer review comments were resolved and incorporated into the final SWEL, ensuring that all recommendations of the EPRI Guidance have been met.

The final SWEL contains a diverse sample of equipment required to perform the five safety functions specified in the EPRI Guidance, which are:

- Reactor reactivity control
- Reactor coolant pressure control
- Reactor coolant inventory control
- Decay heat removal
- Containment integrity

In addition, the peer review process verified that SWEL items included major new and replacement items, a variety of environments, equipment enhanced based on findings of the IPEEE (if any), and risk insight considerations.

The peer review checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment G.

9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

Peer review of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys was conducted by two peer reviewers, each of whom is a qualified SWE and has broad knowledge of seismic engineering applied to nuclear power plants. One of the peer reviewers participated in the seismic walkdown program for a different utility, and the other is engaged with the industry team which developed the Guidance (see Section 4.5). The peer reviews were conducted at JAF concurrent with the conduct of walkdowns, at approximately 50% completion. The peer review was performed as follows:

- The peer review team reviewed the walkdown packages (including checklists, photos, drawings, etc.) for SWEL items already completed to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the Guidance. A total of 23 SWC and 16 AWC forms were reviewed, each representing approximately 18% and 26%, respectively, of their totals. In the context of the Guidance, the peer review team considered the number of walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate. The packages reviewed represent a variety of equipment types in various plant areas. Specific SWC forms reviewed are SWEL1-001, 032, 052, 069, 137, 157, 213, 433, 448, 452, 457, 474, 494, 501, 519, 624, 646, 670, 683, 686, 690, SWEL2-007 and SWEL2-009. Specific AWC forms reviewed are AWC-003, 006, 009, 013, 015, 017, 018, 021, 022, 029, 033, 034, 045, 047, 049, and 057. During the selection of SWC's and AWC's to be peer reviewed, particular attention was given to obtaining a broad sample of items that encompass a variety of equipment and systems, equipment classes and environmental conditions.

- While reviewing the walkdown packages, the peer reviewers conducted informal interviews of the SWEs and asked clarifying questions to verify that they were conducting walkdowns and area walk-bys in accordance with the Guidance.
- The peer review team held a meeting with the SWE teams to provide feedback on the walkdown and walk-by packages reviewed and the informal interviews, and discuss potential modifications to the documentation packages in the context of the Guidance.
- The peer review team held a meeting with the SWE teams to provide feedback on the walkdown and walk-by observations, and discuss how lessons learned from review of the walkdown packages had been incorporated into the walkdown process.

As a result of the peer review activities, the SWE teams modified their documentation process to include additional clarifying details, particularly related to checklist questions marked "N/A" and where conditions were observed but judged as insignificant. The peer review team felt these modifications would be of benefit for future reviews of checklists incorporated into the final report. These modifications were recommended following review of the walkdown and area walk-by packages, and the observation walkdowns and area walk-bys demonstrated that the SWEs understood the recommendations and were incorporating them into the walkdown and area walk-by process. Previously completed checklists were revised to reflect lessons learned from the peer review process.

Based on completion of the walkdown and walk-by peer review activities described, the peer review team concludes that the SWE teams are familiar with and followed the process for conducting seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys in accordance with the Guidance. The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable. The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions such as the examples described in Section 4 of the Guidance. The SWEs demonstrated appropriate use of self checks and peer checks. They discussed their observations with a questioning attitude, and documented the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys on appropriate checklists.

9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations

All potentially adverse seismic conditions were entered into the plant's CAP program for further review and disposition. See Attachment E for summary of CRs and LB

evaluations. The review team verified the decisions for identifying such conditions as being sound, and the dispositions were conducted in accordance with the plant's CLB.

A peer review of the licensing basis evaluations was completed. Within these licensing basis evaluations, CRs were generated for maintenance issues to replace missing bolts, nuts or remove items for housekeeping issues, or to provide further, detailed resolution of the potentially adverse seismic condition when applicable. The remaining licensing basis evaluations were created to document potentially adverse seismic conditions that were immediately entered into the CAP for detailed evaluation and investigation. See Attachment F for detailed LB evaluations. The peer review of these LB evaluations ensured that all the information provided from the walkdown team to the licensing basis evaluation team member provided enough detail for accurate and timely resolution. See Attachment I for comments received on LB evaluations.

9.2.4 Submittal Report

The peer review team was provided with an early draft of this submittal report for peer review. The peer review team verified that the submittal report met the objectives and requirements of Enclosure 3 to the 50.54(f) Letter, and documented the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown program performed in accordance with the Guidance. The peer review team provided the results of review activities to the SWE team for consideration. The SWE team satisfactorily addressed all peer review comments in the final version of the submittal report. The signature of the Peer Review Team Leader provides documentation that all elements of the peer review as described in Section 6 of the Guidance were completed.

10.0 REFERENCES

- 10.1. 10CFR50.54(f) Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012
- 10.2. EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012
- 10.3. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
- 10.4. Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4 and 5, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities
- 10.5. James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), JAF-RPT-MISC-02211, Revision 0, Submitted June 1996.
- 10.6. Generic Letter No. 87-03, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46
- 10.7. Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Procedure: Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment, Revision 3A, December 2001
- 10.8. JAF Document 18570.00, Rev. 1, "Design Criteria for Balance of Plant (BOP) Piping Stress and Supports – James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant."
- 10.9. Engineering Standard Manual: CES-2B, Rev. 0, "Seismic Design of Electrical Conduit Supports for JAF."
- 10.10. JAF-RPT-ELEC-02075, Rev. 2, "Design Criteria for Independence of Redundant Electrical Circuits."
- 10.11. EN-DC-168, Rev. 0, "Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walk-down Procedure."
- 10.12. JAFP-12-0075, "Entergy's 120-Day Response to the NRC Request for Information (RFI) Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident."

- 10.13. USI A-46, "Seismic Evaluation Report Volume I/VI, Stevenson & Associates," September 1995.
- 10.14. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Safe Shutdown Equipment and Relay Evaluation For unresolved Safety Issue USI A-46," September 1995, Volume I of XII.

11.0 ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT A – IPEEE VULNERABILITIES TABLE

ATTACHMENT B – SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS

ATTACHMENT C – SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs)

ATTACHMENT D – AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (AWCs)

ATTACHMENT E – POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

ATTACHMENT F – LICENSING BASIS EVALUATION FORMS

ATTACHMENT G – PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL

ATTACHMENT H – SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER TRAINING CERTIFICATES

ATTACHMENT I – PEER REVIEW COMMENTS

Attachment A
“IPEEE Vulnerabilities Table”

ATTACHMENT 9.3

IPEEE VULNERABILITIES TABLE FORM

#	IPEEE VULNERABILITY	COMMITMENT	RESOLUTION	CMP	RESOLVED
V-01	Seismic-induced station blackout sequences are controlled by seismic-induced failures of emergency diesel generator building (EGB) and electric bay (EB) block walls: HCLPF – High Confidence Low Probability Failure EGB-272-6,7,9 and IO (HCLPF = 0.17g) EB-272-15 (HCLPF = 0.22g) EB-286-2 (HCLPF = 0.23g)	Strengthen high risk emergency diesel generator building (EGB) block walls EGB-272-6, 7, 9 and 10. The seismic-induced station blackout sequences responsible for the 0.17g pga overall plant HCLPF capacity for JAF are controlled by seismic-induced failures of these block walls. A modification (MOD# D1 -96-011) is being planned to accomplish this strengthening	Design change DC#D1-96-011, Rev.0, and calculation JAF-CALC-EDG-02153, Rev.0, implemented and evaluated the proposed modification which reinforced the block wall to a higher frequency range, and the corresponding structural capacity of block walls increased to 0.26 g. The existing steel structures are capable to resist the additional load due to modification. This is based on the existing concrete structure is capable to resist all of the seismic loads. Calculation 93C2803-C012, "HCLPF for Block Walls EB-272-1,2", Rev. 0, evaluated Electrical Bay block walls and the block walls were found acceptable.	Y	12/19/1997

Prepared by: Yaroslav Losev /  Date: 11/12/2012

Attachment B
“Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists”

ATTACHMENT 9.4

SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS FORM

Table 9.4.1 – Base List 1 (BL 1)

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions					
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 6 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment	
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System						
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	01-125MOV-14A	01-125MOV-14A	SGT FILTER TRAIN A INLE ISOLATION VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO						X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	02-3LI-85A	02-3LI-85A	REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO						
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	02-3LI-85B (02-3LR-85B)	02-3LI-85B (02-3LR-85B)	DIV I RX WATER LEVEL RECORDER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO						
1	18 - Instrument Racks	02-3LT-85A	02-3LT-85A	REACTOR VESSEL WIDE RANGER LEVEL XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO						
1	18 - Instrument Racks	02-3LT-85B	02-3LT-85B	REACTOR VESSEL WIDE RANGER LEVEL XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO						
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02AOV-17	02AOV-17	ADS REACTOR HEAD VENT INBD ARE OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02AOV-18	02AOV-18	ADS REACTOR HEAD VENT OUTBD AIR OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71A	02RV-71A	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE A SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X		

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71B	02RV-71B	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE A SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71C	02RV-71C	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE B SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71D	02RV-71D	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE B SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71E	02RV-71E	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE C SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71F	02RV-71F	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE C SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71G	02RV-71G	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE C SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71H	02RV-71H	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE D SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71J	02RV-71J	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE D SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71K	02RV-71K	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE A SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	02RV-71L	02RV-71L	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE D SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-17	02SOV-17	ADS REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X						
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-18	02SOV-18	ADS REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X						
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71A2	02SOV-71A2	ADS/MST A 02RV-71A REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71B2	02SOV-71B2	ADS/MST A 02RV-71B REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71C2	02SOV-71C2	ADS/MST B 02RV-71C REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71D2	02SOV-71D2	ADS/MST B 02RV-71D REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71E2	02SOV-71E2	ADS/MST C 02RV-71E REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71F2	02SOV-71F2	ADS/MST C 02RV-71F REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71G2	02SOV-71G2	ADS/MST C 02RV-71G REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71H2	02SOV-71H2	ADS/MST D 02RV-71H REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71J2	02SOV-71J2	ADS/MST D 02RV-71J REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71K2	02SOV-71K2	ADS/MST A 02RV-71K REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	02SOV-71L2	02SOV-71L2	ADS/MST D 02RV-71L REMOTE MANUAL PILOT SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	03AOV-126(HCU-02-19)	03AOV-126(HCU-02-19)	HCU INLET SCRAM AIR OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO	X							
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	03AOV-127(HCU-02-19)	03AOV-127(HCU-02-19)	HCU OUTLET SCRAM AIR OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO	X							
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-117(HCU-02-19)	03SOV-117(HCU-02-19)	HCU-02-19 SCRAM PILOT AIR SOLENOID OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X							
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-118(HCU-02-19)	03SOV-118(HCU-02-19)	HCU-02-19 SCRAM PILOT AIR SOLENOID OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X							

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-120(HCU-02-19)	03SOV-120(HCU-02-19)	HCU-02-19 WITHDRAW SETTLE SOLENOID OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-121(HCU-02-19)	03SOV-121(HCU-02-19)	HCU-02-19 INSERT EXHAUST WATER SOLENOID OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-122(HCU-02-19)	03SOV-122(HCU-02-19)	HCU-02-19 WITHDRAW DRIVE WATER SOLENOID OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-123(HCU-02-19)	03SOV-123(HCU-02-19)	HCU-02-19 INSERT DRIVE WATER SOLENOID OPER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-29	03SOV-29	SDIV ISOL TEST SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-31A	03SOV-31A	SDIV A AOV INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY SOLENOID VALVE EQ	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	03SOV-31B	03SOV-31B	SDIV B AOV INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY SOLENOID VALVE B EQ	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				
1	00 - Other	03TK-125(HCU-02-19)	03TK-125(HCU-02-19)	WATER ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO	X				
1	00 - Other	03TK-128(HCU-02-19)	03TK-128(HCU-02-19)	NITROGEN ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	03TK-1A	03TK-1A	CRD A SDIV SCRAM DISCH INSTRUMENT AIR VOLUME TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X				

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								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	03TK-1B	03TK-1B	CRD B SDIV SCRAM DISCH INSTRUMENT AIR VOLUME TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X							
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	06PI-61A	06PI-61A	REACTOR VESSEL PRESS INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	06PI-61B	06PI-61B	REACTOR VESSEL PRESS INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	18 - Instrument Racks	06PT-61A	06PT-61A	ECCS LOOP A FEEDWATER CONTROL REACTOR PRESS XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	18 - Instrument Racks	06PT-61B	06PT-61B	ECCS LOOP B FEEDWATER CONTROL REACTOR PRESS XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-21	09-21	NUCLEAR STEAM TEMP RECORD PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-3	09-3	NUCLEAR STATION MAIN CONTROL BOARD	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-32	09-32	CHANNEL "A" RHR/RCIC RELAY PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-33	09-33	CHANNEL "B" RHR/RCIC RELAY PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Sorted System					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-39	09-39	HPCI RELAY PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-45	09-45	AUTO BLOWDOWN RELAY CABINET	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-46	09-46	CORE SPRAY CHANNEL "A" RELAY CABINET	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-47	09-47	CORE SPRAY CHANNEL "B" RELAY CABINET	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-5	09-5	REACTOR CONTROL MAIN CONTROL BOARD	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-6	09-6	BALANCE OF PLANT (MECH) MAIN CONTROL BOARD	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-95	09-95	EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM DIV 1 A/C TRIP CABINET	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09-96	09-96	EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM DIV 2 B/D TRIP CABINET	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09AR-5A	09AR-5A	(RED) A AUXILIARY RELAY CABINET	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X							

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Setback 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	09AR-5B	09AR-5B	(BLUE) B AUXILIARY RELAY CABINET	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X							
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10AOV-68A	10AOV-68A	RHR A LPCI TESTABLE CHECK VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO			X					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10AOV-68B	10AOV-68B	RHR B LPCI TESTABLE CHECK VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10AOV-71A	10AOV-71A	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A OUTLET TO TORUS OR RCIC ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10AOV-71B	10AOV-71B	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B OUTLET TO TORUS OR RCIC ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	10E-2A	10E-2A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO				X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	10E-2B	10E-2B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER B	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	10FI-132A	10FI-132A	RHR SW PUMPS A&C DISCH FLOW INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	10FI-132B	10FI-132B	RHR SW PUMPS B&D DISCH FLOW INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	10FI-133A	10FI-133A	A REACTOR AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY LOOP FLOW INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	10FI-133B	10FI-133B	B REACTOR AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY LOOP FLOW INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	18 - Instrument Racks	10FT-109A	10FT-109A	RHR LOOP A FLOW XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	18 - Instrument Racks	10FT-109B	10FT-109B	RHR B DISCH HDR FLOW XMITTER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	18 - Instrument Racks	10FT-97A	10FT-97A	RHR SW A DISCH HDR FLOW XMITTER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	18 - Instrument Racks	10FT-97B	10FT-97B	RHR SW LOOP B FLOW XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-12A	10MOV-12A	RHR HEAT EXCH A OUTLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-12B	10MOV-12B	RHR HEAT EXCH B OUTLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-13A	10MOV-13A	RHR PUMP A SUCT TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-13B	10MOV-13B	RHR PUMP B SUCT TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-13C	10MOV-13C	RHR PUMP C SUCT TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-13D	10MOV-13D	RHR PUMP D SUCT TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-148A	10MOV-148A	RHR SW A TO RHR CROSS TIE UPSTR ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-148B	10MOV-148B	RHR SW B TO RHR CROSS TIE UPSTR ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-151A	10MOV-151A	RHR PUMPS A&C SUCT SUPPR POOL ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-151B	10MOV-151B	RHR PUMPS B&D SUCT SUPPR POOL ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-15A	10MOV-15A	RHR PUMP A SUCT SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-15B	10MOV-15B	RHR PUMP B SUCT SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-15C	10MOV-15C	RHR PUMP C SUCT SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-15D	10MOV-15D	RHR PUMP D SUCT SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-166A	10MOV-166A	RHR HEAT EXCH A UPSTR VENT TO TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-166B	10MOV-166B	RHR HEAT EXCH B UPSTR VENT TO TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	—	NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-16A	10MOV-16A	RHR A MIN FLOW ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-16B	10MOV-16B	RHR B MIN FLOW ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-21A	10MOV-21A	RHR HEAT EXCH A DISCH TO TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-21B	10MOV-21B	RHR HEAT EXCH B DISCH TO TORUS ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-25A	10MOV-25A	RHR A LPCI INBD INJ VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-25B	10MOV-25B	RHR B LPCI INBD INJ VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-26A	10MOV-26A	RHR A CONT SPRAY OUTBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-26B	10MOV-26B	RHR B CONT SPRAY OUTBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-27A	10MOV-27A	RHR A LPCI OUTBD INJ VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-27B	10MOV-27B	RHR B LPCI OUTBD INJ VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-34A	10MOV-34A	RHR A TORUS COOLING SUPPLY VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-34B	10MOV-34B	RHR B TORUS COOLING SUPPLY VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-38A	10MOV-38A	RHR A TO TORUS SPRAY ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-38B	10MOV-38B	RHR B TO TORUS SPRAY ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-39A	10MOV-39A	RHR A TORUS COOLING ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-39B	10MOV-39B	RHR B TORUS COOLING ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-65A	10MOV-65A	RHR HEAT EXCH A SHELL INLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-65B	10MOV-65B	RHR HEAT EXCH B SHELL INLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-66A	10MOV-66A	RHR HEAT EXCH A BYPASS VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-66B	10MOV-66B	RHR HEAT EXCH B BYPASS VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-70A	10MOV-70A	RHR HEAT EXCH A STEAM INLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-70B	10MOV-70B	RHR HEAT EXCH B STEAM INLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-89A	10MOV-89A	RHR HEAT EXCH A SERV WATER OUTLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	10MOV-89B	10MOV-89B	RHR HEAT EXCH B SERV WATER OUTLET ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO				X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-1A	10P-1A	RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP A	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO			X	X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-1B	10P-1B	RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP B	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-1C	10P-1C	RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP C	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-1D	10P-1D	RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP D	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-3A	10P-3A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO			X	X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-3B	10P-3B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP B	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO			X	X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-3C	10P-3C	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP C	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	10P-3D	10P-3D	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP D	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X	
1	00 - Other	10RHR-260	10RHR-260	RHR LOOP B REACTOR HEAD SPRAY KEEP-FULL 10PCV-266 BYPASS VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Setemic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	00 - Other	10RHR-274	10RHR-274	RHR LOOP A CONTAINMENT SPRAY KEEP-FULL COND XFER CONNECTION VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-41A	10RV-41A	RHR PUMP A SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCT RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-41B	10RV-41B	RHR PUMP B SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCT RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-41C	10RV-41C	RHR PUMP C SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCT RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-41D	10RV-41D	RHR PUMP D SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCT RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-43A	10RV-43A	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A TUBE SIDE RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-43B	10RV-43B	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B TUBE SIDE RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-46A	10RV-46A	RHR HEAT EXCHANGE A SHELL SIDE RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10RV-46B	10RV-46B	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B SHELL SIDE RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	00 - Other	10S-5A1	10S-5A1	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER STRAINER	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO				X	
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-101A	10SOV-101A	RHR SW PUMP A MOTOR COOLING WATER RETURN SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-101B	10SOV-101B	RHR SW PUMP B MOTOR COOLING WATER RETURN SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-101C	10SOV-101C	RHR SW PUMP C MOTOR COOLING WATER RETURN SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-101D	10SOV-101D	RHR SW PUMP D MOTOR COOLING WATER RETURN SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-263A	10SOV-263A	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A OUTLET INNER SAMPLE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-263B	10SOV-263B	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B OUTLET INNER SAMPLE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic 17	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-68A	10SOV-68A	RHR A TESTABLE CHECK AIR SUPPLY ISOL SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-68B	10SOV-68B	RHR B TESTABLE CHECK AIR SUPPLY ISOL SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-71A	10SOV-71A	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A TO TORUS OR RCIC ISOL VALVE 10AOV-71A SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	10SOV-71B	10SOV-71B	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B TO TORUS OR RCIC ISOL VALVE 10AOV-71B SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10SV-35A	10SV-35A	RHR LOOP A SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10SV-35B	10SV-35B	RHR LOOP B SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10SV-44	10SV-44	REACTOR HEAD SPRAY LINE SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10SV-74A	10SV-74A	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A STEAM INLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUIG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4			Five Safety Functions							
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment	
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System						
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	10SV-74B	10SV-74B	RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B STEAM INLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO						
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	11ACC-2A	11ACC-2A	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP 2A SUCTION PULSATION DAMPENERS	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X		X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	11ACC-2B	11ACC-2B	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP 2B SUCTION PULSATION DAMPENERS	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X		X			
1	00 - Other	11EV-14A	11EV-14A	SLC A DOUBLE SQUIB ACTIVATED SHEAR EXPLOSIVE VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X		X			
1	00 - Other	11EV-14B	11EV-14B	SLC B DOUBLE SQUIB ACTIVATED SHEAR EXPLOSIVE VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X		X			
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	11P-2A	11P-2A	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL A PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X		X			
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	11P-2B	11P-2B	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL B PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X		X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	11SV-39A	11SV-39A	SLC PUMP 2A DISCH SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X		X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	11SV-39B	11SV-39B	SLC PUMP 2B DISCH SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X		X			

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	11TK-1	11TK-1	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X		X					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	12MOV-15	12MOV-15	RWCU SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X	X			
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	12MOV-18	12MOV-18	RWCU SUPPLY OUTBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO				X	X			
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	13MOV-15	13MOV-15	RCIC STEAM SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X	X			
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	13MOV-16	13MOV-16	RCIC TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY OUTBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X	X			
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	13P-1	13P-1	RCIC PUMP	NO	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO			X					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	14AOV-13A	14AOV-13A	CSP A REACTOR ISOL TESTABLE CHECK VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	14AOV-13B	14AOV-13B	CSP B REACTOR ISOL TESTABLE CHECK VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	14MOV-12A	14MOV-12A	CORE SPRAY LOOP A INBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	14MOV-12B	14MOV-12B	CORE SPRAY LOOP B INBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	14P-1A	14P-1A	CORE SPRAY PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-131A	16-1RTD-131A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 0 AZIMUTH BAY L X-232 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO				X				
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-131B	16-1RTD-131B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 0 AZIMUTH BAY L X-232 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-132A	16-1RTD-132A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 22.5 AZIMUTH BAY K X-233 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-132B	16-1RTD-132B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 22.5 AZIMUTH BAY K X-233 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-133A	16-1RTD-133A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 45 AZIMUTH BAY J X-234 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-133B	16-1RTD-133B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 45 AZIMUTH BAY J X-234 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-134A	16-1RTD-134A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 67.5 AZIMUTH BAY I X-235 RESIST THERMAL DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-134B	16-1RTD-134B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 67.5 AZIMUTH BAY I X-235 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-135A	16-1RTD-135A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 90 AZIMUTH BAY H X-236 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-135B	16-1RTD-135B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 90 AZIMUTH BAY H X-236 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-136A	16-1RTD-136A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 112.5 AZIMUTH BAY G X-237 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-136B	16-1RTD-136B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 112.5 AZIMUTH BAY G X-237 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-137A	16-1RTD-137A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 135 AZIMUTH BAY F X-238 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-137B	16-1RTD-137B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 135 AZIMUTH BAY F X-238 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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					Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-138A	16-1RTD-138A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 157.5 AZIMUTH BAY E X-239 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-138B	16-1RTD-138B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 157.5 AZIMUTH BAY E X-239 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-139A	16-1RTD-139A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 180 AZIMUTH BAY D X-240 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-139B	16-1RTD-139B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 180 AZIMUTH BAY D X-240 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-140A	16-1RTD-140A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 202.5 AZIMUTH BAY C X-241 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-140B	16-1RTD-140B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 202.5 AZIMUTH BAY C X-241, RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-141A	16-1RTD-141A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 22.5 AZIMUTH BAY B X-242 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-141B	16-1RTD-141B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 22.5 AZIMUTH BAY B X-242 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-142A	16-1RTD-142A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 247.5 AZIMUTH BAY A X-243 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-142B	16-1RTD-142B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 247.5 AZIMUTH BAY A X-243 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-143A	16-1RTD-143A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 270 AZIMUTH BAY P X-244 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-143B	16-1RTD-143B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 270 AZIMUTH BAY P X-244 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-144A	16-1RTD-144A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 292.5 AZIMUTH BAY O X-245 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-144B	16-1RTD-144B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 292.5 AZIMUTH BAY O X-245 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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					Setanic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-145A	16-1RTD-145A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 315 AZIMUTH BAY N X-246 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-145B	16-1RTD-145B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 315 AZIMUTH BAY N X-246 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-146A	16-1RTD-146A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 337.5 AZIMUTH BAY M X-247 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	16-1RTD-146B	16-1RTD-146B	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 337.5 AZIMUTH BAY M X-247 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	16-1TI-131A	16-1TI-131A	SUPPRESSION CHAMBER A TEMP INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	16-1TI-131B	16-1TI-131B	SUPPRESSION CHAMBER B TEMP INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	16-1TR-131A	16-1TR-131A	TORUS BULK TEMP MON AVERAGE TEMP RECORDER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	16-1TR-131B	16-1TR-131B	TORUS BULK TEMP MON AVERAGE TEMP RECORDER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	PEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23AOV-42	23AOV-42	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY UPSTR DRAIN ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23AOV-53	23AOV-53	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN TRAP T-3 BYPASS VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO			X					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	23E-2	23E-2	HPCI LUBE OIL COOLER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	23FI-108-1	23FI-108-1	HPCI PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW INDICATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	18 - Instrument Racks	23FT-82	23FT-82	HPCI MAIN PUMP P-1M DISCH FLOW XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23HOV-1	23HOV-1	HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23HOV-2	23HOV-2	HPCI TURBINE CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	23LI-202A	23LI-202A	SUPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER LEVEL INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	23LI-202B	23LI-202B	SUPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER LEVEL INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	23LT-202A	23LT-202A	SUPPRESSION POOL HPCI LOGIC LEVEL XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	23LT-202B	23LT-202B	SUPPRESSION POOL HPCI LOGIC LEVEL XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-14	23MOV-14	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X	X			
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-15	23MOV-15	HPCI STEAM SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	X			
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-16	23MOV-16	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY OUTBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	X			
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-17	23MOV-17	HPCI BOOSTER PUMP P-1B SUCT FROM 33TK-1A & B ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-19	23MOV-19	HPCI PUMP DISCH TO REACTOR INBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-20	23MOV-20	HPCI PUMP DISCH TO REACTOR OUTBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-21	23MOV-21	HPCI FULL FLOW TEST RETURN TO CST 33TK-1A & B UPSTR ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-24	23MOV-24	HPCI FULL FLOW TEST RETURN TO CST 33TK-1A & B DNSTR ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-25	23MOV-25	HPCI MAIN PUMP P-1M MIN FLOW ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-57	23MOV-57	HPCI BOOSTER PUMP P-1B SUCT FROM SUPPRESSION POOL DNSTR ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-58	23MOV-58	HPCI BOOSTER PUMP P-1B SUCT FROM SUPPRESSION POOL UPSTR ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X		
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-59	23MOV-59	HPCI TURB EXH LINE VAC BREAKER VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X		
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	23MOV-60	23MOV-60	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY OUTBD ISOL VALVE 23MOV-16 BYPASS VALVE	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO					
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	23P-150	23P-150	HPCI TURBINE AUX LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO					X
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	23P-1B	23P-1B	HPCI BOOSTER PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X		
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	23P-1M	23P-1M	HPCI MAIN PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO	X	X	X		
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	23P-1MO	23P-1MO	HPCI MAIN LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X		

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								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23RV-106	23RV-106	HPCI AUX OIL PUMP P-150 DISCH RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23RV-107	23RV-107	HPCI MAIN LUBE OIL PUMP P-1MO DISCH RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	23SOV-42	23SOV-42	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY UPSTR DRAIN ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	23SOV-53	23SOV-53	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN TRAP T-3 BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	23SPI-161	23SPI-161	HPCI TURBINE SPEED INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23SV-34	23SV-34	HPCI BOOSTER PUMP P-1B SUCT SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	23SV-66	23SV-66	HPCI BOOSTER PUMP P-1B RECIRC SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	23TK-1	23TK-1	HPCI LUBE OIL SUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO	X	X	X					
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	23TU-2	23TU-2	HPCI PUMP DRIVE TURBINE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X					

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								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-126A	27AOV-126A	AMBIENT VAPORIZER A INLET VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-126B	27AOV-126B	AMBIENT VAPORIZER B INLET VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-127A	27AOV-127A	STEAM VAPORIZER NV-8 LIQUID NITROGEN SUPPLY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-127B	27AOV-127B	STEAM VAPORIZER NV-8 LIQUID NITROGEN SUPPLY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-128A	27AOV-128A	CAD TRAIN A NITROGEN MAKE-UP SUPPLY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-129A	27AOV-129A	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR CAD TRAIN A BACKUP VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-129B	27AOV-129B	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR CAD TRAIN B BACKUP VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-131A	27AOV-131A	CAD TRAIN A NITROGEN MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-131B	27AOV-131B	CAD TRAIN B NITROGEN MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-132A	27AOV-132A	CAD TRAIN A TORUS NITROGEN MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27AOV-132B	27AOV-132B	CAD TRAIN B TORUS NITROGEN MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	27CAD	27CAD	CONTAINMENT AIR DILUTION PANEL	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	27E-1A	27E-1A	CAD A VALVE OPERATING NITROGEN AMBIENT HEAT EXCHANGER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	27E-1B	27E-1B	CAD B VALVE OPERATING NITROGEN AMBIENT HEAT EXCHANGER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	18 - Instrument Racks	27EH-10A	27EH-10A	CAD A AMBIENT VAPORIZER ELECTRIC HEATER	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO								
1	18 - Instrument Racks	27EH-10B	27EH-10B	CAD B AMBIENT VAPORIZER ELECTRIC HEATER	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	27MAP	27MAP	MONITORING ANALYSIS PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	18 - Instrument Racks	27NS-CA	27NS-CA	CAD A NITROGEN SUPPLY INSTR CABINET	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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					Setanic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	27NS-CB	27NS-CB	CAD B NITROGEN SUPPLY INSTR CABINET	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	27NV-9A	27NV-9A	CAD TRAIN A AMBIENT VAPORIZER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	27NV-9B	27NV-9B	CAD TRAIN B AMBIENT VAPORIZER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-101A	27PCV-101A	27PC-101A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-101B	27PCV-101B	27PC-101B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-102A	27PCV-102A	27FCV-111 POSITIONER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-102B	27PCV-102B	27FCV-111 SIGNAL CONVERTER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-114	27PCV-114	27PCV-120 NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	27PCV-116A	27PCV-116A	27FCV-103A SIGNAL CONVERTER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	27PCV-116B	27PCV-116B	27FCV-103B SIGNAL CONVERTER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-120	27PCV-120	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR NITROGEN BACKUP SUPPLY PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-121A	27PCV-121A	27PCV-122A POSITIONER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-121B	27PCV-121B	27PCV-122B POSITIONER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-122A	27PCV-122A	PRESS BUILDING COIL A INLET PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-122B	27PCV-122B	PRESS BUILDING COIL B INLET PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-124A1	27PCV-124A1	27AOV-131A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-124A2	27PCV-124A2	27AOV-132A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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					Belamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-124B1	27PCV-124B1	27AOV-131B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-124B2	27PCV-124B2	27AOV-132B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-125A	27PCV-125A	27TCV-124 POSITIONER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-125B	27PCV-125B	27TCV-124 CNTRLR NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-126A	27PCV-126A	27AOV-126A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-126B	27PCV-126B	27AOV-126B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-127A	27PCV-127A	27AOV-127A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-127B	27PCV-127B	27AOV-127B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-128A	27PCV-128A	27AOV-128A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-128B	27PCV-128B	27AOV-128B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-129A	27PCV-129A	27AOV-129A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-129B	27PCV-129B	27AOV-129B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-130	27PCV-130	CAD PC-120 PRESSURE REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-132A	27PCV-132A	27PC-122A NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-132B	27PCV-132B	27PC-122B NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-133A	27PCV-133A	27RV-101A POSITIONER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-133B	27PCV-133B	27RV-101B POSITIONER NITROGEN SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-134A	27PCV-134A	CAD TRAIN A VALVE OPERATING NITROGEN PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-134B	27PCV-134B	CAD TRAIN B VALVE OPERATING NITROGEN PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27PCV-140	27PCV-140	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR NITROGEN BACKUP SUPPLY PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	27PI-115A2	27PI-115A2	CAD DRYWELL DIV I PRESS INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	27PI-115B2	27PI-115B2	CAD DRYWELL DIV II PRESS INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	27PT-115A2	27PT-115A2	DRYWELL DIV I WIDE RANGE PRESS XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	27PT-115B2	27PT-115B2	DRYWELL DIV II WIDE RANGE PRESS XMITTER EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27RV-101A	27RV-101A	LIQUID NITROGEN TANK A RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27RV-101B	27RV-101B	LIQUID NITROGEN TANK B RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-126A	27SOV-126A	AMBIENT VAPORIZER A INLET VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-126B	27SOV-126B	AMBIENT VAPORIZER B INLET VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-127A	27SOV-127A	STEAM VAPORIZER NV-8 LIQUID NITROGEN SUPPLY VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-127B	27SOV-127B	STEAM VAPORIZER NV-8 LIQUID NITROGEN SUPPLY VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-128A	27SOV-128A	CAD TRAIN A NITROGEN MAKE-UP SUPPLY VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-128B	27SOV-128B	CAD TRAIN B NITROGEN MAKE-UP SUPPLY VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-129A	27SOV-129A	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR CAD TRAIN A BACKUP ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-129B	27SOV-129B	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR CAD TRAIN B BACKUP ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-131A	27SOV-131A	CAD TRAIN A NITROGEN MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE EQ	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO	X	X	X		

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													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-131B	27SOV-131B	CAD TRAIN B NITROGEN MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-132A	27SOV-132A	CAD TRAIN A TORUS N2 MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-132B	27SOV-132B	CAD TRAIN B TORUS N2 MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE EQ	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-141	27SOV-141	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR INSTR AIR OR NORMAL N2 CROSS TIE VALVE EQ	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08B - Solenoid-Operated Valves	27SOV-145	27SOV-145	CAD DRYWELL INSTR NITROGEN BACKUP SUPPLY ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-114A	27SV-114A	CAD TRAIN A VALVE OPERATING SUPPLY SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-114B	27SV-114B	CAD TRAIN B VALVE OPERATING SUPPLY SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-115A	27SV-115A	AMBIENT VAPORIZER A OUTLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-115B	27SV-115B	AMBIENT VAPORIZER B OUTLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Setanic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-118A	27SV-118A	LIQUID NITROGEN TANK A OUTLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-118B	27SV-118B	LIQUID NITROGEN TANK B OUTLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-119A	27SV-119A	PRESS BUILDING COIL A INLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-119B	27SV-119B	PRESS BUILDING COIL B INLET SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-121	27SV-121	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR NORMAL SUPPLY 27PCV-120 BYPASS SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-122	27SV-122	STEAM VAPORIZER NV-8 CAD TRAINS A & B INLET CROSS-TIE SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-201A	27SV-201A	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR NORMAL SUPPLY SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-201B	27SV-201B	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR NORMAL SUPPLY SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 3 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	27SV-202	27SV-202	DRYWELL PCV AND INSTR BACKUP SUPPLY SAFETY VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	27TK-7A	27TK-7A	CAD A LIQUID NITROGEN TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	27TK-7B	27TK-7B	CAD B LIQUID NITROGEN TANK	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1A	29AC-1A	MST D OUTBD MSIV AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO					X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1B	29AC-1B	MST A INBD MSIV N2/AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO					X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1C	29AC-1C	MST D INBD MSIV N2/AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1D	29AC-1D	MST B OUTBD MSIV AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1E	29AC-1E	MST C OUTBD MSIV AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1F	29AC-1F	MST B INBD MSIV N2/AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1G	29AC-1G	MST A OUTBD MSIV AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	29AC-1H	29AC-1H	MST C INBD MSIV N2/AIR ACCUMULATOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			

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UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-80A	29AOV-80A	MST A INBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO					X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-80B	29AOV-80B	MST B INBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-80C	29AOV-80C	MST C INBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-80D	29AOV-80D	MST D INBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-86A	29AOV-86A	MST A OUTBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO					X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-86B	29AOV-86B	MST B OUTBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-86C	29AOV-86C	MST C OUTBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	29AOV-86D	29AOV-86D	MST D INBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO					X			
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	29MOV-74	29MOV-74	MST INBD LINE DRAIN INBD ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO					X			

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	33LI-101A	33LI-101A	CND STORAGE TK-12A & B LEVEL INDIC	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	33LT-101	33LT-101	CST LEVEL TRANSMITTER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	33TK-12A	33TK-12A	CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	33TK-12B	33TK-12B	CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK B	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	46(70)ESW-101	46(70)ESW-101	CR/RR VENT 70AHU-3A & 12A ESW SUPPLY ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	46(70)ESW-102	46(70)ESW-102	CR/RR VENT 70AHU-3B & 12B ESW SUPPLY ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	46(70)ESW-103	46(70)ESW-103	CR/RR VENT 70AHU-3A & 12A ESW RETURN ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	46(70)ESW-104	46(70)ESW-104	CR/RR VENT 70AHU-3B & 12B ESW RETURN ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	46MOV-101A	46MOV-101A	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LOOP A SUPPLY HEADER ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	46MOV-101B	46MOV-101B	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LOOP B SUPPLY HEADER ISOL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				

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UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	46MOV-102A	46MOV-102A	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP A TEST VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	46MOV-102B	46MOV-102B	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP B TEST VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	46P-2A	46P-2A	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP A	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO				X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	46P-2B	46P-2B	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP B	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	00 - Other	46STR-5A1	46STR-5A1	EMERG SERVICE WATER PUMP A DISCH SOUTH BASKET STRAINER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO				X				
1	00 - Other	46STR-5A2	46STR-5A2	EMERG SERVICE WATER PUMP A DISCH NORTH BASKET STRAINER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO				X				
1	00 - Other	46STR-5B1	46STR-5B1	EMERG SERVICE WATER PUMP B DISCH NORTH BASKET STRAINER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	00 - Other	46STR-5B2	46STR-5B2	EMERG SERVICE WATER PUMP B DISCH SOUTH BASKET STRAINER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO				X				
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	66PCV-101	66PCV-101	RB UNIT COOLERS SWS RETURN HEADER PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	66TCV-107E	66TCV-107E	EAST CRESCENT AREA UC-22E SWS INLET TEMP CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22A	66UC-22A	WEST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22B	66UC-22B	EAST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22B	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22C	66UC-22C	WEST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22C	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22D	66UC-22D	EAST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22D	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22E	66UC-22E	WEST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22E	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22F	66UC-22F	EAST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22F	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22G	66UC-22G	WEST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22G	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22H	66UC-22H	EAST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22H	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22J	66UC-22J	WEST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22J	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	66UC-22K	66UC-22K	HPCI ROOM UNIT COOLER 22K	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	67E-11	67E-11	WEST CABLE TUNNEL VENT SUPPLY COOLING COIL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67E-14	67E-14	EAST CABLE TUNNEL VENT SUPPLY COOLING COIL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67MOD-16A1	67MOD-16A1	WEST ELECTRIC BAY UC-16A DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67MOD-16A2	67MOD-16A2	WEST ELECTRIC BAY UC-16A DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67MOD-16B1	67MOD-16B1	EAST ELECTRIC BAY UC-16B DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67MOD-16B2	67MOD-16B2	EAST ELECTRIC BAY UC-16B DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67PCV-101	67PCV-101	ELECTRIC BAY UC-16A & B SERVICE WATER RETURN PRESS CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67UC-16A	67UC-16A	WEST ELECTRIC BAY UNIT COOLER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	67UC-16B	67UC-16B	EAST ELECTRIC BAY UNIT COOLER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70AHU-12A	70AHU-12A	RELAY ROOM VENT AIR HANDLING UNIT A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70AHU-12B	70AHU-12B	RELAY ROOM VENT AIR HANDLING UNIT B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	70AHU-19A	70AHU-19A	CHILLER ROOM VENT AIR HANDLING UNIT A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70AHU-19B	70AHU-19B	CHILLER ROOM VENT AIR HANDLING UNIT B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70AHU-3A	70AHU-3A	CONTROL ROOM VENT AIR HANDLING UNIT A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70AHU-3B	70AHU-3B	CONTROL ROOM VENT AIR HANDLING UNIT B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70FD-1	70FD-1	RELAY ROOM INLET VENT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70FD-10	70FD-10	SOUTH/NORTH CABLE ROOMS FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70FD-2	70FD-2	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FANS INLET FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70FD-4	70FD-4	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70FD-5	70FD-5	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70FD-6	70FD-6	RELAY ROOM VENT SUPPLY FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70FD-7	70FD-7	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	09 - Fans	70FN-13A	70FN-13A	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	09 - Fans	70FN-13B	70FN-13B	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	09 - Fans	70FN-4A	70FN-4A	CONTROL ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO				X				
1	09 - Fans	70FN-4B	70FN-4B	CONTROL ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-101A	70MOD-101A	RELAY ROOM VENT AHU-12A OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-101B	70MOD-101B	RELAY ROOM VENT AHU-12B OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-102A	70MOD-102A	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN 13A OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-102B	70MOD-102B	RELAY ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN 13B OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-104A	70MOD-104A	RELAY ROOM VENT RECIRC ISOL DAMPER A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-104B	70MOD-104B	RELAY ROOM VENT RECIRC ISOL DAMPER B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-106A	70MOD-106A	CONTROL ROOM VENT AHU-3A OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-106B	70MOD-106B	CONTROL ROOM VENT AHU-3B OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-108A	70MOD-108A	CONTROL ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN 4A OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-108B	70MOD-108B	CONTROL ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN 4B OUTLET ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-110A	70MOD-110A	CONTROL ROOM VENT RECIRC ISOL DAMPER A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	70MOD-110B	70MOD-110B	CONTROL ROOM VENT RECIRC ISOL DAMPER B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70PCV-100A1	70PCV-100A1	CR/RR CHILLER CONDENSER A SWS PRESS CONTROL VALVE 1	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70PCV-100A2	70PCV-100A2	CR/RR CHILLER CONDENSER B SWS PRESS CONTROL VALVE 2	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70PCV-100B1	70PCV-100B1	CR/RR CHILLER CONDENSER A SWS PRESS CONTROL VALVE 1	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70PCV-100B2	70PCV-100B2	CR/RR CHILLER CONDENSER B SWS PRESS CONTROL VALVE 2	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Selenic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Barated System					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70RV-101A	70RV-101A	CR/RR CHILLER A CONDENSER SERVICE WATER RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70RV-101B	70RV-101B	CR/RR CHILLER B CONDENSER SERVICE WATER RELIEF VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	11 - Chillers	70RWC-2A(CND)	70RWC-2A(CND)	CONTROL ROOM CHILLER A CONDENSER	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO				X	
1	11 - Chillers	70RWC-2B(CND)	70RWC-2B(CND)	CONTROL ROOM CHILLER B CONDENSER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70TCV-123A	70TCV-123A	CR/RR CHILLER ROOM AHU-19A CHILLED WATER OUTLET TEMP CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves	70TCV-123B	70TCV-123B	CR/RR CHILLER ROOM AHU-19B CHILLED WATER OUTLET TEMP CONTROL VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10502	71-10502	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10500)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO		X	X	X	
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10512	71-10512	EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR C FEED TO EMERG 4KV BUS 10500	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10514	71-10514	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10500)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10560	71-10560	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10500)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10602	71-10602	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10612	71-10612	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10614	71-10614	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71-10660	71-10660	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71-11502	71-11502	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 11500) BKR 02	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71-11602	71-11602	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 11600) BKR 02	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71-12502	71-12502	600V EMERG BUS FEED BREAKER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (Y/N)	Borated System					
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71-12602	71-12602	600V EMERG BUS 12600 FEED BREAKER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71ACA2	71ACA2	RELAY ROOM EMERGENCY PANEL DISTRIBUTION PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71ACA4	71ACA4	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71ACA4 EMERGENCY CONTROL & INST POWER A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71ACB4	71ACB4	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71ACB4 EMERGENCY CONTROL & INST POWER B	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71ACUPS	71ACUPS	RELAY ROOM UNINTERRUPTABLE BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL	NO	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	15 - Battery Racks	71BAT-3A	71BAT-3A	LPCI INVERTER BATTERY	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	15 - Battery Racks	71BAT-3B	71BAT-3B	LPCI INVERTER BATTERY	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Perated System					
1	16 - Battery Chargers and Inverters	71BC-1A	71BC-1A	125 VDC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	16 - Battery Chargers and Inverters	71BC-1B	71BC-1B	125 VDC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71BCB-2A	71BCB-2A	BATTERY A CONTROL BOARD	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71BCB-2B	71BCB-2B	BATTERY B CONTROL BOARD	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71BMCC-1	71BMCC-1	RB WEST CRESCENT DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71BMCC-2	71BMCC-2	RB EAST CRESCENT DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71BMCC-3	71BMCC-3	RB WEST CRESCENT DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IP/EE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I / O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T / H)	Berated System					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71BMCC-4	71BMCC-4	RB EAST CRESCENT DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71BMCC-6	71BMCC-6	RB DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71DC-A2	71DC-A2	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71DC-A2 DC CONTROL POWER A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71DC-A2-4	71DC-A2-4	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71DC-A2 (BRK 4)	NO	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71DC-A5	71DC-A5	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71DC-A5 DC CONTROL POWER A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71DC-B2	71DC-B2	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71DC-B2 DC CONTROL POWER B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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					Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71DC-B4	71DC-B4	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71DC-B4 DC CONTROL POWER B	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO					
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71DSC-11561	71DSC-11561	L15 UNIT SUBSTATION TRANSF T-13 HIGH SIDE DISC SW	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	T	NO			X	X	
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71DSC-11661	71DSC-11661	L16 UNIT SUBSTATION TRANSF T-14 HIGH SIDE DISC SW	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71DSC-12561	71DSC-12561	L25 UNIT SUBSTATION TRANSF T-15 HIGH SIDE DISC SWITCH	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71DSC-12661	71DSC-12661	L26 UNIT SUBSTATION TRANSF T-16 HIGH SIDE DISC SWITCH	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71ESSA1	71ESSA1	SAFEGUARD CONTROL & INST POWER A DISTRIBUTION PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches	71ESSB1	71ESSB1	SAFEGUARD CONTROL & INST POWER B DISTRIBUTION PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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					Seramic?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71H05	71H05	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10500)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	03 - Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear	71H06	71H06	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	16 - Battery Chargers and Inverters	71INV-3A	71INV-3A	LPCI MOV INDEP POWER SUPPLY A INVERTER	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	T	NO			X	X	
1	16 - Battery Chargers and Inverters	71INV-3B	71INV-3B	LPCI MOV INDEP POWER SUPPLY B INVERTER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71L15	71L15	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 11500)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71L16	71L16	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 11600)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71L25	71L25	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 12500)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X	
1	02 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels	71L26	71L26	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 12600)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X	

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								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-151	71MCC-151	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 115100)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-152	71MCC-152	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 144200)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-153	71MCC-153	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 115300)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-155	71MCC-155	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 115500)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-156	71MCC-156	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 115600)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-161	71MCC-161	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 116100)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X		X	X	

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					Setanic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Barated System					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-162	71MCC-162	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 116200)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-163	71MCC-163	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 116300)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-165	71MCC-165	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 116500)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-166	71MCC-166	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 116600)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-251	71MCC-251	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 125100)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-252	71MCC-252	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 125200)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X	

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								Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (Y/N)	Borated System					
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-253	71MCC-253	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 125300)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-254	71MCC-254	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 125400)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X				
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-261	71MCC-261	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 126100)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-262	71MCC-262	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 126200)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X				
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-263	71MCC-263	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 126300)	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	01 - Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors	71MCC-264	71MCC-264	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 126400)	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X				

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								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	04 - Transformers	71PT-71ACA2	71PT-71ACA2	EMERGENCY DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER 71MCC-253-OD3	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO						X		
1	04 - Transformers	71PT-71ACA4	71PT-71ACA4	EMERGENCY DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER 71MCC-254-A3A	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X				
1	04 - Transformers	71PT-71ACB2	71PT-71ACB2	EMERGENCY DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER 71MCC-263-OE3	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	04 - Transformers	71PT-71ACB4	71PT-71ACB4	EMERGENCY DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER 71MCC-264-A3A	YES	NO	NO	YES	N/A	I		NO								
1	04 - Transformers	71PT-71ACUPS	71PT-71ACUPS	UNINTERRUPTIBLE BUS 37.5 KVA TRANSFORMER 71MCC-252-OD2	NO	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO			X					
1	04 - Transformers	71PT-71ESSA1	71PT-71ESSA1	SAFEGUARD BUS A DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER 71MCC-252-OC2	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	04 - Transformers	71PT-71ESSB1	71PT-71ESSB1	SAFEGUARD BUS B DISTRIBUTION 15KVA TRANSFORMER 71MCC-252-OB3	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	15 - Battery Racks	71SB-1	71SB-1	125 VOLT STATION BATTERY A	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X	X		
1	15 - Battery Racks	71SB-2	71SB-2	125 VOLT STATION BATTERY B	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X	X		
1	04 - Transformers	71T-13	71T-13	600V UNIT SUBSTATION L15 TRANSFORMER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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								Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	04 - Transformers	71T-14	71T-14	600V UNIT SUBSTATION L16 TRANSFORMER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	04 - Transformers	71T-15	71T-15	SWITCHGEAR L25 100KVA TRANSFORMER 71-10560	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	04 - Transformers	71T-16	71T-16	600V UNIT SUBSTATION L26 TRANSFORMER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	13 - Motor Generators	71UPS-1(MTR)	71UPS-1(MTR)		YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	72AHU-30A	72AHU-30A	BATTERY ROOM A AIR HANDLING UNIT	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X				
1	10 - Air Handlers	72AHU-30B	72AHU-30B	BATTERY ROOM B AIR HANDLING UNIT	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	72FD-13	72FD-13	BATTERY ROOM A VENT EXHAUST FANS A & C SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	72FD-14	72FD-14	BATTERY ROOM B VENT EXHAUST FANS B & D SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	72FD-3	72FD-3	BATTERY ROOM A VENT EXHAUST FANS A & C DISCH FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	10 - Air Handlers	72FD-4	72FD-4	BATTERY ROOM A RECIRC FAN A EXHAUST FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72FD-5	72FD-5	BATTERY ROOM VENT AHU-30B SUPPLY FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72FD-6	72FD-6	BATTERY ROOM A AHU-30A INLET FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	72FN-31A	72FN-31A	BATTERY ROOM A RECIRC FAN	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	
1	09 - Fans	72FN-31B	72FN-31B	BATTERY ROOM B RECIRC FAN	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	72FN-46A	72FN-46A	BATTERY ROOM A EXHAUST FAN	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	
1	09 - Fans	72FN-46B	72FN-46B	BATTERY ROOM B EXHAUST FAN	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	
1	09 - Fans	72FN-46C	72FN-46C	BATTERY ROOM A EXHAUST FAN	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	72FN-46D	72FN-46D	BATTERY ROOM D EXHAUST FAN	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	72HV-7A	72HV-7A	ADMIN BUILDING VENTILATION CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-100A	72MOD-100A	BATTERY ROOM A AHU-30A FRESH AIR SUPPLY ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-100B	72MOD-100B	BATTERY ROOM B AHU-30B FRESH AIR SUPPLY ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-101A	72MOD-101A	BATTERY ROOM A AHU-30A RECIRC ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
								Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-101B	72MOD-101B	BATTERY ROOM B AHU-30B RECIRC ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-102A	72MOD-102A	BATTERY ROOM A RECIRC FAN A DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-102B	72MOD-102B	BATTERY ROOM B RECIRC FAN B DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-103A	72MOD-103A	BATTERY ROOM A EXHAUST FAN A DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-103B	72MOD-103B	BATTERY ROOM B EXHAUST FAN B DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-103C	72MOD-103C	BATTERY ROOM A EXHAUST FAN C DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-103D	72MOD-103D	BATTERY ROOM B EXHAUST FAN D DISCH ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-104A	72MOD-104A	BATTERY ROOM A VENT RECIRC FAN A EXHAUST DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	72MOD-104B	72MOD-104B	BATTERY ROOM B VENT RECIRC FAN B EXHAUST DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	73FD-1A	73FD-1A	ESW/RHRSW PUMP ROOM A FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	73FD-1B	73FD-1B	ESW/RHRSW PUMP ROOM B FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4				Five Safety Functions					
					Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	73FD-1C	73FD-1C	ESW/RHRSW PUMP ROOM B FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	73FD-1D	73FD-1D	WEST DIESEL FIRE PUMP ROOM FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	73FN-3A	73FN-3A	ESW/RHRSW PUMP ROOM EXHAUST FAN A	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	73FN-3B	73FN-3B	ESW/RHRSW PUMP ROOM EXHAUST FAN B	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92CD-1	92CD-1	EDG A SWITCHGEAR AREA VENT CO2 ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92CD-2	92CD-2	EDG B SWITCHGEAR AREA VENT CO2 ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92CD-3	92CD-3	EDG C SWITCHGEAR AREA VENT CO2 ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92CD-4	92CD-4	EDG D SWITCHGEAR AREA VENT CO2 ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-01	92FD-01	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FANS A & C FRESH AIR SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-02	92FD-02	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN A RECIRC SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-03	92FD-03	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN A DISCH FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-04	92FD-04	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN C RECIRC SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-05	92FD-05	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN C DISCH FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-06	92FD-06	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN B DISCH FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-07	92FD-07	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN B RECIRC SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-08	92FD-08	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN D DISCH FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-09	92FD-09	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN D RECIRC SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92FD-10	92FD-10	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FANS B & D FRESH AIR SUCT FIRE DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	92FN-1A	92FN-1A	EMERG DIESEL GEN A VENT SUPPLY FAN	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	
1	09 - Fans	92FN-1B	92FN-1B	EMERG DIESEL GEN B VENT SUPPLY FAN	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	92FN-1C	92FN-1C	EMERG DIESEL GEN C VENT SUPPLY FAN	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	09 - Fans	92FN-1D	92FN-1D	EMERG DIESEL GEN D VENT SUPPLY FAN	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4				Five Safety Functions					
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?		Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment	
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	92HV-9A	92HV-9A	EDG VENT A & C HEATING/VENT LOCAL CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	92HV-9B	92HV-9B	EDG VENT B & D HEATING/VENT LOCAL CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-143A	92MOD-143A	EMERG DIESEL GEN A VENT EXHAUST ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-143B	92MOD-143B	EMERG DIESEL GEN B VENT EXHAUST ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-143C	92MOD-143C	EMERG DIESEL GEN C VENT EXHAUST ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-143D	92MOD-143D	EMERG DIESEL GEN D VENT EXHAUST ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-148A	92MOD-148A	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN A RECIRC SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-148B	92MOD-148B	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN B RECIRC SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-148C	92MOD-148C	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN C RECIRC SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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					Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/ Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-148D	92MOD-148D	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN D RECIRC SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-149A	92MOD-149A	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN A FRESH AIR SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-149B	92MOD-149B	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN B FRESH AIR SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-149C	92MOD-149C	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN C FRESH AIR SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-149D	92MOD-149D	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FAN D FRESH AIR SUCT ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-150A	92MOD-150A	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FANS A & C FRESH AIR WEST SUPPLY ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-150B	92MOD-150B	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FANS B & D FRESH AIR WEST SUPPLY ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-150C	92MOD-150C	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FANS A & C FRESH AIR EAST SUPPLY ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

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								Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	10 - Air Handlers	92MOD-150D	92MOD-150D	EMERG DIESEL GEN VENT SUPPLY FANS B & D FRESH AIR EAST SUPPLY ISOL DAMPER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	92RTD-101A	92RTD-101A	EMERG DIESEL GEN A ROOM SOUTH SIDE RESIST TEMP DETECTOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X				
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	92RTD-101B	92RTD-101B	EMERG DIESEL GEN B ROOM SOUTH SIDE RESIST TEMP DETECTOR	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X				
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	92RTD-101C	92RTD-101C	EMERG DIESEL GEN C ROOM NORTH SIDE RESIST TEMP DETECTOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	19 - Temperature Sensors	92RTD-101D	92RTD-101D	EMERG DIESEL GEN D ROOM NORTH SIDE RESIST TEMP DETECTOR	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	12 - Air Compressor	93AC-A1	93AC-A1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START COMPRESSOR A1	NO	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A1	93AR-A1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A1	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A10	93AR-A10	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A10	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A2	93AR-A2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A2	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

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					Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A3	93AR-A3	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A3	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A4	93AR-A4	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A4	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A5	93AR-A5	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A5	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A6	93AR-A6	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A6	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A7	93AR-A7	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A7	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A8	93AR-A8	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A8	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-A9	93AR-A9	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A9	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B1	93AR-B1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B1	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B10	93AR-B10	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B10	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B2	93AR-B2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B2	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B3	93AR-B3	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B3	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity?(T/H)	Borated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B4	93AR-B4	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B4	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B5	93AR-B5	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B5	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B6	93AR-B6	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B6	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B7	93AR-B7	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B7	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B8	93AR-B8	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B8	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-B9	93AR-B9	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B9	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C1	93AR-C1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C1	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C10	93AR-C10	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C10	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C2	93AR-C2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C2	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C3	93AR-C3	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C3	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C4	93AR-C4	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C4	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C5	93AR-C5	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C5	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C6	93AR-C6	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C6	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C7	93AR-C7	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C7	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C8	93AR-C8	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C8	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-C9	93AR-C9	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C AIR START RECEIVER C9	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D1	93AR-D1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D1	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D10	93AR-D10	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D10	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D2	93AR-D2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D2	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D3	93AR-D3	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D3	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D4	93AR-D4	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D4	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D5	93AR-D5	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D5	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D6	93AR-D6	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D6	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D7	93AR-D7	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D7	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D8	93AR-D8	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D8	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93AR-D9	93AR-D9	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D AIR START RECEIVER D9	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93AURP-01	93AURP-01	EDG A & C AUX UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93AURP-02	93AURP-02	EDG B & D AUX UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY PANEL	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECP-A	93ECP-A	EDG A ENGINE CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X			
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECP-B	93ECP-B	EDG B ENGINE CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X			
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECP-C	93ECP-C	EDG C ENGINE CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X			

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
								Replaced	IEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Bonded System					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECP-D	93ECP-D	EDG D ENGINE CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECSP-A	93ECSP-A	EDG A ENGINE CONTROL SUB PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECSP-B	93ECSP-B	EDG B ENGINE CONTROL SUB PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECSP-C	93ECSP-C	EDG C ENGINE CONTROL SUB PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93ECSP-D	93ECSP-D	EDG C ENGINE CONTROL SUB PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	17 - Engine Generators	93EDG-A	93EDG-A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	17 - Engine Generators	93EDG-B	93EDG-B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	17 - Engine Generators	93EDG-C	93EDG-C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	17 - Engine Generators	93EDG-D	93EDG-D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93EGP-A	93EGP-A	EDG C GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Ceramic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Perated System					
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93EGP-B	93EGP-B	EDG B GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93EGP-C	93EGP-C	EDG C GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93EGP-D	93EGP-D	EDG D GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93FPAC	93FPAC	EDG A & C FORCED PARALLELING PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	93FPBD	93FPBD	EDG B & D FORCED PARALLELING PANEL	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LI-102A	93LI-102A	EDG A FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7A LEVEL INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LI-102B	93LI-102B	EDG B FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7B LEVEL INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LI-102C	93LI-102C	EDG C FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7C LEVEL INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LI-102D	93LI-102D	EDG D FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7D LEVEL INDIC	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93LOE-1A	93LOE-1A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A LUBE OIL COOLER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Barated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93LOE-1B	93LOE-1B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B LUBE OIL COOLER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93LOE-1C	93LOE-1C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C LUBE OIL COOLER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93LOE-1D	93LOE-1D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D LUBE OIL COOLER	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO	X	X	X	X	X
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LT-102A	93LT-102A	EDG A FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7A LEVEL XMITTER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LT-102B	93LT-102B	EDG B FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7B LEVEL XMITTER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LT-102C	93LT-102C	EDG C FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7C LEVEL XMITTER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	93LT-102D	93LT-102D	EDG D FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7D LEVEL XMITTER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-A1	93P1-A1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP A1	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-A2	93P1-A2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP A2	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-B1	93P1-B1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP B1	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Selamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-B2	93P1-B2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP B2	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-C1	93P1-C1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP C1	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-C2	93P1-C2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP C2	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-D1	93P1-D1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP D1	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P1-D2	93P1-D2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP D2	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-2A	93P-2A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A CIRCULATING LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-2B	93P-2B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B CIRCULATING LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-2C	93P-2C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C CIRCULATING LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-2D	93P-2D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D CIRCULATING LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Islamic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-3A	93P-3A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A TURBOCHARGER LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-3B	93P-3B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B TURBOCHARGER LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-3C	93P-3C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C TURBOCHARGER LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	06 - Vertical Pumps	93P-3D	93P-3D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D TURBOCHARGER LUBE OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P-4A	93P-4A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A FUEL OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P-4B	93P-4B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B FUEL OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P-4C	93P-4C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C FUEL OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	05 - Horizontal Pumps	93P-4D	93P-4D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D FUEL OIL PUMP	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-1A	93TK-1A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Seismic 1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Berated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-1B	93TK-1B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-1C	93TK-1C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-1D	93TK-1D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-6A	93TK-6A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-6B	93TK-6B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-6C	93TK-6C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-6D	93TK-6D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-7A	93TK-7A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A FUEL OIL DAY TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-7B	93TK-7B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B FUEL OIL DAY TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X				
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-7C	93TK-7C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C FUEL OIL DAY TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X				

Attachment B

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UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions				
					Selanic,1?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
										Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93TK-7D	93TK-7D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D FUEL OIL DAY TANK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93WE-1A	93WE-1A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93WE-1B	93WE-1B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I		NO		X	X	X	
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93WE-1C	93WE-1C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	93WE-1D	93WE-1D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	YES	NO	YES	YES	N/A	I	NO	NO		X	X	X	
1	18 - Instrument Racks	IR-25-01	IR-25-01	CORE SPRAY CHANNEL "A" INST RACK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO				X	
1	18 - Instrument Racks	IR-25-05	IR-25-05	REACTOR PROTECTION AND NSSS SYSTEM RACK	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	IR-25-06	IR-25-06	REACTOR PROTECTION AND NSSS SYSTEM RACK	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	IR-25-50	IR-25-50	HPCI INST RACK	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	IR-25-59	IR-25-59	RHR CHANNEL "A" INST RACK	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO					

UNIT	SQUG EQUIP CLASS	CURRENT EQUIPMENT ID	SSEL EQUIPMENT ID	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	SCREEN 1	SCREEN 2	SCREEN 3	SCREEN 4					Five Safety Functions							
								Ceramic?	Undergo Regular Configuration Inspections?	Maintains at least one of the 5 Safety Functions	Replaced	IPEEE	Environment?			Reactivity Control	Pressure Control	Inventory Control	Decay Heat Removal	Containment
													Inside/Outside (I/O)	High Temp/Humidity? (T/H)	Borated System					
1	18 - Instrument Racks	IR-25-60	IR-25-60	CORE SPRAY CHANNEL "B" INST RACK	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	18 - Instrument Racks	IR-25-62	IR-25-62	RHR CHANNEL "B" INST RACK	YES	NO	YES	NO	N/A	I	NO	NO			X	X				
1	08A - Motor-Operated Valves	01-125MOV-14A	01-125MOV-14A	SGT FILTER TRAIN A INLE ISOLATION VALVE	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	02-3LI-85A	02-3LI-85A	REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								
1	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	02-3LI-85B (02-3LR-85B)	02-3LI-85B (02-3LR-85B)	DIV I RX WATER LEVEL RECORDER	YES	NO	NO	NO	N/A	I		NO								

ATTACHMENT 9.4

SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS FORM

Table 9.4.2 – Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 1 (SWEL 1)

SWEL#	EQUIPMENT ID	DESCRIPTION	BLDG	ELEV	ROOM	TRAIN	SYSTEM TYPE	CLASS	ENVIRONMENT	ANC	DWG
1-001	01-125MOV-14B	SGT FILTER TRAIN B INLE ISOLATION VALVE	SG	272	1D	B	Containment	8A	I	N	N/A
1-011	02RV-71D	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE B SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	PC	295	4.5R	B	Automatic Depressurization	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-012	02RV-71E	ADS MAIN STEAM LINE C SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE	PC	295	5W	C	Automatic Depressurization	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-032	03AOV-126(HCU-02-19)	HCU INLET SCRAM AIR OPER VALVE	RB	272	5Y		Control Rod Drive Injection	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-033	03AOV-127(HCU-02-19)	HCU OUTLET SCRAM AIR OPER VALVE	RB	272	5Y		Control Rod Drive Injection	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-043	03TK-125(HCU-02-19)	WATER ACCUMULATOR	RB	272	5Y		Control Rod Drive Injection	0	I,T	Y	SEWS.11825-FC-22P
1-044	03TK-128(HCU-02-19)	NITROGEN ACCUMULATOR	RB	272	5Y		Control Rod Drive Injection	0	I,T	Y	SEWS.11825-FC-22P
1-052	09-3	NUCLEAR STATION MAIN CONTROL BOARD	CR	300	10F		Low Pressure Coolant Injection	20	I	Y	1.51-272, DSK-9A, DSK-9B, FE-38AB, Calculation JAF-CALC-MISC-00285
1-053	09-32	CHANNEL "A" RHR/RIC RELAY PANEL	RR	285	9.5F	A	Low Pressure Coolant Injection	20	I	N	N/A
1-056	09-45	AUTO BLOWDOWN RELAY CABINET	RR	285	9.5FG		Automatic Depressurization	20	I	Y	1.83-10 (OUTLINE), FE-38AC, Calculation JAF-CALC-MISC-00285
1-065	10AOV-68A	RHR A LPCI TESTABLE CHECK VALVE	PC	284	5R	A	Low Pressure Coolant Injection	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-069	10E-2A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER A	RB	272	2.5A	A	Suppression Pool Cooling	21	I	Y	4.12-2 (OUTLINE)
1-079	10MOV-12A	RHR HEAT EXCH A OUTLET ISOL VALVE	RB	272	2A	A	Suppression Pool Cooling	8A	I	N	N/A
1-119	10P-1A	RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP A	SP	255	26B	A	Suppression Pool Cooling	6	I,T	Y	2.28-2 (OUTLINE), FP-37A (PIPING), FP-37B (PIPING)
1-123	10P-3A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A	RB	227	3A	A	Low Pressure Coolant Injection	6	I,T	Y	2.11-5 (OUTLINE), FC-20B, FC-20D
1-124	10P-3B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP B	RB	227	3D	B	Low Pressure Coolant Injection	6	I,T	Y	2.11-5 (OUTLINE)
1-137	10S-5A1	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER STRAINER	SP	255	26		Suppression Pool Cooling		I,T	N	N/A
1-155	11EV-14A	SLC A DOUBLE SQUIB ACTIVATED SHEAR EXPLOSIVE VALVE	RB	326	6R	A	Standby liquid Control System	0	I	N	N/A

SWEL#	EQUIPMENT ID	DESCRIPTION	BLDG.	ELEV.	ROOM	TRAIN	SYSTEM TYPE	CLASS	ENVIRONMENT	ANC	DWG
1-157	11P-2A	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL A PUMP	RB	326	6P	A	Standby liquid Control System	5	I	Y	2.16-1 (OUTLINE), FC-25D, 2.16-1B
1-161	11TK-1	STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK	RB	326	6P		Standby liquid Control System	21	I	Y	FC-25D, 3.37-3
1-164	13MOV-15	RCIC STEAM SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE	PC	291	4R	B	Steam Condensing Mode of RHR	8A	I,T	N	N/A
1-165	13MOV-16	RCIC TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY OUTBD ISOL VALVE	RB	24	3R	A	Steam Condensing Mode of RHR	8A	I,T	N	N/A
1-166	13P-1	RCIC PUMP	RB	227.5	3P		Steam Condensing Mode of RHR	5	I,T	Y	11825-FC-20D, 2.12-3
1-169	14MOV-12A	CORE SPRAY LOOP A INBD ISOL VALVE	RB	300	4.5R	A	High Pressure Core Spray System	8A	I	N	N/A
1-171	14P-1A	CORE SPRAY PUMP	RB	226	4	A	High Pressure Core Spray System	5	I	Y	PFSK-2343 SH1, PFSK-2343 SH2
1-172	16-1RTD-131A	TORUS BULK TEMP MONITOR 0 AZIMUTH BAY L X-232 RESIST TEMP DETECTOR EQ	SU	227	4P	A	Suppression Pool Cooling	19	I,T	Y	7.48-13
1-209	23AOV-53	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN TRAP T-3 BYPASS VALVE	RB	227	1T		High Pressure Coolant Injection	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-210	23E-2	HPCI LUBE OIL COOLER	RB	227	1T		High Pressure Coolant Injection	21	I,T	N	2.03-02
1-213	23HOV-1	HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE	RB	227	1T		High Pressure Coolant Injection	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-217	23LT-202A	SUPPRESSION POOL HPCI LOGIC LEVEL XMITTER EQ	RB	227	4.5A	A	High Pressure Coolant Injection	18	I	Y	7.31-19B
1-219	23MOV-14	HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY ISOL VALVE	RB	227	1T		High Pressure Coolant Injection	8A	I,T	N	N/A
1-232	23P-150	HPCI TURBINE AUX LUBE OIL PUMP	RB	227	1T		High Pressure Coolant Injection	5	I,T	Y	FC-20A, FC-20D, 2.03-2
1-234	23P-1M	HPCI MAIN PUMP	RB	227	1T		High Pressure Coolant Injection	5	I,T	Y	FC-20B, FC-20D,
1-243	23TK-1	HPCI LUBE OIL SUMP	RB	227	1T		High Pressure Coolant Injection	21	I,T	Y	2.03-02
1-314	27SOV-131A	CAD TRAIN A NITROGEN MAKE-UP ISOL VALVE SOLENOID VALVE EQ	SU	260	2T	A	Automatic Depressurization	8B	I,T	N	N/A
1-319	27SOV-145	CAD DRYWELL INSTR NITROGEN BACKUP SUPPLY ISOL VALVE	RB	295	3RT	A	Automatic Depressurization	8B	I	N	N/A
1-333	27TK-7A	CAD A LIQUID NITROGEN TANK	CB	271	0.5RP	A	Automatic Depressurization	21	I	Y	FC-22Q, 6.29-25, 6.29-26
1-335	29AC-1A	MST D OUTBD MSIV AIR ACCUMULATOR	ST	272	6.5T	A	Containment	21	I,T	Y	6.35-39
1-336	29AC-1B	MST A INBD MSIV N2/AIR ACCUMULATOR	PC	276	5.5T	B	Containment	21	I,T	Y	SEWS
1-343	29AOV-80A	MST A INBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	PC	276	5.5T	A	Main Steam Line Isolation Valves	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-347	29AOV-86A	MST A OUTBD MAIN STEAM ISOL VALVE	ST	272	6.5T	A	Main Steam Line Isolation Valves	7	I,T	N	N/A
1-360	46MOV-101A	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LOOP A SUPPLY HEADER ISOL VALVE	SP	255	26B	A	Equipment Cooling	8A	I	N	N/A
1-364	46P-2A	EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP A	SP	255	26B	A	Equipment Cooling	6	I	Y	Vendor 71452-D

SWEL1#	EQUIPMENT ID	DESCRIPTION	BLDG.	ELEV.	ROOM	TRAIN	SYSTEM TYPE	CLASS	ENVIRONMENT	ANC	DWG
1-366	46STR-5A1	EMERG SERVICE WATER PUMP A DISCH SOUTH BASKET STRAINER	SP	255	26B	A	Equipment Cooling	0	I	Y	6.60-2
1-367	46STR-5A2	EMERG SERVICE WATER PUMP A DISCH NORTH BASKET STRAINER	SP	255	26B	A	Equipment Cooling	0	I	Y	6.60-2
1-371	66TCV-107E	EAST CRESCENT AREA UC-22E SWS INLET TEMP CONTROL VALVE	RB	242	3A	A	Equipment Cooling	7	I	N	N/A
1-372	66UC-22A	WEST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22A	RB	242	3D	A	Equipment Cooling	10	I	Y	10.00-113
1-373	66UC-22B	EAST CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLER 22B	RB	242	4D	B	Equipment Cooling	10	I	Y	10.00-113
1-406	70FN-4A	CONTROL ROOM VENT EXHAUST FAN A	AD	300	9.5V	A	Control Room Cooling	9	I	Y	SEWS, SFSK-41
1-426	70RWC-2A(CND)	CONTROL ROOM CHILLER A CONDENSER	AD	300	10.5S	A	Control Room Cooling	11	I	Y	FC-32C
1-430	71-10502	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10500)	EG	272	24A1	A	Vital Bus Power	3	I	Y	Vender drawing 0673D0515
1-433	71-10560	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10500)	EG	272	26A1	A	Vital Bus Power	3	I	Y	Vender drawing 0673D0515
1-434	71-10602	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	EG	272	26A1	B	Vital Bus Power	3	I	Y	vender drawing 0673D0516
1-436	71-10614	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	EG	272	26A1	B	Vital Bus Power	3	I	Y	vender drawing 0673D0517
1-437	71-10660	4160V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 10600)	EG	272	26A1	B	Vital Bus Power	3	I	Y	vender drawing 0673D0518
1-438	71-11502	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 11500) BKR 02	RB	300	2R		Vital Bus Power	2	I,T	Y	DSK-71S
1-439	71-11602	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 11600) BKR 02	RB	300	6R	B	Vital Bus Power	2	I	Y	DSK-71S
1-444	71ACB4	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71ACB4 EMERGENCY CONTROL & INST POWER B	EG	272	26A	B	Vital Bus Power	14	I	Y	SEWS
1-445	71ACUPS	RELAY ROOM UNINTERRUPTABLE BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL	RR	284.8	11F		Vital Bus Power	14	I	Y	SEWS
1-446	71BAT-3A	LPCI INVERTER BATTERY	RB	344.6	5.5	A	Vital Bus Power	15	I	Y	SEWS
1-448	71BC-1A	125 VDC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	BR	272	12.5E	A	Vital Bus Power	16	I	Y	SEWS
1-450	71BCB-2A	BATTERY A CONTROL BOARD	BR	272	13C	A	Vital Bus Power	14	I	Y	1.52-11, DSK-71U
1-452	71BMCC-1	RB WEST CRESCENT DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER	RB	242	1R		Vital Bus Power	1	I	Y	FE-38N, 1.43-16
1-456	71BMCC-6	RB DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER	RB	272	8Y		Vital Bus Power	1	I	Y	SEWS
1-457	71DC-A2	DISTRIBUTION PANEL 71DC-A2 DC CONTROL POWER A	RR	284.4	10F	A	Vital Bus Power	14	I	Y	SEWS
1-462	71DSC-11561	L15 UNIT SUBSTATION TRANSF T-13 HIGH SIDE DISC SW	RB	300	2R	A	Vital Bus Power	3	I,T	Y	FE-38P, DSK-71S, 1.42-3
1-470	71INV-3A	LPCI MOV INDEP POWER SUPPLY A INVERTER	RB	344.6	5.5	A	Vital Bus Power	16	I	Y	1.26-2, 1.26-102
1-474	71L25	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 12500)	EB	272	18.5A1		Vital Bus Power	2	I	N	N/A
1-475	71L26	600V SWITCHGEAR DISTRIBUTION (BUS 12600)	EB	272	18.5B		Vital Bus Power	2	I	Y	SEWS

SWEL#	EQUIPMENT ID	DESCRIPTION	BLDG.	ELEV.	ROOM	TRAIN	SYSTEM TYPE	CLASS	ENVIRONMENT	ANC	DWG
1-481	71MCC-161	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 116100)	RB	272	1.5W		Vital Bus Power	1	I	N	N/A
1-487	71MCC-252	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 125200)	EB	272	18A		Vital Bus Power	1	I	N	FE-38F, FE-38G, FA-2A, 1.43-87
1-489	71MCC-254	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 125400)	EG	272	23A1		Vital Bus Power	1	I	N	FE-38AH, FC-38A, 1.43-96
1-491	71MCC-262	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 126200)	EB	272	18B		Vital Bus Power	1	I	Y	FE-38F, FE-38G, FA-2A, 1.43-88
1-493	71MCC-264	600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BUS 126400)	EG	272	25.5A1		Vital Bus Power	1	I	Y	FE-38AH, FC-38A, 1.43-98
1-494	71PT-71ACA2	EMERGENCY DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER 71MCC-253-OD3	CS	272	11C	A	Vital Bus Power	4	I	Y	SEWS
1-495	71PT-71ACA4	EMERGENCY DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER 71MCC-254-A3A	EG	272	24A	A	Vital Bus Power	4	I	Y	SEWS
1-498	71PT-71ACUPS	UNINTERRUPTIBLE BUS 37.5 KVA TRANSFORMER 71MCC-252-OD2	EB	272	14A		Vital Bus Power	4	I	Y	Stone & Webster calculation 12966- S-82-6
1-501	71SB-1	125 VOLT STATION BATTERY A	BR	272	14E	A	Vital Bus Power	15	I	Y	1.20-3, 1.20-8
1-502	71SB-2	125 VOLT STATION BATTERY B	BR	272	12F	B	Vital Bus Power	15	I	Y	1.20-3, 1.20-8
1-508	72AHU-30A	BATTERY ROOM A AIR HANDLING UNIT	BR	272	12E	A	Vital Bus Power	10	I	N	N/A
1-516	72FN-31A	BATTERY ROOM A RECIRC FAN	BR	282	12E	A	Vital Bus Power	9	I	Y	SEWS
1-518	72FN-46A	BATTERY ROOM A EXHAUST FAN	BR	282	12E	A	Vital Bus Power	9	I	Y	1.79-474, SEWS
1-519	72FN-46B	BATTERY ROOM B EXHAUST FAN	BR	282	12F	B	Vital Bus Power	9	I	Y	1.79-474, SEWS
1-522	72HV-7A	ADMIN BUILDING VENTILATION CONTROL PANEL	BR	272	11.5C	A	Control Room Cooling	20	I	Y	1.79-131
1-555	92FN-1A	EMERG DIESEL GEN A VENT SUPPLY FAN	EG	272	24A1	A	Vital Bus Power	9	I	Y	10.00-194
1-577	92RTD-101A	EMERG DIESEL GEN A ROOM SOUTH SIDE RESIST TEMP DETECTOR	EG	300	23A2	A	Vital Bus Power	19	I	N	N/A
1-578	92RTD-101B	EMERG DIESEL GEN B ROOM SOUTH SIDE RESIST TEMP DETECTOR	EG	300	27A2	B	Vital Bus Power	19	I	N	N/A
1-581	93AC-A1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START COMPRESSOR A1	EG	272	24A2	A	Vital Bus Power	12	I	Y	1.12-2
1-582	93AR-A1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A AIR START RECEIVER A1	EG	272	24A2	A	Vital Bus Power	21	I	Y	1.12-43
1-594	93AR-B2	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B AIR START RECEIVER B2	EG	272	26.5	B	Vital Bus Power	21	I	Y	11825-1.12-43B
1-624	93ECP-A	EDG A ENGINE CONTROL PANEL	EG	272	24	A	Vital Bus Power	20	I	Y	1.12-58
1-625	93ECP-B	EDG B ENGINE CONTROL PANEL	EG	272	26A3	B	Vital Bus Power	20	I	Y	1.12-58
1-628	93ECSP-A	EDG A ENGINE CONTROL SUB PANEL	EG	272	24	A	Vital Bus Power	20	I	Y	1.12-125
1-629	93ECSP-B	EDG B ENGINE CONTROL SUB PANEL	EG	272	26A3	B	Vital Bus Power	20	I	Y	1.12-125
1-634	93EDG-C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C	EG	272	24A2	A	Vital Bus Power	17	I	Y	1.12-95

SWEL#	EQUIPMENT ID	DESCRIPTION	BLDG	ELEV	ROOM	TRAIN	SYSTEM TYPE	CLASS	ENVIRONMENT	ANC	DWG
1-635	93EDG-D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D	EG	272	26.5	B	Vital Bus Power	17	I	Y	1.12-95
1-636	93EGP-A	EDG A GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL	EG	272	24A1	A	Vital Bus Power	20	I	N	1.12-97, 1.12-98, SEWS
1-637	93EGP-B	EDG B GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL	EG	272	26A1	B	Vital Bus Power	20	I	Y	1.12-97, 1.12-98, SEWS
1-640	93FPAC	EDG A & C FORCED PARALLELING PANEL	EG	272	24.5A	A	Vital Bus Power	20	I	Y	1.12-58
1-642	93LI-102A	EDG A FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7A LEVEL INDIC	EG	272	23.5A4	A	Vital Bus Power	18	I	N	1.12.59
1-643	93LI-102B	EDG B FUEL OIL DAY TANK 7B LEVEL INDIC	EG	272	26A4	B	Vital Bus Power	18	I	N	1.12.59
1-646	93LOE-1A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A LUBE OIL COOLER	EG	272	24	A	Vital Bus Power	21	I	N	N/A
1-647	93LOE-1B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B LUBE OIL COOLER	EG	272	26A3	B	Vital Bus Power	21	I	N	N/A
1-658	93P1-C1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP C1	EG	272	24A4	A	Vital Bus Power	5	I	Y	1.12-99
1-660	93P1-D1	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP D1	EG	272	26.5A4	B	Vital Bus Power	5	I	Y	FC-38A, 1.12-99
1-662	93P-2A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A CIRCULATING LUBE OIL PUMP	EG	272	24	A	Vital Bus Power	6	I	N	N/A
1-663	93P-2B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B CIRCULATING LUBE OIL PUMP	EG	272	26A3	B	Vital Bus Power	6	I	N	N/A
1-670	93P-4A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A FUEL OIL PUMP	EG	272	24A4	A	Vital Bus Power	5	I	N	1.12-123, 1.12-120
1-671	93P-4B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B FUEL OIL PUMP	EG	272	26.5A4	B	Vital Bus Power	5	I	N	1.12-123, 1.12-120
1-674	93TK-1A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK	EG	272	24A4	A	Vital Bus Power	21	I	N	N/A
1-675	93TK-1B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK	EG	272	26A4	B	Vital Bus Power	21	I	N	N/A
1-682	93TK-7A	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A FUEL OIL DAY TANK	EG	272	24A4	A	Vital Bus Power	21	I	Y	1.12-128, SEWS
1-683	93TK-7B	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B FUEL OIL DAY TANK	EG	272	26.5A4	B	Vital Bus Power	21	I	Y	1.12-128, FC-38A, FC-38B
1-686	93WE-1C	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR C JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	EG	272	24A4	C	Vital Bus Power	21	I	Y	1.12-35, 1.12-101
1-687	93WE-1D	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR D JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	EG	272	26.5A4	D	Vital Bus Power	21	I	N	1.12-35, 1.12-101
1-690	IR-25-01	CORE SPRAY CHANNEL "A" INST RACK	RB	242	4A	A	Low Pressure Coolant Injection	18	I	Y	7.70-81D
1-696	IR-25-62	RHR CHANNEL "B" INST RACK	RB	242	3D	B	Low Pressure Coolant Injection	18	I	Y	7.70-75, 7.70-76, 7.70-81D

ATTACHMENT 9.4

SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS FORM

Table 9.4.3 – Base List 2 (BL 2)

BL2#	EQUIPMENT ID	DESCRIPTION	BLDG.	ELEV.	ROOM	TRAIN	SYSTEM TYPE	CLASS	ENVIRONMENT	N/R
2001	19TK-8A	FUEL POOL COOLING SKIMMER SURGE TANK A	RB	344	4D	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	I	N
2002	19FPC-32	SKIMMER SURGE TANK A COND MAKE-UP CHECK VALVE	RB	369.6	3.5Y	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	00 - Other	I	N
2003	19LS-65	SKIMMER SURGE TANK A HIGH LEVEL SWITCH	RB	344	4D	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	I	N
2004	19LS-67	SKIMMER SURGE TANK A LOW-LOW LEVEL SWITCH	RB	347	4D	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	20 - Instrument and Control Panels	I	N
2005	19FPC-33	SKIMMER SURGE TANKS A & B TO CNDSR HOTWELL ISOL VALVE INLET ISOL	RB	326.9	3R	A&B	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valve	I	N
2006	19AOV-09	SKIMMER SURGE TANKS A & B TO CNDSR HOT WELL ISOL VALVE	RB	326.9	3R	A&B	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valve	I	N
2007	19FPC-01	SKIMMER SURGE TANKS A & B DRAIN VALVE	RB	326	3T	A&B	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 - Pneumatic-Operated Valve	I	N
2008	19P-1A	FUEL POOL COOLING RECIRC PUMP A	RB	326	3T	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	05 - Horizontal Pumps	I	N
2009	19E-1A	FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER A	RB	326	4.5R	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	I	N
2010	71MCC-131-OD1	19P-1A(M) FUEL POOL COOLING RECIRC PUMP A MOTOR	RB	326.9	3P	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	1 - Motor Control Center	I	N
2011	32P-1A	DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SFP WATER PRIMARY PUMP A	RB	326	2.5Y	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	05 - Horizontal Pumps	I	N
2012	32DHR-5	DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CLG WATER RETURN ISOL VALVE	RB	300	1Y	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 - Pneumatic-Operated valve	I	N
2013	71MCC-120-OE1	32P-1A(M) DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SFP WATER PRIMARY PUMP A MOTOR	YD	293	N/A	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	05 - Horizontal Pumps	O	N

ATTACHMENT 9.4

SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS FORM

Table 9.4.5 – Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 2 (SWEL 2)

SWEL2#	EQUIPMENT ID	DESCRIPTION	BLDG.	ELEV.	ROOM	TRAIN	SYSTEM TYPE	CLASS	ENVIRONMENT	N/R	RDD
2-001	19TK-8A	FUEL POOL COOLING SKIMMER SURGE TANK A	RB	344	4D	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	I	N	N/A
2-003	19LS-65	SKIMMER SURGE TANK A HIGH LEVEL SWITCH	RB	344	4D	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	20-Instrument and Control Panels	I	N	N/A
2-004	19LS-67	SKIMMER SURGE TANK A LOW-LOW LEVEL SWITCH	RB	347	4D	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	20-Instrument and Control Panels	I	N	N/A
2-005	19FPC-33	SKIMMER SURGE TANKS A & B TO CNDSR HOTWELL ISOL VALVE INLET ISOL	RB	326.9	3R	A&B	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 – Pneumatic-Operated Valve	I	N	N/A
2-006	19AOV-09	SKIMMER SURGE TANKS A & B TO CNDSR HOT WELL ISOL VALVE	RB	326.9	3R	A&B	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 – Pneumatic-Operated Valve	I	N	N/A
2-007	19FPC-01	SKIMMER SURGE TANKS A & B DRAIN VALVE	RB	326	3T	A&B	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 – Pneumatic-Operated Valve	I	N	N/A
2-008	19P-1A	FUEL POOL COOLING RECIRC PUMP A	RB	326	3T	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	05-Horizontal Pumps	I	N	N/A
2-009	19E-1A	FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER A	RB	326	4.5R	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers	I	N	N/A
2-010	71MCC-131-OD1	19P-1A(M) FUEL POOL COOLING RECIRC PUMP A MOTOR	RB	326.9	3P	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	05- Horizontal Pumps	I	N	N/A
2-012	32DHR-18	DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CLG WATER RETURN ISOL VALVE	RB	300	1Y	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	07 – Pneumatic-Operated Valve	I	N	N/A
2-013	71MCC-120-OE1	32P-1A(M) DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SFP WATER PRIMARY PUMP A MOTOR	YD	293	N/A	A	Fuel Pool Cooling	01-Motor Control Centers	O	N	N/A

ATTACHMENT 9.4

SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS FORM

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Approval

Prepared by: Rick Casella / Rick Casella

Date: 11/1/12

Equipment Selection Personnel

Prepared by: Jeffrey Cooney / Jeffrey Cooney

Date: 11/5/2012

Equipment Selection Personnel

Prepared by: Roger Locy / Roger A. Locy

Date: 11/5/2012

Equipment Selection Personnel

Reviewed by: Al Porch / Al Porch

Date: 11/1/12

Peer Reviewer

PHIL PERAZICH

Concurrence by: Richard Sullivan / R. Sullivan

Date: 11/13/12

Operations Personnel

Attachment C
“Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)”

SWEL #	Equipment ID	Page #
1-001	01-125MOV-14B	6
1-011	02RV-71D	10
1-012	02RV-71E	15
1-032	03AOV-126(HCU-02-19)	19
1-033	03AOV-127(HCU-02-19)	23
1-043	03TK-125(HCU-02-19)	27
1-044	03TK-128(HCU-02-19)	31
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1-053	09-32	40
1-056	09-45	45
1-065	10AOV-68A	50
1-069	10E-2A	54
1-079	10MOV-12A	58
1-119	10P-1A	62
1-123	10P-3A	66
1-124	10P-3B	70
1-137	10S-5A1	74
1-155	11EV-14A	78
1-157	11P-2A	82
1-161	11TK-1	87
1-164	13MOV-15	91
1-165	13MOV-16	96
1-166	13P-1	100
1-169	14MOV-12A	105
1-171	14P-1A	109
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1-209	23AOV-53	119
1-210	23E-2	123

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1-213	23HOV-1	127
1-217	23LT-202A	131
1-219	23MOV-14	135
1-232	23P-150	139
1-234	23P-1M	144
1-243	23TK-1	148
1-314	27SOV-131A	153
1-319	27SOV-145	158
1-333	27TK-7A	162
1-335	29AC-1A	166
1-336	29AC-1B	170
1-343	29AOV-80A	175
1-347	29AOV-86A	180
1-360	46MOV-101A	184
1-364	46P-2A	188
1-366	46STR-5A1	192
1-367	46STR-5A2	196
1-371	66TCV-107E	200
1-372	66UC-22A	204
1-373	66UC-22B	208
1-406	70FN-4A	213
1-426	70RWC-2A(CND)	217
1-430	71-10502	222
1-433	71-10560	227
1-434	71-10602	232
1-436	71-10614	237
1-437	71-10660	241
1-438	71-11502	245

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1-439	71-11602	250
1-444	71ACB4	255
1-445	71ACUPS	260
1-446	71BAT-3A	264
1-448	71BC-1A	268
1-450	71BCB-2A	273
1-452	71BMCC-1	278
1-456	71BMCC-6	283
1-457	71DC-A2	288
1-462	71DSC-11561	292
1-470	71INV-3A	297
1-474	71L25	301
1-475	71L26	305
1-481	71MCC-161	310
1-487	71MCC-252	315
1-489	71MCC-254	319
1-491	71MCC-262	324
1-493	71MCC-264	328
1-494	71PT-71ACA2	332
1-495	71PT-71ACA4	336
1-498	71PT-71ACUPS	341
1-501	71SB-1	345
1-502	71SB-2	350
1-508	72AHU-30A	354
1-516	72FN-31A	358
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SWEL #	Equipment ID	Page #
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1-577	92RTD-101A	382
1-578	92RTD-101B	386
1-581	93AC-A1	390
1-582	93AR-A1	395
1-594	93AR-B2	400
1-624	93ECP-A	404
1-625	93ECP-B	409
1-628	93ECSP-A	413
1-629	93ECSP-B	418
1-634	93EDG-C	422
1-635	93EDG-D	427
1-636	93EGP-A	432
1-637	93EGP-B	437
1-640	93FPAC	442
1-642	93LI-102A	447
1-643	93LI-102B	451
1-646	93LOE-1A	455
1-647	93LOE-1B	460
1-658	93P1-C1	465
1-660	93P1-D1	470
1-662	93P-2A	474
1-663	93P-2B	479
1-670	93P-4A	483
1-671	93P-4B	488
1-674	93TK-1A	492
1-675	93TK-1B	497
1-682	93TK-7A	501

SWEL #	Equipment ID	Page #
1-683	93TK-7B	506
1-686	93WE-1C	510
1-687	93WE-1D	515
1-690	IR-25-01	519
1-696	IR-25-62	523
2-001	19TK-8A	527
2-003	19LS-65	531
2-004	19LS-67	535
2-005	19FPC-33	539
2-006	19AOV-09	543
2-007	19FPC-01	547
2-008	19P-1A	551
2-009	19E-1A	556
2-010	71MCC-131-OD1	561
2-012	32DHR-18	566
2-013	71MCC-120-OE1	570

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-001**Equipment ID No. 01-125MOV-14B Equip. Class¹ 8 – Motor-Operated ValvesEquipment Description SGT Filter Train B Inlet Isolation ValveLocation: Bldg. SG Floor El. 272 Room, Area Col. 1, Line Y

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The item is an inline valve

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-001**Equipment ID No. 01-125MOV-14B Equip. Class 8 – Motor-Operated ValvesEquipment Description SGT Filter Train B Inlet Isolation Valve

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
The soft targets are free from impact.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
Three overhead pipes with unsupported spans of 12'6, which is greater than the suggested span in ANSI B311 Sec 121.1.4. The inline valves and systems are noted below:
39BAS-108: SBGT Filter Train B Breathing Air Manifold
39SAS-20: SBGT Filter Train B Service Air Manifold
46SWS-53G2: RX BLDG 272'EI SGT Room East Service Water
In a seismic event, the pipes are likely to fail, based on engineering judgment and the fact that the connections are soldered. The collapse of copper pipes on the valve (made of steel) will not result in damage to the valve. Hence, this is an industrial safety issue and not an adverse seismic interaction. Site personnel were notified immediately.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The attached lines have adequate flexibility.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-001

Equipment ID No. 01-125MOV-14B Equip. Class 8 - Motor-Operated Valves


Equipment Description SGT Filter Train B Inlet Isolation Valve

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Donald Koberg



Date: 9/25/12

Pouria Pourghobadi



9/25/12

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-001


Equipment ID No. 01-125MOV-14B Equip. Class 8 – Motor-Operated Valves

Equipment Description SGT Filter Train B Inlet Isolation Valve

Photographs



Note: 01-125MOV-14B Valve



Note: Unsupported Pipe Spans

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-011**Equipment ID No. 02RV-71D Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valvesEquipment Description ADS main steam line b safety/relief valveLocation: Bldg. PC Floor El. 295 Room, Area Drywell, Azimuth 0°, Col. 4.5 Line R

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-011**Equipment ID No. 02RV-71D Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valvesEquipment Description ADS main steam line b safety/relief valve

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
 N/A

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-011

Equipment ID No. 02RV-71D Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valves

Equipment Description ADS main steam line b safety/relief valve

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

02TE-113D valve temp element off SRV discharge elbow is loose at threaded nipple. CR-JAF-2012-06495 initiated. This deficiency does not result in any adverse seismic interaction.

Evaluated by: *Rick Casella* Date: 9-28-12

A.C. Danche
Alan Porch 9-28-12

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-011

Equipment ID No. 02RV-71D Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valves

Equipment Description ADS main steam line b safety/relief valve

Photographs



Note: 02RV-71D looking toward Biological Shield Wall



Note: 02RV-71D

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 5 of 5

Status: Y N U


Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL 1-011

Equipment ID No. 02RV-71D Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valves

Equipment Description ADS main steam line b safety/relief valve



Note: Loose temperature element at threaded nipple to branch connection on SRV tailpipe elbow.



Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-012**Equipment ID No. 02RV-71E Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valvesEquipment Description ADS main steam line c safety relief valveLocation: Bldg. PC Floor El. 295 Room, Area Drywell, Azimuth 138°, Col 5 Line W

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-012**Equipment ID No. 02RV-71E Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valvesEquipment Description ADS main steam line c safety relief valve

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) Y N U N/A
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
N/A Y N U

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-012

Equipment ID No. 02RV-71E Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valves

Equipment Description ADS main steam line c safety relief valve

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: Rick Casella

Rick Casella

Date: 9-28-12

Alan Porch

A. C. Porch

9-28-12

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-012

Equipment ID No. 02RV-71E Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valves

Equipment Description ADS main steam line c safety relief valve

Photographs



Note: 02RV-71E, 3-Stage SRV



Note: 02RV-71E, 3-Stage SRV

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-032Equipment ID No. 03AOV-126 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class¹ 07-Pneumatic Operated ValveEquipment Description HCU Inlet Scram Air Operated ValveLocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 272' Room, Area RB East, Col. 5, Line Y

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The evaluated item in this SWC is not part of the 50% of the SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
Bottom of valve is anchored by an angle plate, attached to a skid which supports multiple tanks and other AOV components in the area.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
The equipment is anchored to a steel skid.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-032**Equipment ID No. 03AOV-126 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 07-Pneumatic Operated ValveEquipment Description HCU Inlet Scram Air Operated Valve

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Item is not one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
Based on the above anchorage evaluations, the anchorage is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
There are no soft targets on the equipment.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are not likely to collapse onto the equipment.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The lines attached to the SWEL item have adequate flexibility to avoid damage.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, the equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-032

Equipment ID No. 03AOV-126 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 07-Pneumatic Operated Valve

Equipment Description HCU Inlet Scram Air Operated Valve

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

No other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area were found.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

No additional comments.

Evaluated by: Harpreet Ghuman 

Date: 09/23/2012

Yaroslav Losev 

09/23/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-032

Equipment ID No. 03AOV-126 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 07-Pneumatic Operated Valve

Equipment Description HCU Inlet Scram Air Operated Valve

Photographs



Note: *Picture of equipment 03AOV-126. Valve 03AOV-126 is on the left.*

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-033Equipment ID No. 03AOV-127 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class¹ 07-Pneumatic Operated ValveEquipment Description HCU Outlet Scram Air Operated ValveLocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 272' Room, Area RB East, Col. 5, Line Y

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The evaluated item in this SWC is not part of the 50% of the SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-033**Equipment ID No. 03AOV-127 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 07-Pneumatic Operated ValveEquipment Description HCU Outlet Scram Air Operated Valve

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage. Y N U N/A
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage. Y N U

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
There are no soft targets on the equipment. Y N U N/A
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
The overhead equipment, distribution systems; ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are not likely to collapse onto the equipment. Y N U N/A
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
The lines attached to the SWEL item have adequate flexibility to avoid damage. Y N U N/A
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, the equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects. Y N U

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-033

Equipment ID No. 03AOV-127 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 07-Pneumatic Operated Valve

Equipment Description HCU Outlet Scram Air Operated Valve


Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

No other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area were found.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

No additional comments.

Evaluated by: Harpreet Ghuman 

Date: 09/23/2012

Yaroslav Losev 

09/23/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-033

Equipment ID No. 03AOV-127 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 07-Pneumatic Operated Valve

Equipment Description HCU Outlet Scram Air Operated Valve

Photographs



Note: Picture of equipment 03AOV-127(HCU-02-19). 03AOV-127(HCU-02-19) is the valve on the right.

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-043Equipment ID No. 03TK-125 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class¹ 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.Equipment Description Water AccumulatorLocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 272' Room, Area RB East, Col. 5, Line Y

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The item is one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The four (4), 1/2" shell anchors are free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of visible cracks in the concrete.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-043**Equipment ID No. 03TK-125 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.Equipment Description Water Accumulator

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
The 03TK-125 (HCU-02-19) is mounted to the same steel skid as 03TK-128 (HCU-02-19). The configuration of the four (4), 1/2" anchors attaching the skid to the embedded steel frame is in accordance with the SEWS for equipment 03TK-125 (HCU-02-19), Rev. 0 and Drawing 11825-FC-22P, Rev. 2.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
Based on the above anchorage evaluations, the anchorage is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
The soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are not likely to collapse onto the equipment.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The lines attached to the SWEL item have adequate flexibility to avoid damage.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, the equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-043

Equipment ID No. 03TK-125 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.

Equipment Description Water Accumulator


Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

No other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area were found.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

No additional comments.

Evaluated by: Harpreet Ghuman 

Date: 09/23/2012

Yaroslav Losev 

09/23/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-043

Equipment ID No. 03TK-125 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.

Equipment Description Water Accumulator

Photographs



Note: Picture of equipment 03TK-125(HCU-02-19). 03TK-125(HCU-02-19) is on the left.

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-044**Equipment ID No. 03TK-128 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class¹ 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.Equipment Description Nitrogen AccumulatorLocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 272' Room, Area RB East, Col. 5, Line Y

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The item is one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The four (4) 1/2" shell anchors are free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of visible cracks in the concrete.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-044**Equipment ID No. 03TK-128 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.Equipment Description Nitrogen Accumulator

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
The 03TK-128(HCU-02-19) is mounted to the same steel skid as 03TK-125(HCU-02-19). The configuration of the four (4), 1/2" anchors attaching the skid to the embedded steel frame is in accordance with the SEWS for equipment 03TK-125(HCU-02-19), Rev. 0 and Drawing 11825-FC-22P, Rev. 2.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
Based on the above anchorage evaluations, the anchorage is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
The soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are not likely to collapse onto the equipment.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The lines attached to the SWEL item have adequate flexibility to avoid damage.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, the equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-044

Equipment ID No. 03TK-128 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.

Equipment Description Nitrogen Accumulator


Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U


No other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area were found.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

No additional comments.

Evaluated by: Harpreet Ghuman 

Date: 09/23/2012

Yaroslav Losev 

09/23/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-044

Equipment ID No. 03TK-128 (HCU-02-19) Equip. Class 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers.

Equipment Description Nitrogen Accumulator

Photographs



Note: Picture of equipment 03TK-128(HCU-02-19). 03TK-128(HCU-02-19) is on the left.

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-052**Equipment ID No. 09-3 Equip. Class¹ 20-Instruments and control panelsEquipment Description Nuclear Station Main Control BoardLocation: Bldg. CR Floor El. 300 Room, Area Col 10

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
No visible corrosion, Limited visibility.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
No visible cracks. Limited visibility.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-052**Equipment ID No. 09-3 Equip. Class 20-Instruments and control panelsEquipment Description Nuclear Station Main Control Board

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Reviewed SEWS for 09-3. Limited view inside the cabinet. Cannot verify anchorage configuration.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
 N/A

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
Latticed ceiling panels above 09-3 are tie-wrapped, but it was determined not to be an adverse seismic condition.
Lighting is above the ceiling panels.
76ELB-CR-300T mounted securely to column F10, adjacent to panel.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-052

Equipment ID No. 09-3 Equip. Class 20-Instruments and control panels

Equipment Description Nuclear Station Main Control Board

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

The back cover of the panel was removed but due to limited visibility, verification of the anchorage was not possible. Visible plug welds appeared satisfactory.

Evaluated by: Rich Casella Date: 11/01/2012

A. Porch 11/01/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 5


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-052


Equipment ID No. 09-3 Equip. Class 20-Instruments and control panels

Equipment Description Nuclear Station Main Control Board

Photographs



Note: Inside 09-3



Note: Inside 09-3

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 5 of 5

Status: Y N U


Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-052

Equipment ID No. 09-3 Equip. Class 20-Instruments and control panels

Equipment Description Nuclear Station Main Control Board



Note: 09-3



Note: 09-3

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-053**Equipment ID No. 09-32 Equip. Class¹ 20 – Instrumentation and Control PanelsEquipment Description Channel "A" RHR/RCIC Relay PanelLocation: Bldg. RR Floor El. 284.8 Room, Area Col. 9.5, Line F

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The anchorage is free of bent, broken and loose hardware.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
The anchorage is free of corrosion which is more than mild surface corrosion.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-053**Equipment ID No. 09-32 Equip. Class 20 – Instrumentation and Control PanelsEquipment Description Channel "A" RHR/RCIC Relay Panel

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
The anchorage configuration is consistent with SWES for 09-32 (Rev. 0). The panels are bolted together and plug welded to embedded steel. 09-32 is anchored to embedded steel with six 3/4" diameter plug welds to embedded steel – 3 in the front and 3 in the back.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
The soft targets are free from impact from nearby equipments.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipments are adequately supported.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The attached lines have adequate flexibility.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
The equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-053

Equipment ID No. 09-32 Equip. Class 20 – Instrumentation and Control Panels

Equipment Description Channel "A" RHR/RCIC Relay Panel

Other Adverse Conditions

- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Donald Koberg



Date: 9/24/12

Pouria Pourghobadi



9/24/12

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-053


Equipment ID No. 09-32 Equip. Class 20 – Instrumentation and Control Panels

Equipment Description Channel "A" RHR/RCIC Relay Panel

Photographs



Note: Cabinet 09-32



Note: Cabinet Front Plug Weld

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM


Sheet 5 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-053

Equipment ID No. 09-32 Equip. Class 20 – Instrumentation and Control Panels

Equipment Description Channel "A" RHR/RCIC Relay Panel



Note: *Spot Welds In The Back Of The Panel.*

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-056**Equipment ID No. 09-45 Equip. Class¹ 20 – Instrumentation and Control PanelsEquipment Description Auto Blowdown Relay CabinetLocation: Bldg. RR Floor El. 284.8 Room, Area Col. 9.5, Line FG

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 5

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-056**Equipment ID No. 09-45 Equip. Class 20 – Instrumentation and Control PanelsEquipment Description Auto Blowdown Relay Cabinet

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
The anchorage configuration is consistent with SWES for 09-45 (Rev. 0) and DWG. No. 1.83-10. The panels are bolted together and plug welded to embedded steel. 09-41, 45, 46, which are a total of 84" wide, are anchored by 7 plug welds – three in the front and four in the back.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
The soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipments and structures.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipments and distribution systems are not likely to collapse onto the document.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The attached lines have adequate flexibility.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
The equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-056

Equipment ID No. 09-45 Equip. Class 20 - Instrumentation and Control Panels

Equipment Description Auto Blowdown Relay Cabinet

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Donald Koberg



Date: 9/24/12

Pouria Pourghobadi



9/24/12

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-056

Equipment ID No. 09-45 Equip. Class 20 – Instrumentation and Control Panels

Equipment Description Auto Blowdown Relay Cabinet

Photographs



Note: Cabinet 09-45



Note: Cabinet Plug Weld

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM


Sheet 5 of 5

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-056

Equipment ID No. 09-45 Equip. Class 20 – Instrumentation and Control Panels

Equipment Description Auto Blowdown Relay Cabinet



Note: Cabinet Plug Weld

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-065Equipment ID No. 10AOV-68A Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valvesEquipment Description RHR A LPCI testable check valveLocation: Bldg. PC Floor El. 279 Room, Area Drywell, Azimuth 0° Col 5 Line R

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
The item is an inline valve.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-065**Equipment ID No. 10AOV-68A Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valvesEquipment Description RHR A LPCI testable check valve

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
The component is an inline valve.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-065

Equipment ID No. 10AOV-68A Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valves

Equipment Description RHR A LPCI testable check valve

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: *Rick Casella* Date: 9-28-12

A.C. Dorch 9-28-12
Alan Porch

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


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Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-065


Equipment ID No. 10AOV-68A Equip. Class Pneumatic-operated valves

Equipment Description RHR A LPCI testable check valve

Photographs



Note: 10AOV-68A (The date provided on the bottom right corner is not correct the date that the picture was taken. Malfunction with camera setting)



Note: 10AOV-68A (The date provided on the bottom right corner is not correct the date that the picture was taken. Malfunction with camera setting)

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-069**Equipment ID No. 10E-2A Equip. Class¹ 21-Tanks and Heat ExchangersEquipment Description RHR System Heat Exchanger ALocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 272' Room, Area RB RHR Heat Exchange Rm, Col. 2.5, Line A

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The item is one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The twelve (12), 2" diameter anchors are free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
The equipment is anchored to structural steel members.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-069Equipment ID No. 10E-2A Equip. Class 21-Tanks and Heat ExchangersEquipment Description RHR System Heat Exchanger A

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
The 10E-2A is supported on a steel ring. It was verified that there are (12), 2" anchors attaching the heat exchanger to the steel ring as stated in the SEWS for equipment 10E-2A, Rev. 0. Y N U N/A
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Based on the above anchorage evaluations, the anchorage is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions. Y N U

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
There are no soft targets on the equipment. Y N U N/A
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
The overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are not likely to collapse onto the equipment. Y N U N/A
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
The lines attached to the SWEL item have adequate flexibility to avoid damage. Y N U N/A
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, the equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects. Y N U

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-069

Equipment ID No. 10E-2A Equip. Class 21-Tanks and Heat Exchangers

Equipment Description RHR System Heat Exchanger A


Other Adverse Conditions


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

No other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area were found.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

No additional comments.

Evaluated by: Harpreet Ghuman  Date: 09/26/2012

Yaroslav Losev  09/26/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-069

Equipment ID No. 10E-2A Equip. Class 21-Tanks and Heat Exchangers

Equipment Description RHR System Heat Exchanger A

Photographs



Note: *Picture of equipment 10E-2A.*

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-079**Equipment ID No. 10MOV-12A Equip. Class: 08-Motor Operated ValvesEquipment Description RHR Heat Exch. A Outlet Isol ValveLocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 272' Room, Area RB RHR Heat Exchange Rm, Col. 2, Line A

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The evaluated item in this SWC is not part of the 50% of the SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-079**Equipment ID No. 10MOV-12A Equip. Class 08-Motor Operated ValvesEquipment Description RHR Heat Exch. A Outlet Isol Valve

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
Inline SWEL item, which does not contain anchorage.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
There are no soft targets on the equipment.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are not likely to collapse onto the equipment.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The lines attached to the SWEL item have adequate flexibility to avoid damage.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, the equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-079

Equipment ID No. 10MOV-12A Equip. Class 08-Motor Operated Valves

Equipment Description RHR Heat Exch. A Outlet Isol Valve


Other Adverse Conditions


11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

No other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area were found.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

No additional comments.

Evaluated by: Harpreet Ghuman  Date: 09/26/2012

Yaroslav Losev  09/26/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-079

Equipment ID No. 10MOV-12A Equip. Class 08-Motor Operated Valves

Equipment Description RHR Heat Exch. A Outlet Isol Valve

Photographs



Note: *Picture of equipment 10MOV-12A.*

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-119**Equipment ID No. 10P-1A Equip. Class¹ 06-Vertical PumpEquipment Description RHR Service Water Pump ALocation: Bldg. SP Floor El. 255' Room, Area Pump Room Train A, Col. 26, Row B

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The item is one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The four (4) 1" CIP bolts are free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
There are no visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-119**Equipment ID No. 10P-1A Equip. Class 06-Vertical PumpEquipment Description RHR Service Water Pump A

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
The anchorage configuration for the 1" CIP headed bolts is consistent with the SEWS documentation for equipment 10P-1A, Rev 0.
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
Based on the above anchorage evaluations, the anchorage is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
There are no soft targets on the equipment.
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are not likely to collapse onto the equipment.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The lines attached to the SWEL item have adequate flexibility to avoid damage.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, the equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-119

Equipment ID No. 10P-1A Equip. Class 06-Vertical Pump

Equipment Description RHR Service Water Pump A


Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

No other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area were found.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

No additional comments.

Evaluated by: Harpreet Ghuman  Date: 09/21/2012

Yaroslav Losev  09/21/2012

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-119

Equipment ID No. 10P-1A Equip. Class 06-Vertical Pump

Equipment Description RHR Service Water Pump A

Photographs



Note: *Picture of equipment 10P-1A.*

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-123Equipment ID No. 10P-3A Equip. Class¹ 6 – Vertical PumpsEquipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump ALocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 227.6 Room, Area Col. 3, Line A

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
Anchorage is free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-123**Equipment ID No. 10P-3A Equip. Class 6 – Vertical PumpsEquipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump A

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

The anchorage configuration is consistent with File No. 2.11-5 and the SWES for 10P-3A (Rev. 0). The pump is anchored with sixteen 1.75" CIP bolts.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
There are no soft targets on this item.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipments and distribution systems are not likely to collapse onto the equipment.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The attached lines have adequate flexibility.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
The equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic adverse interaction.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-123

Equipment ID No. 10P-3A Equip. Class 6 - Vertical Pumps

Equipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump A

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Donald Koberg



Date: 9/24/12

Pouria Pourghobadi



9/24/12

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4


Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-123

Equipment ID No. 10P-3A Equip. Class 6 – Vertical Pumps

Equipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump A

Photographs



Note: Pump 10P-3A

Note:

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 1 of 4

Status: Y N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-124Equipment ID No. 10P-3B Equip. Class¹ 6 – Vertical PumpsEquipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump BLocation: Bldg. RB Floor El. 227 Room, Area Col 3, Line D

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) _____

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Y N
The anchorage configuration verification is required.
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y N U N/A
The anchorage is free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? Y N U N/A
The anchorage is free of any corrosion.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y N U N/A
The anchorage is free of any visible cracks in the concrete.

¹ Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

ATTACHMENT 9.6**SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM**

Sheet 2 of 4

Status: Y N U **Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-124**Equipment ID No. 10P-3B Equip. Class 6 – Vertical PumpsEquipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump B

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y N U N/A
 (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
The anchorage configuration is consistent with SEWS for 10P-3B which is identical to 10P-3A and DWG. No. 2.11-5
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions? Y N U
The anchorage is free of potentially adverse seismic condition.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y N U N/A
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Y N U N/A
The overhead equipment and distribution system are not likely to collapse onto the equipment.
9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y N U N/A
The attached line have adequate flexibility.
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects? Y N U
The equipment is free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 3 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-124

Equipment ID No. 10P-3B Equip. Class 6 – Vertical Pumps

Equipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump B

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment? Y N U

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Donald Koberg



Date: 9/23/12

Pouria Pourghobadi



9/23/12

ATTACHMENT 9.6

SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST FORM

Sheet 4 of 4

Status: Y N U

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) SWEL1-124

Equipment ID No. 10P-3B Equip. Class 6 – Vertical Pumps

Equipment Description Residual Heat Removal Pump B

Photographs



Note: 10P-3B Residual Heat Removal Pump

Note: